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In this introduction, I explain how, during f ive years of studying history in 
the Netherlands in the mid-1980s, it puzzled me that we never studied the 
decolonization of the Dutch East Indies. The subject was reported in the 
news, but indifference seemed to dominate within the university. This has 
led me to the question, How has the decolonization of the former Dutch 
East Indies during the period from 1945 to 1949 been represented in Dutch 
culture? My aim is to map out the process by which a collective memory 
of the war of decolonization was constructed among the Dutch during the 
50 years after the declaration of independence in Indonesia (1945-1995). 
Using a variety of theoretical frames, I apply new readings to memories of 
decolonization that have been mediated in literature, memoirs, historical 
works, journalism, radio and television documentaries and f ilm. This will 
reveal the means by which decolonization came to be (un)remembered.
Keywords: decolonization, Dutch East Indies, collective memory, 
unremembering
If truth be told, I was born twice. The f irst time, when my mother gave 
birth to me on a February night in late 1950s Ireland. The second, when 
I disembarked from a ship in mainland Europe, aged eighteen. Crooked 
roads eventually led me to the Netherlands in the late 1970s. It seemed to 
me then that all Dutch people were welcoming and warm and I delighted 
in their open and liberal culture. I felt more at home in the Netherlands 
than I had ever felt before.
In the early 1980s, I started my university studies. From the inspiring 
lectures of Professor M.A. Wes on Greek and Roman antiquity, to intriguing 
seminars on the philosophy of history from Frank Ankersmit, I received an 
outstanding education during f ive years at the University of Groningen, for 
which I will always be grateful. I made friendships then that have lasted 
a lifetime.
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Most, if not all of my friends, were progressive thinkers and activists. 
We protested against government tyranny; we occupied the Ministry of 
Education as well as the university headquarters; we went from house to 
house collecting signatures against the placing of American cruise missiles 
on Dutch soil. Conversations often revolved around the liberation move-
ments in El Salvador and Nicaragua. Sometimes, but rarely, the conversation 
touched upon Dutch colonial history. “Ah, Indonesia, we did terrible things 
there.” Yes, but what things exactly? No one seemed to know the details. 
Even more surprising, no one seemed to care or wished to f ind out. Likewise, 
Dutch overseas history was touched upon during my studies, but without 
much depth.
This was even more surprising, given that Dutch colonial history was 
seldom out of the news. Indonesia, the former Dutch East Indies, had gained 
independence from the Dutch, but only after a war of liberation – or, as it 
was euphemistically known among the Dutch, “police actions” – that had 
lasted from 1945 to 1949. During my study in the mid-1980s, controversies 
regarding the war of decolonization regularly appeared in the newspapers. 
Yet my friends, most of them budding historians, seemed uninterested. I was 
baffled by the stories in the newspapers. When I asked my friends, all I heard 
was the refrain: “We did terrible things,” followed by something like, “Those 
bloody veterans.” I got the distinct impression that the military veterans or 
“Old Warriors” as they are called in Dutch, were a most unpleasant group 
of people, varying from disgruntled archconservatives to narrow-minded 
right-wing thugs. No doubt, the sort of people who opposed the Sandinistas 
in Nicaragua and supported the importation of cruise missiles into Europe. 
Years later, I realized some veterans had risked their lives f ighting fascism 
during the German occupation of the Netherlands (1940-1945). Most had 
been between 19 and 21 years old and had been drafted into a new army 
and shipped to Indonesia to f ight a counterinsurgency war that the Dutch 
public supported. Some were my friends’ dads or granddads.
Clearly, this was an episode in recent Dutch history that most people 
seemed to want to ignore, even future historians. What explained the indif-
ference of my friends? What explained why this war, involving the largest 
mobilization of military manpower in all of Dutch history, could be ignored 
during my lessons at university? What explained the discrepancy between its 
frenzied appearance, disappearance and reappearance in public media, and 
it being rarely mentioned in academia? These questions remained with me.
Eventually I moved away from my adopted homeland. Despite the passing 
of time, and from a distance, I noted that the Indonesian War of Independ-
ence remained a wound in Dutch public life that wouldn’t go away. With 
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some frequency, at certain points in time, the experience of 1945-1949 would 
be re-remembered, only to be unremembered again, like the sediment that 
arises when a bottle of liquid gets shaken and floats near the surface briefly, 
until gravity forces it silently to the bottom of the stilled liquid. There the 
sediment remains, almost out of sight, until memory stirs it again.
The question that I attempt to answer in this book is, How has the 
decolonization of the former Dutch East Indies during the period from 
1945 to 1949 been represented in Dutch culture? The focus is on the 50 
years between the Indonesian declaration of independence in August 1945 
and the anniversary of that declaration in 1995. The emphasis is on the 
public discourse regarding decolonization, conducted partly by means 
of academic historiography, but also in popular culture by means of, for 
instance, literature and f ilm. It is in these mediated representations that 
we see collective memory being shaped and contested. My aim is to map 
out the process by which a collective memory of the war of decolonization 
was constructed among the Dutch and uncover the various representations 
that led to this collective memory being contested. Perhaps, in doing so, I 
will reveal the reasons for the indifference of my friends that puzzled me 
all those years ago.
A word on methodology. An attempt to map out 50 years of constructing 
representations of decolonization inevitably involves making a selection 
of sources. Some sources that I have selected for analysis will surprise no 
one familiar with the topic. Haasse’s novella Oeroeg and Hylkema’s f ilm of 
the same name, Hueting’s interview televised on the programme Achter 
het Nieuws and the subsequent parliamentary inquiry report, the historical 
works of De Kadt and Loe de Jong – these are obvious choices. However, 
others may seem less obvious. I decided to include works from some of 
the giants within the canon of Indische literature, works that had, at f irst 
sight, little or anything to say about the process of decolonization. However, 
these authors, such as Dermoût, Robinson and Nieuwenhuys, had a huge 
influence, especially within the Indische community, in shaping collective 
memory. Hence, I set myself the task of applying a rereading of their works 
in order to discover if this would uncover some aspect of the process of 
(un)remembering decolonization. I selected a number of non-f ictional 
and f ictional works by Dutch military veterans. Until very recently, these 
have been all but ignored by scholars. For instance, no scholar before me 
has ever written a word about the writings of Ben Laurens. Yet in the 1980s, 
his work was popular among his fellow veterans, reinforcing the collective 
memory of a group that felt much maligned. I included a selection of works 
from former colonial off icials or government authorities in order to gain 
14 COLLEC TIVE MEMORY AND THE DUTCH EAST INDIES
another perspective. My selection of radio and television shows from the 
1970s, 1980s and 1990s is not exhaustive, but I hope that it is representative 
of what was broadcast during these decades. When considering the vertical 
transmission of memory from one generation to the next, I selected for 
analysis the postmemory novelists of the f irst hour, who all published 
their f irst works in 1983. In order to gain a flavour of how representations 
of decolonization were received, I researched press coverage of the topic 
and included a range of national and local newspapers and magazines.
One could say, in a general sense, that I apply a postcolonial reading to 
my sources. I hope that I have approached every text with a certain humility 
and openness, allowing the text to speak. (I use “text” in the loosest sense, 
to refer to written works of f iction and non-f iction as well as photographs, 
f ilm, and radio and television documentaries.) Nevertheless, I believe 
that in a post-Saidian world, any innocent reading of colonial literature 
demonstrates bad faith. However, I have not felt strictly bound to any one 
reading method. As already mentioned, this is an interdisciplinary work and 
I have freely borrowed concepts and approaches from leading scholars in 
literary studies, f ilm theory, philosophy, and sociology. These have helped 
me frame my analysis of texts. As a cultural historian, I feel like cultural 
anthropologists are my f irst cousins. Hence the ideas of Auge, Connerton, 
Van Gennep and Turner have been helpful in framing some of my readings. 
I am indebted to the late Haitian anthropologist Michel-Rolph Trouillot’s 
gem of a book, Silencing the Past: Power and the Production of History. This 
eclectic approach of mine may seem jarring to some scholars, but I am glad 
that Derrida would approve: “The laws of reading are determined by the 
particular text that is being read. […] [O]ne cannot prescribe one general 
method of reading.”1
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1 Collective Memory and 
Unremembering
Abstract
Maurice Halbwachs demonstrated that memory is shaped by social forces. 
I argue that collective memory is mediated in symbolic representations. 
National collective memory is unstable and open to revision and is a site 
for dispute between alternative representations. Changes in media lead 
to changes in collective memory. The trauma within collective memory 
is passed down through generations. I argue that collective memory 
is not a process of remembering and forgetting, but remembering and 
unremembering. Unremembering is a process of concealment. Literature 
is signif icant in shaping collective memory, but so too are f ilm, memoir, 
public media like newspapers and television, as well as works of historical 
scholarship. I end this chapter with a factual summary of the Indonesian 
War of Independence.
Keywords: collective memory, unremembering, representation, media, 
Maurice Halbwachs, Indonesian War of Independence
Collective Memory
This study owes a debt to, among others, the French sociologist Maurice 
Halbwachs. In his seminal work on collective memory, Halbwachs argued 
that memories are shaped by social frames of references. Astonished that 
psychologists deal with memory as if it emanates from inside isolated indi-
viduals, he argued, “it is in society that they recall, recognize and localize 
their memories.”1 Personal memories are shaped by the group, but the group 
too possesses sets of memories of which a member partakes. Collective 
memory, Halbwachs argued, “requires the support of a group delimited in 
1 Halbwachs, On Collective, 38.
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space and time. […] [T]he collective memory endures and draws strength 
from its base in a coherent body of peoples.”2 Halbwachs suggested that 
the group’s memory is manifested in individual memories. However, the 
individual who remembers does so as a group member.3 During the past 
couple of decades there has been a boom in collective memory studies. 
Within the social sciences, as well as among literary scholars and historians, 
many have mined the rich seam revealed by Halbwachs. This work attempts 
to make a modest contribution to these studies.
Although the word “memory” is a noun, to believe that memory is a thing 
is to succumb to a form of linguistic bewitchment. “Memory” is shorthand for 
the process of and result of remembering. Collective memory is the process 
or result of individual members of a group remembering. Consequently, col-
lective memory contains no essence, no immutable status or transcendental 
being. It does not exist in some ethereal sphere waiting to be discovered. 
Instead, it is a mediated memory that, as Jan Assman suggests, is “stored 
away in symbolic form.”4
Paul Ricoeur applied Freud’s concepts of mourning and working through 
loss in order to understand the formation of collective memory.5 This 
work of mourning takes time. The loved object (for instance, the Dutch 
East Indies) no longer exists but this fact arouses opposition in which 
the existence of the lost object is psychically prolonged. This period is 
characterized by a sense of grief, which Ricoeur defines as “that sadness that 
has not yet completed the work of mourning.” However, after the painful 
period of mourning, with its compulsion to repeat, in a healthy subject the 
period of working through can commence and a reality-tested recollection 
occurs. In Ricoeur’s words, survivors of loss “undergo the ordeal of the 
diff icult work of remembering.” Ricoeur argues that repetition-memory 
“resists criticism” while recollection memory, which follows the period of 
mourning and has as its aim the search for the truth, “is fundamentally 
a critical memory.”6
Collective memory is unstable, fragile and frequently a source of conten-
tion. Ricoeur writes that when “national self-love” is at risk, there will be 
a lack of self-criticism.7 This, as we will see, was partially the case in the 
Netherlands, when it came to remembering the violent decolonization of 
2 Ibid., 84.
3 Ibid., 40-48.
4 Assmann, “Communicative and Cultural Memory,” 110-111.
5 Ricoeur, Memory, 69-80.
6 Ibid., 77.
7 Ibid., 79.
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the Dutch East Indies. The national collective memory is open to assault. 
Groups or sub-groups within the nation that hold counter-memories may 
attempt to contest the accepted narrative or try to force themselves into the 
national discourse. Within the nation, the orderliness and seeming unity 
implied by the term “collective memory” becomes a site of dispute when 
alternative representations surface and gain a following. In the Dutch nation 
after decolonization, collective memory became a site of contestation among 
specif ic sub-groups – military veterans, repatriated colonial minorities and 
professional historians.
Jeffrey Olick argues that remembering consists of a variety of practises and 
he notes three ways in which collective remembering changes.8 Firstly, an 
instrumental approach, when an image of the past is changed or maintained 
because of the deliberate efforts of social actors. Secondly, coherence – when 
images of the past change due to how well they f it into a culture that is itself 
changing or remaining the same. Thirdly, images of the past change due 
to changes in the media or institutions that encode the images. To borrow 
Astrid Erll’s phrase: “the medium is the memory.”9
Edward Said has written that “history cannot be swept clean like 
a blackboard.”10 Although we like to think of ourselves as free agents, 
individuals are bound by a horizon that is greatly determined by ele-
ments from the past. We are born into society and thrown into an ocean 
of memories. Our identity is forged within a family, nation state, class, 
language and gender, none of which we have chosen. We are initiated into 
the memories of our social group as soon as we start learning language. 
Before we are conscious of it, mediated representations of the past abound, 
helping to form our identity within various collectives or groups – from 
the family to the nation state. As Marianne Hirsch argues, memories of 
traumatic experiences of one generation can cast a long shadow over 
the inherited memories of the next generation, leading to the working 
through of postmemories of events not directly experienced.11 Thus, as 
we shall see, the scars and trauma of Dutch citizens who experienced the 
Indonesian War of Independence f irst-hand were sometimes passed on to 
a postmemory generation who inherited a loss of which they themselves 
had had no direct experience.
8 Olick, Politics of Regret, 10.
9 Erll, Memory, 115.
10 Said, Orientalism, xiii.
11 Hirsch, The Generation, 9.
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Collective Unremembering
One cannot discuss memory without looking at the reverse – forgetting. 
Jan Assmann makes the point that forgetting contributes to forming a 
collective identity.12 Benedict Anderson argued that collective remembering 
always includes collective forgetting, what he calls “remember/forget.”13 
Erll claims that “forgetting is the rule and remembering the exception.”14 
Aleida Assmann and Paul Connerton both suggest that there are distinct 
social forms of forgetting.15
However, people speak too lightly about how memory comes to be 
erased in society, as if there is no middle ground between remembering 
and forgetting. As long as society has surviving individuals who experienced 
a traumatic event, the event is not forgotten. Survivors may remain silent, 
and the society itself seemingly ignores the memory of the event, yet the 
survivors bear the memory in their scars and gestures, their silences and 
inarticulate utterances. Indeed the silence is a mark of the presence of 
traumatic memory and such silences are traces of the event, not quite 
forgotten. Even when the survivors are all deceased, their experiences 
that have been hidden or occluded continue to live on among the next 
generation who have witnessed the scars, silences and pain of the f irst 
generation. Thus, memory may remain unrepresented or partially hidden, 
but not erased, not forgotten.
Like Ann Laura Stoler, I maintain that talk about “forgetting” is imprecise. 
Stoler argues that “forgetting and amnesia are more than misleading terms” 
given that in colonial histories, “very little of these histories has been or is 
actually forgotten.”16 Individuals, not societies, may experience amnesia. 
Forgetting needs to be preceded by remembering; you cannot forget what 
you never knew. We cannot speak of a society forgetting, when individuals 
have never remembered in the f irst place. On the one hand, members of 
Dutch society knew nothing about decolonization, or had only the haziest of 
notions. Consequently, they could not forget it. On the other hand, those who 
experienced the trauma of decolonization did remember decolonization. We 
cannot speak of a society forgetting, when some individuals still remember. 
Being silent, and forgetting, are not necessarily the same thing. If a society is 
12 Assmann, “Communicative and Cultural Memory,” 113.
13 Anderson, Imagined Communities, 201.
14 Erll, Memory, 8.
15 Assmann, Formen des Vergessens; Connerton, How Modernity Forgets.
16 Stoler, Duress, 128.
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silent about an episode in its history, it does not mean the episode has been 
forgotten. On the contrary, silence can hold memory, even when hiding it.
Stoler replaced “forgetting” and “amnesia” with a new term: “Aphasia 
is a dismembering, a diff iculty in speaking, a difficulty in generating a 
vocabulary that associates words and concepts to appropriate things.”17 The 
term avoids the pitfalls of “forgetting” and is now widely used by postcolonial 
scholars. Nevertheless, I f ind the term problematic. “Aphasia” is a medical 
term and describes an abnormal condition, while, as we have seen, most 
scholars believe that “forgetting” is a normal state of affairs for societies. 
Furthermore, in its current usage there seems be an imprecise slippage 
between “aphasia” and “dysphasia.” Frequently, the meanings of both, which 
are distinct though closely related terms in the medical world, seem to 
converge into one in the works of social scientists. Finally, “aphasia” describes 
a state of mind while “forgetting” is an action. In other words, replacing an 
adjective with a noun does an injustice to reality.
In this book I have chosen to use the term, “unremembered” or “unremem-
bering.” Etymologically, “remember” derives via the Latin memoria from the 
Old French remembrer. However, some have drawn attention to the close 
relationship between “remembering” and “dismembering.”18 We refer to 
the different parts of the body as “members.” To re-member implies that we 
recall the body with all its members attached. To dismember a body means to 
separate or tear apart its members. When it comes to doing history, historians 
continuously tear the pieces apart. Although time flows in one seamless 
duration, we dismember it, breaking the flow by means of periodization. 
To remember the past when doing history, we f irst dismember it.
One segment or member of Dutch history is the decade 1940-1949, which 
could be labelled as “The Nation at War.” This period was dismembered into 
four: the Netherlands under German occupation (1940-1945); the Dutch East 
Indies under Japanese rule (1942-1945); the Netherlands under reconstruction 
(1945-1949); the Dutch East Indies during decolonization (1945-1949). One 
could argue that some members or pieces have more right to prominence 
than others. However, problems arise when one member achieves such 
prominence in the collective memory that the others disappear almost 
completely.
With such a dismemberment of the nation’s historical narrative, it became 
easy to disremember – with each period being remembered in a different 
way, by different groups. With the perceived need to maintain a national 
17 Ibid.
18 For instance, Derrida, “The Parergon,” 6; Derrida, “Time Is Out of Joint,” 38.
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unity, one member – the suffering of the Dutch people under the Nazi 
occupation – came to dominate the remembering of the entire period, 
blinding one to the possibility of other memories. The dismemberment of the 
past led to a process of disremembering resulting in one member especially 
– the Dutch East Indies during decolonization (1945-1949) – becoming 
unremembered. Unremembered in the sense of not entirely forgotten but 
placed in cold storage, awaiting the trigger that would result in involuntarily 
rememberings (or re-rememberings). Unremembered to the extent that it 
was concealed from the population who never remembered. In this way, 
what had been a public issue in the years from 1945 to 1949 could all but 
disappear from public and academic discourses, although remembering 
survived among individuals who had been active participants and this 
remembering was passed on, vertically, to their progeny.
Historical Representation
Paul Connerton argues that whatever is written down demonstrates “a will to 
be remembered.”19 Texts transmit memory horizontally (across a generation) 
and vertically (to later generations). Historian’s textual representations lean 
towards the scholarly, written essay. This offers one specif ic set of vantage 
points from which to view the past. Novelists, artists and f ilm-makers offer 
alternative representations of a past reality. These representations contribute 
to the construction, distribution and maintenance of a mediated collective 
memory. Consequently, when analysing the construction of collective 
memory, historiographical works earn no special respect. While academic 
historical writing often forms the basis upon which popular works are built, 
it is in f ictional literature, f ilm and television that historical representations 
often profoundly impact public perceptions.
Literature is a major stabilizer of collective memory and through lit-
erature, memory takes on a material form and its power of transmission 
increases regardless of time and space.20 For a large part of the twentieth 
century, the novel was the signif icant vehicle for representing collective 
memory. The novel’s vivid representational quality persuades readers that 
they are gaining an insight into the past as it was. In her attempt to represent 
the past, the novelist invokes the smell and feel of the past, offers multiple 
perspectives and voices, includes dialogues and interior monologues, real 
19 Connerton, How Societies, 102.
20 Assmann, Cultural Memory, 398.
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historical personages and f ictional characters, as well as thick descriptions 
of place. Indeed, the shape of the novel mimics the working of memory. 
Dutch sociologists Lily Clerkx and Wim Wertheim wrote a study of life in a 
colonial settlement in Sumatra based on an analysis of a handful of novels. 
They justif ied their project by arguing that novels can be more realistic 
than other historical data when it comes to learning about the daily habits, 
attitudes and interactions among the Dutch colonials.21
Such an assertion is not defended in the present study. However, I do 
maintain that the novel played a signif icant role in shaping the Dutch 
collective memory of the colonial past. Therefore, representations of de-
colonization in the novel must be examined. Pamela Pattynama argues 
that “the Netherlands has always gained knowledge of the Dutch East Indies 
mainly through literature.”22 Nevertheless, from the 1960s onward other 
technologies began to play a signif icant role in the mediation of collective 
memory. Television and cinema contributed increasingly to the visualization 
of history and the remembering of the recent past. Radio too played an 
increasing role.
Said reminds us that it is representations that circulate within cultural 
discourse and these have purposes that reflect a “specif ic historical, intel-
lectual, and even economic setting.”23 The individual author or historian is 
influenced by a specific cultural archive that leads to a “structure of attitude 
and reference.”24 Objectivity is the mask that often disguises power. Frank 
Ankersmit argues that representations of the past are substitutes for the past 
itself. The absence of the past makes representations necessary. A historical 
representation becomes “a textual substitute for the actual, but absent 
past.”25 However, no representation, whether it be a scholarly monologue, 
a memoir, a historical novel, a documentary or a f ilm, offers a substitute 
for the entire past. Texts and f ilms offer representations of an aspect of 
the past. Some aspects may be more worthy of attention than others. The 
present study will reveal a concern among Dutch historians with creating 
representations of the diplomatic aspects of the past, while ignoring other 
aspects, such as the gory act of killing. On the other hand, some veterans of 
the conflict offer representations that focus almost entirely on the brutality 
of warfare. I argue that it was a failure of the Dutch historical profession 
21 Clerkx and Wertheim, Living in Deli, 113.
22 Pattynama, “‘Laat mij,’” 51.
23 Said, Orientalism, 21, 273.
24 Said, Culture, 134.
25 Ankersmit, Meaning, 81.
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that historians offered representations of a war in which warfare remained 
absent, the equivalent of a representation of a bullf ight with the bull missing.
A Short Summary of Decolonization in the Dutch East Indies
German troops in occupied Holland surrendered in May 1945. However, the 
Dutch East Indies remained under foreign occupation. Since the successful 
Japanese invasion of the Dutch East Indies in 1942, the entire white Dutch 
population, so-called totoks, and a minority of the Dutch population of 
mixed-blood, so-called Indos, were incarcerated by the Japanese in camps. 
Consequently, it seemed urgent for the Dutch to raise an army in order to 
help the Allies defeat the Japanese. Many Dutchmen felt duty bound to 
continue the struggle against fascism and immediately signed up for service 
against the Japanese. By the time these men arrived in the Asian theatre, 
the Japanese had already been defeated and World War Two had ended.
The abruptness of Japan’s defeat meant Japanese forces still controlled al-
most all of Indonesia. The Netherlands-Indies government in exile remained 
in Australia when the Japanese announced their surrender on 15 August. 
That same day the Allied Forces decided that all of Indonesia would be 
placed under the British command of Lord Mountbatten. Mountbatten was 
given the mission of disarming the Japanese and ensuring the safety and 
evacuation of tens of thousands of Western prisoners as well as the task 
of implementing a military occupation of this enormous area.26 For the 
Dutch prisoners in the Japanese prison camps, this proved to be liberation 
without actual release. Most Dutch in the former colony believed they could 
pick up their lives from where they left off in 1942.27 The Dutch believed 
that Indonesian nationalist leaders had little or no support among the 
native population, and had kept the main leaders, like Sukarno and Hatta, 
imprisoned since the early 1930s.28 These leaders had worked with the 
Japanese and two days after the Japanese surrendered, Sukarno and Hatta 
proclaimed an independent Republic of Indonesia.
The months that followed, the so-called Bersiap period, were chaotic and 
violent. With the absence of a strong central power, Indonesian nationalist 
youths, known as the pemuda, attacked anyone associated with Dutch rule. 
The totoks risked their lives if they ventured outside their prison camps. 
26 De Jong, Avondschot, 19.
27 Van Doorn, De laatste eeuw, 275.
28 Van den Doel, Afscheid, 46-58.
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Their former guards, the Japanese soldiers, were now their protectors. Indos 
who remained outside the camps, found themselves easy prey. Men, women 
and children, usually Indos or Chinese, were slaughtered by the pemudas. 
During this period, around 3,500 Dutch citizens were killed.29
With nearly all members of the Dutch colonial army scattered across 
Japanese prisoner of war camps in various parts of Asia, and any newly raised 
Dutch army not yet ready for action, it was impossible for Dutch authorities 
to exert control. It fell to the British to maintain order. By 1946, the British, 
at a cost of a high number of casualties, especially among Indonesians, 
had pacif ied limited areas of Java and handed control back to the Dutch. 
Large areas of Java and Sumatra remained under the control of Indonesian 
nationalists. For the new Dutch army, the mandate had shifted from defeat-
ing the Japanese to protecting Dutch interests from Indonesian nationalists. 
Eventually the Dutch would use 150,000 conscripts in this army.30
Lieutenant Governor-General of the Dutch East Indies Hubertus van 
Mook favoured a negotiated settlement with moderate Indonesian national-
ists, though ultimate authority lay with the government in The Hague. In 
October 1945, and against the express wishes of his government in The 
Hague, Van Mook had met with Sukarno.31 In April 1946, discussions took 
place in the Netherlands between Dutch leaders and representatives of the 
Indonesian nationalist government at the Hoge Veluwe Conference. These 
were characterized by an atmosphere of distrust and a peaceful resolution 
seemed unlikely.32 In the summer of 1946, the Netherlands acquired a new 
coalition government of the Labour Party and Catholic People’s Party. 
Labour wanted to build a social welfare state and the Catholics agreed to 
cooperate, but insisted that retaining the East Indies was economically 
essential.33 The new cabinet dispatched a high-powered commission to 
Indonesia to investigate the situation. The commission recommended that 
military conflict be avoided through negotiation.34 In November 1946, both 
sides signed the Linggadjati Agreement, by which the Dutch recognized 
the republic’s authority over a limited area and both sides agreed to form a 
federal United States of Indonesia under the Dutch monarchy by 1949. Only 
a minority of both sides welcomed the agreement; the violence did not cease. 
29 Ibid., 100.
30 Van Doorn and Hendrix, Ontsporing, 295.
31 “Notulen van de vergadering van de ministers op 1 nov. 1945,” (Minutes of the Cabinet 
Meeting on 1 Nov. 1945), in Wal et al., Officiële Bescheiden, vol. 1, 504-506.
32 Van Mook, Indonesië, 131.
33 Van der Liempt, Nederland Valt Aan, 17-18.
34 Ibid., 18-19.
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In the Netherlands, the government avoided collapse only after unilaterally 
applying a number of additions to the agreement without consulting the 
Indonesians; on the Indonesian side, nationalist military attacks on Dutch 
troops increased.35 In July 1947, citing infringements of the Linggadjati 
Agreement, the Dutch began the f irst of two military offensives, which they 
called “police actions.” The signing of the Renville Agreement in January 1948, 
briefly led to renewed Dutch hope that the two sides were close to creating 
a Netherlands-Indonesia Union under Dutch leadership.36
However, by the year’s end the relationship between the two sides had 
deteriorated again and in December 1948 the Dutch launched their second 
“police action,” capturing the republican capital Yogajakarta and most 
of the republic’s leadership. The Dutch were reprimanded by the United 
Nations and a Security Council resolution of 28 January 1949 demanded an 
immediate ceasefire, the release of political prisoners, the reestablishment 
of the republican government in Yogajakarta and the beginning of new talks 
with the assistance of the United Nations that should lead to Indonesian 
independence by no later than July 1950.37 This pushed the Dutch into a 
f inal round of negotiations. The Dutch-Indonesian Round Table Confer-
ence took place between August and November 1949 in The Hague and the 
Netherlands recognized the independence of the United States of Indonesia 
on 27 December 1949, while retaining control over Dutch New Guinea.
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2 Representations during the War
Abstract
During the Indonesian War of Independence (1945-1949) Dutch national 
media collaborated with the authorities in providing a sanitized represen-
tation of the conflict. The public was complicit in this early unremember-
ing. Some left-wing media carried reports of Dutch atrocities. Joris Ivens’ 
documentary Indonesia Calling (1946) represented the conflict as one of 
international liberation which contested colonialism, but was viewed by 
few members of the Dutch public. Hella Haasse’s novel Oeroeg (1948) came 
to be widely read as a representation of the irreconcilability of East and 
West. In early historiography, Van Mook offered the enlightened colonial 
view that the Dutch mission had been sabotaged by outsiders. De Kadt’s 
thesis was that Dutch smugness had brought about the violent conflict.
Keywords: Joris Ivens, Hella Haasse, Indonesia Calling, Oeroeg, unremem-
bering, decolonization
The Press
Paul Virilio argues that while there is no war without representation, it 
is only in industrialized warfare that representation outstrips the facts.1 
Lieutenant-General S.H. Spoor, commander-in-chief of Dutch forces during 
the Indonesian War of Independence, was aware that this conflict would be 
fought by means of representations in the public arena as well as by combat 
on the battlef ield. Consequently, he set up a military information service 
with headquarters in Batavia.2 The Dienst voor Legercontacten (DLC, Army 
Contact Service) produced “military magazines, bulletins, press releases, 
radio shows, photos and f ilms,”3 ensuring that the Dutch public received a 
1 Virilio, War and Cinema, 1-8.
2 De Moor, Generaal Spoor, 203-204; Zweers, De gecensureerde oorlog, 29-30.
3 Zweers, De gecensureerde oorlog, 40.
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sanitized version of the war that, for the most part, lacked any representation 
of actual warfare. Indeed, Louis Zweers goes as far as to say that the army 
and navy information services “were virtually absolute rulers in the area of 
military information and propaganda.”4 Thus, the war that was represented 
was a f iction, ensuring the unremembering that would follow.
Film and Photography
Multif ilm Batavia may have had the appearance of a private company, 
but as Gerda Jansen Hendriks shows, it was government controlled.5 She 
lists dozens of propaganda f ilms that the Rijksvoorlichtingsdienst (RVD, 
Government Information Service) commissioned from Multif ilm Batavia 
during the war of decolonization.6 An important source of public informa-
tion in the Netherlands regarding world events came from Polygoon news 
journals shown in cinemas. The Polygoon leadership collaborated with the 
Dutch military authorities in creating propaganda, the chairman of its news 
commission admitting, “we are in principle willing to make propaganda for 
the army in the Indies, as long as it is good quality propaganda.”7 Members 
of its board included representatives from the Ministry of Education, Arts 
and Sciences as well as the RVD. Jansen Hendriks points out that Polygoon 
enjoyed an advantage over potential competitors as the company had 
a monopoly in presenting news features in nearly every cinema in the 
Netherlands. Because the company did not themselves have camera crews 
in the Indies, they relied on footage supplied to them by the authorities.8 
Much of this was produced by Multif ilm Batavia.
Consequently, it is not surprising that the newsreels showed carefully 
staged scenes and never real f ighting. These staged scenes presented the 
Dutch public with a picture of an army that came in peace. Right from 
the beginning, this is a war that, in its representation, is characterized 
by the absence of the act of killing. Scenes of soldiers setting off for the 
kampongs (villages) with their bags of medicine for the villagers, the Red 
Cross prominently displayed, were frequent. Also popular were shots of 
troops dispersing food aid, mending roads and bridges, and carrying out 
4 Zweers, “‘Silence Is the Best Solution,’” 9.
5 Jansen Hendriks, “Een voorbeeldige kolonie,” 230-231.
6 Ibid., 436-437.
7 Quoted in Jansen Hendriks, “Een voorbeeldige kolonie,” 237.
8 Ibid., 245-246.
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patrols in order to ensure the safety of the villagers. There are no scenes of 
burning village houses or aerial bombardment.
Take, for instance, the two-part f ilm Brengers van Recht en Veiligheid 
(Bringers of justice and security). In the f irst part, we are told that the 
“terrorists” treat their compatriots brutally. But the Dutch soldier serves the 
people. Local children are “best mates” of the soldiers, and we see them, as 
well as their elders, volunteering to help the soldiers with household tasks. 
We see soldiers on patrol – they crouch, break suddenly into a run, leap 
to the ground and open f ire at an unseen enemy. These scenes clearly are 
staged. The f ilm shows Dutch soldiers exchanging language lessons with 
liberated villagers and the f inal scene shows Dutch soldiers and Indonesian 
villagers drinking from the same coconut.
The aim of Dutch military actions, we are told, is the creation of a new 
basis for cooperation between the Dutch and Indonesians. We see the 
military at their preparations: maps are studied, soldiers march and board 
trucks, engineers prepare materials for repairing bridges, armoured vehicles 
are checked, planes are sent on reconnaissance flights, telegraphists open 
lines of communication, divisions are moved into position and watches 
are synchronized. The entire sequence gives an impression of Western 
organization and capability. Then the troops advance. Soldiers form human 
chains to cross rivers, mobile telephone units maintain communication, 
armoured vehicles protect infantry, and villages are avoided until the enemy 
can be fought directly without endangering the innocent. Soldiers enter a 
village. A Dutch flag is hoisted. A group of villagers looks relieved. However, 
the essence of warfare, the act of killing, is absent. The “terrorists” are 
never within range of the camera’s eye. Once the village is secure, life is 
normalized – women pound grain, make batik, villagers spin cotton. The 
narrator tells us that trust has been rebuilt; the basis has been laid for a new 
future, a new cooperation between East and West. The European army is 
eff icient and self less, while the people of Indonesia are docile victims of 
terrorists, dependent on Dutch aid.
A number of short f ilms were made under the title Soldaat Overzee 
(Overseas soldier). One, broadcast in January 1948, began with a soldier 
looking into the camera. He says, “I am Jan. I come from the cities and 
villages of the Netherlands, and now I’m in the red heat of the tropics.” The 
purpose is to represent the Dutch soldier as being an ordinary, tough but 
honest lad – the boy next door. A photobook of the same title was published 
and sold over 50,000 copies in 1947.9
9 Zweers, De gecensureerde oorlog, 77.
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Film-makers may have believed they were serving a “noble purpose,” but 
according to Jansen Hendriks, they were “pulling the wool over people’s eyes.”10 
Most f ilms were made on the orders of the DLC. The films mediated not so 
much a war but a humanitarian mission. Also popular were documentaries that 
linked seamlessly with films that had been produced near the beginning of the 
twentieth century. These picturesque films about local peoples and customs, 
what Said would call Orientalist, appealed to the Dutch cultural archive, in 
which colonialism was seen as something humanitarian and ethical.11
Some representations of the conflict were deemed not suitable for the 
Dutch public. In 1947, the f ilm Linggadjati in de branding (Linggadjati burn-
ing) was released in cinemas in the Dutch East Indies. It showed some 
non-aggressive scenes of the Dutch military offensive. Despite mildly positive 
responses from viewers, Lieutenant Governor-General Van Mook decided not 
to release it for audiences in the metropole. It was taken out of circulation 
and was never broadcast in the Netherlands.12
It was next to impossible to create representations that countered the 
off icial myth of war as a humanitarian project. We will see in the following 
section the lengths that the authorities went to in order to occlude Joris 
Ivens’ anti-colonial f ilm, Indonesia Calling. Henk van Randwijk, editor of 
the weekly Vrij Nederland and an outspoken critic of the war, helped to 
produce a 20-minute long f ilm, Oud en Nieuw in Indonesië (Old and new in 
Indonesia), hoping it would provide a counterweight to the off icial pro-war 
propaganda. The government Film Commission twice refused to grant it a 
licence for distribution, and it was never released.13
By 1949, the war had stretched on for nearly four years and most of the 
world, it seems, had turned against the Netherlands. After a second “police 
action,” the DLC found it necessary to create a 40-minute documentary 
proving the purity of the intentions behind the actions of the military. The 
f ilm, Het Vreemde Leger (The strange army), was edited and commentary 
was written by military photographer and correspondent Ton Schilling. It 
was framed like a personal travelogue by someone who had travelled along 
with the military forces just to give the viewer back home a personal, but 
honest view. Twice we are told that this is not propaganda.14
10 Jansen Hendriks, Klein and Otten, “The Final Years,” 82.
11 Jansen Hendriks, “Een voorbeeldige kolonie,” 274-277.
12 Ibid., 255-257.
13 Ibid., 260-262.
14 The f ilm credits mention it was made “in opdracht van de Dienst van Legercontacten” 
(“ordered by the Army Contacts Service”), Het Vreemde Leger: 2e politionele actie – Java en 
Sumatra, Multif ilm, Java, 1949.
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The f ilm is an ode to the hard-working army, composed of honest men 
from all ranks of society. We see the results of republican chaos in areas 
formerly held by the nationalist government – starving children, orphaned 
Eurasian children, scenes of devastated houses, churches and workplaces. 
Dutch soldiers work in the newly liberated zones – treating the ill, feeding 
the hungry, distributing clothes, working with the locals at reconstructing 
roads and repairing telegraph wires, accepting the weapons of republicans 
who turn themselves in and then training these former enemies to become 
a new militia under Dutch authority. We see no f ighting, no war wounded, 
no dead bodies. We do see the funeral of a Dutch soldier. This too was in 
keeping with a directive of the DLC, calling for scenes of solemn burials 
that would remind the home front of the hardship and sacrif ice of the army, 
yet provide comfort for family members by seeing that their boys received 
a respectful funeral.15 This army, Schelling concludes, is “the strangest 
army that ever was.” The war, we are told, is not fought to simply protect 
the interest of Dutch capitalists, but for a just cause. But clearly, the f ilm 
had been made at a time in which voices back home questioned the war’s 
legitimacy. One has to agree with Jansen Hendriks in wondering if journalists 
like Ton Schilling “still believed in their own message.”16 At this stage in 
the war, many did not. Prime Minister Drees recommended that the f ilm 
not be released. The f ilm reminded him of a “four-year nightmare.”17 By 
mid-1949, it had become clear that the war was, for the Dutch, a lost cause.
Ever since its f irst use in the Crimea War (1853-1856), war photography 
has been used for propaganda. As Susan Sontag reminds us, for most of its 
history war photography has been managed and carefully staged.18 The 
representation of the war of decolonization in photographs in the Dutch 
press was consistent with the representation in propaganda f ilms. The press 
in the metropole was dependent on the authorities for providing them with 
images of the conflict. Dutch military authorities were not going to take the 
risk of allowing horrifying images be published and instead implemented 
a carefully planned management of public perception. All photographers 
had to be accredited by the military authorities.19 The Marine Information 
Service and the DLC strictly controlled the flow of information. Only ap-
proved photographs were sent to the Netherlands, to be distributed among 
15 Wolthuis, “Voorlichtingsbeleid,” 133.
16 Jansen Hendriks, “Een voorbeeldige kolonie,” 297.
17 Ibid., 311.
18 Sontag, Regarding the Pain, 42-51.
19 Kok, Somers and Zweers, Koloniale Oorlog, 66.
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the press, and only after photo captions had been approved in The Hague.20 
A distorted representation of the conflict ensued, in which warfare did 
not involve killing. For instance, in 1947, army photographer Ben Huisman 
captured the hard reality of the war in eastern Sumatra. The photographs 
showed scenes of Indonesians being interrogated, stripped naked and humili-
ated, as well as images of dead Indonesians and burnt-out buildings. They 
were withheld by the DLC and not published until 1997.21
Zweers argues that the main Dutch illustrated magazines collaborated in 
constructing a manipulated representation of the war, uncritically publishing 
photographs supplied by the DLC. This meant that “one-third of the popula-
tion […] had the approved image of the situation in the Dutch East Indies 
[…] served up to them.”22 In the daily newspapers the situation was little 
better, with newspapers sometimes publishing identical photographs on 
their front pages.23 The exceptions were the left-wing press – the communist 
De Waarheid and the socialist Het Parool, as well as the weeklies De Groene 
Amsterdammer and Vrij Nederland. However, these publications all lacked 
the funds to have a photographer stationed in Indonesia.24
Another source of photographic representation lay in the amateur 
photographs of Dutch soldiers themselves. Not every soldier could afford 
a camera, but the authorities actively encouraged soldiers to create photo 
albums.25 These photo albums have recently become an area of interest 
to historians, especially since the publication in a national newspaper in 
2012 of two photographs of Dutch soldiers executing Indonesians – the 
f irst of their kind ever to be published. Susie Protschky has tentatively sug-
gested, “there are numerous examples of photographs that could constitute 
further, explicit evidence of atrocities committed.” Such images, she argues, 
would have circulated within a selective visual economy of, “social and 
professional publics.”26 In other words, they were shared with carefully 
monitored audiences – perhaps with family members and, more likely, 
with fellow veterans. Their impact, on public representations of the war, 
was negligible. Consequently, they played little or no role in the creation 
of a collective memory.
20 Zweers, De gecensureerde oorlog, 47; Kok, Somers and Zweers, Koloniale Oorlog, 52.
21 Zweers, De gecensureerde oorlog, 57-65.
22 Ibid., 266.
23 Ibid., 220-221.
24 Ibid., 353, 360.
25 Kok, Somers and Zweers, Koloniale Oorlog, 144.
26 Protschky, “Burden of Proof,” 259-260, 270.
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Print Journalism
The Dutch-Indies Government Information Service produced a number 
of newspapers, magazines and news bulletins. One such was Het Dagblad, 
a daily newspaper circulated free of charge. Het Dagblad promised that 
it would not provide propaganda, but would provide calm and truthful 
information.27 But for the most part the Dutch-language press represented 
the conflict as one of law and order with Dutch forces battling terrorism. 
Nadap Pieter analysed reports of three Indisch newspapers and found that all 
three defended the same point of view.28 Typical is the report in Het Dagblad, 
in which Dutch troops are welcomed by the local Indonesian population who 
“stood rows deep alongside the road, cheering with enthusiasm and with 
both thumbs up.”29 Another newspaper described the Dutch army during 
the second “police action” as being like a vacuum cleaner “that sucks away 
the dirt but leaves the good behind.”30 All three newspapers represented the 
intervention by the United Nations as “inexpert” and portrayed the Soviet 
Union as the real threat to world peace.31
Journalists embedded in the army were accredited to the Ministry of War, 
registered as civil off icers and wore military attire, while a visa requirement 
kept undesirables out. Journalists and photographers rarely visited war areas, 
remaining in the capital, Batavia, and relying on communiqués from the 
DLC. When journalists telephoned their stories home their conversations 
were listened to by army personnel. When they resorted to telegram, they 
had to use the army telegram service.32 The Dutch public’s acceptance 
of the representation of the conflict provided by the authorities to the 
independent press allowed the authorities to provide the public with a 
false image of reality.33
A prominent exception was the Amsterdam newspaper Het Parool. The 
newspaper had been founded by Frans Goedhart as a mouthpiece of the 
anti-Nazi resistance during the German occupation. Goedhart had become 
an influential member of the new ruling Labour Party. Having visited the 
nationalist leaders in Yogajakarta, using the name Pieter ’t Hoen, he pub-
lished the f irst of a series of articles arguing that the Netherlands should 
27 “Ter Inleidng,” Het Dagblad, 23 October 1945.
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avoid military conflict and instead organize a peaceful transfer of power.34 
When the Dutch launched their f irst so-called “police action” in July 1947, 
Het Parool quoted on its front page a speech of the Indonesian leader Amir 
Sjarifuddin, in which he accused the Dutch of launching a colonial war and 
warned that Indonesia was free and would never surrender.35 In an editorial, 
they rejected the use of the term “police action.”36 However, Het Parool was 
read by a relatively small constituency and its anti-colonial reporting led 
to thousands of its readers cancelling their subscriptions. As Zweers puts 
it: “It seems the readers were less progressive than the editors.”37
In contrast to Het Parool, and far more typical of the majority, when the 
f irst “police action” was launched the liberal Algemeen Dagblad used the 
term “police action” in its main front page story and quoted from a speech 
from the Dutch queen.38 Lieke Hagebeuk compared how the conflict was 
covered in Het Parool and the pro-government, Catholic De Volkskrant. Het 
Parool cheered on the fact that the Dutch government entered negotiations 
with delegates of the Indonesian republicans in 1946, while De Volkskrant 
condemned this as shameful.39 De Volkskrant ignored the republican point 
of view while Het Parool interviewed republican delegates and permitted 
Indonesian Prime Minister Sjahrir to air all sorts of accusations against 
the Dutch.40 Het Parool referred to “Indonesia” and “Indonesian” while De 
Volkskrant preferred the (colonial) term “Dutch East Indies.” Het Parool 
referred to members of the Indonesian government by their off icial titles 
but De Volkskrant put their titles, such as “minister” between inverted 
commas.41 When reporting on violence, Het Parool focused on Indonesian 
victims, often blaming Dutch troops, while in De Volkskrant it was the 
other way around.42
Dutch media did not provide one homogenous pro-Dutch view of the 
conflict. The violence unleashed in 1947 brought a mixed response, though 
mainly positive. But a growing group began to question the war. In late 1948, 
questions were asked in parliament regarding reports of the use of excessive 
34 De Keizer, “‘Mission Impossible,’” 360; Pieter ’t Hoen, “Sjahrirs binnenlandsche moeili-
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violence by Dutch troops, and this began to dominate newspaper coverage 
of the conflict. In February 1949, De Groene Amsterdammer published a 
letter from an unidentif ied off icer.43 He wrote:
KNIL [Royal Netherlands East Indies Army] off icers: […] [D]efend with 
passion and conviction the assertion that, for instance, if you are shot at 
from a kampong [village] then this kampong should be set on fire from four 
sides before the inhabitants have the chance to run away. And whoever 
then tries to escape, […] shoot them with a machine gun, preferably not 
caring if these include women and children.
The off icer drew a comparison to Putten, the site of one of the worst Nazi 
atrocities perpetrated on Dutch soil. The off icer wrote of summary execu-
tions of prisoners who are “simply shot behind the head and then buried.” 
He described the Indonesians as living under “military terror.” He described 
the civil government as being led “by people who had been civil servants or 
plantation owners before the war, and they still see the Indonesian always 
as someone who, at the clap of your hands, will climb a palm tree to get you 
a coconut and is expected to treat every white as some sort of half-god.”
In April, De Groene Amsterdammer published a letter from a conscripted 
soldier.44 He wrote that the troops were doing much good work, but agreed 
with every word of the previous letter, writing of the war crimes perpetrated 
by Dutch soldiers, the military terror and the cowardice of those afraid to 
speak out against the outrages. He agreed that the civil administration 
wanted to turn the clock back to the colonial days.
On 23 March 1949, the liberal NRC Handelsblad reported that a certain 
Pastor Hildering claimed that Dutch troops had attacked personnel and 
patients in a polyclinic in the town of Peniwen, killing ten members of a 
Christian church and raping three women.45 General Spoor called for an 
off icial investigation into the Peniwen affair.46 Goedhart published an 
article on the “cruelties and excesses,” wondering if, in future years, there 
will be monuments in villages throughout Indonesia remembering the 
Dutch atrocities, just like the monuments being erected in the Netherlands 
43 Anonymous, “Een of f icier schrijft aan zijn vrienden,” De Groene Amsterdammer, 
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to remember the Nazi atrocities.47 In May, newspapers reported that the 
investigation into the Peniwen affair had not turned up any evidence against 
Dutch soldiers and no further investigation would take place.48
An anti-war organization brought out a pamphlet in 1949, composed 
mainly of newspaper articles. It contained graphic descriptions of mass 
killings and torture perpetrated by Dutch soldiers.49 One writer argued 
that the Dutch will have to admit that there is no difference between the 
Dutch and the Germans, and concluded: “Isn’t it time to admit that War 
is Genocide?”50 On the other hand, journalist Alfred van Sprang penned 
an account of his seven months embedded with the army. He wrote about 
an army that protected a terrorized population, rejecting accusations of 
atrocities: “Someday [the world] will have to open its eyes to reality. Then the 
sharp protests, the insulting words and the f ierce reactions of the Security 
Council will be recognized as false accusations.”51
In August 1949, the Round Table Conference in The Hague commenced, 
with the Indonesian nationalist leaders facing their former adversaries 
across the negotiating table. Vrij Nederland ran a long article by Henk van 
Randwijk. He asked, Why had the inevitable taken four years? He concluded: 
“Something important is taking place on Dutch soil. One of the most impor-
tant things to have ever taken place and of a signif icance that will stretch 
at least as far, and maybe further, than the arrival of the Germans and the 
later liberation.”52
However, the German occupation would come to dominate Dutch 
historical memory while the decolonization of its Asian colony would be 
unremembered. Almost the entire press corps, and most of the public, had 
acquiesced in accepting a representation of the conflict that was constructed 
by an off icial disinformation campaign. This formed the basis for further 
unremembering. In fact, the Dutch had experienced two Indonesian wars 
of decolonization. The f irst was a f iction, perpetrated by the military and 
government authorities, distributed widely by a complicit press and accepted 
by the majority of a compliant population. In this f ictional war, the Dutch 
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had fought a huge f irst-aid campaign against collaborators of the Japanese 
but were betrayed by an ignorant international community. The second 
war was very real, but only known to those who experienced it – especially 
the tens of thousands of conscripted soldiers. This real war was one of 
counterinsurgency and mass violence. In the home front, it was only the 
small number of readers of some left-wing publications that accepted the 
reality of this war. This second war would be unremembered.
Indonesia Calling: A Film
By the late 1930s, Joris Ivens had built an impressive oeuvre of politically 
motivated documentaries. Though confessing that his early f ilms were aes-
thetic, Ivens admitted that creating beautiful f ilms was “a dead-end street” 
and that, eventually, “I saw that content, especially in the documentary 
f ilm, had to mean social content. That social content, in a stronger situation, 
becomes political content, and, in an even stronger situation, becomes 
militant.”53 The decolonization of Indonesia was one such situation and 
compelled him to make one of his most militant f ilms.
When Germany invaded the Soviet Union in June 1941, Ivens offered his 
services as a f ilm-maker to the Dutch government in exile.54 On 28 Septem-
ber 1944, he was appointed film commissioner of the Netherlands East Indies. 
Charles van der Plas, Dutch delegate to the Allied Supreme Command in the 
Pacif ic and the emissary of Lieutenant Governor-General Van Mook, told 
Ivens that the post-war Dutch East Indies would promote “a high degree of 
self-determination for Indonesians in domestic affairs.”55 Ivens agreed to 
make f ilms shot in the combat zone and after the defeat of the Japanese, he 
would make educational f ilms for the newly liberated Dutch East Indies.
Arriving in Australia in 1945, Ivens quickly discovered that many members 
of the Dutch East Indies government in exile had plans for the future of the 
Dutch East Indies that were contrary to his own.56 The situation came to 
a head when the Japanese surrender was followed by Sukarno and Hatta’s 
declaration of independence. When the Dutch set sail from Australia to 
return to their former colony, a mutiny broke out among Indonesian sea-
men, followed by Australian dockworkers’ refusal to load Dutch ships. By 
53 Shaffer and Ivens, “Fifty Years,” 15.
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September, trade unionists, as well as Indian and Chinese seamen, were 
refusing to man the Dutch ships.
Moved by the plight of the Indonesians and by the international solidar-
ity demonstrated by Chinese, Indian and Australian workers, Ivens quit 
his off icial Dutch government position in November 1945. In his letter of 
resignation, he noted that the ideals expressed in the Atlantic Charter would 
suggest that the Indonesians had the right to national independence.57 By 
this stage, he had already secretly begun making Indonesia Calling. When 
the f ilm was released in 1946, instead of depicting the Dutch return to 
their colony, and their noble mission, Ivens had represented the Indonesian 
struggle for independence.
Ivens represents a conflict where white and coloured work together for 
a common goal. David Hanan suggests Indonesia Calling breaks with the 
Orientalizing approach of Western f ilm-makers towards Asians.58 Instead, 
as Hogenkamp puts it, Ivens’ work “stresses that Indonesians are people 
like any other.”59 Gerda Jansen Hendriks considers the unique quality of 
Ivens’ f ilm to be its focus on the international solidarity between people of 
different creeds and colour.60 Thomas Waugh claims that Indonesia Calling 
is unique for being the f irst “post-colonial solidarity f ilm.”61
Film historian Bert Hogenkamp suggests four ways of looking at Indonesia 
Calling. Firstly, we can read the f ilm as a representation of international 
working-class solidarity in action. Secondly, it can be viewed as a significant 
part of Australian trade union history. Thirdly, it can be seen as an example 
of how non-f iction f ilm can promote progressive forces. Fourthly, the f ilm 
can be analysed for its mythical aspects which themselves “became a force 
in history.”62 In this fourth way, Indonesia Calling became, in Dutch society, 
an attempted intervention in the national collective memory. The work was 
a f ilmic pamphlet in that it did not record an event, but actually shaped 
what was happening. Ivens did not reconstruct an episode in the Indonesian 
revolution, but Indonesia Calling became an episode in the revolution.
The f ilm premiered in Sydney, Australia, on 9 August 1946. A copy was 
presented to a representative of the Indonesian republican government 
for President Sukarno, though, as Schoots puts it, it was strictly symbolic 
57 Ibid., 202.
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because, “in reality [it was] an empty can as there were no copies.”63 Waugh 
claims that two copies of the f ilm circulated in republican Java, dubbed 
into Malay and shown to outdoor audiences, becoming “an important arm 
in the Indonesian resistance.”64
The f ilm had been made in secret and no credits appeared, protecting 
those involved. Australian authorities bowed to pressure from the Dutch 
government and issued an export ban, but by the end of 1946, a new Labour 
government was in power and, after a screening for the entire new cabinet, 
the export ban was lifted. In 1948, the f ilm was due to be shown at the 
Locarno Film Festival in Switzerland but was withdrawn after objections 
by the Dutch government. In 1962, Dutch Minister for Foreign Affairs Joseph 
Luns refused to send a representative to the Dutch Film Days at a f ilm 
festival in West Germany because of the inclusion of Indonesia Calling in 
the programme.65
One of the f irst countries to buy the f ilm was the Soviet Union. It was 
shown in the USA, Great Britain and France and was hailed as an anti-
colonial f ilm. However, the f ilm had no chance of passing the Board of Film 
Censors in the Netherlands and Ivens did not waste his time trying. Thus, in 
an act of unremembering, Dutch f ilmgoers were denied the opportunity of 
viewing Indonesia Calling. Ivens left Australia in early 1947 and arrived in 
Holland. At a presentation at Amsterdam’s Kriterion Theatre, he avoided any 
reference to Indonesia Calling. However, he did show the f ilm to members of 
the Dutch Communist Party and an artists’ group called De Kring. A number 
of left-wing newspapers carried articles about Ivens and the communist 
newspaper De Waarheid published a series of four articles in the space of 
two weeks, singing his praises, but none mentioned Indonesia Calling for 
the simple reason that its existence was still known to only a few.66
Gradually the f ilm was mythologized, becoming a symbol, even for those 
who had never seen it. As Hogenkamp puts it: “being for or against the 
f ilm meant being for or against the way in which the Dutch had handled 
their colonial past.”67 By the mid-1960s, Indonesia Calling had a growing 
following, long before it had an audience. This made it unusual in the history 
of the cinema. In its symbolic form, it intervened in the historical process, 
shaping memory and providing a site for the articulation of diametrically 
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opposing approaches to the national past. The facticity of the f ilm had 
become tangential. One’s opinion of the (unseen) film signified one’s position 
in the context of postcolonialism.
By the early 1960s, the rights and wrongs of Indonesia Calling were bound 
up with the fate of its maker. Many accepted the view, perpetrated by 
Ivens himself, that the Dutch director suffered persecution because of 
his telling the truth about the Dutch in Indonesia. In 1963, he wrote of 
Indonesia Calling:
This short f ilm showed that a so-called police operation was in reality 
a fully f ledged colonial war. It earned its maker eight years of exile. Nor 
should we forget certain retaliatory methods, like the blacklists aimed 
at f ilm-makers who dared to tell the truth about their own country.68
The f ilm’s critical representation of the conflict seems to have brought 
about an off icially sponsored harassment of the director. In the increas-
ingly oppressive climate of the Cold War, and just months after Indonesia 
had achieved independence, Ivens had had his Dutch passport seized 
by the Dutch authorities. For a number of years he had to renew his 
passport every three months, so the Dutch authorities could monitor 
his whereabouts.69 His biographer, Hans Schoots, argues that Ivens 
exaggerated his persecution, but it became an accepted truth among 
leftist intellectuals, artists and the Dutch press that Ivens, one of the 
few to have dared to hold up the truth during a colonizer’s war, was 
unwelcome and unforgiven and was persecuted by his own country.70 
Eric van’t Groenwout, who wrote his dissertation on Indonesia Calling, 
claimed that it wasn’t Indonesia Calling that led to the Dutch government 
declaring Ivens as persona no grata, but rather, in the climate of the Cold 
War, it was his active communism.71 However, while his communism 
may have been the straw that broke the camel’s back, Indonesia Calling 
was the ultimate provocation. In Hogenkamp’s words, it was “like a red 
ray [sic] to a bull.”72
Views on Ivens in some quarters began to soften by the late 1950s. In 
1959, the Algemeen Handelsblad suggested that Ivens had lost the goodwill 
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of the authorities for twelve years because he had made Indonesia Calling, 
but the article quoted Ivens as saying: “I have always been a Dutchman; I 
could never take a position against my compatriots.”73 By the early 1960s, it 
had become received opinion among most journalists that Indonesia Calling 
had been not an anti-Dutch f ilm, but an anti-colonial f ilm.74 In 1963, Het 
Parool declared that it was time to recognize that, regarding the “infamous 
affair,” Ivens had been correct.75
In 1964, the Dutch Film Museum and the Amsterdam Film Academy 
decided to organize a public celebration of the director’s 65th birthday. He 
returned to the Netherlands for a weeklong festival in his honour.76 On 
his 70th birthday, there were more celebrations and the Dutch Minister of 
Culture, Recreation and Social Work had a number of meetings with Ivens 
and offered to f inance a new documentary. A small group of adversaries 
in The Hague, led by Joseph Luns, still fought a rearguard action against 
the director.77 By the time of his 80th birthday, Ivens was feted worldwide. 
Long revered by off icials in the USSR, East Germany and Cuba, he had 
been welcomed to North Vietnam by Ho Chi Minh and to the People’s 
Republic of China by Mao Zedong and Zhou Enlai. But in Western Europe 
his contributions to f ilm had been recognized and honoured as well. 
Spain’s government awarded him a gold medal for his services to art, in 
France he was made a Commander of the Legion of Honour and in Italy, 
he was made a Knight Commander of the Order of Merit.78 In his home 
country there now was a near consensus that Indonesia Calling had led 
to his unjust persecution. During the celebrations for his 80th birthday in 
1978, the Dutch Minister for Overseas Development presented Ivens with 
an award for his services to the promotion of development issues.79 Het 
Parool published a long interview with the f ilm-maker and claimed that 
the Dutch government had attacked the man, rather than the f ilm.80 Two 
years later the Algemeen Dagblad was singing his praises, giving him the 
nickname “The Flying Dutchman,” who had journeyed on an “ideological 
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Odyssey.”81 Yet, in 1982, he was still willing to tell a journalist that he was 
“a son of the revolution of 1917.”82
In 1985, the jury of the Dutch Film Days in Utrecht awarded Ivens a Golden 
Calf. The jury explained: “As long as film and television have existed, bureaucra-
cies, ruling cliques and politicians have tried to control the medium. Joris Ivens 
has resisted this pressure all his life. He has suffered outrageous libel and deep 
humiliations for filming what he saw.”83 The reference to Indonesia Calling was 
clear. Ivens, who lived in Paris, requested that the government minister should 
travel to Paris and present him with the award. A minister was dispatched to 
Paris. The newspaper De Volkskrant warned: “Ivens will not accept anything 
from a representative of the government unless told in so many words that 
Holland has been unjust to its greatest director for almost 40 years.”84
What was being referred to was the 40 years since Indonesia Calling. At a 
ceremony at the French-Dutch Institute in Paris, Ivens received the award. 
In his speech, the minister said, “Shortly after the war, your support for In-
donesia’s right to self-determination and your film Indonesia Calling brought 
you into conflict with the Dutch government. […] I can now say that history 
has come down more on your side than on the side of your adversaries.”85 
Even the Algemeen Dagblad, in an article titled “Joris Ivens: Honesty Lasts 
Longest,” described the minister’s presentation as having been a “well-chosen 
bowing of the knee” to a man who had been the victim of a “moral death 
sentence” because he had chosen the side of the Indonesian nationalists.86 
The battle seemed over on this aspect of the memory of decolonization.
However, in 1985, Michel Korzec and Hans Moll published an article in 
Intermediair, a weekly aimed at university graduates and professionals. 
They accused Ivens of being an apologist for mass murderers, comparing 
his f ilms with the propaganda of Goebbels.87 The following month student 
magazine Propria Cures published an article that questioned why the whole 
of intellectual Holland had put “Chairman Ivens” on a pedestal.88 In 1988, a 
young writer, Jan Willem Regenhardt, published an article in HN Magazine 
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about Ivens’ “anti-Dutch f ilm.”89 He accused Ivens of “unjust and cowardly” 
behaviour in 1945, and suggested that Ivens’ account of events was incorrect. 
In fact, Regenhardt’s article was based on a mediocre assignment he had 
completed for his bachelor’s degree.90 It was the academic equivalent of a 
hatchet job.
Ivens remained a divisive f igure, partly because his f ilms were considered 
to have been communist propaganda, but also because he had chosen to 
support the cause of Indonesian independence. Most of all, he remained 
a controversial f igure as long as Dutch collective memory was unwilling 
to pursue an act of recollection based on a critical assessment of the past.
Oeroeg: A Novella
Since the early 1930s, a Dutch organization called the Collectieve Propaganda 
van het Nederlandse Boek (CPNB, Collective Promotion for the Dutch Book) 
has had the custom of giving away a new work of literature during a so-
called Boekenweek (Book Week). From the 1940s through the 1960s, the book 
appeared anonymously and the reading public could enter a competition 
and submit their guesses as to the identity of the author. In 1948, the com-
mittee chose a novella by the name of Oeroeg by Hella S. Haasse, which 
had been submitted under the Malay pseudonym of “Soeka toelis” (“Like 
to write”).91 Consequently, 145,000 copies of Oeroeg were given away as the 
Boekenweekgeschenk (Book Week gift). Over 24,000 readers participated in 
the competition to guess the author, though only a meagre 672 got it right.92 
As one journalist commented at the time, the relationship between the two 
male characters had been narrated so convincingly that most readers had 
assumed that the writer was a man.93
Haasse’s representation of the twilight years of Dutch rule in Indonesia 
had a huge influence in shaping a Dutch collective memory of the period. 
It proved to be the most successful Book Week gift ever; becoming one of 
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the most widely read and best loved books of modern Dutch literature. The 
novella has been reprinted more than 50 times, is studied in secondary 
schools and has been the subject of master’s theses and doctoral disserta-
tions. It formed the basis of a successful movie in 1993. In October 2009, one 
million copies of Oeroeg were distributed free of charge in Dutch libraries 
and schools, while in Jakarta an Indonesian translation was presented.94 The 
entire novel, printed on huge posters, was hung in bus shelters throughout 
the Netherlands and Belgium. It would seem that every Dutch household 
must own a copy of this undisputed classic of Dutch literature. In the 1990s, 
one journalist referred to it as “one of the most read books in post-war Dutch 
literature.”95 Clearly, this work qualif ies as being what Pierre Nora has called 
a lieux de mémoire, a place “where memory crystallizes and secretes itself.”96
Hella Haasse was born and raised in the Dutch East Indies, but had lived 
in the Netherlands for a decade. Oeroeg was her debut novel. Yet, despite her 
long and illustrious career, it is her f irst slim novella of little more than 70 
pages for which she is best remembered, not least because of the historical 
signif icance of the book. The novella is set in the Dutch East Indies and 
tells the tale of the childhood friendship between a Dutch totok boy and his 
native Indonesian friend called Oeroeg, and how this friendship collapsed 
as they grew older and Oeroeg became an Indonesian nationalist. As a novel 
set in the time of decolonization in the middle of the war of decolonization, 
it couldn’t have been more topical.
The book opens with words that seem prophetic: “Oeroeg is burnt like 
a seal into my life […] more than ever at this moment when every contact, 
every meeting has been reduced forever to the past.”97 Further, “Maybe I am 
stimulated by his [Oeroeg’s] irrevocable, incomprehensible otherness, that 
secret of spirit and blood, that for child and lad created no problem but that 
now seems all the more tormenting.”98 The young narrator paints a picture 
of life in the Indies that borders on the Rousseauesque, with Oeroeg being 
the admired embodiment of the young Noble Savage while the narrator 
feels ashamed of his own “freckles, and my reddening and peeling in the 
sun and I envied Oeroeg his even dark colour.”99 The narrator’s father is 
the chief of the tea plantation and he worries about his son’s relationship 
94 Bloembergen, “Oeroeg,” 422.
95 Rob de Kam, “Hans Hylkema verf ilmde klassiek boek van Hella Haasse: ‘Oeroeg’ – woorden 
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with Oeroeg: “You are going native [ Je verindischt]. That worries me.”100 
No doubt, the father suffered from the common worry of Dutch colonials 
about “the contaminating influence of servants on European children.”101
As teenagers, the boys remain best friends, and Oeroeg is one of the few 
natives to receive a good education. During these years, we learn that Oeroeg 
“did his best to undo anything that reminded him of the past. He only spoke 
Dutch, his clothing was obviously Western. […] [H]e did his best to pass 
for a half-blood.”102 Nevertheless, the narrator adds: “Neither clothing nor 
attitude could make him what he was not; one of us.”103 Oeroeg gradually 
discovers that he can never become Dutch. Instead, he migrates towards 
anti-Dutch nationalism, and the boys grow apart. The narrator travels to 
Holland for his studies just before the outbreak of World War Two, survives 
the German occupation without incident, is then called up for his military 
service and is sent back to the Dutch East Indies to help quell the disorder 
there.104 He f inds himself near his childhood home, and, dressed in Dutch 
military uniform, visits a small lake, Telaga Hideung, that holds strong 
memories for him. It was here that Oeroeg’s father had drowned while saving 
the narrator’s life. Then, amazingly, he comes face to face with Oeroeg, now 
an armed Indonesian nationalist. Oeroeg tells him: “Go away, otherwise I’ll 
shoot you. You have no business here.”105 The story closes with the narrator’s 
words: “It goes without saying that I didn’t understand him. I knew him, 
like I knew Telaga Hideung – as a mirrored surface. I never fathomed the 
depths. Is it too late? Am I forever a stranger in the land of my birth, on the 
ground from which I never want to be moved? Time will tell.”106 Of course, 
time did tell, and within two years of the publication of Oeroeg, the Dutch 
had lost their colony and Haasse, together with 300,000 other totoks and 
Indos, found herself permanently estranged from the land of her birth.
Oeroeg is a memory novella. Haasse had returned, from a point distant in 
place and time, to the beloved Indies of her childhood and youth, to create 
a representation of memory. Oeroeg is her attempt to say goodbye to the 
Dutch East Indies, but the grief that is evident in her prose demonstrates 
the profound sadness of mourning. For some of the book’s f irst readers it 
might have been simply a good story, a straightforward tale of friendship, 
100 Ibid., 40.
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laced with tropical atmosphere.107 However, given the contemporary state 
of affairs, the context of the story could not have been lost on the reader.
A reviewer in the Nieuwe Rotterdamsche Courant argued that it had 
undeniable literary value.108 A reviewer in the Algemeen Dagblad remarked 
that the “clear beauty” of the prose compelled the reader with admiration.109 
Indeed, all of the initial Dutch reviewers remarked on the literary quality 
of the writing. Some also saw political connotations. Van Randwijk wrote 
the f irst substantial review in Vrij Nederland. He hoped that “the novel will 
contribute to the interest and empathy of the Dutch for Indonesia” of which 
there was, according to Van Randwijk, a distinct lacking.110 On the other 
hand, the reviewer of Het Vrije Volk was relieved that the book was simply 
a good story, free of any political standpoint.111 Some reviewers, including 
Van Randwijk, felt that the ending was weak.112
On the other hand, C.J. Kelk in the left-wing De Groene Amsterdammer 
saw in the book “a childish declaration of love by white for brown, and at 
the same time a concerned and hidden declaration of love and a declaration 
of independence of the West to the strange, nostalgia inducing, mystery-
f illed birthplace.”113 In the socialist De Vlam, Jef Last also saw in Oeroeg 
political repercussions: “a precious gift to those for whom the freedom of 
the oppressed, coloured class is important. […] Oeroeg helps us understand 
the soul of the Indonesian revolutionary.”114
Some reviewers with an Indische background were harder on the book 
than their European colleagues. Haasse was attacked for creating a caricature 
in the person of Oeroeg.115 Two reviews appeared in the Batavian journal 
Orientatie. The f irst, from Dirk de Vries, focused on the literary aspects of 
the work, but three months later Indo writer and activist Tjalie Robinson 
accused Haasse of being the representative of a narrow totok community, 
unable to really understand his world.116 His review was filled with contempt, 
declaring “the book is Wrong.”117 As Sarah Fen argues, Robinson’s attack 
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seemed to be predicated on the idea that Haasse’s white skin excluded her 
from having an authentic memory of the Dutch East Indies.118
One might conclude that Oeroeg provides an example of what Said calls 
“‘they’ were not like ‘us,’ and for that reason deserved to be ruled.”119 We only 
come to know the thoughts of the narrator, while the sole main Indonesian 
character, Oeroeg, is rendered mute and is made visible only through the 
European gaze. For the narrator, Oeroeg remains the incomprehensible 
Other. Inevitably, he becomes an enigma for the reader, in the best (or 
worst) Orientalist tradition.
On the other hand, the chasm that opens between the two friends is 
clearly due to the political ignorance of the narrator, his inability to really 
know Oeroeg due to his unquestioned acceptance of the colonial structure; 
this ignorance is clearly demonstrated to the perceptive reader and was 
apparent to some early reviewers.120 The narrator even admits his own 
fault when he accepts that he had only known his Indonesian friend “as a 
mirrored surface.” However, because of the absence of multiple perspectives 
in the novel, and because the single narrator never questions the hegemonic, 
colonial authority, the justif ication of colonialism never becomes an explicit 
issue. The problems between the narrator and Oeroeg are played out at the 
level of personalities, and the underlying systems of inequality remain out 
of sight and unspoken. The diff iculties in the relationship between the 
narrator and Oeroeg are mirrored by the differences between ruler and 
ruled, between white and brown, but are played out in terms of individuals. 
This means that politics fail to become explicit, which is why the committee 
may have approved of it in the sensitive year of 1948.
It has been argued that Haasse worked narrowly within the traditional 
colonial discourse and authored a story that offers a variation of the colonial 
cultural project in which the exotic other is collected, examined, classi-
f ied, measured and narrated. Such is the conclusion of Pamela Pattynama, 
who reads Oeroeg as an example of colonial (as opposed to postcolonial) 
literature.121 Oeroeg is represented as an Orientalized Other. Haasse’s 
descriptions of Java unavoidably reminds one of Said’s famous words: “The 
Orient was almost a European invention, […] a place of romance, exotic 
beings, haunting memories and landscapes, remarkable experiences.”122 
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Haasse’s approach seemingly qualif ies as Orientalism according to Said’s 
def inition: “Orientalism is a style of thought based upon an ontological 
and epistemological distinction made between ‘the Orient’ and (most of 
the time) ‘the Occident.’”123
Certainly, the totok narrator mediates the character of Oeroeg. Haasse 
refrains from availing of any literary trope that would permit us to 
witness Oeroeg representing his own feelings, thoughts and emotions. 
He is the silent subaltern. From this perspective, Oeroeg essentializes 
the myth that East and West are forever divided into two unchanging 
identities. This essentialism is what Said objected to when he described 
Orientalism as being a system of thought suggesting “both an enduring 
Oriental reality and an opposing but no less enduring Western essence, 
which observes the Orient from afar and, so to speak, from above.”124 
It is almost as if he is describing the narrator of Oeroeg, when Said, 
discussing Kipling’s Kim, writes that the “imperial European would not 
or could not see he or she was an imperialist and, ironically, how it was 
that the non-European in the name of circumstances saw the European 
only as imperial.”125
Nevertheless, there is some intimation that Haasse’s narrator, while not 
questioning European hegemony, nevertheless has a dawning realization that 
other perspectives are possible. We are introduced to the Dutch character 
Gerard Stokman, the son of a soldier and are told that he “had lost his heart 
to Java, the hunt and the outdoor life.” Both the narrator and Oereog are in 
awe of this man, who tells them, “I never want to go to Holland.”126 Stokman 
lives a simple life and every weekend disappears into the mountains to go 
camping; one evening, while Oeroeg and the narrator camp with Stokman, 
we even catch a glimpse of a native character, Stokman’s coolie, Ali, who 
turns out to be a Sundanese teller of stories, of “animal fables and myths 
of demi-gods and miraculous creatures” (37).
One day, having noticed that other totok children treat Oereog differently, 
speaking to him like to a servant, the narrator naively asks Stokman: “Is 
Oeroeg less than we are?” Stokman answers that a panther is different from 
an ape, and asks: “[B]ut is one of the two less than the other?” He adds: “To 
be different – that is normal. […] [T]o be worth less or more because of the 
colour of your face or because of what your father is – that is nonsense” (42).
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More poignant is the character of the totok Lida, a former nurse who 
had emigrated from Holland, who had cared for the narrator and Oeroeg 
when they were teenagers but took a special interest in Oeroeg. As the 
narrator becomes estranged from his childhood friend, Lida grows closer to 
Oeroeg. She eventually becomes a nurse in a native hospital and supports 
the Indonesian nationalist cause. When the narrator visits Oeroeg, he f inds 
him living in a household with Lida, and the family of Abdullah Harudin, 
a youth with an Arab background who, like Oeroeg, is an anti-colonialism 
activist. The narrator doesn’t know what attitude to take towards his old 
friend. He notices that Lida, when she walks, has the stride of a local woman. 
The three fail to recover their old feeling of ease. “The split between their 
world and mine was complete,” the narrator informs us (70).
Oeroeg, the native or inlander, has turned towards Indonesian national-
ism, but so too have the totok Lida and the Arab Abdullah Harudin. We fail 
to really connect with their motivations, their arguments are basic, but only 
because the narrator lacks an understanding for the motivations of the 
three multicultural characters. The three make up a hybrid group, but the 
narrator does not realize that this failure to understand their motives is due 
to his own shortcoming, his own unquestioning acceptance of the colonial 
system. This is not Haasse’s failure. Haasse offered enough information so 
the perceptive postcolonial reader could see the unreliability of the narrator. 
The politics of the book are hidden, but present.
It can be argued that the novella covers the period of decolonization 
in a superf icial manner. The narrator travels to the Netherlands to study 
engineering in Delft. The German occupation of the Netherlands, which he 
experiences, is covered in a couple of lines; likewise the Japanese occupation 
of his place of birth. After the war, he hears about the “disorderly situation” 
that is the legacy of the Japanese occupation (71). He returns to the East 
Indies as the f irst “police action” is taking place. As an engineer, the narrator 
repairs bridges that were destroyed by the republicans (72). He witnesses 
a landscape blackened by the revolutionaries’ scorched-earth policy (73). 
Then, f inally, he has that fateful encounter with his former friend, that 
ends with those words, “Go away, otherwise I’ll shoot you. You have no 
business here” (74).
Let us consider this. The post-war problems are those of disorder, not 
revolution. The cause of the disorder is the Japanese occupation, not the 
injustices inherent in colonialism. The actions of the Dutch are police 
actions, not warfare. Destruction is caused by rebels, not by the Dutch who 
repair bridges. Such are the views of the narrator. But are we supposed to 
believe him?
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The narrator of Oeroeg is unreliable, locked within his unquestioning 
acceptance of the hegemonic structures of European imperialism. His failure 
is his belief in the inevitability of the clash of civilizations, not realizing that 
the cause of the clash should be sought within the inequalities inherent in 
the colonial project, rather than in any essentialized differences between 
East and West. As Stefanie van Gemert has argued, the narrator’s “inability to 
recognise and empathise with Oeroeg” was Haasse’s subtle way of criticizing 
“a more general, political blindness in the Netherlands: a Dutch inability to 
recognise violence when discussing the Indies.”127 Indeed, Gemert points 
out that none of the reviewers in the 1940s even mentioned the real political 
violence of the war of decolonization in their reviews – an early example 
of unremembering.128
In order to create a representation for remembering decolonization, 
Oeroeg was perhaps too subtle. The novel could have become a springboard 
for open discussion. That it did not is not a failure on the part of Haasse’s 
novel. By reducing the collapse of their friendship to the inevitability of 
misunderstanding when children come from different cultures and by 
providing a metaphor for the collapse of the Dutch colonial project, the 
reception of Haasse’s work began a process of unremembering, rather than 
remembering. The reading, discussing and rereading of Oeroeg, rather 
than creating a collective memory of decolonization, initiated a process 
in which it was thought that colonization was a tragic error, bound to fail 
due to the unbridgeable divide between the culture of the totok/Indos on 
the one hand and the culture of the natives on the other. Details regarding 
decolonization like “police actions,” massacres, possible war crimes could 
remain unspoken.
Oeroeg became a site of longing made more acutely painful because 
it was a longing, not only for a world that no longer existed, but could no 
longer exist. In this sense, the reading and rereading of Oeroeg reinforced 
a repetition-memory, as suggested by Ricoeur, initiating and continuing a 
collective unremembering sustained by the grief that came from a traumatic 
loss. Oeroeg became an instrument through which a melancholic longing for 
the past could be acted out. This mythical memory conveyed a simple mes-
sage, untested by past reality: that the loss of the colony had been inevitable 
because the two cultures, the European and the Indonesian, had become 
estranged from each other due to mutual Otherness. It is ironic, as Marieke 
Bloembergen puts it, that Oeroeg came to be seen as the example of politically 
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incorrect nostalgia for the colonial past, while in fact Haasse’s novella 
provided “the place [aanknopingspunten] to reflect upon the complexity of 
that colonial past.”129 Instead, it was read as a representation of what Maier 
has labelled the “mutual othering” of the waning years of colonialism.130
Historiography of the Conflict: Early Beginnings
Hubertus J. van Mook
Former Lieutenant Governor-General Hubertus J. van Mook’s Indonesië, 
Nederland en de Wereld (Indonesia, the Netherlands and the world), was 
published in February 1949. Van Mook had been at the helm of Dutch govern-
ment in the colony, leading the Dutch government in exile in Australia during 
the Japanese occupation and returning to Batavia in 1945. An enlightened 
colonial, Van Mook devoted his life to the betterment of the colony in which 
he had been born. As a member of a group of intellectuals associated with the 
periodical De Stuw, he advocated throughout the 1930s for the development 
of the colony until the point when an Indonesian commonwealth could be 
accepted as an independent nation.131 This earned him the enmity of Carel 
Gerretson, professor at the University of Utrecht, who argued that Van Mook 
and the De Stuw members formed a sort of Girondist club whose aim was to 
betray the Netherlands by creating an enlightened despotism in the colony 
under their control.132 During the Indonesian War of Independence, Van 
Mook had opened negotiations with the Indonesian nationalist leadership, 
earning him the wrath of die-hard colonialists. However, he had also ordered 
the f irst “police action.” Political in-fighting led to his removal from power in 
late 1948. Indonesië, Nederland en de Wereld was his attempt to tell the story.
Not surprisingly, he did not blame himself for the bloodshed. Nor did 
he blame the government in The Hague, though he revealed some of the 
miscalculations of his conservative fellow colonials. Mainly Van Mook 
blamed the interference of inexpert foreigners – the British and the naive 
Americans, the unreliable Australians, the newly independent Indians, the 
calculating Russians and their communist satellites, and the do-gooders 
at the United Nations.
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At the founding conference of the United Nations in San Francisco in 
1945, Van Mook had rejected the notion that the Dutch East Indies should 
become a trusteeship of the UN.133 Months after his book’s publication he 
still maintained that it was chiefly the concern of the Netherlands and 
Indonesia themselves.134 He argued that the government of the Netherlands 
had always defended the best interests of the Indonesians.135
Van Mook began his book by warning the reader of the new imperialism 
of the Soviet Union. The Soviets, he claimed, preyed on the poor and weak 
but their ultimate aim was not liberation but driving out the West. They are 
helped, he added, by fellow travellers such as Australia, who in the United 
Nations stood on the same side as the Soviets.136
An initial error of perception, according to Van Mook, was for the Labour 
government in Britain to accept all Asian liberation movements at face value. 
The British committed a grievous error by semi-off icially recognizing the 
Indonesian republican movement (90-91). He repeated this point at a lecture 
at Chatham House in March 1949.137 Had the British quickly disarmed the 
Japanese, rather than permitting the latter to hand over their weapons 
to Indonesian nationalists, “a lot of misery would have been spared the 
Indonesians and Dutch.”138
The situation in 1945 was complicated by the strike by Australian workers, 
inspired by the Australian Communist Party (88), as well as the British 
refusal to allow Dutch troops to return to Java and Sumatra (95). Although 
Van Mook was repelled by the idea of negotiating with the collaborator 
Sukarno, in October 1945 he began personal negotiations with the national-
ists, including Sukarno. This caused widespread negative reactions among 
the public in the Netherlands and began a rift between Van Mook and the 
authorities in The Hague (102-105). The minutes of a meeting of the Dutch 
cabinet reveal that they considered Van Mook’s behaviour to be “incorrect 
and not acceptable to the government” and immediately began discussing 
the process of replacing him.139 A week later, Minister for Overseas Territories 
Logemann (and fellow De Stuw member) wrote to Van Mook, letting him 
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know that important sections of the Dutch public and parliament considered 
his meeting with Sukarno an act of “national treason.”140
Shortly thereafter Van Mook visited the Netherlands and was alarmed by 
the strong sentiments that he encountered there, as well as the stridency of 
some voices.141 Similarly, when Dutch authorities sat down with Indonesian 
nationalist leaders at the Hoge Veluwe Conference in April 1946, Van Mook 
was disappointed by the exaggerated security measures, as well as the refusal 
of the Dutch government to allow Van Mook to make any public statements 
and by the negative attitude of the Dutch press. From this time onward, he 
tells us, he became the target of a criticism and lies in the Dutch press, from 
which the government failed to defend him adequately (132-140).
Nevertheless, negotiations between the two sides continued in Indonesia 
itself, culminating in November 1946 in the Linggadjati Agreement. Accord-
ing to Van Mook, many believed that the conflict was now over. Feelings 
of optimism seemed confirmed when the news reached Indonesia that a 
majority in the Dutch parliament had voted to ratify the accord. Alas, it 
became clear that what the Dutch authorities had accepted was a truncated 
version of Linggadjati – an interpretation of the original agreement of their 
own devising which was rejected by the Indonesians (157-169).
Van Mook mentioned that around this time he ordered a special military 
action in South Celebes, in order to put an end to the nationalist regime of 
systematic terror on this island. He admitted that during the pacif ication 
of the island, the Dutch had committed “excesses” (171). Van Mook writes 
that Dutch soldiers had become the daily targets of nationalists and the 
breakdown in law and order had become almost unbearable (165). At last, 
Van Mook, the Commission General and the government in The Hague 
concluded that a military solution was the only option (182).
He described the “police action” of 1947 as a military success, with 
Indonesians greeting Dutch soldiers with relief. It seemed logical that the 
cleansing of the republican areas should continue but the UN intervened. A 
Security Council resolution called for a ceasefire and this was immediately 
accepted by the Dutch government. Van Mook felt betrayed; he had been 
forced to stop, with the job only half done (182-188). Speaking of the Security 
Council’s resolution some time later, he called it “a calamity.”142 Not only 
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that, but the Netherlands also accepted the presence of a UN-appointed 
Commission of Good Services in Indonesia, thereby allowing what Van 
Mook considered to be “inexpert international meddling.”143
Van Mook tells us that the communist influence among the republicans 
grew stronger and that non-communist nationalists began to draw nearer 
to the Soviet Union as they awaited a third world war they expected Russia 
to win. He argued that the members of the Commission of Good Services 
were blind to the true nature of the republican government and that the 
American in the group had concluded that a communist takeover of the 
republican area could only be avoided with far-reaching concessions.144 Van 
Mook’s sense of betrayal deepened when it became clear that by mid-1948 
the authorities in The Hague had come to consider him an obstacle that 
had to be removed. On 5 October 1948, Prime Minister Drees informed Van 
Mook that his services were no longer required.145 In November, he departed 
from Indonesia. The following month the Dutch began their second military 
“police action.” This too was brought to an abrupt end “by an inevitable new 
action of the Security Council.”146
Van Mook concluded his book in February 1949 with a call for the In-
donesians and the Dutch to together build something great, to serve as a 
beacon for Southeast Asia.147 One cannot help but conclude that the type 
of people Van Mook had in mind to construct this beacon were people like 
himself. He desired reform from the top down. He believed that Indonesia 
should be free, after a transition under European (that is, colonial) tutelage. 
Ultimately, it had to be Europeans like Van Mook who would judge when 
the natives were ready for independence. This was the ideology of late 
colonialism, described by Syed Hussein Alatas: “an ideology that recognized 
the need to improve native welfare and for the eventual independence of the 
country, but only after a certain amount of ‘training and preparation.’”148 
Enlightened colonialism was still colonialism.
Van Mook’s colonial imagination could not comprehend the power of the 
Indonesian revolution that surrounded him, because his cultural archive 
would not allow it. As Michel-Rolph Trouillot has argued, for those who lead 
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a system of colonial domination, radical revolution is not only incomprehen-
sible, it is unthinkable.149 Van Mook’s account therefore ignored the growth 
of Indonesian nationalism. He could only see it as an extension of Japanese 
power. This blind spot continued to dog Dutch representations of the war, 
despite H. Bouman’s PhD dissertation (1949). Bouman cogently argued that 
an understanding of Indonesian nationalism was complicated by pre-war 
colonial attitudes (Said’s “cultural archive”), leading to its underestimation.150 
Dutch repression during the 1920s and 1930s had made colonialism seem 
safe, but led the Dutch to mistake “the lack of a nationalist movement for 
a lack of nationalism.”151
Van Mook was not alone in underestimating the force of Indonesian 
nationalism. In an article from 1942, foreign affairs expert Eelco van Kleffens 
argued that “when Japan invaded and occupied the Netherlands Indies, 
the native population in the islands, so far from making an attempt to rise 
against Holland or even exploit the situation, […] remained loyal to the 
kingdom of which they form a part.”152 This wishful thinking is present in 
the report from Frans H. Visman from June 1945, where he suggested that 
in liberated areas of Indonesia the population “eagerly reported” to the 
Dutch authorities.153
In Van Mook’s representation, the Dutch would have prepared Indonesia 
for independence under the Dutch crown. The Japanese occupation initiated 
a catastrophe. Sukarno had been a quasi-fascist collaborator of the Japanese. 
The Dutch were needed in Indonesia to counteract Soviet expansionism but 
were betrayed by their inexpert Western allies and the UN. These tropes 
would reappear in a repetition-memory that contributed to unremembering 
for decades to come. What Van Mook represented is that the Dutch were 
not f ighting a war of reconquest, but a police action that, once successful, 
would lead to decolonization through a peaceful process.
Jacques de Kadt
In May 1949, a counterargument appeared from the leftist parliamentarian 
Jacques de Kadt. His De Indonesische tragedie: Het treurspel van gemiste 
kansen (The Indonesian tragedy: A tragedy of missed chances) accused the 
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Dutch government of following a policy whose goal was to deny Indonesia 
real freedom. Van Mook’s aim, according to De Kadt, had been to create a 
federation composed of weak, small states over which the Netherlands could 
continue to exert its control.154 He compared Van Mook to an enlightened 
despot.155
Jewish, and a former communist activist, De Kadt had narrowly escaped 
with his parents and brother from the German invasion of the Netherlands 
in 1940, arriving in the Dutch East Indies that same year. Upon arrival he 
was detained, being considered a dangerous Trotskyist with connections 
to Hatta and Indonesian nationalists. After the Japanese invasion, he and 
his family were interned in a Japanese prison camp. Neither of his parents 
survived. After the defeat of the Japanese, De Kadt began writing for Het 
Parool. His articles argued against Dutch military intervention in Indonesia. 
In late 1945, he published an article in the British New Statesman and Nation 
calling on Prime Minister Atlee to not commit a crime against liberty by 
aiding the Dutch government in Indonesia. In March 1946, De Kadt left the 
colony, returning to the Netherlands to join the Labour Party. He was elected 
to parliament in 1947, where he was one of a minority that condemned 
Dutch military actions. Writing De Indonesische Tragedie was his way of 
expressing his anger.156
De Kadt’s main purpose was to attack the type of Dutch smugness 
that will not listen to foreigners, because the Dutch know best.157 He 
attacked the belief that the colony was run by a democratic leader-
ship, pointing out that even under the threat of Japanese invasion the 
leadership could not imagine mobilizing the Indonesian majority (17). 
Instead, the colonists lived in a bubble, isolated from the locals, with 
the exception of their servants. For them, Indonesian independence 
lay decades or even centuries in the future. De Kadt pointed out that 
people came by the tens of thousands to hear Sukarno speak during 
the 1920s. The response by the authorities was repression by a type of 
moderate Gestapo. Under such conditions, where even mild expressions 
of nationalism were confronted with repression, Europeans remained 
ignorant of the depth of Indonesian discontent. Indeed, Dutch contempt 
for Indonesian nationalists distorted their judgement so that, when the 
colonial leadership f led to safety in Australia, no one considered bringing 
154 De Kadt, De Indonesische tragedie, 143.
155 Ibid., 111.
156 Havenaar, De tocht, 155-167.
157 De Kadt, De Indonesische tragedie, 5-6.
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their prisoners with them (26-71). Consequently, Sukarno and Hatta, 
liberated by the Japanese, worked with the Japanese to make Indonesian 
nationalism a mass movement.
De Kadt argued that the panic demonstrated by the Dutch on the eve of 
the Japanese invasion, as well as their “exceptionally despicable” attempt to 
defend themselves, destroyed their reputation among most Indonesians, who 
were happy to see them defeated (57-59). He attacked the myth that Sukarno 
and Hatta were Japanese collaborators. They worked with the Japanese 
because they were promised home rule. As a consequence, Indonesians 
were placed in positions of economic and civil service leadership that they 
could never have dreamt of achieving under the Dutch. He argued that 
most Indonesians had turned against the Japanese by 1945, but remained 
devoted to Sukarno (72-81).
De Kadt ref lected on his own experience in a Japanese prison camp. 
He found the atmosphere among his fellow prisoners not particularly 
anti-Japanese, but rather anti-Indonesian. The common point of view was 
that the “natives” had betrayed the Dutch. They found having Indonesian 
leadership in their camps, instead of Japanese, particularly humiliating. 
A common point of view, he claimed, was that the Indonesians lacked 
gratitude for all the things the Dutch had done for them. After the libera-
tion he found himself the only one who claimed that Sukarno and the 
nationalists would have a permanent inf luence on Indonesian politics 
(86-92).
Unlike Van Mook, De Kadt argued that the republic was anti-Japanese, 
a creation of the Indonesians themselves. Contrary to Van Mook, he ex-
pressed understanding for the Americans who were reluctant to f ight for 
old-fashioned Dutch colonialism and he likewise argued that the British 
had no option but to deal with the Indonesian republican government while 
the Dutch still spoke the outdated language of the pre-war colonial world. 
The short-sightedness of the Dutch was shown by their resolve to negotiate 
with only “good” Indonesians and never with collaborators like Sukarno. 
In other words, as Jennifer Foray puts it, when the Dutch authorities were 
confronted with a major problem in their largest colony, “they viewed the 
conflict through the interpretive lenses forged out of f ive years of German 
occupation” and consequently, “memories of World War II overlapped and 
informed understandings of the decolonization process then unfolding in 
Indonesia.”158
158 Foray, “Trauma of Liberation,” 85.
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De Kadt described Van Mook’s approach towards the Indonesian national-
ists as follows:
Just a couple of months earlier they had declared an independent republic 
and now they were invited to give this up in exchange for a return to the 
old colonial relationship with the understanding that this relationship 
would be, say, 10 or 20 per cent better than before the war.
He judged that the colonial attitudes of leaders like Van Mook, Minister 
Logemann and Prime Ministers Schermerhorn and Drees were “the most 
backward in the world.”159 Alternative plans were ignored by Van Mook 
and the Dutch authorities. It was this obstinate behaviour of the colonial 
Dutch, and the British, that unleashed the violence of the Bersiap period, 
according De Kadt (115-126).
The failure of the Hoge Veluwe negotiations marked an early missed 
chance for the Dutch, while the changes that the Dutch brought to the 
Linggadjati Agreement were Van Mook’s attempt to ensure that a federated 
Indonesian state would be a weak collection of puppet states under Dutch 
control (127-134). He accused the Dutch leadership of having little patience 
for painstaking negotiation, especially the Catholics among the leaders 
(139-160). Thus they choose the military solution.
De Kadt described the second “police action” as the violence of a 
totalitarian state destined for bankruptcy. De Kadt f inished his j’accuse 
by declaring that the Netherlands is following a suicidal policy based on 
lies and trickery. The only hope was to quickly grant full sovereignty to 
Indonesia (176-197). Furthermore, he predicted that Indonesia would not 
only gain independence, but that it would fully break with the Netherlands 
and be, for the Netherlands, “completely lost” (199). Finally, he maintained 
that what was needed in 1945 was Dutch recognition of full Indonesian 
independence. This would have allowed close connections to continue, based 
on economic, cultural, technological and organizational cooperation (201). 
What remains instead is the shameful narrowmindedness, incompetence 
and smugness. He concluded: “The idiots who claim that we are right and 
that the entire world errs, and the even bigger idiots who claim that we are 
a shining example for the world, deserve to be seen as what they are: people 
who failed completely and who have caused immeasurable damage to our 
country and our people” (203).
159 De Kadt, De Indonesische tragedie, 114.
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Not everyone was pleased with De Kadt’s message. He had, after all, 
attacked not only the colonial conservatives, but also leading socialists like 
Willem Drees. One journalist, Jan Fabius, sued De Kadt for insulting him 
and the court ordered the reference to be expunged.160 De Kadt’s biographer, 
Ronald Havenaar, claimed that only one reviewer supported De Kadt in all of 
his major arguments.161 Yet Henk van den Doel argues that most historians 
supported De Kadt’s general conclusions.162 If this was indeed the case, 
they succeeded in keeping it to themselves. During the following decades, 
most historians avoided the topic of the 1945-1949 colonial war altogether.
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3 Post-decolonization: The First 
20 Years, 1949-1969
Abstract
While the German occupation of Holland came to dominate post-war 
Dutch collective memory, the memories of those repatriated from Indo-
nesia suffered from a loss of place. This caused a traumatic rupture in 
remembering. During the 1950s and early 1960s, nostalgic remembering 
in the works of the likes of Dermoût and Nieuwenhuys, as well as feelings 
of existential angst and victimhood, contributed to unremembering the 
reality of decolonization. However, memories of military brutality were 
present in the stories of Beb Vuyk and in the memoirs and novels of some 
veterans. Unlike American and Australian historians, few Dutch historians 
showed much interest in decolonization. Despite some promising historical 
work in the early 1950s, historians and memoirists ignored the reality of 
warfare.
Keywords: collective memory, unremembering, decolonization, nostalgia, 
Indonesia, Dutch East Indiess
The Great Unremembering
With the conflict in Indonesia over, there began decades of relative quiet 
in the Netherlands. Not only was decolonization unremembered, works of 
f iction and non-f iction set in post-independence Indonesia received little 
public recognition.1 Marije Goos argues that little attention was given to 
decolonization in Dutch literary periodicals.2 World War Two and the Ger-
man occupation came to dominate the Dutch need for commemoration.3
1 Raben, “De dagen,” 27.
2 Goos, Een hard en waakzaam hond, 185-187.
3 Oostindie, Schulte Nordholt and Steijlen, Postkoloniale Monumenten, 11.
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Totoks and Indos complained that that no Dutch off icials were present 
when they were liberated from the Japanese prison camps after the 
Japanese surrender.4 Three months after the Japanese surrender, most 
former camp prisoners were still displaced persons. One and a half years 
after the Japanese surrender, the f irst wave of repatriation had yet to be 
completed. This was partially due to bad preparation on the part of the 
Dutch authorities. However, many repatriates came to feel that their 
suffering had been prolonged by corruption and nepotism.5 Hundreds 
of thousands of Dutch citizens eventually left the new republic and 
received what some later came to remember as a cold welcome in the 
metropole.6 The f irst Indische self-help organizations were camp reunion 
committees. These provided ways of speaking about their mistreatment 
by the Dutch.7
Few people in the Netherlands were interested in stories of hardship 
in Japanese prison camps. There was even less interest in tales of violence 
during the Bersiap period. The disinterest they faced was similar to the 
experience of Jews who, when returning from the camps in Eastern Europe 
or from hiding, found that few wanted to listen to their stories.8 Similarly, 
the soldiers of the Dutch army arrived home to a country that, shamed by 
defeat, had lost interest.9
With the experience of World War Two still fresh, the equalitarian 
Dutch settled into a collective memory that stressed the sameness of 
the citizen’s experience. The Dutch had suffered under their German 
neighbour and all had suffered equally. In 1946, respected Dutch historian 
Jan Romein published an article in which he outlined how the Dutch had 
reacted to the hardship of World War Two. The Dutch in the East Indies 
never earned a mention. Even his title, “The Occupation,” was singular.10 
(Similarly, his book-length study of Asian nationalisms, published in 
Dutch in 1956 and in English in 1962, all but ignored the Indonesian War 
of Independence.)11
The presence of hundreds of thousands of new migrants, most of whom 
had a skin colour darker then the majority white Dutch, was a reminder of the 
4 Kristel, “Inleiding,” 8.
5 Brocades Zaalberg and Willems, “Onmacht,” 64-84.
6 Oostindie, Post Koloniaal, 26.
7 Kristel, “Inleiding,” 20.
8 Willems, Van wie, 95.
9 Van Doorn, Gevangen, 38.
10 Romein,” The Spirit,” 169-180.
11 Romein, The Asian Century.
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colonial past, but this demographic change worked in a way that reinforced 
the silence. For some, “repatriation” meant setting foot in metropolitan 
Holland for the very f irst time, but 85 per cent of the f irst wave had been 
in Holland before. They brought with them a certain amount of cultural 
capital. Over 90 per cent possessed full Dutch citizenship. They nearly all 
were Christian, had experience of Dutch values and way of life, and spoke 
Dutch on a daily basis. A sizable number had been part of the governing elite 
and had political experience. However, many had had no direct experience 
of living in the Netherlands for any extended period. The elite had lost their 
colonial lifestyle and this could not be replicated. Claims for compensation 
for their loss of wealth and property and claims for back pay for unpaid 
wages during war years were continually postponed.12 For much of the 
Dutch public, the “Eastern Dutch” were seen as reactionaries – a spoilt, 
conservative, colonial class.13
In order to accelerate assimilation many repatriates decided that 
colonial rule and the failed “police actions” should not become issues of 
public debate.14 Integration meant, to a large degree, “unlearning what was 
one’s own: the accepted ‘Indies’ lifestyle.”15 With a minimum of effort on 
the part of governmental authorities, integration was a success.16 By the 
mid-1950s, they had achieved nearly full employment.17 By the late 1960s, 
repatriates had more or less achieved parity with the home-grown Dutch 
in the areas of employment, education and within church life, but the cost 
was that their past had not been integrated into the national memory.18 
Most Dutch people knew nothing about the distinction between “Indisch” 
and “Indonesian.”19
The price paid for assimilation was the suppression of memory. Recalling 
his own experience of mixing with Indisch youths in school during the 1950s 
and 1960s, historian Wim Willems remembers: “No one told stories of the 
land they had come from, the other war of their parents, the flight to the 
Netherlands or the family connections with Indonesia.”20
12 Bosma, Terug, 35-131.
13 Oostindie, Post Koloniaal, 25-26.
14 Pattynama, “Herinneringsliteratuur,” 215.
15 Van Leeuwen, “Het Indisch Huis,” 278.
16 Oostindie, Post Koloniaal, 29, 41, 60-61.
17 Bosma, Terug, 123.
18 Bosma, Raben and Willems, De Geschiedenis, 68.
19 Ibid., 139.
20 Willems, Van wie, 87.
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Loss
Indo is the term that came into common usage to refer to Dutch citizens 
descended from European and Indonesian blood. Since 1828, the criterion 
in the Dutch East Indies for the right to Dutch citizenship was having a 
Dutch ancestor.21 Many European men in the colony lived with a native 
concubine. Children of these relationships, if recognized by the father, gained 
citizenship.22 The number of mixed marriages between European men and 
native women (the other way around was almost unheard of) rose from about 
13 per cent of European marriages in the late nineteenth century to 27.5 per 
cent in 1925, tapering off to 20 per cent by 1940. The number of concubinages 
approximately equalled the number of mixed marriages in 1940.23 Thus, 
a signif icant number of Dutch in the colony were mainly descended from 
locals, but with a (male) white ancestor. Off icially, there was no colour bar 
blocking those of mixed heritage from reaching the highest echelons in 
society. By the twentieth century, Indos were found at high levels of colonial 
society.24 Discrimination among the elite existed, though some argue that 
the criterion for social mobility was based on education rather than colour.25 
However, the period from 1942 to 1949 formed a deep discontinuity in this 
history. Indisch people went from being engineers of colonial policy, to 
prisoners of the Japanese, victims of Indonesian nationalists and f inally 
displaced persons in the Netherlands.
Aleida Assmann argues that places “are of prime importance for the 
construction of cultural memory,” because they “embody continuity.”26 
Places bear traces of memory. In the absence of place, memories remain 
beyond recollection. Memory is triggered by place because that which 
is remembered happened in place. We say that events take place. Events 
takes place within a topography that is meaningful and is appropriated 
by one’s identity. A catastrophe for memory ensues when an entire social 
group, through forced translocation, loses their houses and their cities. 
They f ind themselves transported to an alien world that knows nothing 
of their former homes and cities, and demonstrates disinterest in their 
experiences and memories. Paul Connerton argues that the house and city 
street provide powerful loci of memory. The house is a memory device, a 
21 Bosma, Terug, 61.
22 Cottaar and Willems, Indische Nederlanders, 14.
23 Ibid.
24 Bosma, Terug, 37.
25 Bosma, Raben and Willems, De Geschiedenis, 36.
26 Assmann, Cultural Memory, 282.
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medium of representation that can be read as a mnemonic system. The 
furnishings within the home “remind us of the shared history,” while the city 
street forms a web of memories that help to create “a web of public trust.” 
This is taken for granted until war deprives one of one’s house.27
With the Indisch community forcibly removed to the Netherlands, places 
that could anchor collective memory had been lost. Major Dutch cities 
provided constant reminders of colonial times, not only in the form of 
Indisch shops and restaurants, but also in the form of Indisch buurten or 
neighbourhoods where all streets were named after islands and cities in 
the Indonesian archipelago.28 These street names were now markers of 
an absence. The Indisch community found themselves amputated from 
their past.
Those forced to flee their homeland become, in Salman Rushdie’s words, 
“haunted by some sense of loss,” but the writers among them share an “urge 
to reclaim.”29 Among the exiled repatriates, writers like Maria Dermoût, 
Tjalie Robinson and Rob Nieuwenhuys played leading roles in the “urge 
to reclaim.” Their work provides an example of what Ricoeur described as 
mourning for loss by psychically prolonging the existence of the loss.30
Maria Dermoût: Memory and Nostalgia31
In 1951, a novel was published which reflected one writer’s urge to reclaim. 
Maria Dermoût, born and partly raised in the Dutch East Indies, had left the 
colony and “repatriated” with her husband to the Netherlands in 1933. The 
loss of the colony meant that there was no possibility of return for Dermoût, 
or for the hundreds of thousands of “repatriates.” What could be reclaimed 
was the literary representation of place by means of memory.
Nog pas gisteren (Only yesterday) was her f irst published book and, 
although she was 63 years of age at the time of its publication, the vivid 
memories inscribed in the book create the feeling that it was only yesterday 
that she had left the former colony and her childhood. The f irst sentence 
localizes memory: “On Java, somewhere in Central Java, in between the 
mountains Lawoe and Wilis, but closer to the side of Lawoe, deep in a walled 
garden under dark green trees, was a house.”32 Similarly, her second novel, 
27 Connerton, How Modernity, 18-27.
28 Nas and Boersma, “Feeling at Home,” 150-156.
29 Rushdie, Imaginary Homelands, 10.
30 Ricoeur, Memory, 72.
31 Most of this section has been previously published: Doolan, “Marie Dermout,” 1-28.
32 Dermoût, Verzameld werk, 9.
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The Ten Thousand Things, from 1955, opens with the following words: “On 
the island in the Moluccas there were a few gardens left from the great days 
of spice growing and ‘spice parks’ – a few only. There had been many, and 
on this island they had even long ago been called not ‘parks’ but ‘gardens.’” 
This is followed by a description of the garden as it looks now, as well “as 
then,” with its “spice trees clustered together, kind with kind, clove with 
clove, nutmeg with nutmeg, a few high shades trees in between, kanari 
trees usually, and on the bay-side coconut palms and plane trees to give 
shelter from the wind.”33
In both works Dermoût emplaces the memory work that follows. The f irst 
novel offers an almost cartographical emplacement of the house of memory, 
the second proceeds by placing the garden of memory on an unidentif ied 
Moluccan island, clearly Ambon, and then offers a description of the garden’s 
layout. In this garden there is a broken-down house, and Dermoût asks, 
“What was left of all the glory?” She tells us that it is memory that remains: 
“The remembrance of a human being, of something that happened, can 
remain in a place.”34 This is why both works are saturated with a strong 
presence of place – because place holds memory. Furthermore, both novels, 
in their openings, possess a suggestion of the searching, probing nature 
of memory work. Only Yesterday, with its vague “somewhere” in Central 
Java, then its narrowing in to a location between two mountains, then 
immediately corrected to “but closer to the side of Laroe.” The description of 
the garden in The Ten Thousand Things, contains the phrase “Now, as then,” 
linking the present with the past, like the place of remembering linked 
with the place of the remembered. Both novels attempt to counteract the 
painful absence, bringing the past into the Dutch present by representing 
memory at work.
Memory, Identity, Place
Marc Auge has written that ethnic groups seek identity through the demarca-
tion of soil, creating a myth of a society “anchored since time immemorial 
in the permanence of an intact soil” and that the group “is established, 
assembled and united by the identity of place.” When the territory can no 
longer be read as a marker of identity, the group f inds itself, wherever it 
might be, in a non-place. When a people are forced to migrate, then their 
place becomes a place of memory.35 The Indisch community had diverse 
33 Dermoût, The Ten Thousand, 5.
34 Ibid., 5-6.
35 Auge, Non-Places, 36-63.
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origins, but, it was the Dutch East Indies that provided the place of their 
establishment, assemblage and unity, their “intact soil.” By the 1950s, this 
homeland no longer existed, neither spatially nor temporally, and they 
found themselves inhabiting a non-place. This was of great signif icance in 
Dermoût’s attempts to emplace her memories in thick descriptions of the 
landscapes of Ambon and Java. Dermoût was exiled from her territory and 
amputated from her place; her works attempted to reclaim it by means of 
the evocation of a place of memory.
Only Yesterday
Only Yesterday tells the story of twelve-year-old Riek, an only child. Her 
childhood is near idyllic, with a beautiful house, servants, a loving native 
baboe or nanny who sleeps on a mat by her bed. She is surrounded by stories 
that keep her awake at night.36 Sleep arrives only with forgetfulness, a 
metaphor for the Dutch postcolonial situation in which repatriates will only 
achieve contentment though forgetting. Riek’s life is surrounded by secrets. 
Violence is only slightly out of sight. The sultan wants to buy a particular 
beautiful boy “to play with,” despite the fact that he has over a hundred 
others (16). Riek is afraid of Arabs (17). Aunt Nancy reads her fairy stories 
but breaks down in tears because of homesickness (30-31). Everyone seems 
to have secrets, including Riek, who has spied married Nancy locked in an 
embrace with bachelor “Uncle Fred” (35). Riek and her mother visit an old, 
wise man in the mountains; he knows about plants and herbs, astrology 
and the ancient kingdoms of Java (38-41). When the old man dies, Riek feels 
the loss deeply, not just the loss of the old man, but also his garden, the 
mountains where he lived, the old Buddhist temples and Hindu gods (46). 
It is a premonition of a loss to come.
Riek’s childhood is threatened as the native population grows restless 
and burns sugar plantations. Her family are gripped by fear. “Why do they 
want to murder us?,” the little girl wonders (49). The burnings stop, but a 
servant is killed and Riek encounters the reality of murder (50-52). By the 
end of the novel Nancy becomes a persona non grata, Fred goes into exile 
and dies and Fred’s devoted manservant, Boeyoeng, overwhelmed with 
sadness, departs for his home in Sumatra. Riek’s baboe, Oerip, leaves after 
years of devoted service. Nothing remains, Dermoût seems to be saying. One 
morning, Riek’s father informs her that she is to be sent to the Netherlands 
to attend secondary school. She thinks to herself “dying and going away, 
it’s the same thing” (84). But, before she leaves, she tries to take it all in: 
36 Dermoût, Verzameld werk, 14-19.
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“There was so much: besides all the people, also the other things that she 
loved – her place on earth until now. […] All of the mountains, the entire 
range – she knew them all out of her head. Java and her blue mountains, 
and the surrounding blue sea” (85). The novel ends with the words: “She 
needed time to lose it all” (85).
Dermoût had left the Dutch East Indies before decolonization. The 
memories that she recalls are of a time further back, in her own childhood 
in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. However, her work 
served as a metaphor for decolonization, which explains its popularity 
among the displaced Indisch population. As Pattynama points out, the 
ending, “foreshadows the national loss of the Indies.”37 Thick descriptions 
of nature, sounds, houses and food combine to retrieve the lost and bring 
it into the present. It is in the periphery of the story we glimpse allusions 
to colonial cruelty: “When you strike, you must hit hard”38; the oppression 
of the faceless peasants and the fear of their colonial masters who prepare 
for revolt (48); the rigid class system (36).
Decolonization meant that the place that had provided the group with an 
identity had been lost. The European rule of Indonesia had passed, just like 
the rule of the earlier Buddhist and Hindu kingdoms. The memory of this 
loss is fresh and painful but it too will pass, until forgetfulness is achieved. 
In the meantime, we have memory. However, the novel unremembers the 
historical causes of the loss and no reasons are given as to why the idyll 
had to end.
The Ten Thousand Things
The Ten Thousand Things appeared in 1955. We have seen how it opens with 
the emplacement of the story within a garden on an island in the Moluccas, 
the so-called Spice Islands. This story is told in sections or frames. However, 
the English translation reworked these frames, to Dermoût’s satisfaction, 
and thereby “made visible the deeply hidden foundation of the narrative 
framing.”39 The titles emphasized the importance of place for the localization 
of memory: “The Island,” “At the Inner Bay,” “At the Outer Bay,” and again “The 
Island.” The main character, Felicia, is referred to as “the lady of the Small 
Garden,” rooting her in a sense of place. In the second frame, “At the Inner 
Bay,” it is not so much the lady of the Small Garden but, as Olf Praamstra 
37 Pattynama, “(Un)happy Endings,” 100.
38 Dermout, Verzameld werk, 55.
39 Freriks, Geheim, 85.
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has pointed out, it is the garden itself who is the main character.40 This 
rootedness in place is an example of Auge’s claim that a group’s identity is 
united through the identity of place.41
The Ten Thousand Things is set in Ambon just before World War One. 
Yet, it is as if Dermoût still dwelled deep within that world. She writes that 
inanimate objects, manmade or natural, hold memories of the distant past.42 
Songs are vehicles of memory (13). Recitation enhances memory (36, 51). 
Narratives operate as a form of ars memoria (80). Memory is embodied, like 
when one picks up an implement and the hand remembers (108). Memory is 
outsourced to written notes (156). Photography acts as a prosthetic memory 
(160-162). In this world of remembering, forgetting is like a disease, as when 
a professor complains about his memory and wonders if he has malaria 
(176). The slave bell is rung every time a boat enters or leaves the bay, but 
sometimes it is forgotten (7). Stones are erected as markers of everlasting 
remembrance, but the graves lie forgotten (10-11). A grandmother warns her 
grandchild: “[F]orgetting is not good” (87).
Each frame narrates a story of violent loss. Life amidst the magnif icent 
nature is undermined through dark undercurrents. This sense of loss, had 
been experienced personally by Dermoût. The lady of the Small Garden 
is the f ifth generation to own the garden; “her son would have been the 
sixth generation,” but her son is murdered and she is the end of the line 
(6). Dermoût, too, is descended on her father’s side from a family that had 
lived in the East Indies for generations.43 Her son, too, had died violently, 
in a Japanese prison camp. Like the lady of the Small Garden, “she knew 
pain, inside and outside – and what is there to still pain?”44 Like Riek in 
Only Yesterday, Dermoût was raised on a sugar estate on Java within sight 
of Mount Lawoe. For years, she had lived with her husband in the Moluccas, 
like Felicia, the lady of the Small Garden.45
Nostalgia
To some extent, Dermoût’s two novels are works of nostalgia – evoking 
an aching memory that is a bittersweet longing for something impossible 
to retrieve. Dermoût expresses the dominant mode of memory, nostalgia, 
experienced by most forced migrants. For the f irst generation of Indisch 
40 Praamstra, “A World,” 57.
41 Auge, Non-Places, 37.
42 Dermoût, The Ten Thousand, 5, 50.
43 Nieuwenhuys, Mirror of the Indies, 256.
44 Dermoût, The Ten Thousand, 199.
45 Nieuwenhuys, Mirror of the Indies, 255-256.
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repatriates, according to Pattynama (herself a child of Indisch repatriates), 
“there was no deeper emotion than the feeling of loss of and separation 
from the East Indies and this feeling shaped them into a Dutch mnemonic 
culture.”46 Dermoût’s works package memories in a powerful manner, sure 
to impact those suffering from a melancholy brought about by loss. Zofia 
Rosinska has described the dominant emotion among emigrant communities 
when confronted with the impossibility of return as being melancholy 
and that this melancholy becomes closely tied to the group’s identity and 
memory, supporting community forming and creating a bond by means of 
collective recollecting.47 Dermoût’s work, furthermore, was an example of 
what Ricoeur called “repetition-memory,” the f irst, but incomplete step in 
working through the traumatic memory.48
Anthropologist Renato Rosaldo warns against a so-called innocent impe-
rial nostalgia that, in effect, captures the imagination while concealing 
its “complicity with often brutal domination.”49 This echoes Rushdie’s 
anger against the nostalgia of “Raj f iction” in Britain during the 1980s.50 
Such representations of colonial times rely on an Orientalist “archive of 
information.”51 However, Pattynama argues that the nostalgia of the likes 
of Dermoût was not reactionary, but a vehicle for emotions that otherwise 
would not have been permitted public expression in the Dutch culture of 
memory during the 1950s, where colonial guilt and shame dominated.52 
Furthermore, she claims that nostalgia is not a simple affair and that there 
are different forms of nostalgia, serving different goals for different groups.53
Recent research supports Pattynama’s argument. Nostalgia is a compli-
cated form of memory representation. Walder argues that the “suspicion 
and mistrust with which it has been viewed by progressives […] reflects a 
lack of understanding.”54 Likewise, while examining the pervasive pres-
ence of imperial nostalgia among the formerly colonized, Bissell warns, 
“any attempt to cast colonial nostalgia as purely retrograde or reactionary 
seems dubious at best.”55 For instance, Rosaldo’s claim that nostalgia as 
46 Pattynama, “‘Laat mij,’” 59.
47 Rosinska, “Emigratory Experiences,” 31-39.
48 Ricoeur, Memory, 79.
49 Rosaldo, “Imperial Nostalgia,” 108.
50 Rushdie, Imaginary Homelands, 87-92.
51 Said, Orientalism, 41-42.
52 Pattynama, “‘Laat mij,’” 58-59.
53 Pattynama, Bitterzoet, 136.
54 Walder, Postcolonial Nostalgias, 3.
55 Bissell, “Engaging Colonial Nostalgia,” 217.
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a concept is a Eurocentric one56 is disputed by f indings in psychology, 
where experimental results in British tests have been replicated in Chinese 
f indings.57 This implies that nostalgia is universal. Indeed, psychologists 
today see nostalgia as a resource that “strengthens social connectedness 
and belongingness, partially ameliorating the harmful repercussions of 
loneliness,”58 something that the displaced Indisch community needed. 
Furthermore, nostalgia is considered “a fundamental human strength” that 
helps imbue life with meaning.59 No doubt, the capacity to strengthen social 
connectedness and ameliorate feelings of loneliness as well as the capacity 
to foster a new purpose or meaning gave nostalgia its power, and hence 
its hold over the displaced Indisch community. Dermoût’s works thereby 
inscribed a form of cultural remembering that helped create a collective 
identity among a mnemonic community, where the binding element was 
the nostalgic remembering of loss.
But Dermoût’s novels also operated as a screen upon which unremember-
ing took place. They appeared at a crucial time – with the metropole still 
recovering from German occupation, relations between the former colonial 
power and the former colony deteriorating, and thousands of repatriates 
still arriving in the Netherlands. As we know from Halbwachs, the mind 
does not remember alone but remembers “under the pressure of society,” 
that is, memories are constructed “on the basis of the present.”60 In the 
Dutch present, Dermoût’s work provided a recipe for surviving a sense of 
loss by helping to build a nostalgic community.
In the f inal section of The Ten Thousand Things, the lady of the Small 
Garden sits alone on the beach, under the moon, as she does every year, and 
remembers all those who have been murdered on the island. In this battle 
against forgetfulness, she tries to bring each to mind, until she enters a 
mystical reverie and contemplates the murderers “without hatred now.”61 In 
her mystical trance she experiences how all things, people, animals, stones 
and sea, are linked together and flow into each other in a way that she could 
not understand, but understanding “was not needed, wasn’t possible, she 
had seen it – for one moment over the moonlit water” (208).
In this acceptance of the absence of understanding, Dermoût represents 
the loss of the Indies as a loss that can be experienced, but not understood. 
56 Rosaldo, “Imperial Nostalgia,” 108-109.
57 Zhou et al., “Counteracting Loneliness,” 1028.
58 Ibid.
59 Sedikides, et al., “Nostalgia,” 306-307.
60 Halbwachs, On Collective, 57; 40.
61 Dermoût, The Ten Thousand, 206.
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It will be accepted by forgiving, and by erasing the need for understanding. 
The lady of the Small Garden is brought out of her reverie when two servants 
call her to come to bed and to drink coffee: “The lady of the Small Garden 
whose name was Felicia stood up from her chair obediently and […] went 
with them […] to drink her cup of coffee, and try again to go on living” (208). 
So too, the Indisch community had to leave their beautiful archipelago and 
in their new home would have to “try to go on living.” It is signif icant that 
in this f inal sentence, Dermoût refers to the lady of the Small Garden by her 
name. Felicia means “happy,” and it is the acceptance of her loss, without 
the need for understanding or explanations, that makes her, f inally, happy.
Dermoût’s work represents decolonization as a rupture with the past, 
the incomprehensible loss of one’s place. It brings with it the challenge 
to remember, to accept and to go on living. But this act of remembering, 
as an instrument of unremembering, did nothing to help explore why, 
suddenly (seemingly), in the years from 1945 to 1949, the native popula-
tion of Indonesia had turned against their European (Indisch) leaders and 
the Indisch community had discovered themselves to be strangers in the 
place they considered their own. Nostalgic representations and collective 
memories of loss, by reinforcing the dwelling on pain, impeded attempts 
to remember the roots of the trauma.
Cultural Appropriation
Leading Indisch intellectuals have claimed Dermoût as an Indisch writer, 
and therefore not really European or Dutch at all.62 They could not be 
more wrong. True, Dermoût’s novels reflect a deep interest in the culture, 
beliefs and lifestyles of the peoples of Indonesia. The Ten Thousand Things is 
influenced by Chinese thought and the narrative is animated with concepts 
taken from Moluccan animist folklore.63 Dermoût’s writings combine her 
own memories with ancient Javanese epics.64 Dermoût presents the reader 
with an “Eastern view of life” constructed from Taoist, Buddhist, Christian 
and Moluccan beliefs.65
However, the appropriation of non-Western ideas, motifs and narratives 
was a common feature of European modernism. Orientalist fantasies were 
a recurring element in European popular literature and the East Indies as 
62 For instance, Tjalie Robinson to Maria Dermoût, 16 November 1955, in Robinson, Schrijven 
met je vuisten, 256.
63 Thiam, “Een wereld vol geesten,” 81.
64 Bogaerts, “Tussen tekst,” 52-54, passim.
65 Praamstra, “Afscheid,” 194-197.
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the Dutch Orient was present in Dutch literature. It is within the context 
of this European tradition, enabled by the adventure of empire and the 
appropriation of non-Western narrative, characters and ideas, that we must 
place the work of Dermoût.
At the time that she was working on her novels she was also reading 
widely. We find her seriously engaged with Dutch poets J.C. Bloem, Marsman 
and Roland Holst, but also Wordsworth, Matthew Arnold, Auden, Yeats, 
Emily Dickinson, as well as Pound, Tennyson and T.S. Eliot.66 The latter 
deeply influenced her in his approach to love and death and the attempt 
to f ind harmony in life.67 His work supplied her with the epigraph to Only 
Yesterday. She was inspired by a poem from the modernist Vita Sackville-
West.68 The novelists that she read at this time included those by Kipling, 
Camus and Forster.69 She described A Passage to India as “one of the most 
beautiful [books] that I know.”70
Dermoût’s f irst collection of short stories, published in 1954, was based on 
a Javanese Hindu epic (in Dutch translation) and contains much exoticism. 
However, she marked her literary modernism by including a quote from Brit-
ish writer Sacheverell Sitwell in this collection, and, as Salverda argues, below 
the surface of her prose lies her literary technical modernism.71 Dermoût 
combined Eastern oral narrative techniques with sophisticated Western 
literary tropes, making The Ten Thousand Things typical of twentieth-century 
Western literature.72 Houtzager concludes that Nieuwenhuys’ obsession 
with squeezing Dermoût into an Asian tradition blinded him to the modern, 
Western aspects of her novel.73 Praamstra admits that Dermoût’s use of 
Moluccan motifs in The Ten Thousand Things was taken directly from the 
works of the great seventeenth-century German naturalist Rumphius.74
One could counter by claiming that The Ten Thousand Things is permeated 
by “Eastern” thought and Asian motifs. After all, Tjalie Robinson pointed out 
that the epigraph of The Ten Thousand Things came directly from Chinese 
philosopher Ts’en Shen.75 The epigraph reads: “When the ten thousand 
66 Van der Woude, Maria, 158-162; Freriks, Geheim, 216.
67 Freriks, Geheim, 190.
68 Ibid., 215.
69 Van der Woude, Maria, 145-162.
70 Freriks, Geheim, 205.
71 Salverda, “De dingen,” 221-222.
72 Houtzager, “Maria,” 75-87.
73 Ibid., 87.
74 Praamstra, “Afscheid,” 198-199.
75 Van der Woude, Maria, 184.
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things have been seen in their unity, we return to the beginning and remain 
where we have always been.” Additionally, Dermoût had been intensively 
reading Chinese poems – but these “Poems of Departure” were Ezra Pound’s 
translations.76 She also read the old Chinese classic Monkey, in Arthur 
Waley’s new translation, but only because it had been recommended in 
The Perennial Philosophy, a work by Aldous Huxley.77 Huxley influenced 
her profoundly. His claim that oneness “is the ground and principle of all 
multiplicity,” summarizes Dermoût’s philosophy in The Ten Thousand Things, 
and his quotation from the ancient Neo-Platonist, Plotinus, seems to have 
influenced the ending of Dermoût’s book.78 Furthermore, we f ind Huxley 
quoting the following words from an ancient Chinese text: “When the Ten 
Thousand things are viewed in their oneness, we return to the Origin and 
remain where we have always been.”79 In a letter to her German translator, 
Dermoût admitted that she had taken this quote for the epigraph [and title] 
to her second novel, not from Ts’en Shen, but from Huxley’s The Perennial 
Philosophy.80
Contrary to what Robinson thought, having an Asian epigraph to The Ten 
Thousand Things did not demonstrate that Dermoût was Indisch as opposed 
to Dutch. Neither did it prove that she had read the Tao Te Ching; rather it 
proved she had read Aldous Huxley. It was an indication of how she was 
part of a general European movement that was intrigued, in an Orientalist 
manner, with aspects of the cultures of colonized people. The irony is that 
Dermoût herself regularly denied the label “Indisch.”81
The Colonial Point of View
Demoût’s books could only have been written from the point of view of 
Dutch colonial power. To claim otherwise is to deny the asymmetrical 
nature of power that characterized relationships during imperialism. It is 
the privilege of the colonial power to tell its own story. Furthermore, it is 
the privilege of colonial power to tell the other’s story as well, in as much 
as it touches or overlaps with the story of its own power, like when servants 
enter the colonial narrative. As Said articulates it: “The power to narrate, 
76 Freriks, Geheim, 311.
77 Ibid., 217-218.
78 Huxley, Perrenial Philosophy, 11.
79 Ibid., 21.
80 Freriks, Geheim, 128.
81 Van der Woude, Maria, 16-18; Freriks, Geheim, 301-311.
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or to block other narratives from forming and emerging, is very important 
to culture and imperialism.”82
We never read of any of Dermoût’s main characters abusing their power. 
They are horrif ied by the brutality of some colonials. They study the ancient 
cultures of Java and respect native beliefs. In The Ten Thousand Things, the 
lady of the Small Garden has, it seems, gone native, so to speak, “in her sarong 
and simple white cotton jacket […] in bare feet on strong leather sandals” and 
everyone on the island likes her.83 But, Said reminds us that “the rhetoric of 
power all too easily produces an illusion of benevolence when deployed in an 
imperial setting.”84 During the f irst three decades of the twentieth century, 
while Dermoût was living in the colony, the Dutch colonial government 
operated under a policy that was meant to be benevolent, aiming to develop 
the social and economic position of the native, yet this was also the time 
of the birth of the f irst Indonesian nationalist movements. The response of 
the colonial government was to limit political and civil freedoms, detaining 
suspects for years without charges. By the early 1930s, around the time 
that Dermoût would leave the East Indies, the leading spokespeople for 
Indonesian nationalism had been interned in prison camps. In such a system, 
when criticism is silenced, it is easy to be convinced of one’s benevolence.
Much is made of the physical descriptions of the owners of the Small 
Garden. We learn that the grandmother “was a skinny little woman with 
a dark complexion, dark hair and dark eyes.”85 We are told that Felicia, 
the lady of the Small Garden, when a young woman, was “small and strong 
with a round boyish face, springy brown hair, dark attentive eyes” (39), 
and her son, Himpies, has “warm brown eyes with spots” (90). There is no 
doubt that the family is European and the native people refer to the lady 
of the Small garden as “the little white woman” (89). But the stress on dark 
complexion and dark eyes seems to indicate that they are of mixed blood 
or Indos. This is supported by the expression “She herself belonged to the 
island” (17), meaning, probably, that she is descended from a native Moluccan. 
Praamstra goes as far as to say that the grandmother was Ambonese.86 He 
agrees that the strong sense of place in the novel, is a strategic deployment 
that asserts ownership and colonial hegemony.87 Within the garden, there 
exists a hybrid society where totoks, Indos, natives – masters as well as 
82 Said, Culture, xii.
83 Ibid., 17.
84 Said, Culture, xix.
85 Dermout, The Ten Thousand, 29.
86 Praamstra, “A World,” 57.
87 Ibid., 57-60.
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servants – come together in a peaceful, privileged place where respect and 
toleration are the order of the day. In such a place, hegemony is complete, 
power remains invisible. A good example is the f inal lines of the novel, 
already quoted, when the servants call Felicia to come to bed and to drink 
her cup of coffee. We are told that she rises from her chair “obediently.” She 
obeys her servants. However, this relationship is not based on equality. It is 
her prerogative to obey, or disobey. In fact, the hybrid society that she has 
created on her property can only exit due to the laws implemented by the 
colonial government. If the colonial authority would cease to exist, the idyllic 
micro-society would be doomed. What passes unmentioned in Dermoût’s 
account, but is pointed out by Praamstra, is that the Small Garden in which 
European and Asian meet each other with mutual respect is in a space that 
once was “violently taken away from the original population.”88 Dermoût’s 
point of view is that of a Dutch colonialist, backed by the apparatus of power 
which, though kept out of sight, nevertheless, surrounds the narratives and 
enables their telling.
Dermoût does not entirely ignore the ugly side of colonialism. As we 
have seen, in Only Yesterday the peasants burn down the sugar f ields and 
the planters are gripped by fear. Prisoners are beaten. In The Ten Thousand 
Things, we are reminded of the former existence of slavery: “My father said 
once – everyone had slaves, those were the years of slaves, that was the evil 
of the time, my father said. Every time has its own evil.”89 This passage 
seems to trivialize the ugliness of slavery as a system. To accept that slavery 
is bad, on the one hand, and on the other hand, to accord that every era 
has something bad, trivializes. In addition, if this goes for slavery, then it 
goes for colonialism as well. Colonialism has its ugly side, but every era has 
its own form of evil. The important thing is to be good within the system. 
This interpretation is supported by the words of Maria Dermoût herself. 
In an interview with Robinson, she voiced her dislike of the label “colonial 
family,” explaining, “East and West were not a problem. We were spoon-fed 
the idea that ‘Every person has equal worth.’”90
Regardless of how much she disliked the term “colonial,” we learn that 
the family of the Small Garden was wealthy, owning a big house with a 
spice plantation but also a house in the town, which they rented out.91 As 
a child, the lady of the Small Garden and her parents went to live in the 
88 Ibid., 59.
89 Dermoût, The Ten Thousand, 64.
90 Tjalie Robinson, “Maria Dermoût,” De Haagse Post, 5 July 1958.
91 Dermoût, The Ten Thousand, 23.
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Netherlands and she returned as a young mother (38-39). In turn, she sends 
her son Himpies to the Netherlands to be educated and to become a surgeon 
(85). These are privileges made possible by the colonial system. However 
integrated the family becomes into the world of the East, they retain the 
advantages that Western hegemony bestows. Yet the trappings of power that 
ensure this asymmetrical relationship between colonizer and colonized 
remain almost invisible in Dermoût’s representations of colonialism. The 
novels include incidents of violence, but they are excesses, not symptoms 
of some deeper, political malaise.
Silencing Other Stories
Dermoût tells us that the land had been in the family’s possession for f ive 
generations, but she silences the brutality of its appropriation. She informs us 
of the earlier existence of slavery, but silences the fact that the Netherlands 
was a major player in the global slave trade. She tells us that Riek’s parents 
were sugar planters, but silences the fact that the sweetness and exploitation 
went hand in hand. These are examples of what anthropologist Michel-Rolph 
Trouillot calls “formulas of erasure.”92 He has written that “planters and 
managers could not fully deny resistance, but they tried to provide reassuring 
certitudes by trivializing all its manifestations. Resistance did not exist as 
a global phenomenon. Rather each case of unmistakable def iance, each 
possible instance of resistance was treated separately and drained of its 
political content.”93 Trouillot was writing of eighteenth-century Haiti, but 
his words apply equally to Dutch colonial society.
Let us look at three examples from The Ten Thousand Things. Firstly, we 
learn that during the age of slavery, the f irst spice growers had employed 
a Balinese slave girl as the nurse for their three daughters. One day the 
daughters were all poisoned and the slave was accused of murder and tor-
tured until she was crippled, but she refused to confess and was eventually 
released.94 The tragic killing of the little girls is a motif that returns. They 
are remembered. The slave is never referred to again.
Secondly, when Himpies becomes an off icer in the colonial army he is 
sent on an expedition – “just a small expedition” – to the island of Ceram, 
to make a “show of strength for the Mountain Alfuras who had become 
a nuisance” (97). Note the use of the euphemism “small expedition.” We 
are not given to consider that Dutch colonial authority might have been a 
92 Trouillot, Silencing the Past, 96.
93 Ibid., 83.
94 Dermoût, The Ten Thousand, 63-64.
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nuisance for the Mountain Alfuras. During the “expedition,” Himpies is shot 
and killed by a single arrow. The killing is described as random, senseless, 
memorable only for the heroic efforts of his comrades attempting to save 
the young soldier (106-107). The motivations of the Mountain Alfuras are 
passed over in silence.
The third example concerns a Scottish professor who undertakes a tour of 
the islands with his Javanese assistant, Suprapto. The professor is murdered 
by machete-wielding Binongkos or sea tramps (183-184). We learn a great deal 
about the professor, his family, his naive enthusiasm, occasional wisdom 
and his positive philosophy of life, which seems to echo Dermoût’s own 
(168). He dreams of a hybrid space where East and West can be equals. But 
Dermoût only tells us of the Binongkos that “they were a strange kind of 
people, speaking a language no one understood; and no one wanted to have 
anything to do with them” (173). No attempt is made to understand their 
point of view. They are dressed “in rags, almost naked” with “small, squat 
bodies” and “black, stupid eyes staring straight ahead” armed with machetes 
(173). They enter the story to murder and rob the professor. The rest is silence.
Dermoût’s novels, widely admired in the Indisch community and beyond, 
staked a claim to a territory in the past that provided a marker of identity. 
They helped to construct a collective memory of nostalgia, a melancholy 
acceptance of irreparable loss, the loss of that place that she had described 
with loving detail, a benevolent tropical home that had given the group 
its identity. That place would remain a marker of identity only in as much 
as it would be remembered. While her memory work served to create a 
mnemonic community based on nostalgic remembering, Dermoût’s silencing 
of Indonesian aspirations inadvertently served to unremember the reality 
of decolonization.
Tjalie Robinson: Building Memory for a Hybrid People
Hybidity
Benedict Anderson characterized a nation as being an “imagined political 
community” that is “inherently limited and sovereign.”95 For people of mixed 
colonial descent, such as the Indo, the problem lay in negotiating a position 
between or within imagined communities. Homi Bhabha has problematized 
what he refers to as “the irresolvable, borderline culture of hybridity.”96 
Edward Said is a case in point: raised an Orthodox Christian Palestinian 
95 Anderson, Imagined Communities, 6.
96 Bhabha, The Location, 225.
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with American nationality, he was born in Jerusalem, educated in Cairo 
(attending an English primary school and American secondary school) and 
gained renown as a professor at an American university. It is not surprising 
to learn from Said that “the overriding sensation I had was always being out 
of place.”97 This feeling of not quite f itting in, of in-betweenness, animated 
Said’s work while also lending it strength. Being able to identify with both 
sides of the “imperial divide” allows the hybrid to feel that he or she belongs 
to more than one group, more than one history.98 This challenges the myth 
of purity. The diff iculties of cultural hybridity are compounded when it 
stems from the unequal relationships of colonialism, developing from, to 
use Fanon’s words, “the arsenal of complexes that has been developed by 
the colonial environment.”99
In 1954 there arrived on Dutch shores a repatriate who would come 
to def ine, during the following decades, what it meant to be an Indo and 
whose energetic activities came to shape Indo collective memory: he went 
by many names but became most well known as Tjalie Robinson. Long 
before Rushdie, Bhabha or Said, Robinson became a cultural translator 
negotiating a space between cultures. He recognized that the Netherlands 
and the Republic of Indonesia had positioned the Indo on the margins of 
the East-West encounter, but argued that the Indo was not simply a mix of 
European and Asian, but a separate cultural-historical category. Anticipating 
the views of postcolonialists, Robinson claimed that what made the Indo 
unique was not his or her marginalization on the periphery of East and West, 
but the fact that Indo identity was shaped by living in more than one culture.
Robinson quickly became the leading f ighter for the Indisch community 
in the Netherlands, struggling to maintain Indisch culture and confronting 
an assimilation that would mean disappearance.100 He wrote soon after his 
repatriation that “there is no possibility of returning home. […] [A] Dutch-
man exiled in the Netherlands […] is not the problem of Tjalie only, but of 
thousands and tens of thousands more tropical Dutchmen, […] a conflict of 
the spirit.”101 With no return possible, the temptation was to f ind support 
in nostalgia. Robinson set himself the task to save the Indo from nostalgia 
and from assimilation. The way to ensure that the culture of the Indo would 
not disappear, was through the construction of a collective memory.
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Robinson’s work focused on remembering, yet ironically it contributed 
to unremembering decolonization. His work consisted of three strands. 
Firstly, his prime concern was to create a new, hybrid culture within the 
Indisch community. Secondly, he intended to salvage the old Indisch way of 
life in order to construct a collective memory that would form the basis of 
this new, hybrid identity. Thirdly, this emphasis on recalling the old Indisch 
way of life would mean unremembering the traumatic years from 1942 to 
1949, the period of Japanese occupation and decolonization; remembering 
colonialism necessitated unremembering decolonization.
A Flâneur in Batavia
Tjalie Robinson was a pen name of Jan Boon. Born in the Dutch city of 
Nijmegen in 1911 to a totok father and Indo mother, he moved to the Dutch 
East Indies when just three months old. From the mid-1930s he worked as 
a journalist. Biographer Wim Willems comments that even early in his 
career, Robinson was motivated by the idealistic goal of nurturing an Indisch 
consciousness.102 During the Japanese occupation, he was imprisoned in 
the Tjimahi internment camp, where he became editor-in-chief, as well as 
contributor and cartoonist, of a weekly paper published by the prisoners. 
He was later transferred to Changi, in Singapore, and f inally Johore, on the 
Malay Peninsula, where he was put to work as a forced labourer. During 
the decolonization war he was appointed editor-in-chief of a magazine for 
Dutch military personnel, where he wrote articles using pseudonyms.103
In 1948 Robinson became editor-in-chief of the daily Nieuwe Courant. 
In a series of articles he called for young Europeans and Indonesians to 
create a new type of society, in which the double identity of the in-between 
would not be questioned. That same year he became involved in Orientatie 
(Orientation), a periodical supporting Indonesian independence, highlighting 
nationalist Indonesian and Indisch authors. Here, for the f irst time, he used 
the pen names by which he would become famous, Vincent Mahieu and 
Tjalie Robinson.104
Inspired by the mestizo culture of Latin America, he embarked on the 
task of being the chronicler of this hybrid culture. Thanks to a series of 
essays published in Indonesia, in the newspapers Nieuwsgier and Het Vrije 
Volk in the early 1950s, the name Robinson became a renowned, especially 
when a selection of the essays were published in two volumes in Bandung in 
102 Willems, Tjalie Robinson, 121.
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1952 and 1954, under the title Piekerans van een straatslijper (Ruminations 
of a f lâneur).105
Robinson recognized that an exiled people lose the loci of their memories 
and are in danger of losing their identity. Many of these essays find Robertson 
wandering through the romantic city of his memory, pre-war Batavia. In 
his attempt to explain to himself and his contemporaries who he is, who 
they are, he reclaimed the memory of what it meant to grow up in Indisch 
culture. What that meant must be found in the pre-war period because, as 
he says, the Dutch East Indies “has been dead since 1939.”106 Consequently, 
his memory work leaves the period from 1939 to 1949 unremembered. The 
war is rarely referred to. When it is mentioned, decolonization is represented 
as a rupture that changed Indisch historical development. So Robinson’s is a 
literature of salvaging what can be salvaged – the cultural memory, with its 
smells, tastes and colours, so that, equipped with this memory, the Indisch 
community can move on.
The original articles appeared in newspapers between 1951 and 1955. 
But few readers preserve newspaper clippings. Memory becomes stabilized 
through revisiting, and few readers revisit essays in their original medium. 
Even Robinson himself, when he eventually immigrated to the Netherlands 
in 1954, no longer had access to the original essays. Instead, it was the 
selections that appeared in the two-volume Piekerans van een straatslijper 
that would be read and reread over the following decades. Generations of 
Indo-Dutch citizens grew up with these stories.107
The Forgotten Essays
While researching his biography of Robinson, Wim Willems discovered 
copies of the original articles of the entire Piekerans series on microf ilm. 
In 2011 he published a selection that had been forgotten. Once again we 
f ind Robinson grappling with the dilemma of the in-between. He describes 
himself as someone with Nietzsche in his head, Mozart in his ears, Malraux 
in his heart, but also “mosquitoes at my calves and the smell of shrimp 
paste in my nose.”108 He refuses to reject European or Indonesian culture: 
“I simply want the best of Indonesia and the best of Paris. That’s all” (146).
But the selection also contains essays based on Robinson’s memories of 
the Japanese occupation and the subsequent war of decolonization. In one, 
105 Ibid., 27 and 227.
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he gives an account of when he and a comrade sneaked out of the Japanese 
camp to raid a nearby fruit garden. Robinson unexpectedly f inds himself 
confronted by a guard, who turns out to be Javanese. He is frozen by fear, 
but then: “It was as if we recognized each other. […] I saw the homesickness 
in his eyes.” Having stood in silence, the guard slowly turns and returns to 
his post (124). Back in camp Robinson and his comrade do not share their 
plunder with others, but devour the bananas and jackfruit, ignoring the 
greedy eyes and smacking lips of their starving fellow prisoners (125). “We 
were all stone hard,” he states (126).
These confessional essays include dark reflections on what the torturous 
pain of persistent hunger does to a human being, based on his own experi-
ence in Jahore in 1945 (128). He recalls how he and a comrade stole cassava 
and, back in the camp, ate it themselves, ignoring the pleading looks of their 
fellow prisoners. He writes: “I am a pig, I am a pig” (130). He tells of privileged 
gentlemen reduced to eating leafs, grass, snakes and rooting in the rubbish 
bins for f ish heads and peels (131). He tells of men reduced to beasts, sucking 
the empty eye sockets of a dog’s head, and concludes that as “civilized 
human Europeans, […] we are deeply ashamed” (130). Signif icantly, he 
describes how he saw this same sort of starvation and depravity, during the 
decolonization war in 1949, witnessing masses of naked, starving Javanese 
standing motionless, their eyes dull, their skin stretched over their bones 
(127). When he throws them a banana they react “like wild dogs,” striking 
out, scratching, kicking, screaming as they f ight for the banana. They were 
like beasts, he says. They remind him that he once was a beast (128).
Robinson had experienced life at its most debased, an experience that 
f illed him with shame. Willems argues that this convinced Robinson of the 
negative aspects of nationalism, the narrow choice between Indonesia and 
the Netherlands, and convinced him that the right choice was a combination 
of what was worthwhile in both civilizations.109 In his personal life, Robinson 
seldom spoke to his family members about his war experiences.110 In one 
essay we f ind the rhetorical question: “And who likes to think back to times 
of need?”111 The Japanese experience, and the loss of a homeland resulting 
from decolonization, for Robinson, was hard to think back on. But he did 
undertake this memory work. Yet, when his essays appeared in book form, 
those that dealt with the Japanese occupation and decolonization were 
not selected. It was Robinson himself who made the selection for inclusion 
109 Willems, Tjalie Robinson, 166-167.
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in Piekerans van een straatslijper. He decided to exclude these pieces that 
revealed “I am a pig.”
It was hard to represent the Indo as anything but a victim of decoloniza-
tion. But focusing on victimhood was not going to be a useful tool in building 
a hybrid culture. For that, Robinson needed the memory of the Indisch past, 
one that had continuity and was heroic. The experience of 1942-1949 formed 
a traumatic rupture in history. There was nothing there to be salvaged. These 
were the years characterized by the sense that “we are deeply ashamed.” For 
the dislocated Indo, decolonization needed to be unremembered in order 
to salvage the memory of the hybrid culture of pre-decolonization times.
Enter Vincent Mahieu
But Jan Boon was a complicated human being, hard to pin down, as evi-
denced by his use of pseudonyms. The February 1948 issue of Orientatie had 
seen the birth of Tjalie Robinson, f iery journalist and gifted essayist. The 
following month saw the debut of Vincent Mahieu, storyteller and author 
of literary f iction. Boon had found another outlet for his creative energy.
Mahieu wrote vividly about events during decolonization. Yet, unlike 
Tjalie Robinson, he is today almost forgotten, both within the Indisch com-
munity and among the Dutch reading public at large. When his collected 
works were published in 1992, Mahieu was described as “a great writer.”112 
Near the end of the twentieth century, Het Parool published a hundred 
declarations of love to the most beautiful books of the century. Mahieu’s 
work was included. But, Allu Lansu added that it was a scandal that this 
writer became all but unknown.113 The disappearance of Vincent Mahieu 
forms a case study in unremembering decolonization.
Mahieu’s f irst published short story, “Op zoek naar eten” (“Looking for 
food”), appeared in Orientatie.114 We immediately recognize the theme. 
Four men, prisoners of the Japanese, maddened by hunger, come across 
a cat and try, but fail, to beat it to death in order to eat it. A second story, 
called “Sonja,” explores the strange friendship between two prisoners of the 
Japanese, Marcel Blondeau and Rudi. The name, “Marcel Blondeau” echoes 
“Vincent Mahieu” and the character shares similarities with Boon/Robinson/
Mahieu – a born storyteller, footballer, boxer, and motorcyclist.115 Although 
112 Willem Kuipers, “Met een been in het koele water van de kali,” De Volkskrant, 13 March 1992.
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the theme of the story is the relationship between the two men, this takes 
place against a vivid background of depravity and Japanese cruelty.
Like the example of Robinson’s Piekerans series, occasional publications in 
magazines seldom become stabilizers of collective memory unless they appear 
in book format or are remediated in film or television or in another media. 
Mahieu did have an anthology of his work appear in Indonesia in 1956, and 
this collection, Tjeis, appeared in the Netherlands in 1958. Dutch critics were 
unanimous in their praise. The collection was chosen as a “Book of the Month,” 
garnered literary awards in Belgium and the Netherlands and in 1960 the author 
was presented with the Novella Prize of Amsterdam on television.116 But when 
we examine the contents of this f irst collection, we find, just like with the 
two-volume Piekerans van een straatslijper, no stories dealing with the period 
from 1942 to 1949 appear. In other words, “Op zoek naar eten” had not been 
reprinted, and would not appear in book format until long after his death. The 
case of “Sonja” is even more pertinent. Mahieu never sent it to be published. 
So, by the mid-1950s Robinson/Mahieu had, for whatever reason, decided to 
unremember his memoirs of the Japanese occupation, and to leave the period 
of decolonization, with the exception of some brief references, unexplored.
Yet, in the year of his f irst television appearance, 1960, Mahieu’s second 
collection, Tjoek, appeared. Of the eleven stories, three offer lengthy rep-
resentations of the violence of decolonization. “De Piroes oerat mas” (“The 
Piroes Oerat Mas”) tells the story of a Chinese-Indo, Teck Eng, nicknamed 
“The Invincible.” He owed his name to the fact that he seemed indestructible, 
having survived the war against the Japanese, the massacres of the Bersiap 
period, the Indonesian revolution; he had survived hunger, unemployment, 
street f ights, bomb attacks and housing shortages, death and insanity. Like 
other veterans, he had experienced the type of danger that turns your 
hair white. But he believed that he owed his survival to a precious piece of 
gold-flecked turquoise that he wore on a chain around his neck, the piroes 
oerat mas.117 Near the end of the story, an awful truth strikes Teck Eng – the 
stone offered no protection at all. He had simply been lucky, and some day 
his luck will run out. “I am lost,” he realizes (230-231).
The story “De Muur” (“The wall”) begins with a paragraph that sums up 
something essential about Mahieu’s representation of war:
Nothing particular ever happens in a city under siege. People live as 
normally as possible between the attacks. […] [W]hoever is dead, or 
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abducted (which turns out to be the same), the siege is over. For good. 
Especially in besieged cities, life is far too urgent to waste time on useless 
emotions concerning the disappeared. […] [M]any discover that in fact 
they have been liberated from another type of siege: that of the endless 
obligations of an organized, respectable society. Where death also comes 
at some point, but where life is already dying. Here, everyday is life. (235)
The real enemy is not the barbarity of war, it is everyday life, with its stifling 
duties. The story is set around the time of the second “police action,” “as it’s 
called” (236). The prose evokes the intensity experienced during war. The 
main character, Paul, is driving though enemy territory:
They’re getting the machine gun ready. They’re priming the mine. There 
by this corner. The next corner. The next corner. The next corner. The 
next corner. Suffocate death. In the city they call you glass-hard. And 
sometimes courageous. People in the safe city are brainless, bloodless, 
nothing. They’re lousy bastards. When you really think about it, you’ve 
just got one hatred. Your hate isn’t meant for the enemy. He lives just like 
you. Not for the clerk from social services who you’ll soon shoot dead, that’s 
just settling a score. No, the hate is for weak, pasty-faced, eternally nice 
talking people from the safe city. With their whining about humanity, 
love of animals, morality (236).
Paul witnesses civilians “who draw suffering like a vagrant draws lice.” He 
has experienced too much brutality in the war and reflects: “I wish I could 
forget everything. I wish I wasn’t Paul, wasn’t a European, wasn’t a horror. 
[…] I’m fed up with the tiredness of centuries of Europeanness. […] I’m tired 
of working dreaming working dreaming working dreaming” (241-242). Paul 
meets a young native woman who, since age thirteen, has lived with men, a 
Japanese commander, an Indonesian rebel commander, and others (244). He 
is drawn to her himself, but, as a married man, he doesn’t want to give into 
his feelings and he tells her that we must never compromise our principles 
of trust and purity, while he thinks to himself that civilization is collapsing 
and if he was completely honest, he should shoot her dead. He realizes that 
he is a hunter among men: “[W]e kill the most beautiful thing that we can 
have. Look out, you. Look out, me” (248).
The house that they are in comes under heavy attack and they seek to 
comfort each other. Paul seems to give into fear, feeling helpless and sinking 
into forgetfulness, waking up to f ind the girl asleep next to him. The next 
morning, standing outside the house, he looks back at the place where he 
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spent the night with her. Suddenly he orders his servant to gather their 
things and they drive away quickly, along lonely roads with “hopefully – a 
landmine. The landmine” (251).
In these two stories, Mahieu offers us a representation of war in which 
conflict is not something alien to humans. Instead, war highlights that which 
is always present, but which we do not see, burdened by the trivialities of 
everyday life. Normal life suffocates. War confronts us with ourselves. It 
forces us to choose, to say yes or no. Teck Eng can recognize and acknowledge 
his own vulnerability, or take refuge in a fairy tale. Paul can accept his 
animal nature, or choose self-hatred. War provides the opportunity to test 
our virtues. To become confronted by the certainty of our own death, and 
to accept or embrace this fact, is to grow stronger. Teck Eng and Paul fail 
the test. But in another story, entitled “Madjoe,” Mahieu presents us with 
an unnamed protagonist who passes the test.
The protagonist is a man, travelling in Java with his son and his driver 
in a military pickup soon after the second Dutch “police action.” He is a 
hardened warrior, not easily given to sentimental emotions. In the desolated 
landscape, they see a crowd of Indonesians, naked and starving, and when 
they throw them scraps, the crowd turn into screaming, f ighting wolves 
(254). The protagonist wonders why he is never shocked by the brutal scenes 
that he encounters, even when he comes across body parts of Dutch soldiers 
blown up by a mine (255). Suddenly, there is an explosion, their vehicle 
is blown up and he sees his driver, blood oozing from his nose and ears, 
dead. He hears his son crying. At f irst the son is thrilled to see his father: 
“‘You’re the best Dad.’” But, the son calls out that he is afraid. The father 
holds him, tells him not to be afraid: “Dying is just going through a door. […] 
[W]ait on the other side of the door. I’ll come straight after, […] hunting in 
the eternal hunting f ields,” and he sees the young face grow rigid in death 
(257). When the father stands up, he is surrounded by the crowd, who are 
armed with primitive weapons. As they move in for the kill, he thinks of 
his son’s words, and he calls out “Madjoe” and attacks the crowd himself 
(258). The protagonist in this story has no time to mourn the death of his 
son; instead, he is motivated to attack the threatening crowd by the pride he 
feels in remembering his son’s last words. He has accepted the inevitability 
of his own death.
Years after the death of Robinson, his wife, Lilian Ducelle, recollected 
that all of the stories of Mahieu were written when the couple had been 
living in Borneo in the early 1950s.118 This means that Mahieu penned his 
118 Frits Abrahams, “Leven met Tjalie,” NRC Handelsblad, 28 March 1992.
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f ictional representations of the decolonization conflict before he went into 
exile, and before his f irst collection was to receive so much acclaim. It means 
that, although they were not published until 1960, he wrote them around 
the same time that he wrote, under the name Tjalie Robinson, his essays 
based on his memories of the war. Yet, just like with the essays, this was 
his f irst and last effort to articulate these painful memories in writing. In 
other words, Robinson/Mahieu, before repatriation to the Netherlands, had 
created a small but powerful oeuvre of essays and stories representing the 
war of decolonization. Upon arrival on Dutch shores, this ceased. Rather 
than remember, he choose to unremember.
The Silencing of Vincent Mahieu
One reason for this unremembering was that, once arrived in the former 
metropole, he found himself a stranger in his new home – “A Dutchman 
exiled in Holland,” as he expressed it.119 He discovered that this sense of deep 
alienation was one that he shared with tens of thousands of his compatriots, 
totok and Indos.120 He repeatedly described how it felt to be an outsider in 
Holland.121
Anderson described how the creoles of the Americas had developed the 
“capacity to imagine themselves as communities parallel and comparable 
to those in Europe.”122 However, the Indisch community had failed to earn 
themselves a position parallel to the native Dutch. Upon arrival in Holland in 
1954, Robinson encountered his chief enemy, assimilation.123 He committed 
himself to forging a new, expanded version of what it meant to be Dutch. 
Far from stressing purity or authenticity, this new def inition would be 
open to embracing difference, permitting a space for the Indo. He feared 
that the attempt to assimilate, promoted by Dutch authorities and many 
Indo leaders, would mean that Indisch culture would disappear totally. He 
argued that although you could f ind many Indonesian faces on the streets 
of Holland, “the face is the only thing that is Indonesian.”124 Robinson now 
found himself in the role of what Beekman calls “spokesman for and guru 
of the exiled Indo society.”125 With the preservation of Indo culture at stake, 
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creating literary representations of the war and decolonization must have 
seemed a form of narcissism.
Robinson, with characteristic energy, threw himself into the battle to 
save Indisch culture among the diaspora. He took over the editorship of a 
small Indisch magazine, Onze Brug (Our bridge), which he commandeered 
as a vehicle for creating an archive of collective memory for the Indisch 
community. He saw the magazine as a way of waging war against the loss of 
Indisch memory and identity. By 1958, he had reinvented the magazine in a 
new format with a new name – Tong-Tong.126 The following year, Robinson 
founded the Indische Kunstkring Tong-Tong (Indisch art circle Tong-Tong), 
later renamed the Indische Kuturele Kring (Indisch cultural circle), in order 
to stimulate Indisch literature and arts. He became one of the initiators of an 
annual festival of musical performances, dances, readings and interviews, 
the Pasar Malam Tong-Tong, that grew to become the largest Eurasian 
festival in the world.127
In other words, by the time Mahieu was honoured on television in 1960, 
Robinson’s energy and focus had turned away from writing f iction based 
on decolonization. His mission had become the shaping of Indisch identity, 
through the means of the three institutions that he had founded. Nothing 
more would be heard of the literary writer of f ictionalized war memories, 
Vincent Mahieu. Mahieu had to die in order for Robinson to live and to carry 
out his task of salvaging Indisch culture. Ducelle maintained that Indische 
people devoured Robinson’s essays, but they had little time for the sort of 
literature that Mahieu had written. Consequently, he killed Mahieu, “the 
greatest tragedy of his life.”128 Representations of the period from 1942 to 1949 
were pushed to the periphery of collective memory. Thus, Robinson became 
an agent of remembering the colonial world of the Indo and, simultaneously, 
an agent of unremembering decolonization.
Rob Nieuwenhuys
Few will dispute Rob Nieuwenhuys’ influence upon postcolonial literature 
in Dutch. Pattynama refers to Nieuwenhuys as the patriarch of Indisch 
literature while Beekman calls him “the single most influential force for 
the dissemination of Dutch colonial literature in the Netherlands.129 His 
126 Willems, Tjalie Robinson, 373-379.
127 Ibid., 397-407.
128 Quoted in Abrahams, “Leven met Tjalie,” NRC Handelsblad, 28 March 1992.
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book Oost Indisch Spiegel (Mirror of the East Indies) was a milestone in 
the academic study of Indisch literature. Nieuwenhuys played a key role 
in the progressive literary journal Orientatie, where he worked with Tjalie 
Robinson and Beb Vuyk. However, in 1952 he found himself exiled from the 
place of his birth. As with Robinson, his tweeslachtig (dual) cultural position 
would come to colour his vision and work.130
Faded Portraits
Nieuwenhuys began writing his only novel, Faded Portraits, in a Japanese 
prison camp. He f inished it ten years later in Holland. Faded Portraits ap-
peared in 1954 under the pseudonym E. Breton de Nijs. The title suggests 
we are dealing with a memory work, an attempt to view portraits before 
they fade away completely. This is enhanced when reading the epigram that 
precedes the novel, written in English:
“Two sisters keep this little shop;
Jane Memory and Ann Reminder;
When Jane’s asleep or not yet up,
Or out or absent, Ann must f ind her.”
In other words, we distinguish between memory as a reservoir of past 
experiences and memory as the act of recollection. When the reservoir 
of memories begins to fade, than a conscious act of recollection must be 
undertaken to salvage what can be retained. Faded Portraits is such an act 
of recollection, an effort to salvage the world lost through decolonization.
The opening sentence signals the death of the main character: “Aunt So-
phie Hortense Cecile Doblijn, née De Pauly, passed away in 1940 in Batavia.” 
We are told that nothing indicated the approaching end.131 Inevitably, we 
think of the sudden death of the colony in 1940, cut-off from the metropole. 
In retrospect, this marked the end. Breton de Nijs evokes the last days of 
imperialism seen through the eyes of a narrator who bears the characteristics 
of Rob Nieuwenhuys.
We are repeatedly reminded that this is a memory work therefore, an 
inexact reconstruction: we are told that the oldest memories are inexact, 
memories are unsatisfactory, memory involves forgetting, memories are 
hazy, foggy or have been wiped away (38-59). When memories resurface 
involuntarily, they are usually provoked by place or by people. Echoing the 
130 Nieuwenhuys, Tussen Twee, 226.
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ideas of Halbwachs and Connerton, the narrator tells us, “I cannot separate 
Aunt Sophie from her house or her garden, and certainly not from her family” 
(42). In a passage reminiscent of Dermoût, we get a description of a house 
and a typical colonial garden. House and garden form a memory palace 
populated by the novel’s characters (26-27).
The narrator’s recollections are helped by photographs. He remembers 
one of a girl who had died aged sixteen. We learn that the album and 
photograph were lost during the Japanese occupation, so it is the memory 
of the photograph that remains. The memory seems too authentic, because 
memory can falsify photographs. The opportunity to check memories with 
other witnesses has elapsed because they are deceased, or unreachable. The 
memorialist admits that even the chronology of the narrative is an illusion, 
determined by act of writing which is shaped by the imagination (54-60). 
What Nieuwenhuys is describing is an account of how recollecting works, 
stimulated by objects and other people, layered and (re)constructed though 
the imagination, structured by language. Similar to Halbwachs’ argument 
that our memories are not entirely of our own making, the narrator admits: 
“[M]y impressions are mixed with Aunt Sophie’s stories” (74).
The account of the colonial world is that of the upper echelon of Indisch 
society, the Indo ruling class, “accustomed to giving orders” (48). Nieuwen-
huys’ novel represents this insular society as one obsessed with social status, 
European education, the impertinence of the natives, and shades of skin 
colour (100-134). The colonial elite now f ind themselves on the cold streets 
of The Hague, “betrayed and abandoned.” The old house is still standing, 
but decayed and has “lost its purpose” (151-152).
The old empty house is the colony itself. Its current, decayed state symbol-
izing the loss that the Indisch community endures. What can be salvaged is 
memories, and this is the task that Nieuwenhuys has set himself – to paint 
a vivid picture of the world that has been lost. The cause of the loss, the 
Indonesian revolution, is referred to only once in passing. For Nieuwenhuys, 
the task has not been to explain decolonization. Like Robinson, his task is to 
memorialize the world of the Indisch elite in its heyday, before the ugliness 
of the Japanese occupation and the trauma of the Bersiap. Faded Portraits 
used photography as an extended metaphor. The title in Dutch, Vergeelde 
portretten uit een Indisch familiealbum (Faded portraits from an Indisch 
family album), makes the symbolic reference to photography even clearer.
Tempo Doeloe and the Power of the Photograph
In 1961, Nieuwenhuys went beyond metaphor, and used the medium of 
photography directly. Tempo Doeloe: Fotografische documenten uit het oude 
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Indiё 1870-1914 (Olden days: Photographic documents from the old Indies, 
1870-1914) was the f irst of what became a series of collections of photographs 
from the old colony, drawn from public and private collections. Out of the 
thousands perused, Nieuwenhuys, again using the pseudonym Breton de Nijs, 
selected just over 200 photographs, based on his own subjective choice.132
Marianne Hirsch argues that for people in exile, photographs provide an 
“illusion of continuity.”133 Images of people lay a direct connection between 
the exiled and the person photographed.134 Robinson and Nieuwenhuys 
came up with this project in the late 1950s when, in Robinson’s magazine 
Onze Brug, they called for readers to send in all sorts of personal documents 
that might be used for recording the Indisch past.135 They wanted to collect 
the immaterial legacy of the Indies, in the form of memories (the task of 
Robinson), as well as material documents, including photographs (the task of 
Nieuwenhuys). This would provide the basis for the future historiography of 
their hybrid people.136 In 1960, Nieuwenhuys made another public plea, this 
time in Robinson’s magazine Tong-Tong. He begged readers to search for old 
photos, the sort of photos one would f ind in an Indisch family photo album, 
and to send them to him. He wished to produce a book that “will amaze 
and astonish Dutch people and that will allow you and me to again relive 
that land where we spent ‘the best years of lives.’”137 Pattynama argues that 
the Dutch public formed his primary intended audience.138 His collection 
of photographs would insert itself into the national collective memory.
Geoffrey Batchen argues that photographic albums are not simply objects 
with sequenced images but are “prompts for speech, an excuse for friends 
and families to gather, for stories to be exchanged, incidents to be recalled, 
biographies to be invented.”139 People sit around an album, page through 
photographs and exchange anecdotes, provoking conversation in a relaxed 
way that leads to social bonding. The photo album returns us to an oral 
tradition, shaping the way we speak and remember. No doubt, Nieuwenhuys 
knew this and hoped that it would lead to renewed conversations among 
repatriates and the Dutch nation at large. Indeed, the interest that his 
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pictures provoked among the Indisch community was immediate, affecting 
widespread enthusiastic responses.140
The collection begins with images of steamships arriving at Batavia.141 
It ends with passengers embarking on the return journey to Holland and a 
photograph of four Indische planters standing on the beach in Scheveningen 
(190-191). The purpose is to lure us onto a journey by means of a visual nar-
rative from Holland to the Indies and back again. It is also a return journey 
from the 1960s to the period predating World War One. The f inal page offers 
us a photograph of the neglected gravestones of dead colonials somewhere 
in the Indies. Nieuwenhuys writes: “We can no longer read the names, 
they have been erased; we can only offer the stereotypical formula – ‘Rest 
in Peace’” (192). Thus, Nieuwenhuys brings us on a journey to a chapter in 
history that is f inished. All that remains is memory.
One effect of leaf ing through Nieuwenhuys’ photographs, is that they 
instil a feeling of melancholy. They honour a lost world. There is no hint 
of the disasters that will overwhelm colonial society. The viewers of the 
1960s examined these photographs with a knowing eye, unlike the subjects 
who stare at the viewer innocently. Susan Sontag has ref lected on how 
overwhelming it is to look at photos of life in Jewish ghettos in Poland 
in 1938, knowing that these innocents are about to perish.142 Something 
similar occurs in Nieuwenhuys’ collection. The subjects are unaware that 
they are doomed.
Sontag argues, “death haunts all photographs of people” because those 
whose image is preserved have already moved closer to their death.143 The 
uncanniness brought on by looking at old photographs comes from the 
contradiction that they offer simultaneously some sort of presence and 
an irredeemable absence.144 Barthes used the phrase “That-has-been” to 
describe the almost magical presence that a photograph offers, arguing, “the 
presence of the thing […] is the living image of a dead thing.”145 More than 
his f ictionalized prose memoir, Nieuwenhuys’ selection of photographs of 
people, colonial buildings and tropical landscapes promoted that contradic-
tory bind, of simultaneous presence and absence, “that-has-been” and that 
which is no more.
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One of the f irst photographs in the collection was a group portrait of 
passengers and crew members on board a ship, taken in 1897. Nieuwenhuys 
informs us that the lady on the far left is “no one less than the dancer Mata 
Hari.”146 We look at her eyes, knowing that the famous dancer will be 
executed as a spy. We see her innocent face through the lens of her future 
violent death. It is like examining a f ingerprint or a death mask. This is not 
an innocent choice. The tone is set for the rest of the book. The photographs 
carefully frame a visual narrative of a flawed but beautiful society pushing 
forward to the inevitable ending that gives to the whole its meaning. That 
meaning is decolonization, the ruin of this world.
One family portrait shows a mother and father seated on bamboo seats 
in the tropical garden with their two sons. The caption reads, “the newly 
appointed director of the Hotel des Indes with his family, in 1912. The older 
of the two boys is the compiler of this book” (29). We f ind photographs 
accompanied by passages taken from the novel Faded Portraits, by E. Breton 
de Nijs (32). Thus, Nieuwenhuys shows that his earlier, f ictional work can be 
used to provide a meaning for the reality-based images, while conversely, 
the images can be used to illustrate his f ictional text. Twinned, both provide 
a stabilizer for memory. These photographs enact what Sontag calls “a way 
of certifying experience.”147 They offer what Barthes called “a certif icate of 
presence” in which “the past is as certain as the present.”148 Nieuwenhuys 
may have been living near the shores of the North Sea in 1961, but his child-
hood had been lived in a place of tropical splendour. Though this place no 
longer existed, it remained in memory. Evoked and shared in prose, in these 
photographs, these stencils of the past, lived-in-time is made present again.
We also f ind images that reveal a hard underside of the colonial project: 
deforestation in Java, police off icers abusing a young native boy, a mass 
execution. Six photographs with scenes from the brutal Aceh War are 
included.149 One shows a group of dark-skinned Dutch soldiers with white 
off icers. They stare at the camera with the dead bodies of the foe piled at 
their feet (76). Nieuwenhuys tells us that one off icer, Van Daalen, had a 
reputation for showing no mercy, sometimes killing everyone in a conquered 
settlement and then photographing the dead (68). The most disturbing image 
shows Van Daalen and his men, posing before the camera on the parapets 
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of a small wooden fortress. Sprawled on the ground below lie the bodies of 
the dead enemy. Next to one soldier sits a baby, surrounded by corpses (77).
Paul Bijl suggests that Nieuwenhuys’ inclusion of these violent photos, 
alongside those showing the relaxed tropical lifestyle of the upper-class 
colonials, did not hinder the development of nostalgia. This was due to “the 
book’s compartmentalized structure in which a nostalgic perceptible order 
and an imperial perceptible order […] could exist next to each other.”150 He 
argues that Nieuwenhuys compartmentalized the photographs of violence 
within the frame of public life, while the world of tempo doeloe, the period 
of Dutch colonization in Indonesia, was framed within the private sphere. 
Here, the violent photos “were no longer a threat to his main story on the 
Indies.”151
Nieuwenhuys wrote that the greatest possible research topic for the 
historian, sociologist and literary scholar would be to examine the origins 
of the hybrid society where, at its root, we f ind a native woman – the house 
servant or concubine of the totok male.152 Dozens of photographs show 
family life among some of these Indisch families (121-171). We see ethnically 
mixed families at parties and on holidays, enjoying parades, hunts, com-
memorations and amateur dramatics. Among these is a photograph of the 
young father and mother of Tjalie Robinson (125). We also f ind photographs 
illustrating the lives of totok couples and their children (172-189). From the 
look of their clothes, they have gone native. We find a half dozen or so scenes 
of families sitting together in their garden and on their veranda drinking tea.
Susie Protschky has studied hundreds of family albums from the Dutch 
East Indies, where the colonial gaze has turned consciously upon itself. 
Photographs of families drinking tea in the garden or on the veranda are 
especially common. Protschky notes that such self-representations served 
the function of framing the domestic ideals for which the Indisch families 
wished to be remembered – “bourgeois respectability, conjugal civility, the 
romance of familial contentment and unity.”153
Anderson coined the term “tropical Gothic” to describe the colonial 
lifestyle that mimicked that of old European aristocracy. The images show 
an enviable lifestyle of playing the aristocrat, “against a backcloth of spa-
cious mansions and gardens f illed with mimosa and bougainvillea, and 
a large supporting cast of houseboys, grooms, gardeners, cooks, amahs, 
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maids, washerwomen, and, above all, horses.” This was made possible by 
metropolitan capitalist power, “a power so great that it could be kept, so to 
speak, in the wings.”154
Whatever Nieuwenhuys’ intentions were, his photographs became triggers 
for nostalgia. Near the end of his life, this came to plague him. Celebrating 
Nieuwenhuys’ 90th birthday in 1998, Carl Peters wrote that Nieuwenhuys 
always resisted nostalgia, but that nostalgia was an “unavoidable and 
greatly unintended” consequence of his photo books.155 The following year 
Nieuwenhuys died and was obituarized in the national press. Pieter van 
Zonneveld remarked that Nieuwenhuys had resisted nostalgia.156 Kester 
Freriks quoted Nieuwenhuys as declaring: “Nostalgia, homesickness: these 
are terrible words. […] I have no homesickness for the old East Indies. That 
is passed, it is dead, sunk.”157 Rudy Kousbroek, admitted that nostalgia 
was a point of disagreement between him and Nieuwenhuys: “it was as if 
nostalgia for him [Nieuwenhuys] was something undignified, an admittance 
of weakness.” In contrast, Kousbroek concluded that Nieuwenhuys’ photo 
books were among the most nostalgic in all of Dutch literature.158
Aleida Assmann argues that constructive forgetting can be “the foun-
dation for a spiritual innovation, change in identity and a new political 
beginning.”159 Nieuwenhuys’ collection forces us to understand that pho-
tographs, on their own, do not necessarily tell us anything. The story often 
depends upon the framing, including the captions. With a couple of hundred 
old photographs, he had created a work of salvaging, directed towards 
building a new future. Nieuwenhuys had provided a family album for the 
Indisch community to help them recollect together, strengthen their social 
bond and survive loss. His novel and photographic collection were rooted 
in the world before decolonization. Decolonization is only the ending that 
gives the memories their poignancy. Nieuwenhuys joined Dermoût and 
Robinson as an agent of unremembering. All three directed their gaze 
through decolonization, not at decolonization. Decolonization formed the 
rupture that for Dermoût invoked sadness and nostalgic remembering of 
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what had been lost. For Robinson and Nieuwenhuys, decolonization was an 
aberration in the historical development of the Indo. Their memory work 
was a salvaging act, directed through decolonization, into the colonial world 
in order to build for the future.
Beb Vuyk: The Memory of Cruelty
Beb Vuyk was born in Rotterdam in 1905. As a youngster, she strongly identi-
f ied with her unknown Indonesian grandmother. Dark skinned and feeling 
like an outsider, the young Vuyk was a victim of racist-tinged verbal abuse, 
accentuating her sense of loneliness and alienation.160 By her mid-20s, she 
was the author of short stories, but instead of building her career in the 
Netherlands, she immigrated to the Dutch East Indies. On the voyage to the 
colony, she met the man who would become her husband, a man born of a 
Dutch father and an Ambonese mother. By the outbreak of World War Two, 
she had published two full-length books and was working on a third, partly 
f inished in a Japanese internment camp, which was published in 1947.161
The Yearbook of the Society of Dutch Literature describes her post-war 
work as deviating from the norm because, in her vision, “cruelty, betrayal 
and vengeance was practised with equal conviction on both sides of the 
demarcation line.” Furthermore, her work on “this dirty war” contained 
“no stereotype image of the enemy,” but depicted “the war atrocities and 
race madness [rassenwaan],” in which cruelty is some sort of sickness.162 
This makes her representations of decolonization unique among Indisch 
authors of the time.
Vuyk admitted that her experience of the war had brought about a change 
in her writing. Life in the Japanese internment camp and six weeks as a 
prisoner of the Japanese Kenpeitai had caused “the fear of human cruelty” to 
enter her life, while the onset of the Indonesian revolution meant, “atrocities 
were committed not by strangers and enemies, by Germans and Japanese, 
but by our own people, Dutch and Indonesians.”163 The stories that she 
published during the late 1940s and 1950s were concerned directly with the 
Japanese war or the war of decolonization. These were published in 1947 
under the title De wilde groene geur (The wild green scent) and in 1958 with 
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the title Gerucht en geweld (Rumour and violence). Vuyk admitted that they 
were all concerned with human cruelty (445).
“Verhaal van een toeschower” (“Story of a spectator”) contained events 
based on her own experience and referenced experiences relayed to her by 
the Indonesian leaders Hatta and Sjahrir, as well as Tjalie Robinson.164 The 
story demonstrates, f irstly, that cruelty flows forth from an abundance, a 
form of madness that overwhelms individuals under certain circumstances, 
regardless of nationality. Secondly, one can survive the loss of loved ones by 
means of cultivating memory, but, when one’s place is destroyed, it becomes 
diff icult to retain a purpose.
The narrator tells how he and the protagonist, Hermans, spent years 
together as prisoners of the Japanese.165 Hermans was an uncomplicated 
Indo, married to a local woman (364). The two men meet again as patients 
in a hospital in West Java. Next door is the police station, where the Dutch 
execute suspected Indonesian f ighters (365-369). Another patient, whose 
wife was killed by Indonesian nationalists, calls for the shooting of all natives 
and shouts: “Have you ever opened a pit where ten women and children 
were murdered? And before they were killed. Do you know what was done 
to them before they were killed?” (369)
Hermans had found himself f ighting alongside newly recruited Dutch 
troops against Indonesian nationalists. The young Dutch had volunteered 
for service, committed to the idea that they would be f ighting the Japanese, 
but found themselves forced to confront local nationalists. Their initial 
reluctance evaporated, however, when they found the mutilated bodies of 
some of their comrades. They were suddenly willing to carry out extrajudicial 
executions (368).
Hermans tells of how his wife was murdered by a band of anti-Dutch 
pemudas, one of the f irst victims of the decolonization conflict. Hermans 
tells:
I knew what had been happening here in Asia over the years. The slow 
current of the past 40 years was accelerated by the war. Asia is liberating 
itself. When the f irst reports came in, I tried to explain it to our people. 
They shouted me down. The republic was a Japanese puppet, Sukarno 
and his pemudas Japanese murderers. I argued against this (371).
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He adds that the murder of his wife changed nothing. He doesn’t accuse the 
Indonesian nationalists of being particularly cruel. On the contrary, he has 
witnessed brutality among the Dutch, as well as among the Indonesians. 
“Cruelty is a form of possession, a madness,” he concludes (374).
At the end of the story, the narrator visits Hermans in West Java. Hermans 
admits that he longs for his own island, far to the east, but the coconut 
plantations are destroyed, leaving him nothing to return to: “You can return 
to a dead one. I have my memories,” but “I cannot live in a dead garden. […] I 
don’t dare to return.” He admits he can f ind no purpose to living (377-379).
Vuyk represented the conflict as one of great violence, but made clear 
that no state has a monopoly on violence. The Japanese inflicted cruelty on 
European prisoners, the Dutch shot Japanese prisoners without a thought, 
Indonesian nationalists murdered colonials and the Dutch effortlessly 
shot nationalist suspects. Vuyk offered a merciless analysis of the colonial 
mindset that only recognizes its own suffering. “There are people” she writes, 
“who are still obsessed with their time in the camps. […] The white who 
has been humiliated by the coloured race, that still eats away at many.”166 
The exclusive focus on their own suffering is the preeminent characteristic 
of the mind of the colonialist, according to Frantz Fanon.167 Vuyk’s story 
revealed the European myopic obsession with their own suffering, rooted in 
the racist inability to deal with the humiliation of having been the helpless 
prisoner of non-whites.
Vuyk’s representation of decolonization reflects a sensitivity towards 
Indonesian nationalism, sympathizing with its aspirations, refusing to 
condemn its violence. Her story “De jager met zijn schietgeweer” (“The hunter 
with his gun”), also demonstrated sympathy for the Indonesian point of view. 
It highlighted the predicament of the Indo as the “in-between” victim of 
colonialism. He identif ies with his superior European status, but is rejected 
by European civilization because of his dark skin colour. In this story, the 
female narrator meets an acquaintance, the Indo captain of a ferry. With the 
War of Independence drawing to an end and the handover of sovereignty 
looming, he will be serving a newly independent Indonesian population. 
The captain asks if she agrees that the way to deal with Indonesian revo-
lutionaries is to kill them all. She answers that Indonesian nationalists are 
part of a pan-Asian phenomenon: “If you want to solve it in that manner, 
you will have to massacre all of Asia” (400). She explains that she plans to 
take Indonesian nationality. Astonished, he asks, “You and your husband 
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want to become natives?” She replies, “No, Indonesians” (402). This is the 
choice that Vuyk and her husband had taken after independence.168 The 
captain argues that white civilization is superior and he has worked hard 
to become a captain within the colonial system, and did not want to play 
the role of servant to the “black lads, the lazy, indolent Asians with their 
stupid black mugs.” She replies, “What have you against blacks, Captain? 
Aren’t you black yourself?” He reacts vehemently, pulls at his own skin and 
screams, “This black skin, my own skin that I want to tear off. It is the Asian 
in myself that I hate.”169
In Fanon’s classic study of the delusions inherent in colonialism, he 
argues that the person of colour internalizes European unconscious racist 
attitudes in which black symbolizes original sin: “The white man chooses 
the black man for this function, and the black man who is white also chooses 
the black man.” This creates a neurotic ambiguity.170 It is this self-hatred 
that Vuyk articulates. Political decolonization had taken place, but the 
captain remains colonized. His self-hatred is not his own doing. Shaped 
in the colonial environment, it was brought to light by decolonization. 
Fanon makes a distinction between those who are black and those who 
are of mixed heritage. Fanon refers to the former’s desire to turn white as 
“lactif ication,” while the latter possesses the added anxiety of “slipping back” 
into blackness.171 As represented by Vuyk, decolonization had aggravated 
the Indo fear of relapsing into blackness.
In Vuyk’s story “Full of sound and fury,” (the title is in English) we are 
confronted with cruel incidents from the decolonization conflict. Dutch 
soldiers torture prisoners, beating them with splintered bamboo sticks, 
while Indonesian forces kill an accused informer with a Japanese sword, 
having forced him to dig his own grave.172 The power of this story stems 
from its harrowing yet dispassionate account of brutality, based on Vuyk’s 
own experience of the Indonesian revolution, as well as her time spent as 
a prisoner of the Kenpeitai, the Japanese political police.173
Four years after the appearance of Gerucht en geweld, Beb Vuyk published 
another story that dwelled on the cruelty of decolonization. “De laatste 
waardigheid” (“The last dignity”). A man shows the narrator a photograph 
of a pile of corpses of women and children. His own wife and daughter had 
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been murdered by a radicalized gang of youths.174 The irony is that this man’s 
sympathies, like Vuyk’s, lay with the Indonesian nationalists. However, the 
murder of his family had forced him to choose the Dutch. He explains: “It is 
terrible to be a native, automatically the lesser of any arbitrary Dutchman. 
The feeling burns under your skin, it eats away at you. Nationalism gave us 
a new attitude.”175
In these stories, Vuyk gives voice to the underdog, whether the “in-
between” Indo, or the Indonesian victim of colonialism. The absence of 
nostalgia make the representations all the more powerful. In each story, 
we encounter depravity. The enemy is subsidiary to the atrocity of the war 
itself. There are no heroes, yet no one is entirely evil, either. Protagonists are 
intimately entangled within huge historical forces; options are limited and 
shaped by conditions. Decolonization is a pan-Asian movement towards 
liberation. The personalities are not the instigators; rather the European 
imperialist system has produced its dialectical opposite, a movement for 
liberation. The Dutch refusal to accept this unleashes the madness of violence 
and the violence of gangs of Indonesian youths begets the systematic violence 
of the Dutch war machine. At the same time, there is nothing exceptional 
in Dutch imperialism.
As she said in an interview near the end of her life: “[M]y work is to a 
great extent autobiographical.”176 Biographer Scova Righini argues that 
after the ending of the Japanese occupation and Sukarno’s declaration of 
independence, together with sociologist Wim Wertheim and Jacques De 
Kadt, Vuyk called for the immediate Dutch recognition of an independent 
Indonesia. From that point onward, she became subject to surveillance by 
the colonial intelligence agency as well as the Dutch domestic intelligence 
service.177 Her critical stance led to her patriotism being questioned and 
the awarding of a minor book prize was temporarily suspended.178 In the 
late 1950s, her return to the Netherlands led to a minor scandal in a section 
the conservative press.179
Vuyk’s work, formed a dissonance against the established discourse. 
Even today, she evokes widely different responses among scholars. Professor 
Praamstra, for instance, recently accused Vuyk of being yet another colonial, 
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but one who hid behind a “chameleon-like attitude” towards colonial life.180 
Such a view I think, is erroneous. I side with David van Reybrouck’s verdict. 
He argues that Vuyk was one of the very few Dutch in the colony who looked 
beyond her own suffering and that of other Europeans, to discover the 
far greater suffering of the Indonesians themselves.181 As I have argued 
elsewhere, her stories offer us a window, “through which we are forced 
to glimpse the uncomfortable reality that is the death-throws of a colony 
and the birth pangs of a new state as experienced by myriad groups of 
participants.”182
During the 1950s and 1960s Vuyk’s work found a mixed reception in 
the press. Het Vrije Volk judged Gerucht en geweld successful in portraying 
the confusion and senselessness of violence, but added that the book was 
chaotic and confusing.183 De Tijd judged the work unimpressive.184 One critic 
noted that she lacked the talent for the complexity of a novel.185 Another 
commented that Vuyk was not really a writer, and her stories missed the 
penetrating insights of Vincent Mahieu.186
However, De Groene Amsterdammer named Gerucht en geweld its “Book 
of the Month” and some reviewers praised her sober prose and sugges-
tive descriptions.187 De wilde groene geur received a positive review in De 
Volkskrant.188 Influential critics Hans Warren and Fred Pfeifer praised her 
work.189 In the Friese koerier, a reviewer claimed Gerucht en geweld should 
increase her readership.190 The Algemeen Handelsblad judged it to be of 
uneven quality, but admitted that the stories set during decolonization 
raised the quality of the whole.191 Influential journalist Kees Fens praised 
the collection highly, expressing admiration for how Vuyk had converted 
the stuff of personal experience into literary stories.192
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How is it that a woman who had been compared to a traitor and whose 
stories presented reminders of Dutch brutality, could be reviewed in such 
moderate terms? Firstly, many reviewers did not mention the content of the 
stories. Fens’ review analyses the formal literary merits, ignoring the content. 
More importantly, the answer can be inferred from the wording of a number 
of these reviews. Varangot mentioned that the stories themselves focus on 
the human aspects and not the political or historical.193 Another critic wrote 
that the stories appealed to those looking for human-interest problems 
associated with Indonesia after the separation from the Netherlands.194 A 
reviewer in the Algemeen Handelsblad claimed that the “very impressively 
written stories” would bring clarif ication to those interested in how great 
historical turning points can influence the individual.195
Vuyk’s work contends that human depravity is always just a whisper 
away, and therefore the violence of the Dutch was simply an aspect of being 
human. This is what the reviewers noticed. Some could pass over the content 
in silence. Others could reference the Dutch cruelty that emanates from 
her stories, but dismiss the cruel excesses as a universal, not particularly 
Dutch, phenomenon. Unremembering held sway in Dutch society. Haasse’s 
Oeroeg entered the reading lists of Dutch secondary schools, not Vuyk’s 
Gerucht en geweld. Vuyk provided an addition to the work of remembering 
decolonization, but few listened.
The Existentialist
Albert van der Hoogte’s novel Het Laatste Uur: een kroniek uit het na-oorlogse 
Indonesië (The f inal hour: A chronicle from post-war Indonesia) was pub-
lished in 1953. A certain Opzomer, who works as a prosecuting attorney in a 
district court, narrates the story. Having spent World War Two as a Japanese 
prisoner, he discovers that his two sons died in a Japanese camp. Opzomer 
f inds himself alone, confronting an existential dread amidst a decaying, 
rotting colonial society. He tells us: “The old East Indies no longer exists; 
what there now is, is ravaged, a sad skeleton.”196 Opzomer admits to himself, 
“Cowardice and lack of personality are my most signif icant characteristics” 
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(89). He fulf ils his duties, but has lost his belief in the justice of colonial law: 
“Indonesians are wiser than we are” (92).
The centrepiece of the novel is formed by the so-called Doyle case. A group 
of Indonesian peasants set upon a Dutch soldier and his Indo girlfriend. 
The soldier escapes, but his girlfriend is abducted, severely beaten, gang 
raped, mutilated and killed, then thrown into a hastily dug grave, possibly 
still alive. Scores of Indonesian villagers, women as well as men, sing and 
dance with joy and shout support to the rapists and killers as they watch 
the brutal spectacle. Van der Hoogte supplies us with a detailed account of 
this harrowing incident (95-108). When Opzomer interrogate the suspects, 
he realizes that such collective violence goes beyond reason (111). Yet, he is 
convinced that in a year’s time, back in Holland, “I will hardly be able to 
remember it,” like how the Dutch will unremember the details of their war 
(115). Opzomer goes through the motions and gets the death penalty for the 
main perpetrators (124-125).
A group of soldiers carry out the executions. Their off icer explains that 
republican guerrilla f ighters had captured three of their comrades, mutilated 
them horribly, then tortured them to death. The execution provides the 
opportunity for revenge. Yet, Opzomer, when describing the execution by 
f iring squad, gives us an ambiguous picture, as if it was Calvary that he was 
witnessing (136-150).
Opzomer visits a district that is terrorized by republican guerrillas. 
Indonesian representatives of Dutch rule live imperilled lives (182-183). 
He witnesses the solemn burial of three Dutch soldiers, victims of a mine 
explosion (187-191). Soldiers live in dread of these devices. In the f inal section 
of the novel, Opzomer regains consciousness in a hospital. He discovers that 
he has been the victim of a detonated mine. Gradually it becomes clear, that 
he is fatally wounded (193-200). The “f inal hour” in the title turns out to be 
Opzomer’s f inal hour, as well as that of the colony. Opzomer is dying, but 
accepts his being-towards-death. The notes that he is writing, that we are 
reading, become his expression of existentialist authenticity.
Rob Nieuwenhuys referred to Van der Hoogte’s writing as being high 
quality, specifying that the scene describing the execution of the seven 
murderers could never be forgotten.197 Justus van der Kroef, described The 
Final Hour as “a f irst-rate novel […] that captures the swan song of the Dutch 
colonial community.”198 The book received positive reviews in the national 
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press and was reprinted f ive times within four years of publication.199 Ger-
man and French translations soon appeared.200 Writing in De Telegraaf, 
the conservative C. Gerretson mourned the fact that Van der Hoogte had 
ignored the wonderful years of empire, yet, admitted that this was “the work 
of an artist of quite some talent.”201 The Leeuwarder Courant judged the book 
to be “a serious attempt to offer […] a representation of the situation.”202 
Nico Verhoeven of De Tijd referred to it as “the most revealing work of the 
imagination” to be written about the Dutch-Indonesian conflict.203A few 
years later, he described it as a historical document and an unparalleled 
modern “classical tragedy.”204 In the liberal De Gids, Emmy van Lokhorst 
claimed that the book provided an “unforgettable representation” of the 
period.205 The book won the prestigious Vijverbergprijs book prize for its 
“outstanding representation of the time.”206 When Van der Hoogte read a 
passage from the novel at the off icial prize giving, the audience, including 
the mayor of The Hague, was moved to silence, forgetting to applaud.207 
Novelist Pierre Dubois described The Final Hour as “one of the most moving 
books in our language about the break with our colonial past.”208
One critic who disagreed was Beb Vuyk. Writing in the Indonesian 
newspaper De Nieuwsgier, she accused Van der Hoogte of failing to capture 
the revolutionary energy of the time, pointing out that the Indonesians in 
the novel were all either “fearful federalists or the accused in murder cases” 
while the narrator was so involved with himself that he failed to demonstrate 
the slightest social curiosity.209
Van der Hoogte provided a representation of a rotten, colonial society 
during its dying days, where even civil servants no longer believe in the 
system. Soldiers f ight a sordid war that politicians in The Hague have 
given up on. Law courts are a sham. The Dutch army consists of lonely and 
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homesick men, many infected with syphilis. The book is populated with 
colonials who have questionable points of view.
The Final Hour is not only an existential novel, but also a post-
eschatological one. The greatest problem for the colonials is that they 
once tasted the privilege of what it was like to be a white colonial in a 
European empire, the good old days of tempo doeloe or what Anderson 
called “tropical Gothic.”210 Now the end has come, but they are doomed 
to continue living. Opzomer articulates this, realizing that those who 
survive are incurably sick, like “displaced persons.”211 This is worsened 
by the fact that it was all brought to an end by a Japanese invasion. Those 
“small yellow men have not disappeared; they are still standing behind us, 
with their squinting, slanty eyes under the peak of their stupid caps and 
with their bamboo sticks in their hands” (126). He adds, “We experienced 
the end of the world and our fate is that we survived this ending. We carry 
on as caricatures” (126).
One thing that made it possible for reviewers to give the work a positive 
reception, is that the brutal violence in the book comes from Indonesians. 
The rape scene reveals the Indonesian peasants as barbaric sadists. As Maria 
Dermoût wrote: “[T]he abduction, rape and torturing, before her death, of 
the very young Indo girl Betty Doyle, is of an inescapable horror.”212 Dutch 
violence, on the other hand, is institutional and legal. The protagonist’s sense 
of duty forces him to implement the law, even when it means applying the 
death penalty. Dutch soldiers are victims. They never burn kampongs or 
torture prisoners. Even the loss of belief among colonialists can be blamed 
on Asians. Thus, even Carel Gerretson could f ind much to like in the novel, 
and Beb Vuyk could f ind much to dislike. Furthermore, The Final Hour 
provided no historical explanation for the fall of the Dutch empire in Asia. 
Ultimately, the imperfectability of humans accounts for the extreme violence 
of the conflict.
Despite the prize winning and the positive reviews, interest in Van der 
Hoogte’s work waned, as did interest in the history of the colony. Reviewers 
described it as unforgettable. Yet, time proved them wrong. Van der Hoogte 
published one more novel set during decolonization, but, some decades after 
publication, they slipped out of public interest and out of print, becoming 
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no more than “a footnote in the history of Dutch literature.”213 Yet, The Final 
Hour did have an afterlife.
In 2002, Stef Scagliola published Last van de oorlog (Burden of the war). 
In her attempt to understand what drove Dutch soldiers to commit violent 
excesses, she examined some of the most brutal acts committed by the 
nationalist Indonesians. Scagliola refers to a terrible incident from 1945 
when a Dutch woman is gang raped, mutilated and murdered. Her source 
was a memoir from Dutch veteran, Joop Hulsbus. Scagliola quoted over 30 
lines from the statement of the chief perpetrator of the crime, as related 
by Hulsbus.214 However, in 2004, Esther ten Dolle published a devastating 
critique, showing that Hulsbus, in a case of near plagiarism, had lifted his 
description from Van der Hoogte’s novel. As Ten Dolle concluded, “without 
knowing it, […] the historian here used a fragment from a novel […] as a 
historical source.”215 Scagliola had concluded that the murderer had been 
“encouraged by an entire crowd to abuse in the most cruel manner and 
murder a Dutch woman,” then compounded her error by using this incident 
to argue that “violence from the Indonesian side that went beyond what 
Dutch soldiers could imagine.”216
Furthermore, in a brilliant piece of detective work, Ten Dolle located 
the original incident, f inding it reported in the Indische Courant between 
May and August 1948. Even the names of some perpetrators are the same 
as in The Final Hour. Like Van der Hoogte’s f ictional case, the historical case 
was heard at the district court of Surabaya, where Van der Hoogte himself 
was working. Ten Dolle’s argues that Van der Hoogte made use of the court 
documentation to write his f ictional account. Signif icantly, there is no 
reference to villagers who shouted their support of the rapists. This was an 
addition of Van der Hoogte’s.217 Van der Hoogte’s fantasy provides an example 
of Said’s “already existing structure of attitude and reference,” whereby 
imaginative writing on the Other is limited to certain imaginaries, assump-
tions and intentions.218 It drew on colonialism’s cultural archive of the brutal 
native, and this resonated among readers who had been inducted into the 
same family of ideas. Fifty years later, Scagliola transposed the incident to 
the Bersiap period in 1945, where it became a politically motivated brutal 
killing of a Dutch woman. Van der Hoogte’s work provides an inaccurate, 
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even racist, representation of Indonesian violence. Van der Hoogte’s f ictional 
representations of Indonesian violence may have been forgotten, and his 
work out of print, but its trace still shaped representations of Indonesian 
violence in the twenty-f irst century, providing an explanatory framework 
for Dutch military brutality.
Victimhood
Within the Dutch political elite, the transfer of sovereignty to the Indonesian 
revolutionary government was diff icult to accept. In 1950, former wartime 
Prime Minister Piet Gerbrandy wrote of “a great calamity, […] the deprivation 
of my country of […] a vital part of its being, under pressure exercised by 
Britain, the United States and U.N.O.”219 He blamed the “meddlers” who “stuck 
their clumsy f ingers in the pie” (72). Gerbrandy, leader of the Protestant 
Anti-Revolutionary Party, had led the Dutch government in exile in London 
during World War Two. After the liberation of the Netherlands, he had 
stepped aside. As the grand old man of Dutch politics and the leader of 
the forces that eventually triumphed over the evil of Nazism, his prestige 
was vast.
Gerbrandy did not dilute his praise for Dutch colonialism with Calvinist 
modesty. He judged that the fair-minded Dutch colonial state echoed “the 
Garden of Eden before the Fall” (40). This was due to the Dutch “genius 
for colony-building” (20) in combination with their “most admirable and 
altruistic motives” (34). This “unique excellence in the sphere of colonial 
relationships” (42) caused men’s minds to open wide, leading to “years of 
rapid but sensible expansion in very f ield” (23). The colony was a unique 
community, free of racial prejudice (34).
Gerbrandy denied that the authorities had encroached on personal liberty, 
arguing that the Dutch permitted absolute freedom of speech, except when 
seditious, maintaining that the colony was a Free State (41-47). However, the 
Great Depression was an economic blizzard that caused hardship, creating 
fertile ground for a totalitarian ideology that took its cue from Russia and 
Japan (24). This was led by a small group of self-seeking collaborators who 
“would sell their souls to the devil” (55).
Although the Japanese occupation of the Dutch East Indies was a severe 
blow, Gerbrandy believed recovery was possible. Alas, a combination of 
Dutch errors and interference by ignorant outsiders resulted in disaster 
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(11). Men of inf luence proved to be a “thorn in the side” because they 
had been members of the “avowedly separatist” De Stuw group (90). The 
main culprits in Gerbrandy’s view were Minister for Overseas Territories 
Logemann, followed by Van Mook (94). He described Van Mook as “utterly 
misguided” (135). This situation was aggravated by the fact that during the 
Catholic-Socialist coalitions between 1946 and 1949, the Socialists were the 
more influential; the willingness of the Catholics to compromise proved 
to be tragic (83-89).
Most of Gerbrandy’s ire was reserved for foreigners. The British could have 
stabilized the violent situation, but Mountbatten and General Christison 
made errors, leading to the appeasement of the Indonesian republican 
leadership. Consequently, the work of generations of Dutch colonials was lost 
(95-105). He criticized the UN, which “trained its guns on the Netherlands” 
after the “police action” of 1947. The result of the UN’s pressure meant that 
the Netherlands, “an ancient sovereign State,” was forced to “refrain from 
taking police action against evildoers” (108-110). Finally, he blamed the 
Americans for their interference, having been confused by public opinion 
(117-120).
Gerbrandy held international public opinion in low esteem: “It is a 
fantastic world in which, of all countries, the Netherlands […] is singled 
out and driven to part with our overseas territories” (80). Furthermore, the 
Dutch “who have builded [sic] sensibly, without the aid of megaphone and 
microphone, braggartry or bluster, have been stripped and robbed of our 
birthright in broad daylight” (80).
Gerbrandy argued that politicians in The Hague had failed to protect the 
rights of the peoples who opposed the Indonesian nationalists and had failed 
to ensure that these peoples could exercise their right of self-determination. 
He accused parliamentarians of abandoning their colony and reducing the 
Netherlands to the status of a minor power, predicting that Indonesia will 
fall prey to Islamic fanaticism and Soviet totalitarianism (175-183).
Despite his sense of victimhood, Gerbrandy f inished on a positive note. 
Not all was lost because the Netherlands retained West New Guinea and he 
called upon the Dutch nation to convert New Guinea into “a haven for those 
who wish to live in conditions of safety and tolerance” (185). He recognized 
that the Dutch can still “render Western Civilization a service by remaining 
in New Guinea,” tasked with keeping “the flame of civilization burning in 
the Far East” (190-191).
Gerbrandy’s sense of betrayal did not appear out of nowhere. His conserva-
tive party, along with the Liberals, had vehemently opposed negotiations 
with Indonesian republicans. When things went wrong, they made the 
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Labour Party and Van Mook the scapegoats.220 Gerbrandy had been incensed 
by the Linggadjati Agreement of 1946. This led him to found the right-wing 
extraparliamentary movement the Nationaal Comité Handhaving Rijkseen-
heid (National Committee for Maintaining State Unity). In an emotional 
speech on the radio, Gerbrandy condemned the bandits running amok on 
Java and the Dutch statesmen who would betray the nation. He appealed 
to the Dutch people, saying that they were about to lose World War Two.221 
His movement rapidly collected 300,000 signatures of citizens opposed to 
their parliamentary representatives.222 Historian Joop de Jong argued that 
the committee’s extreme views reflected the opinions of a large number 
from Gerbrandy’s party as well as Liberals.223 Van Doorn points out that 
repatriated colonials could rely on Gerbrandy for support.224 Gerbrandy 
came to champion the rights of minorities in Indonesia, especially the South 
Moluccans, in his attempt to retain Dutch influence in the archipelago.225 
In this context, Gerbrandy’s Indonesia echoed the views of a substantial 
minority of Dutch citizens.
However, the reviews were far from positive. Paul van ’t Veer of Het Vrije 
Volk gave the book short shrift, pointing out Gerbrandy’s lack of balance 
and clear reasoning.226 The Protestant Heerenveense Koerier found the 
scapegoating of the members of the De Stuw group hard to accept, wondering 
why Gerbrandy would cheat the Indonesians of what the Dutch already 
had – national sovereignty.227 One exception was the extended, positive 
review from Gerretson in De Telegraaf.228 He supported the thesis, consistent 
with his 1946 Indië onder Dictatuur, that the blood of Dutch soldiers had been 
spilt due to the self ish manipulations of the leftist De Stuw group. But then, 
Gerretson was one of Gerbrandy’s co-founders of the National Committee for 
Maintaining State Unity. Described by De Jong as “foul” (vileine), Gerretson’s 
views on colonialism were as extreme as Gerbrandy’s.229
If he had expected his book to have influence, Gerbrandy must have been 
disappointed. By the 1950s, few were listening except the colonial die-hards.
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The Adventurer
After the Indonesian War of Independence had ended, the man held respon-
sible for the worst mass killings, Captain Raymond Westering, had become 
the stuff of legend. In national and regional newspapers throughout the 
country, and in Dutch-language newspapers in Indonesia, it seemed like his 
every move was reported on during the 1950s and early 1960s. This included 
reports of his arrest (and release) after months of a manhunt;230 decisions on 
whether he should be deported to Indonesia;231 rumours of his attempt to 
inf iltrate back into Indonesia to start a counter-revolution;232 descriptions 
of his attempts to create a new ultra-conservative movement;233 even ac-
counts of his career and failure as an opera singer.234 In 1982, journalist Peter 
Schumacher claimed that Westerling’s name had become “synonymous with 
the cruelties inflicted by the Dutch soldiers during the police actions.”235 
His life seemed like that of a character in an opera. Indeed, in 1995 the opera 
Westerling premiered in Amsterdam.236
An inquiry and subsequent report in 1948 had justif ied Westerling’s 
methods as necessitated by the emergency situation in South Celebes. Frans 
Goedhart had managed to get a parliamentary motion passed in early 1949, 
calling for an independent commission to investigate Westerling’s use of 
extreme violence. However, by the time the report was delivered in The 
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Hague in 1954, the war seemed to belong to the distant past. The cabinet, 
in a clear example of unremembering, quietly shelved it.237
This did not mean that Westerling’s use of violence had been hidden 
by some sort of cover-up. After all, Van Mook freely admitted that he had 
ordered the pacif ication of South Celebes and this involved excesses.238 
More forcefully, Captain Raymond Westering himself had publically shared 
the details in a colourful, boastful account. Westerling’s Mijn Memoires 
(My memoirs) was published in 1952. From the f irst page, we know that we 
are dealing with no ordinary autobiography. Westerling quickly informs 
the reader that he was a “miracle child.”239 By the age of f ive, he could 
tame wild animals and snakes, by the age of six he could read bloody 
crime novels, by the age of seven he had become an excellent shot and 
by the age of eight he regularly disappeared into the mountains on long 
hikes (9-11). After joining the Dutch army in exile in 1941, he became an 
instructor “in silent killing” (28). As an instructor for the Dutch resistance, 
he boasted that he occasionally slipped across the lines to practise on 
German enemies (37). Eventually he was shipped to the East, where the 
real adventure began.
Westerling argued that the average Indonesian wanted the Dutch to 
restore order. Like Van Mook and Gerbrandy, he blamed the Japanese for 
stirring up hatred of the Europeans, viewed the Indonesian revolution as 
an example of the USSR’s expanding influence and blamed the British for 
failing to stop the disorder and the Australians for betraying the Dutch 
(40-75). Parachuted into Sumatra in 1945, he claimed that the Indonesian 
peasant was pleased to see his uniform, as it meant the end of terrorism. 
Meanwhile, fanatics terrorized the population (51-54). He gladly fulf illed 
his task of restoring order. He described how, almost single-handedly, he 
rescued hundreds of civilians from three internment camps (61-63). He 
related that, because of a wager for a bottle of whiskey, he snuck into the 
camp of a nationalist leader, abducted the terrorist, interrogated him, had 
him decapitated and returned to camp with the terrorist’s head in a biscuit 
tin. He got his bottle of Black & White whisky. He admitted his astonishment 
at his reputation for bloodthirstiness, arguing that this escapade saved lives, 
as it did not necessitate an all-out attack on the terrorist camp (78-89). He 
claimed that his way of killing earned him a reputation among the natives, 
and so the Westerling legend began (91-93).
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In July 1946 he was offered a position in the Royal Netherlands East 
Indies Army, followed by special orders “from my superiors” to pacify South 
Celebes (119). He set about executing corrupt police off icers publically and 
ostentatiously, and within days peace was restored in the regional capital 
(130-131). He described how he walked up to one off icial who was lunching 
at the crowded European Society, and simply shot him dead (134).
Westerling argued that he always worked with local informants, gather-
ing information, then entering a village, collecting the villagers together, 
calling for terrorists to be identif ied, then executing them on the spot. He 
maintained that these methods brought about the pacif ication of the island 
in less than two months, with only 600 terrorists killed. This led the local 
people to refer to him, as the “East Indies Robin Hood,” and earned him 
thousands of friends (140-155). Westerling claimed that the numbers had 
been exaggerated, concluding that, in total, 3,000 to 4,000 were killed by 
both sides during the pacif ication. Meanwhile, he became a scapegoat for 
the Dutch, who refused to publish the military, judicial and parliamentary 
reports about his operation (157-165). He complained that his name was 
brought up at the UN as if he was “a bloodthirsty monster” (185).
He resigned his commission because the treachery of politicians disgusted 
him. Attempting to enter civilian life on Java with his Indo wife, natives 
came seeking his advice, pleading for protection from nationalist violence 
(188-199). With the support of General Spoor, he decided to create a private 
army of 22,000 men (201-206). The locals called him Ratu Adil or “Just Ruler” 
(206-208).
Westerling described his attempted coup d’état of 1950. He justif ied this, 
arguing that he was defending the rights of the federation and the welfare 
of the natives against tyranny (229-238). He described his escape from 
Indonesia, his incarceration in Singapore and, having given the authorities 
the slip, his arrival in Brussels (269-289). Asserting that he was now world 
famous, he decided to use his fame to warn the world of the global danger 
that a Moscow-inspired Indonesia constituted (291-299).
Westerling’s claim of world fame is only slightly exaggerated. In his own 
country, his adventures were followed in regional and national newspapers. 
Yet the Dutch press ignored the publication of his memoir. One journalist 
did report how shocking it was to read of Westerling boasting of his bloody 
deeds, but then added that the press has properly reacted to the publication 
with complete silence.240
240 F.S., “Buiten-parlementair,” Friese Koerier, 3 June 1953.
pOST-DECOLONIzATION: THE FIRST 20 YEARS, 1949-1969 115
Descriptions of summary executions and mass killings were not some-
thing that the Dutch public or journalists seemed to have much stomach 
for. Moreover, historians showed little interest in an area that might provoke 
controversy. Westerling was correct. He was made a scapegoat. He avoided 
prosecution for war crimes, but his name became synonymous with brutality. 
In 1966, Het Vrije Volk reported that his mass killing of 40,000 people was 
remembered in South Celebes.241 Thus, Dutch society perpetrated the myth 
that Westerling was an individual adventurer whose hard methods were the 
exception. A placid press, an inert historical profession and a disinterested 
public, combined to engage in systematic unremembering.
The Soldier
In 2013, Annegriet Wietsma and Stef Scagliola broke new ground with the 
publication of a study on Dutch soldiers and sex during the Indonesian 
War of Liberation. Their purpose was to inscribe what had remained a 
blank page in the history of decolonization – how, upon returning to the 
Netherlands after the cessation of hostilities, the Dutch military left in its 
wake thousands of abandoned children, as well as the children’s mothers, 
most of whom had traded sex for money. The courageous historians hoped 
to expose a “well-kept secret” that had been preserved for over 60 years.242
The issue of European soldiers having sex with local women had long 
been problematized by Dutch public opinion. In his study of concubinage 
in Dutch East Indies, Reggie Bray notes that the colonial army was unique 
in permitting soldiers and women to live together in an unmarried state 
within the barracks. Nevertheless, by the late nineteenth century, pro-
tests were being voiced and Dutch parliamentarians were concerned that 
concubinage contributed to the spread of venereal diseases among the 
soldiers. Furthermore, a serious social concern was the children born from 
mixed relationships. The presence of such children was widely held to be 
an indication of the moral collapse of European society. Consequently, by 
the late 1920s, off icial toleration for concubinage within the military hand 
ended.243 Ann Laura Stoler agrees that the view that the European colonial 
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population was in danger of racial degeneracy was widespread and the 
abandonment of métis children invoked a “social death.”244
Wietsma and Scagliola’s book, unlike that of Baay, focused on the war 
of decolonization. However, it was not the f irst to deal with this topic. In 
1957, Job Sytzen’s f ictional trilogy of novels, Niet Iedere Soldaat Sneuvelt 
(Not every soldier dies), Gods Ravijn (God’s ravine) and Landgenoten (Com-
patriots), was published in a single volume. The f irst two books were set 
squarely against the background of decolonization. Yet, this work has long 
lain unremembered. Furthermore, until very recently there was limited 
information regarding the author. Gert Oostindie has marshalled the basic 
facts for the authors of nearly 700 egodocuments published by veterans of 
the conflict, but for Sytzen there are a number of blanks.245 Some of these 
blanks have been f illed in, in a short work by Harry Poeze.246
At f irst sight, Niet Iedere Soldaat Sneuvelt is a superf icial story of a love 
affair between newly married Captain Willy Besoyen and a young Dutch 
widow in Java, Laura Dusart, mother of two young children and a survivor of 
a Japanese camp. Likewise, the second story, Gods Ravijn, is a doomed love 
story between a Dutch volunteer soldier and a Dutch nurse, but also a story 
of spiritual redemption. All the main characters in the trilogy are Dutch. 
Indonesians are invisible and silent. The Japanese are cruel, Indonesian 
nationalists are bloodthirsty fanatics. Besoyen and Dusart are near perfect 
specimens of humanity. Java forms the tropical, languid backdrop to love 
affairs, an Orientalist fantasy.
A closer reading reveals that the f irst two stories represent the f inal 
years of the Dutch East Indies with some frankness. We learn of soldiers 
who banish women from the camps, especially “the whores.” Entertainment 
consists of visiting friendly families, cinemas and restaurants, which is 
“cheaper than whores.” Venereal diseases is one of the greatest problems 
for the Dutch military. Condoms are unavailable and the only way to stay 
healthy is to stay away from local women.247 Dutch authorities carry out 
raids against infected prostitutes and force them into hospitalization (57). 
Beyozen offers a beautiful girl a ride in his jeep but is upset when she then 
offers him sex (88-89). During a night out, he witnesses a slim Chinese girl 
dancing naked for his drunken comrades (104-107). He admits that if he did 
not have Laura, he too would pay for sex and probably contract syphilis. He 
244 Stoler, “Sexual Affronts,” 27-31.
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compares the sexual behaviour of Dutch soldiers with that of the Germans 
as well as the Canadians in the Netherlands (171-172), a comparison repeated 
in Gods Ravijn (295). With soldiers lying in hospital beds with sexually 
transmitted diseases, he seizes one girl who has been a source of infection 
and forces her at gunpoint to flee naked from her home (266-270). In Gods 
Ravijn, the main character causes a scandal when he has a relationship 
with a Dutch nurse, the scandal being that he infected her with venereal 
disease (295). We are told that if a soldier has a girlfriend and she becomes 
pregnant, he is immediately transferred (240). Laura and Willy break up, but 
Willy discovers that she had been pregnant and, back in Holland, had given 
birth to their baby girl (278). In Gods Ravijn, we f ind a reference to Dutch 
soldiers having sexual relations with their maids, and a number of these 
relationships result in babies being born in the kampongs (376). The fact that 
the Dutch army left the by-products of their war making and lovemaking 
in their wake was not such a “well-kept secret” after all.
The book offers examples of the brutality of life for the Dutch soldier. 
Having killed Indonesian nationalists, it is considered advisable to not f ill in 
a report, in case it falls into the wrong hands (245). Soldiers sell anti-malaria 
pills on the black market (24-25). Soldiers are guilty of plundering and 
conf iscating goods (237). One soldier explains the relationship between 
fighting and sex: “Once you’ve […] killed someone with your submachine gun, 
[…] a woman is no longer something you avoid hurting, […] but something 
that you’ll take if you feel like it.”248
Oostindie writes that little immoral behaviour can be found in the nearly 
700 soldier’s egodocuments that he has studied. Open references to sex hardly 
occur. He quotes from a number of egodocuments that give the impression 
that Dutch soldiers withstood the temptations of prostitutes. He then quotes 
from a select number that give details of soldiers paying for sex.249 Although 
he references Sytzen’s trilogy three times,250 he fails to reference him in 
this passage. Instead, he quotes from seven documents published in the 
twenty-f irst century, f ive from the 1990s and three from the 1980s.251 This 
gives the inaccurate impression that veterans only wrote about this topic 
decades after decolonization. But Sytzen’s work demonstrates that secrets 
were never hidden. In the 1950s, a book was available that represented an 
army with widespread problems. In later decades, we come across frequent 
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references to a cover-up, but early in the process of (un)remembering, we 
have a document that attempts to activate remembering, but eventually 
becomes unremembered itself, even by historians of the twenty-first century.
In June 1960, Sytzen’s volume was the second biggest selling book of the 
month.252 Sytzen’s publisher claimed that the trilogy “appeals to a large 
public.”253 However, the popularity did not last. In 1961, an advertisement 
for the trilogy claimed that the book provided the reader the opportunity 
to acquire “understanding for the extreme diff icult problems of the lads 
during the police actions.”254 Sytzen writes that his story tells of the men 
who volunteered to f ight “the Jap” in order to liberate the Indies but that this 
became a struggle against misunderstanding back home.255 In the third work 
of the trilogy, Sytzen links the narrative of resistance against the German 
occupier with the narrative of volunteering to f ight for the liberation of the 
Dutch East Indies.256 In other words, the audience for the book is the home 
front and the purpose, to set the record straight.
Jennifer Foray argues that the immediate post-World War Two period saw 
various political actors in the Netherlands producing an effective rhetoric, 
centred around simple binaries of “correct” (Dutch patriots) versus “wrong” 
(German occupiers and their Dutch collaborators), and “the German oc-
cupation of the metropolitan Netherlands and the Japanese occupation of 
the East Indies were cloaked in the same rhetorical mantle.”257 Scagliola 
writes that World War Two was the “exemplary war” and its “‘good’ and ‘evil’ 
would provide the main referential framework for post-war Holland.”258 
Foray agrees that “memories of World War II overlapped and informed 
understandings of the decolonization process” and very quickly both sets 
of events “morphed into one cultural trauma.”259 Within this framework 
“Sukarno was a traitor, a Japanese puppet, comparable to the Dutch Nazi 
leader Anton Mussert.”260
Foray argues that by September 1945 division between the Dutch began 
to complicate this simple vision. By late September, the Dutch Communist 
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Party demonstrated solidarity with the Republic of Indonesia, leading to 
the predominantly royalist and Protestant Community of Former Resist-
ance Workers expelling communist resistance veterans from its ranks.261 
Similarly, the group around Vrij Nederland, under the leadership of Henk 
van Randwijk, began to take a critical approach and fostered cooperative 
ties between Dutch progressives and Indonesian nationalists. Therefore, 
a majority of Dutch felt that a f irm line against Sukarno could prevent 
a catastrophic event, similar to the German occupation, while a smaller 
group on the left took a more critical approach to Dutch colonialism and 
its attempts at reconquest.262
Sytzen’s narrative is consistent with that of the royalist, Protestant 
members of the resistance who volunteered to liberate the Dutch East Indies 
after the Allies had liberated the Netherlands. Thanks to Harry Poeze, we 
now know that Sytzen was in fact the pseudonym of Jacob Jonker, a pastor 
in the strict Dutch Reformed Church who served as an army chaplain in 
the Dutch East Indies from 1946 until 1948.263 He was also a member of 
Gerbrandy’s conservative Anti-Revolutionary Party.264 Lieutenant Besoyen 
is a practising member of the Dutch Reformed Church.265 Gijs Kotting is the 
son of a Protestant reverend and the work in which he is the protagonist, 
Gods Ravijn, is a work of spiritual redemption. Many of the male characters 
in the trilogy have been involved in the resistance during the German 
occupation, like Kotting, who had risked his life against the Germans and 
had been hunted by the Gestapo (306). In the third story, we learn that a 
student at the Protestant university led a resistance group that forms the 
background of many of the characters in the previous two novels (454).
One soldier explains that they “volunteered to fight against the Japanese to 
liberate the Indies” (160-161). Another explains that young men in the former 
resistance felt obliged to volunteer to liberate Indonesia (316). However, they 
became disillusioned quickly. Kotting writes to his English girlfriend, “I’ve 
wanted all the time to go to the Indies and to f ight the Japs. But […] now 
I’m here it’s just a rotten business” (319). Later he adds that by helping to 
ensure that Queen Wilhelmina’s lands will be liberated by the Dutch, he 
would be liberated “from the Jerrys, from the wretches and murderers, who 
hunted us like vermin” (360). A character who appears in all three novels, 
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Piet Verkerk, admits he has to volunteer because, “I’ll die of shame if I stay 
here” (532). Most soldiers see Indonesian nationalists as being “poisoned by 
fanaticism,” something learned from the Japanese (42). In other words, they 
see the conflict as one of those who are “right” against those who are “wrong.”
However, Sytzen’s work also articulates how the soldiers became 
disillusioned when they discover that they were defending the rights 
of bigoted colonialists. Besoyen argues against one colonialist: “If you 
had thought about the people rather than the billions earned by your 
companies, we wouldn’t have the mess that we now have” (144). Similarly, 
like Gerbrandy, his books criticize a Dutch government that gives in to 
American pressure and agrees to a ceasef ire, betraying the soldiers (234). 
Kotting ref lects that having been hunted by the Gestapo, and having 
been moved by patriotism to liberate Indonesia, he is betrayed by his 
government to the Americans and British (371). He has “no thrust in 
The Hague anymore” (420). Indeed, even within the former resistance 
group in Amsterdam, there are critical voices who claim that the Dutch 
will be playing the role of the SS among the Indonesians (536). The same 
character, a communist, warns the volunteers that they are servants of 
world capital (554). Furthermore, the Dutch government avoids fulf illing 
its responsibility of paying to widows the salaries of husbands who had 
been killed by the Japanese, and by 1947, the Tour de France received more 
attention than the war in Indonesia (608).
Sytzen’s works received some positive reviews.266 However, most were not 
generous. The Algemeen Handelsblad accused Sytzen of writing a superficial 
love story.267 Het Vrije Volk wrote that the second volume was only marginally 
better than the f irst.268Another reviewer stated that the f irst volume was 
too confrontational and reckoned that Sytzen was trying to sweeten his 
bad conscience by blaming others.269
We have seen that by the late 1940s leading publications on the left had 
become critical of the prosecution of the war. By 1949, the futility of the war 
had become evident. The largest army ever mobilized in Dutch history now 
had to return, in defeat. Meanwhile, authorities in the Netherlands were 
intent on rebuilding the country. The framework of “right versus wrong” 
provided the rhetoric from which the trauma could be (mis)understood.
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Returning soldiers were met by an indifferent public. The veterans be-
lieved their exertions and sufferings had served an acceptable goal. However, 
the society that they returned to did not share this view.270 The Dutch public 
had suffered under the Germans, but had little time for the suffering of Jews 
and next to no interest in the lot of repatriated Indische people. They had 
even less sympathy for soldiers who had lost a war. Oostindie tells us that 
the returning soldiers feared being misunderstood. A number remember 
the public calling them murderers. More frequently, the response was 
indifference, leading some to refer to themselves as “the forgotten army.”271
Sytzen’s early popularity did not reach those of the left of the political 
spectrum. For them, the adventure in Indonesia had already become an 
embarrassing aberration, best ignored. By the mid-1960s, this disinterest 
became widespread. Thus, the experience of the Dutch soldier during the 
war of decolonization in general, and Sytzen’s trilogy in particular, was 
unremembered. Jonker/Sytzen immigrated to Australia, where he continued 
to work in the Calvinist church.272
Tens of thousands of Dutch men and a smaller number of women, military 
veterans, lived with their memories in their minds, sometimes written on 
their bodies, in a society that was not interested. Their representations 
did not f it into the neat binary “right versus wrong” schema. When society 
eventually did express an interest in the late 1960s, it focused exclusively 
on the issue of their war crimes.
The Historian
Dutch colonial historiography had been the handmaiden of imperial power, 
with colonial ideology spoon-fed to future practitioners.273 Into the late 
1960s, Dutch historians denied that the Dutch had ever been involved in 
“anything that could be called ‘imperialism.’”274 Hugenholtz argues that 
colonial history had failed to develop into a separate discipline, so close did 
its ideology resemble that of government power.275 Yet there were exceptions.
In the 1920s and 1930s, B.J.O. Schrieke made strides in developing an 
Indocentric historiography, but this placed him “outside the traditional 
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framework of colonial historiography.”276 In the 1930s, J.C. van Leur made 
substantial contributions to a postcolonial approach to Indonesian history, 
rejecting Eurocentric periodization.277 Blaut ranks Van Leur alongside the 
likes of W.E.B. DuBois and Eric Williams as forming the “first serious critique 
of Eurocentric historiography.”278 This postcolonial perspective developed 
further during the 1950s in the work of G.J. Resink.279 Nevertheless, these 
academics produced work far from the centre of Dutch academia. Van Leur 
never held an academic post. Resink, who choose Indonesian nationality 
after decolonization and lived in Indonesia, wrote from what he described 
as “the periphery.”280
Within days of the end of the war in Europe, a newly founded organization 
was tasked with gathering materials about the German occupation. Its 
director, Loe de Jong, was eventually tasked with writing a complete history 
of the war in the Netherlands. Yet, during the 1950s, Dutch historians all 
but ignored the war in Indonesia. In the 20 years between 1949 and 1969, no 
Dutch historian of repute made a serious attempt to analyse the process of 
decolonization. The University of Leiden was the self-styled world centre of 
expertise for all things Indonesian, especially the Koninklijk Instituut voor 
Taal-, Land- en Volkenkunde (KITLV, now the Royal Netherlands Institute of 
Southeast Asian and Caribbean Studies), yet its esteemed faculty avoided 
the topic.
In 1952 C. Smit published a short study of decolonization, De Indonesische 
Quastie (The Indonesian question), followed in 1962 by De Liquidatie van 
een imperium (The liquidation of an empire). His death in 1991 earned him 
a sympathetic obituary in the NRC Handelsblad, written by a professor 
of diplomatic history at Leiden. The title of Smit’s book De Indonesische 
Quaestie is misspelt in the obituary and earned a single sentence, in which 
he is complimented for his businesslike description of the conflict.281
Yet, this misrepresents the work. Smit’s f irst book offers an analysis of 
the failures of Dutch policies. It follows a similar line of argument as De 
Kadt’s De Indonesische Tragedie. Indonesian nationalism was not invented 
by the Japanese but grew out of the Dutch economic exploitation of the 
276 Vogel, De Opkomst, 105.
277 Ibid., 231-232; Wertheim, “Early Asian Trade,” 168; Van der Kroef, “On the Writing,” 355.
278 Blaut, The Colonizer’s Model, 55.
279 Vogel, De opkomst, 14-16; Van der Kroef, “On the Writing,” 364-371; Mrázek and Resink, 
“Coughing,” 161-162.
280 Mrázek and Resink, “Coughing,” 161.
281 A.E. Kersten, “Historicus van buitenlands beleid en de dekolonisatie,” NRC Handelsblad, 
21 September 1991.
pOST-DECOLONIzATION: THE FIRST 20 YEARS, 1949-1969 123
Indonesians.282 During the 1920s the Dutch missed the chance of integrating 
Indonesians into the colonial government due to a lack of imagination 
(8). They reacted to Indonesian aspirations with executions, arrests and 
banishment to internment camps (12-17). Like De Kadt, Smit argued that 
the Declaration of Independence was not a Japanese construction, but was 
shaped by the nationalist youth movements (46). Most damaging was the 
inaccurate view that Sukarno was simply a former collaborator with the 
Japanese (64). The actual f ighting only takes up a few lines in Smit’s work, 
but, like De Kadt, he does suggest that the so-called “police actions” were 
an attempt to solve the problem, “in the old-fashioned, colonial way, with 
weapons” (140). In short, a couple of years after decolonization, a work of 
history appeared that provided an argument countering the Dutch myth – 
Sukarno was a Japanese puppet and the international community betrayed 
the Dutch. To refer to such a work as “businesslike” belittles it. Alas, the 
work inspired few new historians.
We have seen how Bouman studied the development of Indonesian 
nationalism in West Sumatra. In 1953, J.M. Pluvier’s doctoral dissertation 
on Indonesian nationalism between 1930 and 1942 was published. Leftist 
sociologist Wim Wertheim of the University of Amsterdam argued that it 
covered a “forgotten” chapter of the history of the Indonesian revolution.283 
Wertheim claimed that for most scholars, the period remained a blank 
page, allowing them to blame everything on the Japanese occupation.284
Pluvier argued that “extreme Dutch chauvinism” had been growing in 
the colony since the mid-1920s, and in the early 1930s fascist ideas found 
wide support among Europeans and Indos.285 Indonesian nationalist or-
ganizations were confronted with a series of repressive measures (41-42). 
However, peasant and ethnic organizations with a local character became 
increasingly oriented towards the idea of great Indonesia (79-85). Moderate 
groups directed their energies towards social and economic works, but 
the idea of Indonesian independence remained alive (97-107). Repression 
meant that radical groups made a tactical decision to reorient themselves as 
cooperative groups (107-130). But by the early 1940s, repression of radical and 
moderate groups intensif ied and Indonesians were wondering if their home 
would remain a colony for centuries (143-146). Although many Indonesian 
nationalists sympathized with the Dutch after the German invasion of the 
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Netherlands in May 1940, the following years saw them confronted with 
government intransigence; the chasm between the authorities and the 
nationalist movement widened (167-193). Pluvier concluded that by the time 
of the Japanese occupation, trust in European promises had diminished, 
and Dutch authority left the legacy of Indonesian aspirations ignored (204). 
Pluvier’s work offered a representation in which colonial rule, not Japanese 
propaganda or international conspiracy, was at the root of the Indonesian 
revolution. The Dutch had sown the seeds of their own downfall.
In 1959, a promising article entitled “The Indonesian Declaration of 
Independence: 17th of August 1945” was published by Leiden historian H.J. 
De Graaf, in which he attempted to unravel the events surrounding the 
days and hours before Sukarno and Hatta’s declaration of independence. 
His undertaking suggested a preliminary effort to initiate an academic 
discussion of decolonization.286 Alas, the attempt to initiate a debate failed.
The loss of Dutch West New Guinea in 1962 and its incorporation into 
Indonesia led Smit to write De Liquidatie van een Imperium. But as Henk 
Hofland wrote, this work remained “safely on the surface.”287 Compared 
with his earlier volume, it marked a regression towards unremembering. 
Firstly, it was a purely diplomatic history of the conflict, a history from 
above, in which events are the result of decisions taken by political leaders. 
Secondly, it provided a Eurocentric analysis. Indonesians are represented 
as being reactive. We get to hear a great deal about the uneasy relationship 
between Dutch coalition partners, while the political machinations between 
Indonesian nationalist factions are only alluded to. This Eurocentric focus 
is deepened by the fact that the book begins with the Indonesian Declara-
tion of Independence.288 The prelude to decolonization is unremembered. 
Smit admitted that he cut out any account of Indonesian nationalism and 
the period of the Japanese occupation. No explanation is given for this 
unremembering (5).
Thirdly, Smit all but ignored any actual f ighting. We learn that during 
the f irst “police action,” “Dutch losses were very slight” (81) and that during 
the second “the losses on the Dutch side were minimal” (141). Indonesian 
losses are never mentioned. Westerling’s use of extrajudicial killing on 
South Celebes receives one sentence (51). On the other hand, Indonesian 
gangs are blamed for terrorizing the rural population (75, 130), Indonesian 
286 De Graaf, “The Indonesian Declaration,” 305.
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nationalists are accused of “murder, burnings and intimidation” (89), as 
well as plundering, running amok and sabotage (92, 104).
Nevertheless, Smit’s work includes criticism of the Dutch. We are told 
that the politicians in The Hague were narrow-minded and would have done 
better allowing Van Mook a freer hand in Batavia (10). Van Mook is blamed for 
the failure of the Hoge-Veluwe Conference in 1946 (35). The Dutch parliament 
is criticized for not accepting the Linggadjati Agreement in its “naked” form 
(50). Smit claimed that the obstinacy of the Dutch parliamentarians caused 
open military conflict in 1947 (79). Despite its shortcomings, the publication 
of De Liquidatie van een Imperium meant that Smit had published two 
representations of the decolonization conflict by 1962, while most Dutch 
Indonesia experts had published none.
In 1964 journalist Paul van ’t Veer wrote the f irst Dutch biography of 
Sukarno. Van ’t Veer suggested that the term “collaborator with the enemy” 
was a misnomer, because the Japanese were not an enemy of the Indone-
sians.289 Furthermore, Sukarno was not a puppet of the Japanese, because 
Indonesian independence was the “product of autonomous Indonesian 
thought.”290 But this biography was a slight work. It had little to say regarding 
the years from 1945 to 1949. With just one passing reference to “atrocities” 
committed under the command of Westerling, no attempt was made to 
analyse Dutch military actions.291
The following year saw the publication of an eye-witness account of the 
fall of the Dutch empire by someone who had spent most of his working life 
in Dutch overseas service. Daniel van der Meulen had risen to the position 
of Minister of Education in the Dutch East Indies after World War Two. The 
main message of his volume was that the Dutch and colonial authorities 
failed to see the rise of Indonesian nationalism as an unstoppable force.
His f irst encounter with Indonesian nationalism occurred when he at-
tended a meeting in Leiden in 1912 of three nationalist exiles – Raden Suwardi 
Suriadiningrat, Dr. Tjipto Mangunkusumo and Douwes Dekker. He quoted 
the latter warning the socialist audience: “If all Javanese spit at the same time, 
the Dutch will drown.”292 As a young government administrator in Sumatra, 
he witnessed the arrogance of colonial rulers, and how this blinded them to 
the fact that resistance to colonial authoritarianism was becoming systemic 
(48). Furthermore, he recognized that the “fanatical Muslim” of western 
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Sumatra, while having been bloodily suppressed by the Dutch, remained 
inwardly a people who had never been conquered (96-97). The virulence of 
Islamism emanating from Cairo and the rise of Indian nationalism produced 
twin forces that influenced a growing anti-colonialism in Indonesia, but 
the response of the Dutch colonial authorities was to turn Indonesia into 
a police state (99-111). He added that few in the colonial leadership want to 
remember the enthusiasm with which they greeted Mussert, the Dutch Nazi 
leader, when he visited the colony before World War Two (112).
The sudden collapse of the colony, soon after the Japanese invasion, was 
something which “we as Dutch people should be ashamed of,” while the 
military and civilian leadership, “had no leadership qualities” (130-131). He 
refused to condemn Indonesians who had served under the Japanese, asking, 
Who dares to use the word “collaborator” when, practically without putting 
up a f ight, Dutch authority turned these people over to the merciless power 
of the Japanese? He showed understanding for the Indisch and Indonesian 
civil servants and military personal who, with the outbreak of the Indonesian 
revolution, found themselves in the dilemma of feeling double loyalty to 
the colonial authority and to the new Indonesian government (146-150).
The hero in Van der Meulen’s book (if we discount the author himself, 
who we never witness making an error) is Van Mook. He is described as a 
“strong, courageous, tireless character, who clearly was the leader” (164). 
Although Van Mook was blinded by optimism in his attempt to forge an 
Indonesian federation, “he retained until the end […] my full respect” (260).
The fundamental errors were those of political leaders in The Hague 
(240), especially the right-wing leaders (260). The consequence of these 
mistakes were the two “police actions,” which are described in just two pages 
(261-262). In other words, like in the works of Smit, Van Meulen gives us an 
account of a war shorn of any f ighting. His rosy-coloured representation 
of Van Mook reflects his own view that Indonesia could have transitioned 
into independence under the tutelage of enlightened colonials like himself; 
a late colonial – but nevertheless a colonial – point of view.
The 1960s saw discussions concerning the nature of Dutch imperialism, 
sparked by the crisis around West New Guinea. Arend Lijphart’s The Trauma 
of Decolonization: The Dutch and West New Guinea (1966) had only a little 
to say about the period from 1945 to 1949. He argued that in the case of 
West New Guinea, “subjective and psychological factors can be suff iciently 
powerful to constitute by themselves the driving force behind colonialism 
and the obstacle to decolonization.”293 Lijphart accounted for what made the 
293 Lijphart, The Trauma, 5.
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Dutch withdrawal from the Indies traumatic. Firstly, the colony was by far 
the biggest in the Dutch empire, which made its loss deeply felt. Secondly, 
Dutch ignorance of developments during the period from 1942 to 1945 and 
their strong desire to return to the normalcy of the pre-war period led to 
a deep sense of shock when confronted by Indonesian mass nationalism, 
compounded by the conviction of the Dutch that “they were one of the 
most enlightened and progressive colonizing states in the world” (106-107). 
Thirdly, the metropole felt a sincere attachment to the colony (108). Fourthly, 
the Dutch had a sense that they had been betrayed by the rest of the world, 
especially by their allies Britain and the USA (108). Finally, the “proverbial 
stubbornness” as well as the “intensely legalistic outlook” of the Dutch (109) 
played a role. These f ive factors accounted for the intense pain of decoloniza-
tion, according to Lijphart. In both 1945-1949 and the period around the loss 
of West New Guinea in 1962, Lijphart concluded that the Dutch “acted with 
an intense emotional commitment, manifested in pathological feelings of 
self-righteousness, resentment and pseudo-moral convictions” but this had 
now transformed into “a compulsive urge to forget” (285-286).
A small number of other influential works did appear in the 1950s and 
early 1960s, but as Henk van den Doel pointed out, they were all written 
by foreigners.294 Jan Bank, recommended that if one wanted to search for 
historical works that gave a balanced account of the Indonesian revolution, 
one needed to look to the works of American and Australian historians, 
adding that Dutch historiography on the subject “has made little progress.”295 
Andrew Goss wrote, “During the 1950s, the history of colonialism was not 
forgotten, but certainly was institutionally ignored. For historians and other 
scholars, […] the Netherlands East Indies was an embarrassment and of little 
relevance to building a new Dutch culture.”296 Henk Wesseling agreed that the
Dutch war in the Indies […] received virtually no attention at all: no 
institute, no television series, no scholarly articles, off icial or unoff icial, 
[…] only a few unread novels and some forgotten memoirs. […] In short 
there existed no historical view of colonization and decolonization.297
This situation of historiographical inertia was about to change abruptly, 
though not thanks to any historian.
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4 Breaking the Silence
Abstract
During the 1960s, television allowed historian Loe de Jong to shape a 
collective memory of the Dutch as heroes who suffered German barbarism 
during the Occupation. Thus, decolonization was unremembered. In 1969, 
a VARA television interview with veteran Joop Hueting caused a public 
outcry by detailing Dutch atrocities during decolonization. The off icial 
inquiry that followed, and the decision to publish a collection of off icial 
documents, only furthered the process of unremembering. Hueting’s 
interview inspired some veterans to pen realistic novels of the conflict, 
as well as the f irst academic study of Dutch mass violence. The role of 
the press was ambiguous. Historians failed to engage with the subject, 
but the public television broadcaster VPRO aired a serious documentary 
about decolonization in 1976.
Keywords: decolonization, unremembering, Hueting interview, Loe de 
Jong, collective memory, Dutch East Indies
We have already seen how Olick argues that changes in technology can 
lead to changes in collective memory. Connerton argues that collective 
remembering will change when a transformation in communication 
comes through the introduction of new technology.1 Erll argues: “TV events 
sometimes prove to be landmarks and turning points in the development 
of […] memory discourses.”2 Raben argues that such turning points took 
place by means of Dutch television between the mid-1960 and mid-1970s.3 
The written word, as the chief vehicle of mediated collective memory, was 
seriously challenged by the new media. While photography, radio and 
cinema already provided alternative forms of mediation, television began 
1 Connerton, How Societies, 75-76.
2 Erll, Memory, 139.
3 Raben, “Dutch Memories,” 103.
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to accede to a position of dominance. The supplementing of literature 
with television meant a partial shift from inscription to performance and 
spectacle. Ironically, offering new ways of speaking meant a return to the 
oral. In television documentaries, the interview became a primary mode 
of re-presenting traces of the past. These living traces, the witnesses and 
participants in historical events, allowed the collective to draw close to 
the raw past. Combined with original f ilm footage, the collective could 
experience a pseudo-witnessing of the past itself.
Marshal McLuhan suggested that “any new means of moving information 
will alter any power structure whatever.”4 He argued that the advent 
of television was bringing about “a world […] in which everybody is so 
profoundly involved with everybody else.”5 This created a brand new 
world of “allatonceness,” where different people in different places could 
experience events as “a simultaneous happening.”6 Television reduced 
time and place to that “allatonceness.” The television event being unique, 
with no rewinding, skipping forward or re-watching, had the force of a 
new ritual.7 Raben argues that the absence of television in the 1950s had 
reduced the opportunity to “produce ‘memory.’”8 But in January 1969, two 
decades after the ending of the Indonesian War of Independence, as historian 
Jan Bank puts it, “television […] broke the silence around this subject.”9
The Hueting Interview
Prelude: De Bezetting
Three days after the ending of the German occupation of the Netherlands, 
the Dutch government founded a national institute for documenting the 
war. In 1955, this institute tasked Loe de Jong with writing a def initive 
history of the nation during the war years. Between 1969 and 1988 his Het 
Koninkrijk der Nederlanden in de Tweede Wereldoorlog (The Kingdom of the 
Netherlands during World War Two) would appear, spread over 27 volumes, 
f illing over 16,000 pages.
4 McLuhan, Understanding Media, 99.
5 McLuhan, The Medium, 61.
6 Ibid., 63.
7 Ibid., 125.
8 Raben, “Dutch Memories,” 97.
9 Bank, “Televisie,” 74.
bREAkINg THE SILENCE 137
At the beginning of the era of Dutch television, between 1960 and 1965, 
De Jong presented a 21-episode documentary series on the war, called 
De Bezetting (The Occupation). When it started, 20 per cent of Dutch 
households owned a television, but this grew to nearly 80 per cent by 
the time the series ended. With only one channel in the Netherlands, De 
Jong was guaranteed a massive audience for each episode.10 Indeed, the 
series convinced many to buy a television and the streets of the Nether-
lands emptied on evenings when De Jong was due to offer his “pontif ical 
performance.”11 The programme turned him into a public f igure,12 earning 
him the unoff icial epithet “national history writer.”13 In Wesseling’s words, 
De Jong became “a national hero, the unassailable guardian of the tree of 
knowledge.”14 As the streets emptied and the citizens settled before their 
televisions to receive instruction from their national teacher, each episode 
took on an “allatonceness” ritual character, becoming in Jo Tollebeek’s 
words a “ceremonial broadcast” that strengthened the feeling of being 
one community.15
Frank van Vree describes De Bezetting as “a national monument, consid-
ered by both left and right as the truthful history of war and resistance.”16 
He argues that De Jong represented the war as a period of heroism, with 
the dramatic narrative emphasizing the battle between humanity versus 
barbarism, good versus evil, with individual and group memories sub-
merged into a national memory of collective destiny and with no place 
for exceptions.17
Three of the episodes covered the Dutch East Indies. The seventh episode 
in the series, broadcast in 1961, provided a critical overview of the imperial 
adventure, with images of hunters, peasants in rice fields, Buddhist temples, a 
gamelan orchestra and dancers. Dutch companies build modern plantations 
for sugar, tea, tobacco and rubber and they mine for oil and tin. De Jong 
teaches the nation that these were not philanthropic institutes, but were 
interested only in profit and that profit left the colony and was sent abroad. 
The Dutch brought trains and airplanes, schools and hospitals, but De Jong 
emphasized that the main thrust was the penetration of the colony by Dutch 
10 Ibid., 57.
11 Tollebeek, “De zuigkracht,” 466.
12 Ibid., 415.
13 Daelen, “Loe De Jong,” 167.
14 Wesseling, “Post-Imperial Holland,” 139.
15 Tollebeek, “De zuigkracht,” 467; Smits, Loe de Jong, 306.
16 Van Vree, “De Overval,” 450.
17 Van Vree, “Bilder/Gegenbilder,” 183.
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business interests. In one interview a highly placed former civil servant of 
the colonial administration tells that all honest Indonesians, deep in their 
hearts, wanted independence.18
De Jong included a short account of the rise of Indonesian nationalism 
before the war and a summary of the repressive measures taken by the 
Dutch. He mentioned that most Dutch citizens were uninterested in the 
colony but regarded the idea of an independent Indonesia as absurd, with 
the leftist parties forming the exception. In his account of the Aceh War, De 
Jong showed a number of photographs that demonstrated the results of Dutch 
violence, the same photographs that had appeared in Nieuwenhuys’ Tempo 
Doeloe. Bijl argues that De Jong’s programme released these photographs 
from compartmentalization, permitting them to be “framed by a larger 
historical narrative” so they could “function as icons of a certain phase in 
Dutch colonialism.”19 By reframing these photographs, De Jong, according 
to Bijl, integrated them into the “imagined mnemonic community” of the 
nation.20
However, we should not exaggerate the immediate impact of De Jong’s 
remediation of these images. These were just three images, from 1,908 
included in the series.21 His entire account of the Aceh War took less than 
20 seconds. The camera lingered over each of the images for only f ive 
seconds each. The dead bodies are indistinct or even cut from the frame. 
The baby, in the photograph of the massacre, remained almost indiscern-
ible. Furthermore, in the newspaper reviews of the programme, I have 
been unable to f ind a single reference to these photographs. Rather than 
becoming immediate icons, as Bijl suggests, their impact seems to have 
been negligible.
The following episode of De Bezetting covered the growth of Japanese 
militarism and the attack on the Dutch East Indies, while the sixteenth 
episode covered the Japanese occupation. Indonesian nationalism is touched 
upon and the condition of the Indonesians during the Occupation is briefly 
covered. De Jong mentioned that for the majority of Indonesians, the war 
that the Dutch fought against the Japanese was not their war. This would 
become of fundamental importance when De Jong returned to the subject 
decades later. This episode ended with the surrender of the Japanese and the 
18 De Bezetting, Nederlands Televisie Stichting, Amsterdam, 1 January 1961.
19 Bijl, Emerging Memory, 169-171.
20 Ibid., 182-183.
21 “Nu ook Duitse tv de documentaire ‘De Bezetting’: Dinsdag a.s. de laatste af levering,” 
Limburgsch Dagblad, 1 May 1965.
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outburst of the Bersiap. De Jong closed this episode by calling his audience 
to extend their sympathetic understanding to those who were forced to 
repatriate during the post-war violence. The period from 1946 to 1949 is 
ignored.
De Bezetting created a patriotic collective memory for the Netherlands. 
In its coverage of the East Indies, a great deal is unremembered. As Van Vree 
argues, De Jong presented exclusively a Dutch point of view.22 There was 
no attempt to include Japanese or Indonesian (or German) perspectives. 
Even the Dutch viewpoint was limited – of the thirteen people interviewed 
during the three episodes on Indonesia, eleven are military or government 
leaders.23 Most obviously, decolonization was ignored. The three episodes 
created an uncomplicated collective memory that represented the good 
Dutch nation as the innocent victim of aggression. They functioned as a 
tool of unremembering decolonization.
Nevertheless, in the seventh episode De Jong did include a potential 
critique of colonialism in his depictions of Dutch violence during the Aceh 
War. His remarks on the Dutch search for prof it and the shortsightedness 
about Indonesian nationalism were critical. This provided the potentiality 
for remembering. Most importantly, his negative view of colonialism and 
its impact on the native population and his short account of the rise of 
Indonesian nationalism since the 1920s implied a connection between 
developments within the colony during the interwar years and the violence 
that followed World War Two. This potentiality would be realized in De 
Jong’s main work, more than two decades later, and have a great impact on 
the memory wars surrounding decolonization.
Allatonceness
The unremembering that dominated Dutch society was transformed on 
Friday, 17 January 1969. That evening, viewers of the VARA Broadcasting 
Association television programme Achter het Nieuws (Behind the news) 
witnessed an interview with former conscripted soldier Joop Hueting. The 
previous month the newspaper De Volkskrant had published an interview 
with Hueting about his experiences of Dutch war crimes in Indonesia. The 
article led to little reaction. The impact of Hueting’s interview in Achter het 
Nieuws would be on a different scale.
22 Van Vree, “Bilder/Gegenbilder,” 185.
23 Ibid., 187.
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In 1969, the Netherlands had only two television channels, ensuring a large 
public for Hueting’s interview and a large “allatonceness” effect. The number 
of households owning a television had steadily risen.24 Bank argues that 
Achter het Nieuws director Herman Wigbold belonged to a new generation 
of journalists attracted to the idea of broadcasting current affairs via the 
new medium.25 It was this new medium, not newspapers nor the works of 
historians, that highlighted Dutch war making in Indonesia.
During the broadcast, VARA began to receive telephone calls, mostly from 
irate viewers expressing their rage at Hueting’s statements. In total, VARA 
received 841 reactions – 51 per cent simply negative, 28 per cent positive, 11 
per cent critical and 10 per cent anonymous threats. In the coming weeks, 
no less than 460 articles appeared in ten national newspapers commenting 
on the programme. Hundreds of letters to the editors appeared in national 
and local newspapers. Seldom had a television programme been the catalyst 
for the release of so much emotion.26
What shocked the public was Hueting’s revelation concerning the conduct 
of Dutch troops27:
I participated in war crimes there. […] [T]o give a few examples, I can 
mention that kampongs were riddled [with bullets] – where no one could 
see the military necessity at the time – that interrogations took place 
where torture was used in the most horrible way, in which the military 
necessity was diff icult to f ind – that acts of vengeance took place, in 
which the military necessity was also not to be found. For instance, just 
to tell you, we had prisoners and these prisoners were often shot dead 
and the phrase used was “Go take a piss,” after which they would turn 
around and be shot in the back. (10)
Hueting added: “Those were not incidental examples – that was the normal 
state of affairs” (10). For nearly 20 minutes he continued: while being under 
enemy f ire, prisoners would be taken and killed. “That is a clear example of 
a war crime,” he added (11). There were soldiers who would spot a farmer and 
“bang – he would be shot dead” (11). In what would become an oft-quoted 
24 Bank, “Televisie,” 57.
25 Ibid., 66.
26 Van den Born et al., “De Excessennota,” 172.
27 Achter het Nieuws, VARA, 17 January 1969. The complete text of the programme was published: 
De Graeff, Nederlandsch Indië 1945. All references are to this published text.
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passage, Hueting described how two soldiers entered a house in a kampong 
(village), opened f ire and then he himself entered the house:
I saw there, in the twilight, 15, 20 people – women, children and men, 
squatting down in a heap. And when I got used to [the light] I saw the 
blood spurting from arteries, the screaming, the death agony and death 
cries from the people in that little house. And the lads outside shouted 
at us: “Hey, will you watch out lads, because you shot through the wall 
and almost hit us.” (11)
Hueting described interrogation practices: “After the hitting and kicking 
sometimes the telephone was used, when the wires would be attached to 
the genitals and then a current would be released […] and the people would 
shrivel up from the pain and pass urine” (12). He described one of the most 
upsetting incidents that he had witnessed:
[A] rope was taken and that was tied around the ankles of the man and 
then the rope was thrown over the beam that supported the interior 
gallery of the house. The rope was pulled on one side and on the other side 
the man – ankles above, head below. First the rope was gently released, 
until he came with his head on the concrete f loor of the gallery, and 
then harder, until the blood was coming from pretty much everywhere 
and a sort of cracking sound came from his head. He died in a really sick 
way. (12-13)
He claimed “many thousands” of Indonesians died like this (13). Hueting 
explained that the silence that engulfed these events was the result of two 
processes: the former soldiers or veterans did not believe in “hanging out 
the dirty laundry” and it was not in the interests of the politicians from 
that time to have these issues in the limelight (16). Asked if war crimes had 
been committed, Hueting answered: “[I]t happened on a large scale” (16). 
Furthermore, the responsibility lay not with the soldiers themselves, but 
with the political leaders and with the military commanders (17).
The programme f inished with the words of Herman Wigbold: “[T]he 
sadist within oneself, must know that war crimes do not need to remain 
unknown. In particular, coming to terms with the past needs to commence. 
Over the entire Indonesian drama, there hangs in our country a haze of 
mysteriousness” (20).
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Sequels
The overwhelming reaction to the programme led the producers to broad-
cast an extra, 90-minute-long programme in which other veterans of the 
conflict got the opportunity to share their stories. The Achter het Nieuws 
of 25 January 1969 opened with Wigbold referring to Dutch “plundering, 
burning, torturing and murder.” This introduced a new, sharp tone to the 
decolonization discourse that was still in its infancy. A pastor explained: 
“War crime is not just a question of the German mentality or the American 
mentality. You f ind war crimes in the Netherlands, too” (29-30).
Eleven veterans shared their memories. They told of Dutch soldiers 
burning villages to the ground, herding men together and shooting them, 
forcing men to dig their own graves and then shooting them, children shot, 
women raped and prisoners massacred. They described interrogations in 
which ears and noses were cut off. They told of systematic plundering. 
One veteran read entries from his own diary in which villages are burnt, 
prisoners tortured and shot (60-63). When asked if he often thinks back to 
that time, he answered: “Ah, it wears one down gradually. I haven’t looked 
in this diary for 20 years. But now, with this affair, I’ve looked through it 
in order to select some passages” (64). For these veterans, the broadcast of 
the interview with Hueting seems to have been a catalyst.
A participant tells of an incident in April 1946 in which the military police 
of the KNIL (Royal Netherlands East Indies Army) abused and massacred 
nearly 70 prisoners before dumping their bodies in a river. Dutch soldiers 
and officers did not intervene even though they themselves had experienced 
similar “Gestapo methods” (44) in Holland. He then says that he had written 
about the incident for Het Parool, but that the account had never appeared 
in the newspaper, and that he had sent a copy to the secretariat of the 
Labour Party and that the issue had been raised in parliament but it had 
simply disappeared (44).
Pastor Hildering tells of massacres and rapes that he reported to the 
leadership of the Dutch Reformed Church. He is asked to explain how former 
Prime Minister Drees had claimed that during his time as prime minister 
he had only ever heard of two other such cases. Hildering answered: “That 
is incomprehensible to me, because these accounts were openly published” 
(57). He was correct because, as we saw in Chapter 2, his testimony was 
reported in the NRC Handelsblad in 1949.
Another pastor tells of an incident in which soldiers were commanded 
to shoot “all lads older than sixteen and all men.” Some of the soldiers came 
to him and shared their doubts, asking, “What is the difference between 
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what happened in Putten and what we have now done?” He concluded: “I 
couldn’t discover any difference.” At this point, Wigbold, asked, “Why is this 
only now coming to light, 20 years later? Did we know it, or did we not want 
to know it?” Hildering suggested: “It seems […] that many of these things 
have been hidden. But I have to deny that. […] I have here a couple of books 
in which the things that happened are published” (67).
Two days later, Achter het Nieuws broadcast a third programme. Former 
Prime Ministers Beel and Drees refrained from attending. Nevertheless, 
some of the leading actors in the conflict did attend, including Schermerhorn 
(prime minister during 1945-1946 and former chairman of the Commission 
General for Indonesia) and Thomson (brigade commander of 7th Division 
and temporary chief of the general staff of the Dutch army in Indonesia). 
Schermerhorn expressed his fear that the previous programmes created 
generalizations regarding the behaviour of soldiers (74). De Graaf, a spokes-
person during the conflict for the ruling Catholic People’s Party (KVP), 
questioned the use of the term “war crimes” (74-75). Thomsen complained 
that the two programmes “provoked memories of these people […] who are 
deeply touched, things that cannot be described in words” (78). Thomsen 
blamed the makers of Achter het Nieuws for provoking disturbing memories.
Another participant, Professor Verkuyl, disagreed with the pleas for 
unremembering, expressing gratitude that these things “which we all know 
about, and that live latently within us, now at last can be spoken about 
openly” (80). Van Mierlo, leader of the liberal party D66, agreed that “a public 
national secret was repressed,” adding that questions had been raised by 
Frans Goedhart in parliament and that articles had been published in the 
press but there had been no follow-up (88). However, Thomsen maintained 
that Hueting and the programme makers made it seem that everyone who 
was in Indonesia had earned the label “war criminal” (88).
A veteran of the conflict had at last spoken out publically. Dutch society 
had failed to assimilate into its collective memory the memories of its 
veterans. These had become silent, latent memories. Bourke argues that 
combatants feel a need to bear witness and f ind “a legitimate narrative 
that can ‘place’ the self in a way that is both coherent and convincing.”28 
Assmann and Shortt claim that traumatic cases call for a period of latency, 
an interval before society is willing to face the memory of its violent past. 
What sets the stage for confronting its painful memories is changes in 
political regime, changes in social frame, generational changes or media 
28 Bourke, “Introduction,” 480.
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events.29 The period of latency had now passed. Television had provided a 
new way of speaking for veterans to construct a new narrative.
Why Now?
Halbwachs argued that it is in society that individuals “recall, recognize, 
and localize their memories.”30 Hueting’s remembering was not exclusively 
an individual matter. Rather, changes in society shaped a new phase of 
collective remembering. Hueting had already tried to publish his views 
about the conflict in the 1950s. Both the NRC Handelsblad and Het Parool had 
refrained from publishing the material.31 It was, at that time, too diff icult 
to contest collective unremembering. The editor of Het Parool wrote to 
Hueting and invited him to a meeting in which he explained why he felt the 
moment was not right.32 The editor of the NRC Handelsblad wrote twice to 
Hueting, explaining: “When it comes to expressing criticism of cruel deeds 
that occurred during pacification of areas, one needs to practice prudence.”33
In a television appearance in July 2012, when asked about his motiva-
tion for giving the interview in 1969, Hueting answered that it was linked 
with the discussion regarding French atrocities during their war against 
Algerian nationalists. He found it strange that in the Netherlands people 
were discussing the behaviour of the French army, yet for two decades 
they had ignored discussing atrocities perpetrated by their own troops in 
Indonesia.34 This is consistent with what Hueting said at the time. When 
asked for his reasons for coming clean now, he had said, “You can better 
talk about war criminals and about war crimes committed by the French 
in Algeria, by the Germans in West and East Europe and by Americans in 
Vietnam.”35
The war in Algeria was at its height during Hueting’s f irst attempt to 
publish in the late 1950s. The French conceded defeat and recognized an 
independent Algeria in 1962. In a replay of the Dutch experience, large num-
bers of French citizens were repatriated. Concerns regarding the widespread 
use of torture by the French military had given rise to a growing anti-war 
movement. During the late 1950s and early 1960s, the Dutch press of all 
29 Assmann and Short, “Memory,” 6-8.
30 Halbwachs, On Collective, 38.
31 Van den Born et al., “De Excessennota,” 170.
32 Kousbroek, Oostindisch Kampsyndroom, 272.
33 The letters were f irst printed in ibid., 277.
34 This debate took place on the programme Hollandse Zaken on 17 July 2012.
35 De Graeff, Nederlandsch, 19.
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political persuasions, as well as the national radio, carried reports that the 
French military in Algeria were guilty of widespread torture and murder.36 
Dutch newspapers reported on the people displaced, imprisoned, interred 
and killed.37 The actions of the French radical military organization, the 
OAS,38 were widely reported as being acts of murder or terror.39
Gillo Pontecorvo’s anti-colonial f ilm The Battle of Algiers was released in 
1966 and, despite being banned in France, was nominated for three Oscars 
and won the Golden Lion award at the Venice Film Festival. Joris Ivens had 
been a member of the Venice jury.40 Ivens must have recognized the similar-
ity between Pontecorvo’s f ictional documentary style and his own f ilm, 
Indonesia Calling. The reviewer of the Nieuwsblad van het Noorden wrote that 
the decision in Venice was evidence that the jury had been courageous by 
refusing to capitulate to French pressure.41 The liberal Algemeen Handelsblad 
wrote that Pontecorvo’s f ilm fully deserved its award.42 A reviewer in De 
Tijd pointed out a new trend in attacking colonialism in f ilms, specif ically 
“the terror of the Portuguese and French.”43
In an act of unremembering, no reviewer drew the obvious parallel to 
the Dutch East Indies. The year after the Hueting interview, Paul Haimon 
wrote in the Limburgsch Dagblad that the French were worried that the f ilm 
would “open slow-healing wounds” and wondered how the French could 
have been so blind as to not see the inevitability of decolonization. But, he 
36 “Algerie,” Friese Koerier, 3 January 1958; J.J. Buskers, “Benane Mahfoed,” Het Vrije Volk, 
23 May 1959; “De Franse Militairen in Algerie,” Gereformeerd Gezinsblad, 23 December 1959; 
“Report van Rode Kruis: In Algerie wordt nog wel gemarteld,” Het Vrije Volk, 5 January 1960; 
“De misdaad,” Friese Koerier, 21 May 1962; “Naar een nieuwe ideologie,” Nieuw Israelietisch 
Weekblad, 15 May 1964; “Wij zijn geen stelletje misdadigers,” Leeuwarder Courant, 13 May 1967; 
APN Nieuwsbericht, 12 April 1959.
37 “Oorlog in Algerie kostte redes ca 200,000 doden,” Gereformeerd Gezinsblad, 20 May 1961; 
“Na zeven jaar leed … Vrede,” Algemeen Handelsblad, 19 March 1962; “Bestand in Algerie,” 
Gereformeerd Dagblad, 20 March 1962.
38 Organisation armée secrète, a French far-right dissident terrorist organization that fought 
against Algerian independence during the Algerian War (1954-1962).
39 “De Gaulle: De Algerijnse beproeving nadert zijn einde,” Algemeen Handelsblad, 26 Feb-
ruary 1962; Jo Manassen, “Mohammedanen rekenen op einde OAS-acties,” Het Vrije Volk, 
21 March 1962; “Terreur in Algerie door OAS-agitatie opnieuw ontbrand,” Limburgsch Dagblad, 
21 March 1962; “Ineenstorting van OAS-terreur un volledig,” De Waarheid, 28 June 1962.
40 “Joris Ivens in Jury in Venetië,” De Tijd, 2 September 1966.
41 “Film Algerijnse oorlog wint hoofdprijs Venetië,” Nieuwsblad van het Noorden, 
12 September 1966.
42 “Deining in Venetië over f ilmprijzen,” Algemeen Dagblad, 12 September 1966.
43 “Films vol met haat en geweld,” De Tijd, 1 September 1966.
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never questioned why the Dutch couldn’t see this either.44 That the Dutch 
press could discuss French atrocities while remaining silent regarding their 
own, was thought by Hueting to be peculiar. These reactions to Pontecorvo’s 
f ilm are a case in point.
Hueting must have been aware of the controversy surrounding Ponto-
corvo’s f ilm, as it was widely covered in the Dutch media. Yet, it is doubtful 
that he had seen the f ilm. Despite the widespread reviews, it was not until 
1970 that it had its Dutch premiere.45 Peter Bueren of De Tijd is surely guilty 
of naivety for writing, “[I]t is one of the most incomprehensible things 
in the world that this magnif icent document has only now reached the 
Netherlands.”46 It took nearly another year before the f ilm entered regular 
cinemas in the Netherlands.47 One explanation offered was that f ilm dis-
tributors were afraid that the f ilm would not appeal to a Dutch audience.48 
Still, every reviewer blindly missed the link with the Dutch East Indies. In 
1975, the reviewer in Het Vrije Volk expressed his joy that the f ilm would be 
shown by a f ilm society in Rotterdam, mistakenly believing that this would 
be its f irst showing in Rotterdam. He complained that the f ilm had suffered 
from censorship in some countries (no mention of the Netherlands) and 
suggested that some scenes of violence begged a comparison with South 
Africa.49 Again, no mention made of the Dutch East Indies. It was this type 
of unremembering that Hueting was f ighting.
Furthermore, the Dutch themselves had only just been forced to bring an 
end to their f inal phase of decolonization in Asia. In the year that France 
had lost Algeria, 1962, the Dutch had lost West New Guinea. Relations 
between the Netherlands and the Republic of Indonesia continued to sour 
throughout the 1950s as the Indonesians coveted Dutch New Guinea and 
the Netherlands refused to relinquish it. In 1962, Indonesia annexed West 
New Guinea. Lijphart published his account of this event in 1966 with the 
telling title, The Trauma of Decolonization. As we saw, he argued that the 
Dutch futile attempts to retain West New Guinea were based on “entirely 
subjective and psychological” desires, namely: “the search for national 
44 Paul Haimon, “De slag om Algiers,” Limburgsch Dagblad, 16 April 1970.
45 Henk ten Berge, “Mr. Cinemanifestatie moe maar tevreden: Gillo Pontecorvo De Beste,” De 
Telegraaf, 2 February 1970.
46 Peter van Bueren, “Zelfs na vier jaar blijft de ‘Strijd om Algiers’ actueel,” De Tijd, 
4 February 1970.
47 “Film: De Slag om Algiers,” De Waarheid, 23 October 1970.
48 “Dit moet u zien,” De Tijd, 23 October 1970.
49 “Film over gruwlijke bevrijding Algiers,” Het Vrije Volk, 11 April 1975.
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self-esteem, feelings of moral superiority, egocentric altruism, and deep 
resentment against Indonesia.”50
Dutch society was changing in the 1960s, and this had consequences 
for the production of collective memory.51 Mid-1960s Amsterdam had 
become the birthplace of a colourful new anarchist group, the Provos. 
This anti-authoritarian movement took its name from its deliberate social 
provocations that were widely covered in the nation’s media. At the same 
time, the Vietnam War had become a symbol of protest. Daily newspaper and 
television coverage of the Vietnam War had brought the issue of war atrocities 
before the public’s eyes. The year 1968 was one of chaos and potential change. 
In February 1968, the West German radical student leader Rudi Dutschke 
made a well-publicized visit to Amsterdam.52 The Dutch witnessed on their 
televisions the students of Paris rebel in May, followed by the crushing of 
the Prague Spring in August. Meanwhile, the Dutch government’s decision 
to penalize students for using the slogan “Johnson – War Criminal,” while 
dropping charges against an anti-war philosopher from the University of 
Groningen, caused heated and emotional public debate.53 In April 1968, 
Herman Wigbold presented an edition of the television programme Achter 
het Nieuws dedicated to the polarized views concerning the Vietnam War.
It is against the background of the controversies unleashed by two colonial 
wars – the Algerian War and the American intervention in the Vietnam 
War, as well as instability brought about by potential radical social change, 
that Hueting decided to recall his own country’s unremembered colonial 
war.54 Changes in media provided the means for contesting the established 
unremembering.
The Role of the Public
One must also ask – why had the Dutch public been willing to accept a 
process of unremembering? One can argue that the lack of interest in decolo-
nization mirrored an equal lack of interest in the colonization project itself. 
Remco Raben admits that a lot more work needs to be done by historians 
in order to adequately measure the impact of colonialism on the conscious 
50 Lijphart, The Trauma, 288.
51 Raben, “Koloniale Vergangenheit,” 94-95.
52 Van de Maar, Weltrusten, 105-106.
53 Ibid., 106-121.
54 Van Galen adds another factor: “the bloody defending of Portuguese colonialism in Africa.” 
Van Galen, Afscheid, 523.
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lives of the Dutch citizens. The appeal of empire may have been limited, 
leading Raben to conclude that, probably, “empire was experienced as an 
indispensable daily presence only sporadically.”55
Another reason for the lack of interest in decolonization might be that 
within Dutch society in general, acts of public national self-criticism were 
rare. Rudy Kousbroek, born and reared in the Dutch East Indies, claimed 
that Dutch people criticize how other nations deal with their past, but use 
another measuring stick when judging themselves.56 He argued: “It is a 
well-known phenomenon that every individual, every group, every land, 
is more forgiving towards oneself than towards another” but among the 
Dutch, “the phenomenon […] is out of control.”57
We are reminded of Ricoeur’s discussion of how memory is bound up 
with the “fragility of identity.”58 This suggests that nations are more likely 
to recognize themselves as victims, rather than perpetrators. The primary 
collective memory of the recent past for the Dutch public, as Van Ginkel 
states, was the national myth of resistance against the evil of the Nazi 
occupation (nationale verzetsmythe).59 Frances Gouda argues that the 
Dutch historical imaginary had framed Anne Frank and Sukarno “as icons 
of memory.” Anne Frank served “as a foil for lingering questions about the 
varying degrees of Nazi collaboration among a sizable proportion of the 
Dutch population.” Sukarno served as an icon of memory that “stifled any 
honest postcolonial assessment of Dutch complicity in the technologies of 
oppression.”60
Those who had given their lives in the struggle against fascism were 
commemorated in acts of ritual remembering.61 This national myth made 
it diff icult to believe that the forces of good had also committed rape and 
murder in Indonesia. The ritualized remembering of the years from 1940 
to 1945 created a screen behind which the years from 1945 to 1949 were 
occluded. Just as we have previously seen with Loe de Jong’s De Bezetting, 
the exclusive focus on the pain of the years from 1940 to 1945 caused the 
memory of the years from 1945 to 1949 to be unremembered. Nevertheless, 
the advent of television provided a new means of creating representations 
of the past and constructing collective memory.
55 Raben, “A New Dutch,” 25.
56 Kousbroek, Oostindisch Kampsyndroom, 278-286, 279.
57 Ibid., 281.
58 Ricoeur, Memory, 80-82.
59 Van Ginkel, “4 en 5 mei,” 32.
60 Gouda, “Divided Memories,” 105-106.
61 Ibid., 32-35.
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Political Impact
The representation of decolonization provided by Achter het Nieuws had 
an immediate impact. Henk Wesseling claimed it “was a bombshell.”62 
Van Doorn and Hendrix agree that it “struck like a bomb.”63 The conserva-
tive newspaper De Telegraaf might have aired the views of many when it 
responded to Achter het Nieuws with, “it is […] blown out of all proportions” 
and labelled Hueting’s interview “a sick act.”64 However, the government 
agreed that the issue of excesses (the term “war crimes” was avoided) should 
be investigated. Jurist and historian Cees Fasseur was tasked with leading 
a group to research cases in which Dutch soldiers had been investigated for 
breaking the law. To his surprise, his fellow members on the commission 
were all colonials or ex-military off icers who had served in the Indies. 
None were enthusiastic about the job they had been given. Furthermore, 
Prime Minister Piet de Jong requested that the investigation be f inished 
within three months.65 Under these circumstances Fasseur could do little 
more than read through the 12,000 dossiers involving court martials in 
Indonesia, in the archives at the Supreme Military Court in The Hague.66 
As he himself put it: “Like a sort of accountant, without mixing in emotions, 
I was then able to write that work in record time.”67 Fasseur was able to 
dismiss over 10,000 cases, these being no more than misdemeanours such 
as traff ic violations.68 He eventually narrowed the cases to under 600. The 
Excessennota (List of excesses) that he published lacks any interpretation of 
the data. For a large part, it simply lists these cases, stating place and time, 
the offence, the verdict and a short summary of the case. In most cases, the 
accused was found not guilty. In just 42 cases, a soldier was found guilty 
of murder. The Excessennota was published in mid-1969 with a foreword 
from Prime Minister De Jong, who felt comfortable enough concluding, “The 
government regrets that excesses took place, but maintains the position 
that the armed forces in general behaved in a correct manner.”69
Fasseur’s research had been limited to studying those cases that had 
come before the military authorities. The cases that Hueting had described, 
62 Wesseling, “Post-Imperial Holland,” 140.
63 Van Doorn and Hendrix, Ontsporing, 317.
64 Quoted in Van den Born et al., “De Excessennota,” 163.
65 Ibid., 173.
66 Bank, De Excessennota, 25.
67 Interview in Meijer, Oostindisch, 106.
68 Bank, De Excessennota, 25.
69 Ibid., 32.
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however, were not included in the Excessennota. The Excessennota included 
an overview of newspaper and periodical articles from 1945 to 1950 that 
referred to excesses by Dutch troops. This was a double-column annotated 
list covering 27 pages.70 Yet no one called for a parliamentary inquiry and 
no member of the historical profession protested. Even the public, briefly 
stimulated by the Achter het Nieuws broadcasts, seemed to lose interest. 
The publication of the Excessennota and its debate in parliament did not 
make it to the front page of the newspapers.71 Fasseur concluded that war 
in Indonesia was still “a national trauma.”72 Importantly, decades later he 
admitted that the term “war crimes” had been impossible to use, the entire 
exercise being no more than a government note that needed the approval 
of the cabinet.73 Thus, the Excessennota, rather than being a vehicle for 
remembering, worked as a tool of unremembering.
Literary Impact
Television provided the platform for the renewal of memory. Literature 
provided further renewal. Although professional historians shunned the 
subject, veterans were not so timid. We have seen how Job Sytzen wrote 
novels during the 1950s based on his experiences. Months after Hueting’s 
interview, three new novels were published, written by men who had served 
in Indonesia. None shied away from representing their memories of excesses.
Jan Schilt
Jan Schilt served in West Java from November 1946 until March 1950 – a 
remarkably long period for a conscripted soldier. His Soldaatje spelen onder 
de smaragden gordel (Playing soldier in the emerald belt) begins with an 
epitaph, taken from Stanislaw Lec, that sums up the main theme of the book:
Most people are murderers
They kill a human; the human in the self74
Within the f irst pages, we f ind Dutch intelligence personnel torturing a 
prisoner and we have the f irst of many shootings of prisoners (9-10). The 
70 Ibid., 254-281.
71 Van den Born et al., “De Excessennota,” 173.
72 Ibid., 175.
73 Interview in Meijer, Oostindisch, 106.
74 Schilt, Soldaatje, 2.
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main character delivers a prisoner to the intelligence service, then has sex 
with a young woman who has already slept with his friends (15-17). Later, 
one of his friends discovers that he has caught a venereal disease (32). Much 
of what Schilt writes supports Hueting’s experience – soldiers regularly 
shoot and bayonet prisoners (23, 70, 129, 160); they burn villages to the 
ground (23), they beat and torture prisoners (9, 118, 125). Schilt conveys the 
boredom of army life in the jungle. Soldiers play cards and chess, drink 
and lay around doing nothing. They get malaria and sexually transmitted 
diseases. They listen to the radio, dance with each other, sing together, eat 
bad food and smoke bad cigarettes. They watch f ilms in the local cinema, 
get drunk and visit prostitutes. Their conversations are critical of the Dutch 
authorities. During one such conversation, a soldier says: “Look, we’ll have 
to recognize the republic sooner or later, especially because America and 
good old England want that, so what, what are we doing here?” (41). Another 
answers: “Just hang on in there for a while, until the rotten capitalists have 
taken their loot out of the Indies; that’s why we’re bungling around in the 
mire” (41). Another adds, “nicely dressed men in expensive suits who make 
these dirty cigarettes and these dirty politics” (41).
Anger is directed towards those powerful groups in the establishment 
who sent these young men to f ight in a dirty war. A soldier reflects:
How many evenings had they wasted in that poxy land? A year has 365 
days, so 730 at least, plus a bit more. And still, hanging around, smoking, 
not talking, talking, playing cards, staring into the dark and listening to 
the crickets when on sentry duty, getting plastered drunk, going on patrol, 
going to one of the baboes [women], watching some poxy f ilm, sleeping, 
being tense, relaxing, now yah, relaxing (57).
Schilt captured a complaint that we will increasingly hear from veterans 
– they wasted some of the best years of their lives because their country 
demanded it, yet were never properly thanked. At one point, a journalist 
visits them. A soldier suggests to him: “Make a report now for your newspaper 
and set the truth down, that we want to go home, that it’s a lost cause, that 
we are being messed around with and that we still don’t see the point of 
it” (111). Schilt represents the war in Indonesia as a matter of young Dutch 
men sent by authorities to f ight in a pointless, unwinnable conflict while 
the home front consumed fake news.
That the young soldiers were brutalized is clear. The main character and 
a friend, during a week off, hitchhike to Bandung, where they get drunk, 
pick up girls and pay for sex, then get a lift to Batavia where, after getting 
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very drunk, the main character kicks a dog to death (88-95). Soldiers kick a 
prisoner to death (118). They randomly capture four villagers. As they beat 
them, the women of the village cry loudly, screaming children clinging to 
their mothers. The prisoners are innocent, but the soldiers lead them to a 
f ield “like lambs being led to the slaughter, the soldier thinks” and shoot 
them (160). During an assault on a kampong (village) they f ind a blind, sick 
old man, together with two old women. They drag the man out, kicking and 
beating him as the women scream and beg for mercy. The main character 
recalls the words of the commander-in-chief, General Spoor: “Be aware 
that you are the bringers of justice and security to a people suffering from 
terror and oppression” (125). He reflects: “We all suffer from some form of 
terror, and that’s why we inflict it on others when we get the chance” (125). 
They kill the old man, as well as another prisoner (129).
For the soldiers, the war comes to an unexpectedly sudden end. Demobili-
zation in Holland is quick – the veterans each get a free train pass (192). The 
main character walks through his village and enters his home. His mother, 
crying, embraces him, and he wonders what is he doing here, suggesting the 
disorientation that returned soldiers felt (196). An unarticulated narrative 
is implied but left unspoken, the cold homecoming in which memories will 
be buried in silenced.
Schilt’s protagonist is referred to as “the soldier.” There is nothing special 
about him, except his exceptional circumstances. He is brutalized, though 
his reflections show us that he retains his humanity. The responsibility 
lies with those in authority who created the circumstances under which 
excessive violence becomes a necessity. In a television interview in 1993, 
Schilt referred to the war as a “dirty war” and qualif ied the behaviour of 
the Dutch, explaining that they were not a wild group of bandits, yet they 
killed prisoners, as described in his book.75
Jacob Zwaan
Jacob Zwaan volunteered to go to f ight in Indonesia. In his novel, a main 
character, Jaap Koorman, has volunteered for the army, “in order to liberate 
the Indies” and “resist the terror” of the Japanese. By the time they arrive, the 
Japanese have surrendered and the volunteers have to f ight the Indonesians. 
Koorman will encounter “barbaric cruelties, bacchanalia and erotic excesses” 
and his initial enthusiasm will be replaced with doubt when he witnesses 
75 De Tijd Staat Even Stil: De politionele acties, NCRV, 22 June 1993.
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the interrogation techniques of the Dutch Intelligence and Security Service, 
which make him think of the Germans.76
A character called Rene Verberne encounters a woman in the army post; 
he pushes her into an armoured car and has sex with her. Immediately 
afterwards he thinks of his father, a “puritanical inspector of the Rotterdam 
vice squad” (22). During free time, soldiers visit strip clubs (50). They worry 
that God will condemn them (55-57). Over time, they get used to it and they 
have sex with Dutch, Indisch and foreign prostitutes (105-116), with nurses 
(168), with a primary school teacher (169-184) and with the young daughter 
of a banker (229). A soldier comments; “Eros and Mars always walk hand 
in hand” (168). The narrator comments: “In an attempt to enjoy what there 
was to enjoy before the flame of revolution would irrevocably scorch them, 
they offered their money and their bodies in a possessed drunkenness of 
Bacchus and Eros” (173).
Like in Schilt’s work, there is plenty of violence, though Zwaan injects 
ruminations regarding the morality of such actions, and continually draws 
parallels with the Nazis. Dutch soldiers burn kampongs (32-36, 79-82, 137), 
rape villagers (138), beat, torture and kill prisoners (78, 79, 91-98). One soldiers 
remarks: “I can now even understand some of the reactions of the Germans” 
(19). Verberne thinks: “from such men, Himmler recruited the SS” (22). 
Some soldiers complain about “SS methods” (78). Zwaan writes that the 
Dutch methods have a whiff of “a certain occupier” (82). A member of the 
intelligence service admits that there are some who claim, “we […] are all 
members of the SD [Sicherheitsdienst or Nazi Security Service] and sadists” 
(90). A major asks, “Maybe I’m commanding a company of the SS?” (103).
Similar to Schilt, Zwaan’s soldiers show a low opinion of the political 
leadership. One suggests laying siege to The Hague and hanging ministers 
from the trees; another proposes quartering them and burning them alive 
(37-38). Pondering the brutality that has taken hold of these young recruits, 
an off icer attempts to explain their behaviour:
In what sort of world have these men grown up in? They have been hunted 
like cattle. They’ve been dragged from their homes, deported and shut up 
in camps. After liberation, loaded onto ships and sent to a tropical land, 
[…] brutalized in a time of mass murder and the glorif ication of war. (103)
Zwaan’s novel twice references Hueting’s interview. Firstly, we are told, 
“The peloppers [a derogatory term for Indonesian freedom f ighters] are 
76 Zwaan, Soldaat, 18-19.
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thugs, but our reaction is just as barbaric. […] [I]n the Netherlands they 
will never understand it and will only see the excesses” (18). The key word 
here is “excesses,” a term that f irst enters the public discourse with Achter 
het Nieuws, and the publication of the Excessennota. In the f inal scene, 
four characters and their wives come together for a reunion. They turn on 
the television. It is 19 January 1969. Achter het Nieuws begins and they fall 
silent, their glasses of wine untouched as Hueting tells his story. Their f irst 
reaction is to curse Hueting. One demands: “Why didn’t the old bastard tell 
about how much good we did there?” Another counters, “We know damn 
well that Hueting is generally right.” One wife jokes, “Our husbands are war 
criminals.” That night, the old soldiers and their wives stay up later than 
usual, and, for the f irst time, the men start to tell their stories (302-304).
The brutality of Dutch soldiers and members of the intelligence service, 
the drinking and prostitution, the disillusionment and criticism of the politi-
cal authorities in Holland – the experience was the same for the conscript 
in Schilt’s book and the volunteer in Zwaan’s. Both writers allude to the 
belief that war brutalizes and that those who were responsible were the 
leadership, not the soldier. However, Zwaan offers a further explanation, 
that the time they were living in was particularly brutal. The soldiers in 
Indonesia were raised during the economic depression, lived through the 
Nazi occupation and were transported to labour camps in Germany. After 
liberation, they found themselves again at war.
Jan Varenne
The third novel of 1969 was Eer de haan kraait (Before the cock crows) from 
Jan Varenne. At just over a hundred pages in length, it is a slight work, but 
stylistically it is the most sophisticated. Varenne does not shrink from 
describing brutal excesses, but the reflective tone of the narrator and the 
originality of some of the images soften the hard edges. Rob Nieuwenhuys 
concluded: “All in all, Eer de haan kraait is one of the best books about the 
police actions.”77
The main character is named Jenver, a reference to the author’s own 
name – Jan Varenne. Jenver is a likable young man, whose greatest weakness 
is the wish to please. In the f irst page, we f ind him burning down a house for 
the f irst time.78 Later we f ind descriptions of prisoners being shot (29, 31-32); 
wounded Indonesians being shot (61); electric shocks and burns inflicted 
upon a prisoner during interrogation (65-67); we are told that the great sport 
77 Nieuwenhuys, Oost-Indische, 456.
78 Varenne, Eer de haan, 16-17.
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was plundering villages (103). Varenne describes a village surrounded and 
all the men rounded up, but when the Dutch soldiers fail to f ind weapons 
and fail to f ind the men they were searching for, they randomly take two 
men. When these two fail to supply information, the young off icer orders 
them to “follow normal procedure this afternoon during routine patrol” 
(34). The men are shot, and in the report the off icer writes, “shot during 
attempted escape” (35). After the shooting, the off icer tries to write a letter 
to his mother. He gets no further than writing “Dear Mother” (35).
In another scene, the cook is watching over a prisoner. He kicks the 
prisoner, sticks him in a rubbish drum and f ills the drum with the kitchen 
leftovers, covering the prisoner. The off icer and other soldiers laugh, but 
Jenver found it too crude (50). Near the end of the story, Jenver has decided to 
speak up and save the lives of two prisoners. He is formulating his objections 
in his mind, yet he fails to speak out and the prisoners are killed (117-118).
Most violence takes place off the page. Prostitution is referred to, but is 
not explicit. Prisoners are harassed and killed, but there are no detailed 
descriptions of torture. Unlike the novels of Schilt and Zwaan, there are 
few political discussions, few complaints about the military or political 
leadership. The soldiers have a diff icult task, but it has to be done.
What causes Jenver to go along with acts of brutality without protest? 
Why do ordinary young men become brutal killers? An answer is hinted 
at in one of the italicized pieces that interleaf the story proper: “By the way, 
with the exceptions of a few whiners, they were all great lads. I never had 
it so good as I did in that platoon. Like in mother’s lap” (26). This need to 
belong to the group is described in detail. The soldiers have an evening’s 
entertainment, a cabaret; they get drunk and sing together, eventually with 
arms interlocked, and Jenver becomes emotional: “God, thought Jenver, 
to belong, […] that’s it, […] to love all these people, and to be loved” (47). 
In the foreword, Varenne explains, “For Jenver, my hero, the group always 
wins” (5). His motivation for writing was his astonishment that regular 
churchgoers and well-intentioned villagers, aristocrats and socialists, easily 
metamorphized into killers. He had learned that humans want to belong, 
they become prisoners of the group, and like rats, they remain loyal within 
their own rat colony (6). He represents the war of decolonization as young 
Dutch soldiers who, surrounded by a strange enemy in an alien environment, 
maintained their dignity towards each other, but reacted to the Other in 
the way any group would have reacted – with systemic violence.
This begs the question: If Dutch soldiers did what any soldiers would 
do in a similar situation, does this mean they were no different from the 
German soldiers who had terrorized the Netherlands? Jenver reflects that 
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during the Occupation, you sometimes encountered a normal German and 
you realized that he was just an ordinary lad who had nothing to do with 
Hitler (71). In his foreword, he writes, “I personally have no reason to conclude 
that Dutch men, when placed into the same circumstances, would not have 
produced a comparable percentage of camp brutes as the Germans” (13).
Varenne’s representation suggests that the Dutch military leadership was 
not a bloodthirsty lot, and the politicians have nothing to feel ashamed of 
(14). The brutal excesses were simply the result of the system. At the same 
time, in a clear reference to the negative reactions to Hueting’s Achter het 
Nieuws interview, Varenne admits that he is amazed to read the denials 
of the excesses by people who had to know (15). Varenne concludes his 
foreword: “It is stupid, now that the cat is out of the bag, to sweep him 
under the carpet” (15).
All three novels were written from a strictly Eurocentric point of view. 
We never hear of any Indonesian motivations. No Indonesian character is 
given any depth. We never gain an insight into Indonesian thoughts. All 
three offer us a male point of view. Although Schilt and Zwaan criticize 
authorities in The Hague, suggesting that the war was fought to defend the 
interests of big capital, no writer applies a critical analysis to the nature of 
Dutch colonial rule. None suggests that the outburst of violence was the 
result of the inequalities bred by colonialism.
In 1978, Rob Nieuwenhuys published his critical survey of Indische 
literature, Oost-Indische spiegel (East Indies mirror). He referred to the 
three novels of Schilt, Zwaan and Varenne as attempts at “demythologizing 
the war.”79 The three novels formed an attack on unremembering, and the 
politics of concealment. Margaretha Ferguson revealed that Varenne had 
written his book in 1951-1952 and had spent years trying, in vain, to f ind a 
publisher. The Hueting interview afforded the opportunity of publication.80
Historiographical Impact
Shortly after the Hueting interview, journalist and Sukarno biographer Paul 
van ’t Veer, published De Atjeh-oorlog (The Aceh War). At f irst glance, this 
detailed study of the Aceh War (1871-1942) seems unrelated to a discussion 
of Hueting’s impact. After all, such a study was the result of years of research 
79 Nieuwenhuys, Oost-Indische, 455.
80 Margaretha Ferguson, “De onvrijheid van de literatuur in Nederland,” Het Vaderland, 
20 September 1969.
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predating the Hueting controversy. However, an analysis of the book’s 
reception highlights the work of unremembering.
De Atjeh-oorlog provided an analysis of the military dimensions, as well 
as the ethical and political issues raised at the time of the war that the 
Dutch colonial government fought in Aceh, in Sumatra, on and off from 1871 
until 1942. One could expect that the reader in 1969 might draw parallels 
between Van ’t Veer’s account of the Aceh War and Hueting’s eyewitness 
testimony of the War of Independence. After all, Van ’t Veer suggests that 
Dutch soldiers had routinely burned Indonesian villages to the ground;81 
that prisoners forced to work for the Dutch died by the thousands (169); that 
Dutch military personnel perpetrated “indescribable cruelties” in which 
hundreds of women and children were massacred (174). He represented 
Dutch forces spending days destroying an Indonesian settlement, burning all 
buildings to the ground, chopping down trees, destroying gravestones (207). 
He described how an off icer had an Aceh leader decapitated before the eyes 
of the victim’s wife and children and kept the severed head in an alcohol 
solution in a glass jug (232). He listed war crimes: “arbitrary executions, the 
killing of prisoners, the torture of uncooperative informers, the nurturing 
of murderous rage, the murder of women and children and the locking up 
of hostages in cages” (248). Van ’t Veer claimed that 4 per cent of the Aceh 
population had been killed in just ten years (260). In one campaign, between 
a quarter and a third of the population of one region had been slaughtered 
(269). This led Van ’t Veer to compare Dutch terror with the Spanish fury 
in the Netherlands in the sixteenth century (272).
Van ’t Veer showed that many in the home front objected to how the war 
was being prosecuted. He described health off icers producing a report on 
“inhumane cruelties” (139). He described the futile attempts made to improve 
the deplorable conditions of forced labourers (168). Most importantly, he 
writes of how one ex-off icer had anonymously penned a series of articles 
for a Dutch newspaper in 1907. The articles detailed numerous cruelties and 
the widespread use of terror (284-292). Van ’t Veer argued that the articles 
were the most influential ever to appear in a newspaper about an Indisch 
subject, eventually leading to a parliamentary debate and an official military 
inquiry (284-292). Just like the Hueting interview, one is tempted to exclaim.
The book included the photograph that documented one massacre, 
including a baby sitting next to a group of corpses.82 We have already 
come across this photograph in the work of Rob Nieuwenhuys and Loe 
81 Van ’t Veer, De Atjeh-oorlog, 130.
82 Ibid., interleaved between 256 and 257.
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de Jong. According to Bijl, Van ’t Veer has not simply recycled the pho-
tograph, but he has repurposed the image. On the one hand, it provides 
“an index of a specif ic event.” However, by including it within a broader 
frame – an attack on Dutch imperialism – the photograph “gains larger 
iconic meanings.”83 Nevertheless, few immediately saw any iconic link 
between the photograph from the Aceh War and more recent atrocities 
described by Hueting.
For the readers in 1969, the parallels must have been obvious, one would 
think. Here was a book demonstrating that the atrocities described by 
Hueting, far from being arbitrary, formed a continuation of a tradition of 
Dutch colonial warfare. Hueting’s telling could not be seen as unique, but 
could be placed against a similar case of whistle-blowing in 1907. It would 
seem that the Hueting controversy that had dominated the news only 
months earlier would have been in the back (or forefront) of reviewer’s 
minds, as they picked up another work detailing Dutch military atrocities. 
Consequently, if reviewers were to mention Hueting in their reviews, this 
would be unsurprising. Instead, in an example of widespread unremember-
ing, we f ind that every reviewer without exception failed to connect Van ’t 
Veer’s account with Hueting’s interview.
In the communist De Waarheid, a source of irritation seemed to be the 
fact that Van ’t Veer had failed to mention Marx.84 All other reviewers were 
full of praise. Joop van den Broek praised Van ’t Veer for pointing out the 
“unbelievable shortcomings” of nineteenth-century colonial warfare.85 Tom 
Crijnen thanked Van ’t Veer for proving that the Aceh War had been “the 
bloodiest and most revolting that the Netherlands had ever actively par-
ticipated in,” unremembering 1945 to 1949.86 A reviewer at the Leeuwarder 
Courant described De Atjeh-oorlog as a “clever book,”87 while Het Vrije Volk 
added that “it will stimulate new discussions of war.”88
The blindness of the book reviewers mirrors the blindness of the f ilm 
critics reviewing Pontecorvo’s The Battle of Algiers. Film reviewers had failed 
to see the link between French atrocities in Algeria and Dutch atrocities in 
the Dutch East Indies. Book reviewers had refused to make the link between 
83 Bijl, Emerging Memory, 197.
84 J.M., “De Atjeh-oorlog en de ‘gecompliceerde’ van Heutsz: Het pseudo-anti-colonialisme 
van Paul van ’t Veer,” De Waarheid, 13 December 1969.
85 Joop van den Broek, “Toen kolonialisme nog niet per se verwerpelijk was,” Algemeen 
Handelsblad, 10 November 1969.
86 Tom Crijnen, “Atjeh: Nederlands smerigste oorlog,” De Tijd, 1 November 1969.
87 “Boeken: Nederlands langste oorlog – Atjeh,” Leeuwarder Courant, 24 November 1969.
88 Dick Schaap, “Atjeh: 40 jaren ‘paciferen’ – 100,000 doden,” Het Vrije Volk, 31 October 1969.
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Dutch atrocities in the Aceh War and the War of Independence. Both were 
exercises in unremembering. In the compartmentalized world of Dutch book 
reviewers, the Aceh War (which ended in 1942) and the War of Independence 
(which started in 1945) were unrelated. Both had provoked accusations of 
war crimes and engendered parliamentary debates. Both involved routine 
the killing of civilians, torture of suspects, killing of prisoners, burning of 
villages and massacring of inhabitants. Yet it was as if the Hueting interview 
had never taken place. Paul van ’t Veer’s De Atjeh-oorlog had been published 
in a vacuum.
We have seen how the Dutch cabinet commissioned historian Cees Fas-
seur to oversee the writing of the Excessennota in 1969. Although academic 
historians remained shy of the subject, a further consequence of the Achter 
het Nieuws broadcasts was the announcement by the government that they 
would f inance the publication of a collection of off icial documents relating 
to the decolonization conflict. However, Elsbeth Locher-Scholten argues 
that the cabinet had already reached this decision the previous year, so 
Hueting’s interview simply accelerated the announcement.89 She argues 
that the ministers agreed to a primary source publication because it had 
three advantages. Firstly, it was in keeping with the nineteenth-century 
positivist tradition that the publication of off icial documents formed the 
basis for historical research. Secondly, it meant that historians could research 
decolonization by means of printed sources while being denied access to 
embargoed archives. Thirdly, this type of publication was the most neutral.90 
In an area as sensitive as decolonization, a publication of primary documents 
would ruffle few feathers. Locher-Scholten considered this decision to be an 
indicator of the repressed trauma that dominated Dutch unremembering.91
This decision of politicians provoked no resistance from historians, who, 
with few exceptions, acquiesced in an act of collective unremembering. 
Likewise, most of the press considered the publication of documents as 
suff icient. Consistent with the reviewers of Van ’t Veer’s De Atjeh-oorlog, 
the press collaborated in the process of unremembering. As the volumes of 
Officiële Bescheiden betreffende de Nederlands-Indonesische Betrekkingen 
1945-1950 began to appear (a total of 20 volumes by 1996), Locher-Scholten 
maintains that the press showed a lukewarm interest, leaving some un-
reviewed.92 She contrasts this with the reception given to Loe de Jong’s 
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off icial history of the Netherlands during World War Two. While the state 
commissioned a major narrative history of the nation during World War Two 
immediately after the war, when it came to decolonization, 20 years after 
the war, it commissioned the publication of off icial documents! The former 
had a printing of 100,000 copies per volume; the latter had a print run of 1,400 
copies per volume.93 The former achieved bestseller status and ensured the 
author became a household name. The latter was incomprehensible to the 
layperson and increasingly ignored by the press. Jan Bank, commenting in 
1995, argued that there was consensus around World War Two, but not when 
it came to decolonization. Consequently, the government had decided to 
limit publication to documentary sources for “scholars and semi-scholars” 
but not for the broad public.94
A multivolume publication on the development of Indonesian nationalism 
that appeared between 1975 and 1982 might have seemed promising.95 
However, this too was limited to the publication of written sources. Only 
documents from the former Department of the Colonies were used. These 
were reviewed and published with the special permission of the Minister of 
Internal Affairs.96 In other words, this collection on Indonesian nationalism 
was composed of Dutch off icial documents, not Indonesian nationalist 
documents. In effect, this Eurocentric approach created a representation 
of the growth of Indonesian nationalism seen exclusively though off icial, 
Dutch colonial eyes. Locher-Scholten calculated that of the 571 documents 
published, only 15 were from Indonesian nationalist leaders!97
The Hueting interview lead to the publication of one scholarly work that, 
in turn, provided an impetus for the further academic study of decolonization 
in Indonesia. It was written, not by a historian, but by two sociologists, 
ex-conscripts who had fought in Indonesia and had become close friends. 
In Ontsporing van geweld (Derailment of violence), J.A.A. van Doorn and 
W.J. Hendrix tried to explain the excessive violence used by Dutch forces 
during the period from 1946 to 1949. Both authors had spent three and a 
half years at war in Indonesia. They brought back to the Netherlands “a 
pile of about 80 moderately to very accurately registered incidents that 
people would later term ‘military excesses.’”98 They then set about further 
research, eventually building a collection of about 150 pages. They called 
93 Ibid., 490.
94 Interviewed in Meijer, Oostindisch, 88.
95 Kwantes, De ontwikkeling.
96 Kwantes, introduction to De ontwikkeling, xi.
97 Locher-Scholten, “De ontwikkeling,” 51.
98 Van Doorn and Hendrix, Ontsporing, 11.
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it “Research War Crimes Indonesia” (12). Somehow, as the memory of the 
conflict became latent or unremembered, they had put it to one side, both 
getting on with their careers. When Hueting appeared on television, Van 
Doorn and Hendrix realized, “it is now or never” (13).
The authors emphasized that their purpose was not to condemn or blame, 
but to provide an explanation for “a social history of military violence” (13). 
All case studies were anonymized. They began their study with an account 
of the rise of Indonesian nationalism in the early twentieth century and 
its development from a moderate Islamic form that appealed to the small 
middle class, through “proletarization” inspired by the Russian revolution. 
They described the repression after a failed communist uprising during 
1926-1927, until the eventual emergence of Sukarno and his group, the 
Partai Nasional Indonesia (Indonesian National Party). For the f irst time 
the Dutch faced a genuine popular movement. This led, in the 1930s, to a 
new system of repression led by the Dutch political police (21-32). Together 
with the hardship caused by the world economic crisis of the 1930s, this 
contributed to a hardening of attitudes among conservative Dutch and 
Indisch colonials.
The authors accepted the view of the Bersiap as a period of mass plunder-
ing and massacres (51). However, it was also “a revolutionary process whereby 
a social revolution was conducted by armed violence and a collective national 
consciousness was manifested” (51-52). They gave examples from the Indisch 
press, describing nationalist atrocities in detail (62). This contributed to 
what they called the “ideologization” of the colonial society, in which the 
colonial population became convinced of three beliefs: that the Indonesian 
republic had been manufactured by Japan (86-88); that there was no such 
thing as Indonesia (88-91); and that the native population was terrorized and 
in need of rescuing (91-95). They also gave attention to the diff icult position 
of the Indo: “The tragedy in the position of the Indo-European is that he 
could indeed work his way up within the shadow of the colonial system, 
but at the same time had to f ight tendencies within this system – racial 
discrimination from ‘totoks’” (64). The authors described the changing roles 
of the “colonial troika,” consisting of civil servants, business people and the 
military (69-73). As the Indisch community began to play an ever-stronger 
role in the colony, they found themselves to be opposed to the growing 
Indonesian nationalism, but also at loggerheads with the Dutch government, 
who wanted to see an increased share of native participation in governing 
the colony. This was opposed by the Indisch community, who fell under the 
influence of the propaganda spread by the Dutch Nazi Party (73-75). This 
contributed to an increased militarization of colonial society and eventually 
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led to the recruitment of irregular troops, some of whom were drawn from 
the criminal world of Batavia in 1948 (107-109).
The authors attempted to examine the attitudes of tens of thousands of 
recruits sent from the Netherlands, the young generation who had experi-
enced violence and repression under the Nazi occupation and who looked 
with admiration to their Allied liberators. Those who had volunteered for 
service in Indonesia often had a background in the anti-Nazi resistance, or 
had become “onderduikers” (a person in hiding), or had been forced labourers 
in Germany (120-131). Violence had become a way of life for them, albeit, 
violence in the service of a good cause.
The authors devoted special attention to the Royal Netherlands East Indies 
Army (KNIL), which played a key role in the war, often providing leadership 
and training (139-147). They quote the words of a KNIL sergeant, who tells 
conscripts that natives cannot rule themselves, that only whites can rule 
Asia, for which “an iron f ist is needed, because natives simply prefer to be 
kicked rather than led with a soft hand” (145-146). They analyse the guerrilla 
tactics used by the Indonesians and the diff iculties that the Dutch had in 
responding to such irregular warfare (148-182).
The authors also confronted the topic of Westerling and his pacif ication 
of South Celebes, claiming that Westerling used rough violence with the 
blessings of his superiors, General Spoor, Van Mook and the Intelligence 
Service (81). They suggested that the mobilization of Westerling’s special 
troops by the high command was an example of “reactive organizational 
violence” (194-195). This implied that the notorious violence associated with 
the name Westerling was a product of structural violence.
This provided the frame in which they evaluated the prevalence of the use 
of excessive violence by the Dutch in Indonesia. They presented a number of 
cases. They referred a number of times to Hueting’s interview and suggested: 
“It is much more important to accurately know how frequently such excesses 
happened,” adding that the Excessennota “gives a wholly incomplete image,” 
calling it “the tip of the iceberg” (224-225). However, their main contribution 
was to defend a thesis regarding the structural aspect of the use of excessive 
violence: Excessive violence occurs when an accepted authority sees its 
legitimacy disappear and with its legitimacy gone, the authority needs to 
call upon power. Power then reaches for the instrument of violence. At that 
moment, the preeminent apparatus of violence, the army, gets the main role 
(202). Without any countervailing power from other social institutions, the 
army, whose main specialty is the use of violence, destroys social pluralism, 
and consequently overrides institutions such as the judiciary and the police 
(202-203). For the Dutch, the role of policing fell to the members of the 
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intelligence services, who were responsible for many excesses. The only 
possible limitation of this would have been the army commanders, who 
were reluctant to interfere (204).
The book was published in May 1970. It received a number of positive 
reviews in the left-wing and right-wing press. The fact that no individuals 
were named, the term “war crimes” had not been used and the responsibility 
for excessive violence was laid at the feet of a system, not individuals, made 
it appear inoffensive. However, in the short term, the book was quite ignored, 
much like the Excessennota. In an afterword, written for a later edition, Dirk 
Vlasboom writes: “Ontsporing van geweld missed the tide in 1970. The wave 
of emotions sparked by the Hueting affair had faded.”99
Televisual Impact
The Hueting interview stimulated a number of programmes from different 
television broadcasters during the following years. The television broadcaster 
VARA followed up the publication of Van Doorn and Hendrix’s book with 
a short programme, Ontsporing van Geweld, in May 1970. Three years later 
the Dutch Christian Radio Association (NCRV) broadcast En Wij, wij leven 
voort in een doolhof (And we, we live on in a maze), in which a veteran 
discussed the nightmares and intense guilt he suffered from, having shot 
dead no less than ten Indonesian prisoners during the conflict. Journalist 
Nico Scheepmaker described the programme as “something special.”100 The 
many reactions led to the producer broadcasting a second programme a 
month later.
However, the situation around televised remembering remained ambigu-
ous. In the wake of the Hueting interview, journalist Joop Buddinghausen 
and cameraman Hans van der Busken persuaded former Captain Westerling 
to give his f irst ever television interview about his extrajudical executions 
on South Celebes in 1946. To their disappointment, they discovered that no 
broadcaster would run the risk of transmitting the interview. Over 40 years 
later, the existence of the interview became known.101 It was broadcast in 
99 Dirk Vlasboom, foreword to Van Doorn and Hendrix, Ontsporing, 337.
100 Nico Scheepmaker, “‘En wij. Wij leven voort in een doolhof,’” Leeuwarder Courant, 
11 November 1973.
101 Lidy Nicolasen, “Kaptein Westerling geeft in tv-interview wandaden op Zuid-Celebes toe,” 
De Volkskrant, 14 August 2012; Niels Posthumus, “Westerling erkende executies op Zuid-Sulawesi 
in opgedoken interview uit 1969,” NRC Handelsblad, 14 August 2012.
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2012, updated by Van der Busken, with commentary from historian Willem 
IJzereef and lawyer Liesbeth Zegveld.102
In 1976, the public television broadcaster VPRO, f illing the gap left by 
historians, treated their prime-time viewers to a full evening of the history 
of decolonization.103 Indonesia Merdeka was a piece of remarkable television 
history, not least because of its length, over three hours without a break. 
Filmed in colour, it was the f irst Dutch documentary to tell the story of the 
f inal days of the colony, including an Indonesian point of view, with com-
mentary from some Dutch participants. Most interviewees were Indonesian 
nationalist leaders, including Vice President Muhammad Hatta. The writer 
and director of the programme, Roelof Kiers, travelled to Indonesia to meet 
the former rebels in their own homes. In limiting the number of interviewees 
to seven, spread over three hours, Kiers aimed for depth. All interviewees 
spoke in fluent Dutch. Dutch, Japanese and Indonesian propaganda f ilms 
were interwoven throughout. Kiers supplied an occasional narration, but 
mainly the interviewees told the story. A week before the broadcast Kiers 
warned: “There is a lot of talk. There is no visible drama,” adding that the 
programme is not “a historical reconstruction.” Instead, it presents people 
“letting their memories play.” He concluded that it “is more of a supplement 
to the off icial history.”104 One is tempted to ask, what off icial history?
Peter Schumacher wrote that nothing like this had ever been presented 
before, claiming that this unique f ilm would itself be regarded as a historical 
document and would be rebroadcast years hence. He recommended to view-
ers with a connection to Indonesia “and that is many hundreds of thousands 
in the Netherlands,” that the f ilm is not to be missed.105 The programme – 3 
hours and 16 minutes of non-dramatic, serious television – attracted one and 
a half million viewers. Due to public demand, it was repeated six months 
later.106 A brochure with the complete narrative and interviews was also 
distributed.107 Schumacher’s prediction, that the documentary would be 
rebroadcast years hence, was proven accurate. It was reshown in 1989, with 
102 Altijd Wat, NCRV, 14 August 2012.
103 Indonesia Merdeka, VPRO, 1 December 1976.
104 Jan Eijkelboom, “Indonesië merdeka, weer gewaagd idee van VPRO,” Het Vrije Volk, 
25 November 1976.
105 Peter Schumacher, “TV vanavond: zeer unieke ‘Indonesia Merdeka,’” NRC Handelsblad, 
1 December 1976.
106 “VPRO herhaalt avondlang Indonesische historie,” De Telegraaf, 8 August 1977.
107 “Indonesia Merdeka,” Nieuwsblad van het Noorden, 10 August 1977.
bREAkINg THE SILENCE 165
introductions from historians Jan Bank and H.W. von der Dunk. It was 
referred to as an almost infallible historical document.108
Indonesia Merdeka attempted to put paid to the myth that Sukarno 
and Hatta were collaborators of the Japanese. Similarly, it showed that 
Indonesian nationalism was not a direct product of Japanese propaganda. 
Kiers asked Indonesian army commander Nasution about the fact that 
Dutch soldiers had resorted to terror. Nasution answered that that was 
understandable, given the horrible conditions in which they were f ighting. 
He added that he and his nationalist comrades had hoped that the Dutch 
would resort to terror, knowing that this was a sign of weakness that would 
further undermine the Dutch cause. There is no further talk of excesses or 
war crimes. Kiers asked a Dutch former plantation owner: “Do you have 
any idea why the Netherlands lost the East Indies?” The totok and his wife 
look deeply saddened, and he answered, “Because the government did not 
have foresight.” He added that he, too, had lacked foresight, and that is 
why thousands of “Dutch lads” remain buried in the former colony. Dutch 
politicians, experts and colonials had completely misread the strength of 
the newly imagined community that was Indonesia. Undoubtedly, Kiers 
agreed with one of his interviewees, a former political advisor to Van Mook, 
who suggested the Dutch empire had collapsed because Indonesians had 
no reason to support it.
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5 Postmemory
Abstract
The second generation of those repatriated from the former colony during 
decolonization inherited a memory of traumatic loss that they themselves 
had not experienced. The violent actions of Moluccan youths during the 
1970s were not anti-colonial attempts to promote liberation but can be 
best understood as attempts at contesting Dutch colonial unremembering. 
During the 1980s, postmemory authors, like Jill Stolk, Marion Bloem and 
Adriaan van Dis, problematized unremembering, drawing attention to 
their postcolonial condition and complicating the narrative of us (the 
Dutch) versus them (the Indonesians). Radio and television during the 
1980s increasingly offered platforms where the brutality of the war of 
decolonization and perpetration of widespread Dutch atrocities were 
highlighted. The testimony of veterans, not historians, dominated these 
narratives.
Keywords: decolonization, unremembering, Moluccans, Marion Bloem, 
postmemory, postcolonialism
Collective loss has a long, complicated and often violent afterlife. Eva Hoff-
man has written: “Sometimes, if the loss is large enough, the trail seeps and 
winds like invisible psychic ink through lives, decades and generations.”1 It 
is the fate of the second generation that they “live with a multitude of lost 
‘objects’ that they never had a chance to know.” For the second generation, 
melancholy becomes the dominant form of remembering.2
The second generation inherits a memory of traumatic loss that is not 
based on f irst-hand experience. Children of those who experienced loss 
f irst-hand know of it intimately, from the stories and the silences that 
they have experienced at home, among the elders whom they know and 
1 Hoffman, “The Long,” 406.
2 Ibid., 411.
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love. Marianne Hirsch developed the term “postmemory” to describe this 
relationship that the second generation bears
to the personal, collective, and cultural trauma of those who came 
before – to experiences they “remember” only by means of stories, im-
ages and behaviours among which they grew up. But these experiences 
were transmitted to them so deeply and effectively to seem to constitute 
memories in their own right.3
Postmemory describes a condition of second-generation diasporic popula-
tions who have survived a collective trauma. Children of exiled survivors 
have not experienced directly the initial trauma, but tend to participate 
in the “guardianship” of that traumatic past, even as that past slips into 
history.4
In her study of Holocaust postmemory, Hirsch examined “the long-term 
effects of living in close proximity to the pain, depression, and dissociation 
of persons who had witnessed and survived massive historical trauma.”5 
In this chapter, we will see that, like the second generation of Holocaust 
survivors, second-generation Moluccan repatriates and second-generation 
Indisch repatriates created postmemory representations of decolonization. 
The Moluccan representations came in the form of political violence. In the 
Indisch case, in the form of literature.
The Moluccan Attacks
To the consternation of Dutch authorities and public, the country was 
confronted in the 1970s with a home-grown terrorist movement whose 
actions, even now, form an aspect of Dutch collective memory.6 The 
hundreds of islands that make up the Moluccas are the original, fabled 
“Spice Islands.” From the late nineteenth century onward the Dutch colonial 
government practised large-scale recruitment among the Christian section 
of the Moluccan population for their colonial army, the Royal Netherlands 
East Indies Army (KNIL). Moluccans gained a reputation for being good 
3 Hirsch, The Generation, 5.
4 Ibid., 1-2.
5 Ibid., 34.
6 Bootsma, De Molukse Acties, 7.
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soldiers with “unquestioning, if not fanatical loyalty to the Dutch, especially 
to the House of Orange.”7
The transfer of sovereignty from the Netherlands to the new republic left 
some Moluccans in an awkward position. Months after independence, and 
before the full demobilization of the Dutch colonial army had taken place, 
the government in Java decided to end federalism and rule directly from 
Jakarta. Some Moluccans responded by declaring an independent Republik 
Maluku Seletan (RMS, Republic of South Moluccas) and the new Indonesian 
government moved to crush the rebellion. Although the KNIL was disbanded 
in July 1950, 9,000 soldiers on Java had yet to be demobilized, including 4,000 
Moluccans. These Moluccans feared that they would become victims of 
reprisals if they were to be demobilized on Java. In December 1950, a court 
in The Hague ruled it would be illegal for Dutch authorities to demobilize 
Moluccans against their will on Indonesian soil.8 In February 1951, the 
Dutch government lost their appeal against this decision and consequently 
the Moluccan KNIL soldiers were offered a choice: demobilization on Java 
or embarkation for a temporary sojourn in the Netherlands, together with 
their families.9 They chose the latter. This was considered, by all concerned, 
a temporary solution. It was hoped the Moluccans could return to their 
homeland once stability had been restored.
Upon arrival in Holland, much to their surprise and anger, the soldiers 
were immediately discharged unceremoniously.10 In effect they were now 
unemployed and stateless. The search for temporary housing for the 12,500 
Moluccans was a problem for a Dutch government dealing with a serious 
housing shortage in the immediate post-World War Two period.11 Eventually 
they were housed in 91 locations, in former camps for the unemployed, 
as well as former monasteries, former military barracks and even former 
concentration camps.12
The Moluccans felt a deep and bitter sense of betrayal. Motivated by an 
attempt to maintain Dutch influence in the archipelago, the only Dutch 
who seemed to sympathize with their plight were right-wing, die-hard 
imperialists – people like Gerretson and Gerbrandy, and the conservative 
journalist Jan Fabius, who compared their treatment by the Dutch with 
7 Bartels, “Can the Train,” 25.
8 Smeets, “De plaats,” 7; Steijlen, RMS, 51-52.
9 Smeets, “De plaats,” 13.
10 Bootsma, De Molukse Acties, 19.
11 Ibid., 18.
12 Akihary, “Van Almere,” 40-47.
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the treatment of the Jews by the Germans.13 Gerbrandy was their most 
prominent supporter. In 1950 he co-founded the pro-colonial organization 
Door de Eeuwen Trouw (Loyal through the Centuries) in order to push for 
their right of self-determination.14
The ideology of the RMS continued to live on, dominating the collective 
life among this insular community. Akihary argues that it suited the Dutch 
government for the Moluccans to live in relative isolation – “tropical enclaves 
in the Dutch landscape,” preventing assimilation.15 But historian Fridus 
Steijlen demonstrates that this housing policy of the authorities came back 
to bite them, for it played a crucial role in the development of Moluccan anti-
Dutch resentment.16 Over the years, supporters of the RMS ideal were given 
the opportunity to provide leadership and instil ideological unity within the 
community, with little toleration for alternative viewpoints.17 According to 
Henk Smeets, Moluccan support for the Dutch state and crown had always 
been relative, and the slogan “Ambon – loyal through the centuries” was 
in origin a piece of pro-Dutch propaganda.18 But, in exile and under the 
influence of the RMS ideal, this narrative of the faithful Moluccans who 
had demonstrated loyalty to the Dutch state for over three centuries now 
took on mythical proportions.19 Intimidation and social ostracism were 
used by the Moluccan leadership to conserve their position and promote 
the RMS ideal.20 Consequently, though the Dutch government never gave 
any indication of supporting the RMS ideology, their housing policy during 
the 1950s paradoxically facilitated “the development of an RMS movement 
in the Netherlands.”21
By the late 1960s and early 1970s, a second generation, raised in isolation 
from Dutch society, had become disillusioned at watching the older genera-
tion suffer. About 80 per cent of Moluccans in the Netherlands remained 
stateless.22 According to Bartels some young Moluccans “felt it was their 
responsibility to restore their parent’s honour, if not to avenge them.”23 
In 1966, in response to the execution of Moluccan separatist leader RMS 
13 Fabius, Zwart op Wit, 122-123.
14 Bosma, Terug, 23.
15 Akihary, “Van Almere,” 65.
16 Steijlen, RMS, 65.
17 Ibid., 82.
18 Smeets, “Sprongen,” 7.
19 Steijlen, “De Molukkers,” 364-365.
20 Bosma, Terug, 53.
21 Steijlen, RMS, 95.
22 Bosma, Terug, 25.
23 Bartels, “Can the Train,” 34.
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President Chris Soumokil by the Indonesian regime, Moluccan youths 
stormed and set f ire to the Indonesian embassy in The Hague. Another attack 
on the Indonesian ambassador’s residence in Wassenaar in 1970 resulted in 
the killing of a Dutch policeman.24 In 1975, Moluccans hijacked a train in 
the north of the country, while others occupied the Indonesian consulate 
in Amsterdam, resulting in four fatalities among the hostages. In 1977, two 
groups hijacked a train and occupied a primary school, taking hundreds of 
children and adults hostage. The stand-off lasted nearly three weeks, gained 
world media attention and ended with Dutch military intervention and the 
killing of six Moluccans and two hostages. A f inal action in 1978, in the town 
of Assen, resulted in another hostage stand-off and a further two killings.
These violent actions were about collective memory and unremembering. 
The 1970 action in Wassenaar, according to Steijlen, provided “a reminder 
of the political ideals of the Moluccans in the Netherlands.”25 For years the 
older-generation Moluccans had tried to engage Dutch interest in their plight 
but this had proved futile. The young generation were rebelling against the 
failed methods of their elders, but were also trying to forcefully remind the 
Dutch of the last days of decolonization. These were not simply terrorist 
actions, but representations of decolonization, marking a failure on the 
part of the Dutch historical profession. No major historian had shown an 
inclination to investigate the Moluccan past or to educate the Dutch public 
regarding the roots of Moluccan discontent. Yet, South Moluccan nationalism 
was not simply a product of a failed integration policy, but a product of a 
bad decolonization policy.26 These violent actions represented the historical 
wounds festering among one specif ic group impacted by decolonization.
Dipesh Chakrabarty uses the concept of “historical wounds” to help 
understand the perspective of groups who have felt themselves to be victims 
of collective injustice. He traced the phenomenon to the immediate period 
of decolonization, the 1950s and 1960s. However, it was only in the 1990s 
that groups who were perceived as “givers of the wound in the f irst place” 
began to acknowledge their role.27 During the 1970s the Dutch public were 
oblivious to the suggestion that they had ever inflicted a historical wound. 
Thus, the Dutch public watched these actions on their television screens, 
“dumbfounded.”28 The Moluccan actions were symptoms of unremembering.
24 Ibid.
25 Steijlen, RMS, 133.
26 Schmid et al., Zuidmolukse terrorisme, 21.
27 Chakrabarty, “History,” 78.
28 Wesseling, “Post-Imperial Holland,” 137.
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It is tempting to see the era of Moluccan terrorism, 1970-1978, against the 
background of the progressive, liberation movements of the 1960s that turned 
violent in the 1970s. Emerging from the 1960s youth movement, rebellion 
came in the form of the Blank Panthers in the USA, the Red Army Faction 
in West Germany, the Red Brigades in Italy and the Japanese Red Army 
in Japan. These leftist groups and their supporters were led by youth who 
believed they were attacking the world of their elders in order to bring about 
radical change. Sometimes their aims seemed to merge with the national 
liberation objectives of the Irish Republican Army, the Basque ETA and 
the Palestinian Liberation Organization. One of the train hostage takers at 
Wijster in 1975 linked his struggle with that of the Palestinians as well as 
the work of African-American political activist Angela Davis, arguing that 
nearly all Moluccan youths had a poster of Che Guevara and saw Che and 
Moluccan guerrilla leader Chris Soumokil as equals.29
This perspective is inaccurate on three counts. Firstly, Moluccan activism 
was not a national liberation movement attempting to gain freedom from 
their colonial masters. On the contrary, Moluccans were former allies of the 
colonial masters at war against the Indonesian national liberation movement. 
The struggle for the RMS, in the eyes of the Moluccan fathers, had been an 
extension of the Dutch “police actions,” but the sons, ironically, fought in 
the name of anti-imperialism. This was a postcolonial dilemma. Secondly, 
Moluccan activists in the Netherlands were not bent on radical social or 
economic change within the society that they were attacking, unlike the Red 
Army Faction or the Red Brigades. They had no social programme at all for 
the Netherlands. The main objective was to undo Dutch unremembering, 
in order to help the Moluccans to return to their South Moluccan republic. 
Thirdly, young Moluccan activists were not rebelling against their elders. 
On the contrary, they were rebelling on behalf of their elders. Theirs was 
a postmemory activism rooted in the colonial experience of their parents.
Ever since the arrival of the Moluccans in the Netherlands, many Dutch 
recognized their loyalty to Dutch colonialism, especially the conservatives 
in the Comité Actie Minderheden (Minorities Action Committee) and Door 
de Eeuwen Trouw (Loyal through the Centuries).30 The Moluccan position 
within the KNIL had given Christian Moluccans a privileged position within 
colonial society, one in which they considered themselves to be above other 
native peoples, gaining themselves the nickname “Black Dutch” but also “Dog 
29 Thenu, Korban, 34.
30 Manuhutu, “Help Ambon,” 74-77.
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of the NICA [Netherlands Indies Civil Administration].”31 Steijlen argues 
that this position translated into an identif ication with the Western colonial 
elite and lies at the root of Moluccan nationalism.32 At the beginning of 
the 1960s, Moluccan future president in exile, J.A. Manusama, was trying to 
convince the world that their struggle formed a vital link in the global war 
against communism.33 Using colonialist arguments, he justif ied the Dutch 
bloodstained penetrations into the Indonesian archipelago, by claiming 
this was no worse than what the locals did.34
However, the young activists of the 1970s prof iled their struggle as 
anti-imperialist. Tete Siahaya was one of the activists who attacked the 
Indonesian ambassador’s residence in Wassenaar in 1970. Incredibly, a Dutch 
radio journalist discovered the telephone line to the residence was still open 
and got Siahaya on the line. The interview that ensued was broadcast live 
to the Dutch public. Siahaya’s opening words, describing their motivation, 
were, “Hello Sir. The whole action was set up because of the following: we 
young people, we won’t take it anymore, that for 20 years ours parents have 
been insulted.”35
Former Wijster train hijacker Abe Sahetapy claimed in his prison diary 
that their actions were part of a political struggle against the Dutch “barbaric 
regime” and its “henchman,” Indonesia.36 Sahetapy maintained an anti-
imperialist attitude throughout, calling police or prison guards wolves, 
werewolves and pigs, brutes, dogs, and skunks.37 Dutch authorities are 
referred to as “fascist.”38 The Moluccan leadership are “Judases” (67). He 
even expresses his anger at the Moluccan people because they didn’t offer 
100 per cent support to the violent actions (67).
Sahetapy claimed that the Moluccan struggle was in line with other 
anti-imperialist struggles (12-13). Yet, the Moluccans had been supported 
by the most right-wing elements in The Hague. Furthermore, Moluccans 
in the Netherlands, including the second generation, owed their status 
as a separate people to their cooperation with the colonial power. Their 
existence as a political identity was rooted in the hierarchy of colonialism, 
31 Steijlen, RMS, 35 and 36.
32 Ibid., 59.
33 Manusama, “Political Aspects,” 62-62.
34 Prins, “Location,” 13.
35 These words were rebroadcast on television in De tijd staat stil: De Zuidmolukse droom, 
NCRV, 7 June 1994.
36 Sahetapy, Tawanan, 79.
37 Ibid., 6, 23, 26, 33.
38 Ibid., 10, 61, 79, 80.
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but was now propagated in the vocabulary of equalitarian anti-imperialism. 
Thus, the new generation had seized the baton of revolution from their 
elders and transferred it from a right-wing to a left-wing struggle. This 
double consciousness allowed them to be the privileged products of Dutch 
colonialism and the innocent victims of Dutch colonialism at the same time.
Identif ication with the Black Panthers was superf icial. Rather, their 
motivation was the more intimate frustration of witnessing the pain of their 
parents, transmitted to them within the family through, to use Hirsch’s 
phrase, “a shared archive of stories.”39 A sense of helplessness caused them 
to unleash violence upon the unremembering Dutch. They aimed to force 
remembering of the wound upon those who they considered to be the 
perpetrators. Near the beginning of his book, Sahetapy admits that what 
had given him the power to survive is the strength he gained through his 
“belief” (11). It was the God of his parents, rather than Che, that provided 
the inspiration.
Baukje Prins went to a primary school during the 1960s where half the 
children were Dutch and half were Moluccan. Decades later, she wrote an 
oral history of that time, based on interviews with her former classmates 
and teachers. She noticed that former Moluccan classmates emphasized the 
closeness of their relationship with their parents far more than the Dutch 
interviewees. The Moluccans continually referred to the “immigration 
history” of their parents and the “shock of political exile.”40 Prins concludes 
that her Moluccan former classmates felt duty bound to compensate their 
parents for their sacrif ices, by giving them something back.41
It is signif icant that, while associating himself with the struggles of 
Palestinians, African-Americans and Cubans, Cornelius Thenu inserted 
this dedication in his book: “For my parents, with love always.” He was 
raised in the former concentration camp Westerbork, surrounded with 
barbed wire, yet admitted that it was an idyllic youth, isolated from the 
Dutch world while playing in the woods.42 This ended when he became 
aware of the complaints of his elders: “The question when they could return 
home ran like a thread though the lives of my parents.”43 As a boy, Thenu 
had listened to the stories of life in the army before the forced move to the 
Netherlands, but also to the stories of how his parents had been treated 
39 Hirsch, The Generation, 35.
40 Prins, Gemengde Gevoelens, 168.
41 Ibid., 169.
42 Thenu, Korban, 19-20.
43 Ibid., 20.
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upon arrival in 1951 and had been “betrayed by the Dutch government.”44 
In a television documentary released at the time of his book’s publication, 
Thenu described how his parents had experienced military discharge as 
if “a friend had stabbed you in the back.”45 He emphasized that once you 
have seen your parents crying because of an injustice done to them, “that 
remains in your thoughts for a long time.”46
The difference between the older generation and that of the second, 
according to Thenu, was that his parents had remained loyal to the Dutch, 
seeing Indonesia as the “great evil.”47 But, the young generation was f illed 
with hatred towards the Dutch for what they had done to their Moluccan 
parents.48 Consequently, their sole objective when they seized the train at 
Wijster in December 1975 was “to make our struggle for an independent South 
Moluccan republic known to the Netherlands and the rest of the world.”49
We f ind similar explanations in interviews with other Moluccans who, 
having served their time in prison, came to reflect upon their deeds. In a 
studio discussion broadcast on television in 1994, presenter Philip Feriks 
introduced the Moluccan guests as “a forgotten group of compatriots.”50 
Guests included four of those who had occupied the ambassador’s residence 
in 1970. One activist made the point that the Dutch government had acted 
rudely towards his parents. Another, with tears in his eyes, declared that 
“when I hear [our] old people talking it pains my heart. You see, I’m a bit 
deaf, but you [the Dutch] are worse than I am. You never listen.”
For a four-part documentary in 2000, Dutch Approach, a number of former 
activists agreed to be interviewed. Siahaya compared the discharge of his 
father from the army in 1951 to castration.51 In his study of the unused 
interview transcripts for this programme, Bootsma quotes Gustav Tehupur-
ing, one of the activists who had held over a hundred children and their 
teachers hostage: “At Christmas our uncles and aunties would come to 
visit and that was really nice but also a bit sad. […] I found it terrible to 
realize that my father had not stayed in his own country, but in a temporary 
shelter in the Netherlands.”52 Sahetapy was sentenced to fourteen years 
44 Ibid., 25-27.
45 Interviewed in Antenne: Korban, EO, 1998.
46 Ibid.
47 Thenu, Korban, 40.
48 Ibid., 23.
49 Ibid., 49.
50 De Tijd Staat Even Stil: De Zuidmolukse droom, NCRV, 7 June 1994.
51 Dutch Approach: Gebroken belofte, NPS, 6 November 2000.
52 Bootsma, De Molukse Acties, 28.
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imprisonment for his part in executing three hostages in Wijster in 1975. 
Bootsma quotes him: “When I looked at my parents or at other parents, I 
saw them suffering from this burden – the whole process with the KNIL, 
getting sacked from the KNIL, the experience of the camps, living in two 
rooms in the barracks.”53
In an interview in 2010, Paul Polnaija, one of those who occupied the 
primary school in 1977, suggested that problems arose when “I saw the 
sadness and pain of my parents and I wanted to do something about it.”54 
Five years later he admitted: “I hated the Dutch” because of “what had 
happened to my parents.”55
Paul Saimima participated in the hostage taking on the train at Wijster in 
1975. Although refusing to discuss feelings of guilt (he had been involved in 
the execution of two passengers), he broke his silence and gave an interview 
in 2010. He said that the older generation had engaged for 20 years in peaceful, 
reasonable protests, but “that brought about no result. It began to eat away 
at me. You must never hate people, but forget what had been done to my 
parents? Never.”56
Junus Ririmasse is one of two Moluccans who survived the military 
assault on the train in 1977. In an interview in 2015, he claimed that during 
the stand-off he often thought about his parents and how, against their will, 
they had been brought to the Netherlands. He did it for them, he added.57
While the ultimate goal was the achievement of an independent Republic 
of South Moluccas, the activists of the 1970s were motivated by the pain 
of their parents, pain rooted in the wound of decolonization. Although 
Moluccan youth lived in relative isolation, they attended Dutch schools 
and mixed with outsiders and undoubtedly must have imbued something 
from the youth culture of the 1960s. The Black Power movement in the USA 
suggested a template for their own struggle, giving them an anti-imperialist 
vocabulary and allowing them to reinterpret history in a manner that 
concluded that their parents, far from being collaborators of the colonial 
elite, were victims of Dutch imperialism.58 Their aim was to repair the 
historical wound their parents had suffered. Their method was to awaken 
53 Ibid., 29.
54 Paul Prillevitz, “Interview met Molukse gijzelnemer,” Historiën, 6 December 2010, http://
www.historien.nl/interview-met-molukse-gijzelnemer, accessed 10 June 2016.
55 De Verandering, NOS, 19 September 2015.
56 Jacob Hoekman, “Molukse kaper: Bij Wijster was het tijd om te doden,” Reformatisch Dagblad, 
7 May 2010.
57 Henk Wollreich, “Overleven is Geen geluk,” Dagblad van het Noorden, 2 May 2015.
58 Steijlen, RMS, 144-145.
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the Dutch from unremembering, so they would recognize their obligation 
to the loyal Moluccan people. If historians did not teach the Dutch their 
colonial past, then Moluccan youth would do so.
Bosma argues that during the 1970s any sense of even weak “postcolonial 
consciousness” among the Dutch began to disappear from public discourse.59 
At the same time, the arrival of new Dutch citizens from the Caribbean and 
Surinam, as well as the “infamous Moluccan train hijackings,” became the 
postcolonial themes that dominated the media.60 We have seen how Thenu 
claimed that the aim of the hijackers had been to make their struggle for 
independence known to the Dutch and the rest of the world.61 In this they 
were successful.62 The Dutch were appalled by the violent actions, especially 
by the abduction of children and execution of hostages.63 The image of 
the Moluccan changed from loyal soldier to problematic social group.64 
Nevertheless, Steijlen describes the Moluccan actions as being “a catalyst.”65
A team of researchers examined the impact the actions had on public 
opinion. They found that at f irst media showed understanding for the 
Moluccan actions, possibly caused by a “latent feeling of guilt.”66 Newspapers 
provided much needed historical background, explaining “a forgotten and 
unsolved problem” of decolonization.67 However, the train and primary 
school actions of 1977 caused a loss of sympathy.68 Nevertheless, the actions 
did lead to “a certain mental decolonization among the South Moluccans 
as well as the Dutch.”69
The Moluccan actions provided the motivation for a number of tel-
evision programmes and books that highlighted the intimate Moluccan 
entanglement with Dutch colonialism. One programme, followed by a 
book, complicated the narrative by providing a criticism of the collective 
memory propagated by supporters of the RMS. Ben van Kaam noted that 
only a minority of Moluccans had identif ied with the Netherlands. He 
called the idea that they had always been loyal for centuries a myth.70 He 
59 Bosma, Terug, 40.
60 Ibid., 26.
61 Thenu, Korban, 49.
62 Steijlen, RMS, 156.
63 Ibid., 163.
64 Steijlen, “De Molukkers,” 366.
65 Steijlen, RMS, 156.




70 Van Kaam, Ambon, 9-12.
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demonstrated that many Moluccans supported the Indonesian revolution.71 
The attack on Ambon in 1950 had pitted Indonesian against Moluccan, but 
also Moluccan against Moluccan.72 Van Kaam accused the Dutch authorities 
of perpetrating false history.73 However, he admitted that in 1950, for the 
Moluccans of the KNIL, “the world they knew collapsed.”74
Van Kaam’s book received wide-ranging admiring reviews.75 His argument 
gained support some years later in an academic study by two historians. The 
violence of the 1970s motivated Bosscher and Waaldijk to undertake their 
research. Their main argument was that the ideals of the RMS had only ever 
appealed to citizens in the Netherlands who could not accept the decolonization 
of Indonesia.76 This new interest in the plight of Moluccans never quite disap-
peared. The Dutch had been painfully confronted by an episode in their history 
of decolonization. By 1986, a historic agreement was reached between Moluccan 
authorities and the Dutch government that included the founding of a Moluccan 
Historical Museum in Utrecht.77 The Moluccan actions had been a costly but 
effective way of representing what had been hidden in unremembering.
Postmemory Authors
By the late 1970s, the Indo author Lin Scholte had created a small oeuvre 
of stories. Her book Bibi Koetis voor altijd (Bibi Koetis forever) from 1974 
touched upon the Bersiap period and the absolute horror of October 1945, 
when anyone associated with Dutch rule became the target of bands of 
violent nationalist youths.78 On the other hand, her short story “Geen pardon 
voor saboteurs” (“No mercy for saboteurs”), from 1977, describes how Dutch 
soldiers execute a suspect without any due process.79
71 Ibid., 63-71.
72 Ibid., 142-144.
73 “Geschiedvervalsing over Ambon,” Nieuwsblad van het Noorden, 9 July 1977.
74 Van Kaam, Ambon, 91.
75 “RMS: zaak van tegenstellingen en misverstanden,” Leeuwarder Courant, 7 July 1977; “Ge-
schiedvervalsing over Ambon,” Nieuwsblad van het Noorden, 9 July 1977; Joop Morriën, “Ambon 
door de eeuwen,” De Waarheid, 12 July 1977; Ben Herbergs, “Ambon door de eeuwen,” Het Vrije Volk, 
23 July 1977; G.J. Schulte, “Van Kaam en de Molukken,” Nederlands Dagblad, 26 July 1977; Peter 
Schumacher, “Talloze Molukkers geloven historie van hum republiek niet,” NRC Handelsblad, 
2 July 1981.
76 Bosscher and Waaldijk, Ambon, 3, 108-110.
77 Steijlen, RMS, 195.
78 Scholte, Verzamelde romans, 354-361.
79 Ibid., 452-454.
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Scholte was a repatriate herself, but her biographical stories were based 
on the memories of the women of her parents’ generation. In 1983, three 
new postmemory writers debuted in the Dutch literary scene. These second-
generation authors problematized the silences and oblique references to loss 
that characterized the f irst generation’s approach to decolonization. Each 
writer descended from repatriates, knew the Dutch East Indies primarily 
through stories, and was raised by means of Indisch norms involving a 
silent father who had been scarred by war.80 Adriaan van Dis described 
how the experience of the f irst generation came to dominate the world of 
the second generation: “Everything that you experienced as a child stood 
in the shadow of what they had experienced, without it being stated.”81 
Daan Vree puts it succinctly: “Children of the second generation grew up 
with this Indisch inheritance […] synonymous with a war inheritance.”82
Jill Stolk
Jill Stolk asks the rhetorical question: “Can you pass your dreams and 
nightmares onto your children without ever telling them?”83 Her novel 
Scherven van Smargald (Shards of emerald) was dedicated to her father 
and opens with a declaration from the narrator that she wants to bring to 
the attention of all the World War Two experts how it is to have a father 
f igure who, “cursed by four years in a POW camp, takes out his frustrations 
on his child.”84
The narrator, a young Indo girl, like Stolk herself, was unlucky enough to 
have facial features that looked Japanese, becoming a constant reminder to 
her father of the suffering he had endured in the Japanese prison camp, as 
if “his cells has been so inf iltrated with the actual features of the oppressor 
[…] that he […] had poisoned his soul and body” (12). Thus, his daughter’s 
features carry the memory of his suffering written on her body, embodying 
the memory of humiliation and suffering.
Like many Indisch people, Stolk’s narrator complains that the World War 
that they studied at school in the Netherlands was one of bicycles, tulips 
and the exploits of the brave resistance, but the teachers never described 
the tropical war of her father (10-11). When a minority war experience was 
80 Van Zonneveld, “Indische literatuur,” 158-159.
81 Van Zonneveld, “‘Ik ben,” 213.
82 Vree, “Het verleden,” 37.
83 Stolk, Indiё, 151.
84 Stolk, Scherven, 7.
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discussed, it was never the Indisch experience, but the Jews (81). Yet, the 
father in Stolk’s story has been scarred by his suffering during the war and 
its aftermath, including being repatriated to the Netherlands. He takes 
out his frustration by being a tyrant at home. His violent outbursts are 
sometimes aimed at his daughter (20-24). Eventually, father and daughter 
make a journey to the place of his horrif ic memories, the Burma Railroad 
(32-34), and to the war cemetery of Kanchanaburi (39-47).
In his oral history of Indonesian independence, Kester Freriks writes that 
the interning in Japanese camps is a collective memory that overshadows 
all others among the Indisch community: “The echo of this continues to 
sound, not just in the lives of those concerned; [but] also in the lives of 
their children and even grandchildren.”85 But, because there was little 
understanding for their experiences in the Netherlands, a way of speaking 
could not be found and victims of the camps became silent, the “Indische 
silence.” Consequently, children were barred from accessing their pasts “like 
actors on a stage who have received no lines.”86 He quotes an interviewee: 
“The story of the Dutch East Indies has always been the story of silencing […] 
called Indische silence.” The interviewee mentions that her own husband, 
“remained silent just about his whole life. He had been a volunteer during 
the police actions. That dirty war.”87 Similarly, interviewee Ami Emanuel 
remembers how her father “never spoke about his experience” while her 
mother “remained silent as well about the war time, especially about the 
Bersiap. She spoke about her youth in the East Indies, but never about what 
came after.”88 A veteran says, “From the moment we arrived home [in 
Holland] the great Indische silence began.”89
Stolk indicates the many silences that peppered Indisch family life after 
decolonization. Not only does the father never open up about what he 
endured in the prison camp, but the family history remains shrouded in 
mystery. While the female narrator begins to explore her personal identity, 
she notices that her father “would never discuss my mother’s ancestry” for 
clearly, there was evidence of Japanese blood.90 The young narrator becomes 
aware that her skin colour makes her different than the white children 
around her (69), but is outraged when her father tells her that she needs to 
do her best at school, because she is Indisch. She wonders does this reflect 
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a pride in being Indisch, or is it because they feel so inferior that they have 
to disprove the stereotype and demonstrate that, despite being Indisch, 
they can attain high achievement (74-75). Either way, she is burdened by 
the problems that her parents themselves could not solve. In a passage that 
provides a case study of the postmemory dilemma, Stolk writes: “because 
they, my parents, say it, I am forced to live with it. Even when I don’t know 
what ‘it’ stands for. Because these children are my parents I must believe 
in their problems and they obviously become mine” (76).
This encapsulates the postmemory quandary of decolonization’s second 
generation. Born in the early 1950s, in white, postcolonial Holland, they are 
raised in a country obsessed with reconstruction and convinced of its own 
innocence and victimization by Nazi Germany. There is little space for any 
contesting memory. Additionally, they are born into a minority community 
that has been dislocated. Intent on f itting in, their parents and grandparents 
submerge their own experience, while continually alluding to it. The second 
generation grows up aware of the presence of an absence. They know that 
their collective memory does not involve tulips and brave resistance, but 
that a terrible experience is unremembered. In their attempt to f it in they 
continual juggle unremembering with remembering. Stolk’s narrator tells 
us: “I was good at forgetting. I was a master in forgetting” (83). But, she 
admits: “Gradually I discover that I forgot nothing” (93-94).
Marion Bloem
It is widely recognized that the publication of Marion Bloem’s Geen gewoon 
Indisch meisje (No ordinary Indisch girl) in 1983 constitutes the beginning of 
a new postcolonial genre in Dutch literature, in which the second generation 
of Indisch repatriates problematize their own identity and question their 
community.91 It immediately gained the attention of a wide public, arriving 
“like a bomb.”92 Influential critic Hans Warren called the publication “a 
literary event” and compared Bloem to Tjalie Robinson.93 Jaap Goedgebure 
compared her to Rob Nieuwenhuys and the great Du Perron.94 The publica-
tion of the book meant that the second generation of Indische-Dutch had 
“for the f irst time gained a voice in literature.”95
91 Oostindie, Post Koloniaal, 120.
92 Sophie Tak, “Individualiste tussen wal en schip: aanpassen of afzetten,” Trouw, 2 June 2006.
93 Hans Warren, “Verbluffend debuut van Marion Bloem,” Provinciale Zeeuwse Courant, 
18 June 1983.
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From the very f irst sentence, we know that we are dealing with a novel 
that is a memory work: “Events are past, but become now as soon as they 
become written down as stories.”96 For Bloem, the act of writing is an attempt 
to stop the erasure of Indisch culture.97 Like a great deal of trauma literature, 
Bloem’s narrative is fragmentary, non-chronological and decentralized. It 
lacks a unif ied main character, but instead has a trinity of two sisters, Sonja 
and Zon, and I (“Ik”). Sonja and Zon, though sisters, form the fragmentary 
aspects of a postcolonial personality who, due to the violence of decoloniza-
tion and the displacement that was its consequence, is left decentred and 
wondering where she belongs. Bloem regards the most essential problem 
articulated in her work to be “[b]alancing between two cultures.”98 Most 
signif icantly, the “I” in the book is burdened by the scars of her parents, a 
father who yearns for the lost East Indies and a mother intent on assimilation.
Bloem’s search for a cultural identity echoes, on the one hand, Tjalie 
Robinson’s acceptance of the idea of the mestizo. The “I” of the novel seeks 
out “the mongrel type that is a consequence of the colonial period” and 
seeks recognition for the fact “We are allowed to be here.”99 On the other 
hand, when Zon, who resists assimilation, hears of the schizophrenia of 
mestizos, she spends her days crying “[a]s if the theory applied to her” (83). 
A difference between Robinson, who had died in 1974, and the members of 
the second generation, like Bloem, is that this postmemory generation was 
raised in the Netherlands. For this generation, the problem had become that 
their Indisch cultural references were not based upon direct experiences, 
but on the experiences of their parents. These had been related to them via 
objects, photographs and stories, but also via silences. These silences hid and 
at the same time contained the pain of decolonization. Bloem’s contribution 
to remembering decolonization is that she brings these silences to the fore.
Bloem also articulates the frustration of the younger generation of the 
Indisch community, that the Dutch have not learned their history. What puts 
the Indisch presence in the Netherlands into question is the ignorance of the 
Euro-Dutch. During a trip to Indonesia with her mother, Zon is approached 
by an American tourist, who asks: “Do you know what I like most about 
your country?” (157). This can be laughed off, an American who mistakes 
her for an Indonesian. Less forgivable is the case of her Dutch boyfriend, 
when he tells her that his mother is not used to Indonesians. She replies in 
96 Bloem, Geen gewoon, 11.
97 Van Rijnswou, Marion Bloem, 13.
98 Ibid., 49.
99 Bloem, Geen gewoon, 171.
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frustration, “I am not an Indonesian. I am Indisch. (How often has she said 
this sentence?)” (24).
This frustration reflected the sad state of colonial history in the Neth-
erlands at the time. Oostindie quotes Edy Seriese: “When ‘Indisch’ and 
‘Indonesian’ are used interchangeably, then it means that Dutch people 
don’t know their own history.”100 Worse, the unremembered history of 
decolonization causes pain and frustration among the Indisch-Dutch, as 
when the father in Bloem’s novel comes home and says: “Do you know what 
somebody at my work said? You are a traitor. You betrayed your own people 
and went and fought for the Dutch. I said, hey, are you crazy? What are you 
thinking? I am an Indisch-Dutchman.” He is appalled to discover that a 
colleague “thinks for sure that I’m an Indonesian, or a Moluccan maybe.”101 
This exchange represents an ignorance that lies at the core of how the Dutch 
related to decolonization, an ignorance that the Dutch themselves are not 
aware of. Dark-skinned repatriates are Indonesians who went over to the 
other side. The newer generation, like Bloem, are the children of turncoats. 
Thus, the imagined sins of the father come to stain the lives of the children.
In the years preceding publication of Geen gewoon Indisch meisje, it was 
the Moluccans who had dominated the media’s attention. References to 
Moluccans abound in the novel, revealing the prejudice that dominated 
colonial Indisch life. For the postmemory generation, it is frustrating to be 
mistaken for Indonesian. But, during colonial times, Indisch people were 
frustrated when they were put on a par with Inlanders or natives, because 
not only was Inlander a lower legal category, but they were generally thought 
to be inferior. Moluccans, or Ambonese, as they were known, were also 
considered inferior by the Indisch community. We are reminded of Fanon’s 
“lactif ication.” Bloem shows us the same phenomena at work among the 
Indisch community in the Netherlands. The Indo should not be mistaken 
for the Moluccan, for the Indo is more civilized, being closer to being white, 
having been the servant of colonial power and being descended from a white 
(fore)father and a native (fore)mother.
These old attitudes are present in the character of the mother, in Bloem’s 
novel. We learn that the mother’s father had a suspicion of conscripted 
soldiers, that he found Indisch men not good enough for his daughter and 
that he wouldn’t even consider Indonesians or Ambonese (93). Zon f inds 
that her mother shares this low opinion of Ambonese or Moluccans: to 
mistake someone for an Ambonese is an insult (116); the mother describes 
100 Oostindie, Post Koloniaal, 118.
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Ambonese as ugly, loud and bad-mannered (117); even the word Ambonese 
f ills the mother with dread, because they refused to assimilate and they 
ruin things for the Indisch community that attempts to assimilate, but 
ultimately, because the “Dutch cannot tell the difference” (117). Zon has 
imbibed these prejudices of the older generation, rooted in the stratif ied 
society of the Dutch East Indies (116). She wondered how long will it take 
before her boyfriend can tell the difference between Indonesians, Moluccans, 
“and her sort” (33).
The year Bloem published Geen gewoon Indisch meisje (1983) also saw 
her debut as a f ilm documentarist. Het Land van mijn Ouders (The country 
of my parents) premiered before the press in Amsterdam before appearing 
at the Utrecht Film Festival.102 It played before sold-out audiences at the 
Groningen Film Festival103 and was aired on television. The f ilm made clear 
how the postmemory generation was dealing with the consequences of the 
parents’ experiences and decisions made under the shadow of decoloniza-
tion. The opening scene showed Bloem lacing up her ice-skating boots and 
an unsteady Bloem on the skating rink. It closed with a scene of Bloem at 
her Balinese dance lesson. In neither one is she completely at home. She is 
not the typical Dutch girl and neither is she the natural Indonesian dancer, 
but a person in between cultures.
A montage of homemade videos and interviews with family members 
explore the meaning of hybridity and what is means to be Indisch. In primary 
school, Bloem discovers that she is different than other Dutch children, yet 
when she f irst visits Indonesia, the people on the street call her Belanda 
(Dutch). Her mother is happy that they left Indonesia, leaving the poverty of 
the kampong behind, escaping the violence of decolonization. Her father’s 
feelings are ambiguous. He loves Indonesia, despite the fact that he had 
fought against Indonesian nationalists during the war of decolonization. 
He left the country in 1950 because his wife was afraid. Bloem’s aim had 
been to “break through the exclusiveness of World War Two.”104 Her f ilm 
complicated the national collective memory by demonstrating that among 
the Dutch population there were some who had not experienced the German 
occupation, but had endured other trials.
102 Max Smith, “Speurtoucht naar de Indische geaardheid,” Amersfort Courant, 20 September 1983.
103 Paul Bollen, “Land van mijn Ouders: Marion Bloem en de ‘stille kracht,’” Nieuwsblad van het 
Noorden, 23 December 1984.




Journalist and editor at the NRC Handelsblad, Adriaan van Dis had become 
a public f igure by 1983, thanks to his popular television chat show Hier is 
… Adriaan van Dis (Here is … Adriaan van Dis). At the end of that year, a 
limited edition of his f irst book, Nathan Sid, was sent as a New Year’s gift 
to friends of the publisher. Months later, it was published in commercial 
format. The following year it was announced that the book had been the 
bestselling debut of the year.105 When, over ten years later, Van Dis returned 
to the topic in the novel Indische Duinen (Indische dunes), sales of the latter 
would break all literary records.106 Van Dis, thus, brought the problem of 
unremembering decolonization to the attention of hundreds of thousands 
of readers.
Nathan Sid straddles the border between novel and memoir, between 
f iction and fact. It can be read as an account of young Van Dis growing 
up in a family scarred by the Japanese occupation and traumatized by 
the loss of the East Indies. It is clearly a work of postmemory. The name 
“Sid” is a lightly disguised “Dis” and the f irst reviewer referred to the work 
as “youth memories of Adriaan van Dis.”107 Another referred to Van Dis 
taking a magnifying glass to his own youth memories.108 Some were more 
circumspect, simply asking could Sid be Van Dis.109
A decade after Nathan Sid appeared, Van Dis published Indische Duinen, 
a substantial novel on the same theme. The names of the characters and 
most details remain the same. Many years later, Van Dis published a memoir 
of his recently deceased mother, Ik Kom Terug (I come back). Again, the 
outline of the family history, the names of the characters and memories 
of war and loss are consistent with the earlier two works. Paul Sars states 
bluntly: “Adriaan van Dis is Nathan Sid.”110 Though he warns that it is a 
work of literary imagination, he admits that it is a work where a distinction 
between reality and fiction is dubious.111 Van Dis himself included a message 
near the end of a later edition of the book, in which he admitted that he 
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had given Nathan Sid his own story of growing up in a house of repatriates 
where “[t]he war still raged.”112
Due to his complicated family history, Van Dis once claimed: “I am 
postcolonialism.”113 His Dutch mother, Maria, had left for the Indies in 
1932 with her husband, a soldier in the KNIL who had been born to a Dutch 
plantation owner and a native woman. The couple had three daughters. 
During the Japanese occupation she had been interned with her daughters. 
Her Indo husband was executed by the Japanese. After liberation, while 
awaiting repatriation with her three daughters, she had met and begun 
a relationship with a former Dutch soldier. He had been married to an 
Indonesian woman who had divorced him according to Muslim law, though 
this divorce was not recognized in Dutch law and therefore he could not 
remarry. The new family unit of f ive were repatriated to the Netherlands 
in 1946, though Maria was now three months pregnant. The child born 
after arrival in the Netherlands was Adriaan van Dis.114 In this unusual 
constellation, Van Dis was in many ways the outsider – his three half-sisters 
had black hair and brown skin while he had fair hair and freckles.115 The 
sisters off icially carried the name of their dead father; Van Dis, being il-
legitimate, off icially had the maiden name of his mother. But all the family 
lived the f iction of sharing the name of Van Dis’ father. It is the same family 
constellation in Nathan Sid.
The most obvious fact that gave Dis/Sid outsider status is that all family 
members had lived in the Dutch East Indies, while he had not. The Indies 
were present in Sid’s home, with bamboo photo frames, batik, busts of 
Balinese women, colonial photos and huge pans in which his father prepared 
Indonesian food.116 At school he was proud to be from the Indies (7), though, 
in reality, he had left the colony in his mother’s womb. As the f irst line of 
the book tells us, “Nathan had never been there, but he had been made 
there” (5). The family sang songs that they remembered from the Japanese 
internment camp, and Nathan sang along, hoping that this would make 
him belong, too (43). Hearing their stories of the time in the camp made 
him envious. (42-43). By learning their songs, hearing their stories and 
being surrounded by the objects that embodied their loss, Nathan felt for 
them, but at the same time was envious. They felt a sense of loss; he felt 
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the loss of not being able to share their loss. This mirrors the childhood 
feelings of Van Dis himself, raised as the sole white child in a settlement of 
repatriated Indo families. “I really wanted desperately to belong with those 
war children, with the other colour and experience.”117 Van Dis never visited 
Indonesia until he was 50 years old, yet, like other postmemory authors, he 
experienced the East Indies as a memory, mediated through family stories, 
food and photographs.118
We learn that Nathan’s father, “Pa Sid,” was a strict disciplinarian. He had 
spent months working on the infamous Sumatra railroad. He was left with 
a weak heart and a small pension. Worse, his home, the Dutch East Indies, 
had been “taken from him.” Ominously, Van Dis writes: “His punishments 
were laborious.”119 Nathan suffers regular physical punishments, because 
the war and the loss of the Indies has physically and mentally scarred his 
father. Van Dis wrote of his father, “He wanted to return to his garden, but 
he was stuck in a cage.”120 Nathan’s story represents the consequences of 
decolonization through the diff icult relationship between an innocent boy 
and an angry and disappointed father, a relationship based on impossible 
demands from the father and the futile attempts of the son to please. As Van 
Dis told an interviewer, “Children of the second generation of war victims 
are obedient, eager to please, docile children.”121
At the same time, despite the stories that Nathan hears (“one big story 
bacchanalia” in Van Dis’ later description),122 as well as songs and jokes about 
the war, something important remains unsaid, as if the stories and songs 
camouflage the real trauma. The stories are examples of unremembering, 
rather than remembering, marking the presence of an absence. They are 
traces or the embodied memories of something terrible. Nathan’s sister Ada 
carries an embodied memory in the form of a scar on her hand, inflicted in 
the Japanese internment camp. The wound still hurt whenever it rained, 
and then “the war pulled at the bones of her f ingers.”123 Nathan is aware 
that his father’s health has been destroyed by the Japanese occupation,124 
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and his father’s weak heart is an embodied reminder of great suffering, but, 
explanations are hidden behind tall stories, songs and jokes.
Unanswered questions fester. As Van Dis later commented, “One thing 
is clear: to deny what had happened, you saddle your children with a ter-
rible past.”125 Sars comments that the real truth was too painful to discuss; 
instead, carefully guarded secrets, “remain silenced, although they were 
conspicuously present.”126 The work of Van Dis, beginning with Nathan 
Sid, is an example of working through these painful experiences. His later 
Indische Duinen and Ik Kom Terug highlight more emphatically how the 
second generation was burdened with the pain of their parents and how 
the need to expose the silences leads to obsession. Nathan Sid is a slight 
work, lightly told, despite the descriptions of the punishments that the 
young boy has to endure. But, it wasn’t really the full story. Van Dis had to 
wait another decade before he was ready. As he admits: “[T]he courage and 
inspiration still had to ripen.”127 When he f inally told the story in Indische 
Duinen, the book’s huge sales and the reaction of the Indisch community 
showed that he had touched a nerve: “I had evidently broken a long silence, 
and suddenly became their spokesman.”128
Radio and Television, 1979-1988
In December 1979, Chris van Esterik and Kees van Twist presented a four-
part radio programme on the war of decolonization, the goal of which 
was to f ill in what was ignored in history textbooks.129 The programme 
presented soldiers describing military atrocities, offering a sympathetic 
account of those who had refused to serve in the army, as well as dem-
onstrating how General Spoor had influenced Prime Minister Beel in his 
decision to unleash the f irst “police action” in 1947. The series was repeated 
in July 1980, followed by the publication of a book with supplementary 
material.130
In the summer of 1983, the Catholic Radio Broadcaster (KRO) ran a weekly 
series of f ive radio programmes, De kleine oorlog (The little war), directed 
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by Jaap Vermeer.131 The Nederlands Dagblad announced that the KRO was 
attempting to f ill in some “blank pages” from history by giving attention to 
“war crimes.”132 Introduced by historian Jan Bank, the f irst episode focused 
on reasons why men went to f ight in the Dutch East Indies. The interviewees 
were men who volunteered, believing they would be f ighting the Japanese, 
not defending the interests of the big plantations. A former volunteer tells 
that he had been in the resistance and that he volunteered because he wanted 
to do something like what the Canadians had done for the Netherlands. 
Other contributors went to war because they were called up. They never 
dreamed of objecting. They were victims of brainwashing, they said.
In the second programme, nine veterans shared their experiences. They 
agreed that they were converted to hard-handed methods after seeing 
terrible mutilations and butchery perpetrated by Indonesian nationalists. 
They admitted, you “set yourself up as the judge.” They discovered that they 
were willing to go very far, in order to get information from prisoners. One 
described what happened to prisoners: “They were liquidated. Took them 
to the river.”
In the third programme, a veteran tells of how one night they surrounded 
a village. The shelling began, and they were ordered to shoot everything 
that came running out. He told of how he grabbed a man and drowned 
him in the ditch. The next morning they killed hundreds. “Hundreds,” he 
repeated. They killed all the men, women and children, then they burnt 
the village. A veteran compared their methods with those of the Germans.
The fourth programme focused on the sexual behaviour of the soldiers. 
Participants expressed their disappointment regarding the home front, 
which seemed to be more concerned with the sexual purity of the soldiers 
than with reports of violence. They compared relations with women with 
trade in livestock. Laundry maids were expected to provide sexual services. 
Women were stripped naked and forced to walk back and forth between 
the gaping soldiers. One veteran referred to women as the “spoils of war.” 
They conf irmed that they received no accurate information on venereal 
disease and no condoms. Soldiers attempted suicide when they suspected 
that they had picked up a venereal disease.
In the f inal programme, veterans reflected upon how they have learned 
to deal with their memories. They agreed that the memories can be shut 
away for a while in silence, but after the Hueting interview of 1969, and as the 
131 De kleine oorlog, KRO, 12 July 1983, 19 July 1983, 26 July 1983, 16 August 1983, 23 August 1983.
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men entered their mid-50s, the memories that had been in the subconscious 
“burst forth.” One asked, “How can I live with what I’ve done?”
In 1983, the newspaper Het Vrije Volk was under the editorship of Herman 
Wigbold, the man who had brought Hueting before the television screens 
in 1969. Not surprisingly, Het Vrije Volk published a number of articles on 
this radio series. The day after the f irst episode, an anonymous author 
claimed that the Dutch had committed “systematic war crimes” (“stelsmatige 
oorlogsmisdaden”), touching upon the issue that would come to dominate 
the discourse on remembering decolonization. Furthermore, the article 
mentioned the village of Rawagede and how, though not broadcast in the 
programme, soldiers had described how they had massacred the inhabitants 
of this Javanese village.133 Buried in the Excessennota in 1969, the name 
Rawagede would come to haunt the Netherlands well into the second decade 
of the twenty-f irst century.
Jaap Vermeer explained that his purpose had been to show what happened 
when young men were ripped from their homes at a critical point in their 
lives and inserted into an alien world, isolated from what was familiar. He 
blamed the Catholic Church for pressurizing political and military leaders 
so no condoms would be distributed and sexually transmitted disease would 
become rife. He admitted that had he been in similar conditions “all my 
principles would have ended in the rubbish bin.”134
The KRO received just a hundred reactions over the weeks of the broad-
cast.135 Het Vrije Volk received one negative letter as a result of its positive 
review.136 However, this did not mean that dealing with decolonization 
had entered into calm waters. The term “war crimes” passed unnoticed by 
many when broadcast on summer afternoons on the radio. However, as we 
will see in the next chapter, it would prove to be a different affair when the 
most renowned historian of the land considered using the term.
The purpose of the f ive-part television documentary “Ons Indië” voor de 
Indonesiërs (“Our Indies” for the Indonesians) was to destroy the myth that 
Indonesian nationalism had been a creation of Japanese propaganda.137 With 
help from historian William IJzereef, the programme makers showed that 
133 “Ex-trailleurs bekennen: ‘Wij moorden kampong uit,’” Het Vrije Volk, 20 July 1983. In 2011 
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134 “KRO-Programmermaker Na Laatste Uitzending: ‘Ik heb nu begrip gekregen voor die 
oorlogsmisdaden,’” Het Vrije Volk, 24 August 1983.
135 Ibid.
136 P.J. Wartena, “‘De kleine oorlog’: grove insinuaties,” Het Vrije Volk, 30 July 1983.
137 “Ons Indië” voor de Indonesiërs, NOS, 25 November 1984.
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European colonizers had been, in the words of an Indonesian interviewee, 
“Dutch dreamers” who had believed they could control the Indonesians 
forever. Dutch colonials, Indo women, pro-Dutch Moluccans, Indonesian 
nationalists, and for the f irst time, Japanese participants, were included 
in this oral history. The programme demonstrated the suffering endured 
by Europeans and Indonesians under the Japanese occupation. It showed 
that Sukarno and Hatta had cooperated with the Japanese, not as fascist 
collaborators, but walking a f ine line to eventually complete Indonesian 
independence. Making use of Japanese propaganda f ilms, the programme 
showed how Indonesian youth had been radicalized under the Japanese, 
but also argued that the Japanese had lost control of the situation by 1945. 
The programme was a reminder that, despite the powerful draw of nostalgia 
tropique, the Dutch, had failed to become rooted in the archipelago and, in 
the eyes of Indonesians, remained resented outsiders.
Marion Bloem’s Wij komen als vrienden (We come as friends) broke new 
ground.138 In this f ilm, Bloem allowed f ive former Dutch soldiers who had 
gone over to the Indonesian side to tell their story. The documentary was 
composed almost entirely of interviews with the men, f ilmed on location in 
Indonesia and in the Netherlands. Never before had Dutch media allowed 
this point of view such an airing. One interviewee had escaped the German 
massacre of Putten. For many Dutch people “Putten” was synonymous with 
Nazi barbarity. This man tells how he witnessed a Dutch prisoner transport 
train arriving in Surabaya. When the hermetically sealed train was opened, 
it was discovered that dozens of the Indonesian prisoners had succumbed 
in the heat. “I thought, we are no better than the Germans in Putten,” the 
man says. Other interviewees told of prisoners shot dead and villages burnt. 
One interviewee, Poncke Princen, was shown to have dedicated his life to 
defending human rights in Indonesia, resulting in him spending years in 
prisons and becoming estranged from his third wife and children, who 
moved to Holland for security. Ten years later, Princen would become a 
household name when an outcry arose among some veterans when Princen 
applied for a visa to visit the Netherlands.
In August 1985, 40 years after the Indonesian Declaration of Independ-
ence, a documentary in two parts called Veertig Jaar na Dato – Nederlands 
Indië (Forty years later – Dutch East Indies) was broadcast139 Some of the 
Indonesian interviewees were the same nationalists who had appeared in 
Kiers’ Indonesia Merdeka (1976). However, the Dutch participants were not 
138 Wij komen als vrienden, VPRO, 16 December 1984.
139 Veertig Jaar na Dato: Nederlands-Indies, AVRO, 12 August 1989 and 19 August 1985.
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influential decision-makers but rather “innocent” victims. The f irst part 
showed how Indonesian nationalists like Sukarno had cooperated with the 
Japanese with the goal being Indonesian independence. A number of Dutch 
prisoners of the Japanese spoke of the barbaric conditions that they suffered 
in the camps, including torture. One interviewee, who had been among 
the f irst allied troops to enter a prison camp after the surrender of Japan, 
broke into tears as he exclaimed that everyone has heard of Buchenwald 
and the Nazi camps, but what he had seen had been just as bad: “You can 
never forget something like that.”
One week later, the documentary covered the violent period of the Bersiap 
in 1945-1946. It told the “forgotten” story of Dutch former prisoners of the 
Japanese, especially women and children, being set upon by Indonesian 
mobs and murdered. Photos showed mutilated bodies, mass graves, groups of 
bound captives being killed. An interviewee told of f inding bits of mutilated 
bodies strewn across the street and of discovering scores of bodies stuffed 
down a drinking well. He added that witnessing such scenes drives one mad 
with the urge to avenge. The programme ended with scenes of civilians 
boarding ships to be repatriated and concluded with an interviewee admit-
ting that her stories of cruel hardship had been ignored in the Netherlands.
In 1988, the public broadcaster VPRO put out a ten-episode radio 
documentary on the war of decolonization. The fourth episode, of 24 April, 
Afscheid van Indië: De oorlogsmisdaden (Goodbye to the Dutch East Indies: 
The war crimes), was a litany of excessive violence, told mainly by f ive 
Dutch veterans.140 Again we hear of villages burnt or attacked by heavy 
artillery, summary executions, prisoners abused, beaten and tortured with 
electric shocks. The Hueting interview was quoted, as was an interview with 
Westerling in which he justif ied summary executions. One veteran told of 
his involvement in a massacre in which they eliminated 80 per cent of the 
male population of a village, comparing it with the German massacre in 
Putten. Another told of how he has started collecting signatures of veterans 
who want to write an apology to the people of Indonesia. No historian 
participated in this programme, but sociologist and veteran J.A.A. van 
Doorn, when asked why no Dutch war criminals had been prosecuted, 
explained that it was because the top politicians in the Netherlands bore 
the responsibility for war crimes.
Connerton argues that there is a type of forgetting that is part of a process 
leading to “the formation of a new identity.”141 Submerging memories of 
140 Het Spoor Terug: Afscheid van Indië: De oorlogsmisdaden, VPRO, 24 April 1988.
141 Connerton, The Spirit, 36.
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recent traumas seemed a necessity for the f irst generation of repatriates, 
like Robinson and Nieuwenhuys, in order to survive and forge a new identity 
in their new homeland. But, the pain of suppressing memories did not 
go unnoticed by the second generation. Connerton writes of “humiliated 
silence” that leads to collective shame.142 The repatriates had experienced the 
humiliation of Japanese occupation, of being evicted from their homeland 
and arrival in a country where the inhabitants demonstrated little interest 
in their plight. Assimilation involved silencing those shameful aspects of 
one’s past.
The violence of Moluccan actions during the years from 1970 to 1978 
represented a wake-up call. Historical wounds festered in Dutch society, 
even when ignored. The work of postmemory writers began undoing the 
process of unremembering. Radio and television networks demonstrated 
courage in publicizing the controversial issue of Dutch war crimes. Veterans 
proved to be willing to speak about their memories, frequently using a 
framework that they had internalized, comparing their actions with those 
of the Germans and, specif ically, the atrocity of Putten. But what about 
the historians?
Bibliography
Akihary, Huib. “Van Almere tot de Zwaluwenburg. Molukse woonoorden in Neder-
land.” In Tijdelijk Verblijf: De opvang van Molukkers in Nederland, 1951, edited by 
Wim Manuhutu and Henk Smeets, 40-73. Amsterdam: De Bataafsche Leeuw, 1991.
Bartels, Dieter. “Can the Train Ever be Stopped Again? Developments in the Moluc-
can Community in the Netherlands Before and After the Hijackings.” Indonesia 
41 (April 1986): 23-45.
Bloem, Marion. Geen gewoon Indisch meisje. Amsterdam: De Arbeiderspers, 2012 
[f irst published Haarlem: In de Knipscheer, 1983].
Bootsma, Peter. De Molukse Acties: Treinkapingen en gijzelingen 1970-1978. Amster-
dam: Boom, 2015.
Bosscher, Doeko and Berteke Waaldijk. Ambon – Eer en Schuld: Politiek en pressie 
rond de Republiek Zuid-Molukken. Weesp: Van Holkema en Warendorf, 1985.
Chakrabarty, Dipesh. “History and the Politics of Recognition.” Manifestos for 
History, edited by Keith Jenkins, Sue Morgan and Alun Munslow, 77-87. London 
and New York: Routledge, 2007.
142 Ibid., 46-47.
196 COLLEC TIVE MEMORY AND THE DUTCH EAST INDIES
Connerton, Paul. The Spirit of Mourning: History, Memory and the Body. New York: 
Cambridge University Press, 2011.
Dis, Adriaan van. De Indië Boeken. Amsterdam: Augustus, 2012.
Dis, Adriaan van. Ik Kom Terug. Amsterdam: Augustus, 2014.
Dis, Adriaan van. “Klagen met een mopje.” De Gids 1 (2011): 24-31.
Dis, Adriaan van. Nathan Sid. Amsterdam: Augustus, 2010 [1983].
Dis, Adriaan van. “Squeezed between Rice and Potato: Personal Reflections on 
a Dutch (Post) Colonial Youth.” In Shifting the Compass: Pluricontinental Con-
nections in Dutch Colonial and Postcolonial Literature, edited by Jeroen Dewulf, 
Olf Praamstra and Michiel van Kempen, 20-37. Newcastle: Cambridge Scholars 
Publishing, 2013.
Esterik, Chris van and Kees van Twist. Daar werd iets grootsch verricht: of hoe het 
Koninkrijk der Nederlanden zijn grootste kolonie verloor. Weesp: Heureka, 1980.
Fabius, Jan. Zwart op Wit – Liquidatie van een Imperium: Een beeld van de na-oorlogse 
regeringsbeleid in Nederland, ontleend aan de Nieuwsbrief. Amsterdam: Buijten 
en Schipperheijn, 1954.
Freriks, Kester. Echo’s van Indie: De onafhankelijkheid van Indonesië in verhalen en 
herinneringen. Amsterdam: Athenaeum-Polak & Van Gennep, 2015.
Hirsch, Marianne. The Generation of Postmemory: Writing and Visual Culture after 
the Holocaust. New York: Columbia University Press, 2012.
Hoffman, Eva. “The Long Afterlife of Loss.” In Memory: Histories, Theories, Debates, 
edited by Susannah Radstone and Bill Schwartz, 406-415. New York: Fordham 
University Press, 2010.
Kaam, Ben van. Ambon door de eeuwen. Baarn: Anthos, 1977.
Manuhutu, Wim. “Help Ambon in Nood. De rol van het particulier initiatief bij de 
RMS en de opvang van Molukkers in Nederland.” In Tijdelijk Verblijf: De opvang 
van Molukkers in Nederland, 195, edited by Wim Manuhutu and Henk Smeets, 
74-87. Amsterdam: De Bataafsche Leeuw, 1991.
Manuhutu, Wim and Henk Smeets, eds. Tijdelijk Verblijf: De opvang van Molukkers 
in Nederland, 1951. Amsterdam: De Bataafsche Leeuw, 1991.
Manusama, Johan A. “Political Aspects of the Struggle for Independence.” In The 
South Moluccas: Rebellious Province or Occupied State, by Jan C. Bouman et al., 
49-63. Leyden: A.W. Sythoff, 1960.
Oostindie, Gert. Post Koloniaal Nederland: Vijfenzestig jaar vergeten, herdenken, 
verdringen. Amsterdam: Bert Bakker, 2010.
Prins, Baukje. Gemengde Gevoelens: Molukse en Nederlandse klasgenoten in de jaren 
zestig. Amsterdam: Van Gennep, 2014.
Prins, Jan. “Location, History, Forgotten Struggle.” In The South Moluccas: Rebellious 
Province or Occupied State, edited by Jan C. Bouman, 9-47. Leyden: A.W. Sythoff, 1960.
pOSTMEMORY 197
Rijnswou, Saskia van. Marion Bloem. Amsterdam: De Arbeiderspers, 1993.
Sahetapy, Abe. Tawanan (gevangenschap). Amsterdam: Joop Ririmase, 1982.
Sars, Paul. Adriaan van Dis: De zandkastelen van je jeugd. Nijmegen: SUN, 1996.
Schmid, A.P., J.F.A. de Graaf, F. Bovenkerk, L.M.Bovenkerk-Teerink and L. Brunt. 
Zuidmolukse terrorisme, de media en de publieke opinie: Twee studies van her 
Centrum voor Onderzoek van Maatschappelijke Tegenstellingen. Amsterdam: 
Intermediair, 1982.
Scholte, Lin. Verzamelde romans en verhalen. The Hague: Stichting Tong Tong, 
2007.
Smeets, Henk. “De plaats van keuze.” In Tijdelijk Verblijf: De opvang van Molukkers 
in Nederland, 1951, edited by Wim Manuhutu and Henk Smeets, 7-16. Amsterdam: 
De Bataafsche Leeuw, 1991.
Smeets, Henk. “Sprongen door de Molukse geschiedenis.” Indische Letteren 10, 
no. 1 (1995): 3-12.
Steijlen, Fridus. “De Molukkers.” In Een Open Zenuw: How wij ons de Tweede Werel-
doorlog herinneren, edited by Madelon de Keizer and Marieke Plomp, 361-370. 
Amsterdam: Bert Bakker, 2010.
Steijlen, Fridus. RMS: Van ideaal tot symbool – Moluks nationalisme in Nederland, 
1951-1994. Amsterdam: Spinhuis, 1996.
Stolk, Jill. Indiё was alles. Alles. Bergen: Van Stockum Bonnville, 1996.
Stolk, Jill. Scherven van Smargald. The Hague: Moesson, 1983.
Thenu, Cornelius. Korban: het verhaal van een Molukse activist. Amsterdam: De 
Arbeiderspers, 1998.
Vree, Daan. “Het verleden voorbij: Jill Stolk in het licht van de naoorlogse dekolo-
nisatie.” Indische Letteren 15, no. 1 (2000): 37-46.
Wesseling, Henk L. “Post-Imperial Holland.” Journal of Contemporary History 15, 
no. 1 (1980): 125-142.
Zonneveld, Peter van. “‘Ik ben de schatbewaarder. Ik ben de fantast:’ Gesprek met 
Adriaan van Dis.” Indische Letteren 18, no. 4 (2003): 207-220.
Zonneveld, Peter van. “Indische literatuur van de twintigste eeuw.” In Europa 
buitengaats. Koloniale en postkoloniale literaturen in Europese talen, 2 vols, 
edited by Theo D’haen, vol. 1, 133-159. Amsterdam: Bert Bakker, 2002.
Radio
Daar werd iets grootsch verricht: of hoe het Koninkrijk der Nederlanden zijn grootste 
kolonie verloor. IKON, 1979.
De kleine oorlog. KRO, 1983
Het Spoor Terug: Afscheid van Indië. VPRO, 1988.
198 COLLEC TIVE MEMORY AND THE DUTCH EAST INDIES
Television
Antenne: Korban. EO, 1998.
Dutch Approach: Gebroken belofte. NPS, 2000.
De Kampong staat in brand. RVU, 1989.
Het Land van mijn Ouders. IKON, 1983.
‘Ons Indië’ voor de Indonesiers. NOS, 1984.
Oorlog en Verzet in Nederlands-Indië. RVU, 1989.
De Tijd Staat Even Stil: De Zuidmolukse droom. NCRV, 1994.
Veertig Jaar na dato: Nederlands-Indië. I. AVRO, 1985.
Veertig Jaar na dato: Nederlands-Indië. II. AVRO, 1985.
De Verandering. NOS, 2015.
Wij komen als vrienden. VPRO, 1984 [Released in cinemas in 1984.]
6 Loe de Jong Controversy
Abstract
During the 1970s and 1980s Dutch historians of colonialism continued 
to produce works on the war of decolonization that failed to provide 
any sustained analysis of actual f ighting, creating the impression that 
the war was fought exclusively by diplomatic means. The work of Jan 
Bank formed a modest exception. This silence of Dutch historians can 
be understood by using the metaphor of the guild. The historical guild 
reinforced and rewarded the virtues of avoiding controversy, speculation 
and sweeping statements. This systemic unremembering was broken by 
the work of IJzereef in 1984 and especially by Loe de Jong in the late 1980s. 
De Jong was forced to endure vehement criticism and legal proceedings. 
But unremembering was at last being publically contested.
Keywords: Loe de Jong, unremembering, historical guild, Dutch East 
Indies, decolonization, collective memory
A heated historiographical debate on decolonization started in the mid-1980s 
and continued into the mid-1990s. At its centre was Loe de Jong, presenter of 
De Bezetting and off icial historian of World War Two. The meaning of Dutch 
history was fought out in the public arena, in the law courts but most of all 
in the pages of the press. It revealed how misunderstood and unrecognized 
members of the Indisch community and the veterans had come to feel as 
they fought for their place in collective memory.
Television had elevated Loe de Jong to the position of informal history 
teacher of the Netherlands. From 1969 onward, a growing number of volumes 
of De Jong’s Het Koninkrijk der Nederlanden in de Tweede Wereldoorlog began 
appearing in scholarly and popular editions. The publication of each new 
volume was “a national occasion” launched at an off icial press conference.1 
Bodewijn Smits estimates that 80,000 Dutch households own a complete 
1 Smits, Loe de Jong, 491.
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set of 29 volumes.2 De Jong became a household name with his work, a 
monument in his own lifetime.
By the mid-1980s, De Jong turned his attention to the East Indies. On 
30 October 1984, the eleventh section of his giant work, divided into two 
volumes, arrived in the bookstores. It unleashed a memory war comparable 
to, if not greater than the Hueting controversy. By its end, in the late 1980s, 
participants in historical culture could no longer bury themselves in a state 
of unremembering.
A Slow Change Coming
One might have been forgiven for predicting that Van Doorn and Hendrix’s 
analysis from 1970 would be followed by numerous in-depth studies of 
Dutch systematic violence. Instead, it remained the standard work on the 
decolonization war for the next half century.3 By the end of the 1970s, other 
publications about decolonization were published, but had shortcomings.
C. Smit’s De Dekolonisatie van Indonesië (The decolonization of Indonesia), 
despite the promising title, was a light work, meant as an introduction for 
teachers, “not too deep, but still complete.”4 Smit’s third book on the subject 
was pruned of all critical remarks. He began with Sukarno’s Declaration 
of Independence in 1945, ignoring the rise of Indonesian nationalism and 
Dutch repression.5 It offers an example of what Frederick Cooper labels “a 
light switch view of decolonization.”6 With no context given, like the flick 
of a light switch, the declaration occurs and everything changes. Bogaerts 
and Raben argue that this approach “is not feasible and is indeed […] rarely 
used.”7 Rare perhaps, but in the Dutch historiography not out of the ques-
tion. Smit’s Eurocentric approach becomes obvious considering that more 
than half of the book provides an analysis of eight “dramatis personae” – all 
Dutch, as if the struggle for Indonesian independence was exclusively the 
result of Dutch miscalculations in the absence of any Indonesian agency.8
Harry Poeze’s lengthy, fact-f illed and painstakingly documented doctoral 
dissertation, Tan Malaka: Levensloop van 1897 tot 1945 (Tan Malaka: Life from 
2 Ibid., 485.
3 Oostindie, Hoogenboom and Verwey, “The Decolonization War,” 259-260.
4 Smit, De Dekolonisatie, 5.
5 Ibid., 11.
6 Cooper, Colonialism, 19.
7 Bogaerts and Raben, “Beyond Empire,” 15.
8 Smit, De Dekolonisatie, 53-154.
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1897 until 1945) was published in 1976. It was the first ever full-length study of 
the Indonesian Marxist revolutionary Tan Malaka, who played a prominent 
role in the Indonesian revolution and the war of decolonization. Most of 
the volume dealt with Tan Malaka’s years in exile – in the Netherlands, the 
Soviet Union and across East Asia. The book ends with Malaka heading for 
Jakarta in August of 1945, the eve of the war of decolonization.9 This was 
something of a cliffhanger ending. Poeze declared his intention was to 
publish, in the foreseeable future, a second volume dealing with Malaka’s role 
in the conflict.10 Het Vrije Volk reported that Poeze intended to publish the 
second volume in under two years.11 Alas, it was to be over three decades. 
The second volume had by then mushroomed into three more volumes of 
over 2,000 pages. The reason given for the delay was that Poeze had been 
distracted by his professional responsibilities at the publishing department 
of the Royal Netherlands Institute of Southeast Asian and Caribbean Studies 
(KITLV) in Leiden.12
J.A. Jonkman had been Minister for the Colonies from 1946 until 1948. His 
Nederland en Indonesië beide vrij: Gezien vanuit het Nederlands Parlement 
(The Netherlands and Indonesia both free: Seen from the Dutch parliament) 
was the second volume of his political memoirs. Like Van Mook, he had been 
a member of the De Stuw group and claimed that they had worked towards 
creating a Kingdom of the Netherlands in which all parts – metropole and 
colonies – would be equals.13 Imprisoned in a Japanese camp, he heard that 
Sukarno was collaborating with the Japanese, but claimed that he never 
thought harshly of Sukarno. He could understand why Sukarno, under the 
circumstances, would choose to work for the Japanese for the betterment 
of his own nationalist cause (17). He claimed that he was entirely surprised 
in 1946, when Prime Minister Beel asked him to be Minister of the Colonies. 
He accepted the position only out of a sense of duty (35).
Throughout the description of his time in off ice, he stressed, he always 
felt duty bound to abide by the constitution. This gave him an aversion to 
radical decision-making (47-52). He was consistently against the use of force, 
but admitted that it was unimaginable as a government not to have an 
army; therefore, soldiers were drafted and transported to Indonesia (61-62). 
He praised Van Mook for what he had achieved by 1946, but constitutional 
9 Poeze, Tan Malaka, 535.
10 Ibid., v.
11 Peter Post, “Tan Malaka: de Rode Pimpernel van Zuid-Oost-Azië,” Het Vrije Volk, 25 March 1976.
12 Poeze, Verguisd en Vergeten, vol. 1, vii.
13 Jonkman, Nederland en Indonesië.
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reform stumbled because of opposition from the Catholic People’s Party 
(KVP) (79). With the deterioration of the situation by mid-1947, he real-
ized military action might be needed, but discussions with General Spoor 
convinced him that this could be limited. This was, he emphasized, a police 
action, not a war (100-111). He emphasized “we old De Stuw men” had always 
followed a pro-Indonesian policy (115).
Jonkman argued that the intervention by the United Nations lacked 
legal basis as the “police action” was an internal affair of the Netherlands 
(116). By early 1948, the former De Stuw men (Van Mook, Logemann and 
Jonkman) were undermined by the KVP (142-143). Later that year he gave up 
his post to become a member of the Senate of the Dutch parliament for the 
Labour Party (153). He was taken by surprise by the second “police action” 
of December 1948 (158). This action he condemned (165).
Jonkman’s account received widespread positive reviews. Even the com-
munist De Waarheid seemed to absolve him of all personal responsibility 
for the f iasco of 1945-1949.14 The following year, L.G.M. Jaquet’s memoir 
of his time in Indonesia, Aflossing van de Wacht (Changing of the guard) 
appeared. Jaquet had spent his entire adult life in government diplomatic 
service, f irst in the Dutch East Indies, later in the Netherlands, receiving 
a knighthood in 1972.15 Some months later, he was appointed director of 
the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.16
The former colonial official stated that this work was simply a fragmentary 
attempt to place his memories against a broad background.17 Jaquet’s 
work was not devoid of criticisms of the Dutch approach to decolonization. 
During the late 1930s, one of Jaquet’s duties had involved regular face-to-face 
meetings with Sukarno, who was under internal exile. Sukarno is portrayed 
as well-read, intelligent and charming. A man who espoused anti-fascist 
and anti-Japanese views (21-23). The fact that the colonial government did 
little to channel Sukarno’s talents into helping protect the colony from the 
Japanese and then failed to evacuate Sukarno in order to keep him out of 
the hands of the Japanese, was a colossal failure (23-28). While it may have 
been impossible to avoid the inevitable, Jaquet concluded that “a more 
reasonable policy regarding nationalism before the war could have led the 
post-war developments into calmer waters” (28).
14 “Onontbeerlijk bijdrage in Indonesië-discussie,” De Volkskrant, 21 March 1977; J.R. Soetenhorst, 
“Memoires Jonkman: boeiende aanvulling,” NRC Handelsblad, 7 April 1977; Joop Morriën, 
“Jonkman en de koloniale oorlog,” De Waarheid, 16 April 1977.
15 “Dr. L.G.M. Jaquet,” NRC Handelsblad, 22 July 1972.
16 “Dr. L.G.M. Jaquet,” NRC Handelsblad, 13 December 1972.
17 Jaquet, Aflossing, 9.
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Regarding the process of decolonization, Jaquet complained that the 
Dutch view of Sukarno as a Japanese puppet had serious political conse-
quences (206). His severest criticism was towards members of government 
who misread the international situation – there are no excuses, he suggests, 
for not being aware of what the international repercussions would be for 
turning to the military option (294-295).
Jaquet was a political insider who had spent his life in government civil 
service. His carefully worded memoir offered some cautious lessons. The 
reviewer, A. Kamsteeg, focused on the lesson that ran through Jaquet’s 
book: Dutch leaders had failed to consider Indonesian nationalism.18 Cees 
Fasseur, chief author of the Excessennota, reviewed Jaquet’s work twice. Both 
reviews are remarkable for what they leave out. In his review in Itinerario, a 
historical journal from the University of Leiden, he failed to mention Jaquet’s 
criticisms of the Dutch and colonial governments. The closest he got was 
mentioning that Jaquet “provides some interesting remarks on his contacts 
with [Sukarno] and on attitudes towards him of certain Dutch off icials, 
whose occasional pettiness Jaquet f inds reprehensible.”19 More surprising, is 
Fasseur’s review in the NRC Handelsblad. He mentioned that Jaquet doesn’t 
have much new to say about the post-war period of decolonization, but 
this makes the early chapter “all the more nice” for the anecdotes that they 
share about Sukarno. Fasseur is pleased that these show a sympathetic side 
to Dutch rule!20 Jaquet had cautiously provided a critique of Dutch policy 
that Fasseur ignored.
In 1979, Professor J.H. van Stuijvenberg edited an economic history of 
the Netherlands to be used as a textbook at universities. The f inal chapter, 
written by Fasseur and Henri Baudet, covered the economic history of the 
Dutch East Indies in 38 pages. Only 6 pages were given to the period from 1945 
to 1949.21 However, Baudet returned to the subject together with a team of 
political scientists and economic historians from Amsterdam and Groningen. 
In 1983, they published the first economic history of decolonization to appear 
in book form. It provided an analysis of the relationship between government 
and private industry and an evaluation of the economic consequences of 
Indonesian independence for the Netherlands.22
18 A. Kamsteeg, “Meer aansluiting bij Indonesisch nationalisme had veel ellende kunnen 
voorkomen,” Nederlands Dagblad, 17 November 1978.
19 Cess Fasseur, review of Dr. L.G.M. Jaquet, Aflossing van de Wacht: Bestuurlijke en politieke 
ervaringen in de nadagen van Nederlandsch-Indië, Itinerario 3, no. 1 (1979): 94.
20 C. Fasseur, “De Nadagen van Tropisch Nederland,” NRC Handelsblad, 28 April 1979.
21 Baudet and Fasseur, “Koloniale bedrijvigheid,” 342-347.
22 Baudet and Fennema, Het Nederlands belang.
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In 1982, J.C. Bijkerk published a political study of the role of Van Mook 
in the dying years of the Dutch colony. It was hagiographical in style. The 
protagonist is well intentioned, but misunderstood: “At that moment a lonely 
man was sitting at his desk in his study in the off icial residence. He stared 
ahead and thought about the most recent reports.”23 Bijkerk had spent 
World War Two in a Japanese camp (155). He considered the Dutch East 
Indies to have been an outstandingly well run colony and regarded Sukarno 
as untrustworthy and cowardly (158-163). He gave a detailed account of the 
violence unleashed upon Europeans by Indonesian nationalists in 1945, 
admitting that this made the pro-Dutch Ambonese troops “trigger-happy” 
(186-194). Amidst the violence, Van Mook stood “head and shoulders” above 
everyone else (218). However, we are repeatedly told that right-wing leaders 
in the Netherlands worked to undermine Van Mook (191-194, 207-209, 217, 
230). Bijkerk absolved the military, including Westerling, of any suspicion 
of violent excesses (251-252). He noted that even Van Mook saw that there 
was no alternative to military violence when he ordered the f irst “police 
action” in 1947 (256).
Jan Bank of the University of Amsterdam penned an outstanding 
detailed study of the role of the Catholic Church and its party, the KVP, 
during the Indonesian revolution, Katholieken en de Indonesische Revo-
lutie (Catholics and the Indonesian revolution). Bank remarked that the 
“fruitfulness” of English-language studies of the Indonesian revolution 
formed a stark contrast with Dutch historiography, which had failed 
to make any progress, despite the fact that for Dutch history it was a 
“crucial subject.”24 He argued that the leaders of the KVP had formed 
a conservative lobby that made signif icant political and diplomatic 
errors. Bank considered the KVP leader Romme’s famous article on 
the Hoge Veluwe Conference in De Volkskrant in 1946 to have been “a 
f ierce attack” on the decision to talk with the Indonesian republican 
nationalists (160). Flying in the face of the facts, KVP leaders like Sassen, 
Beel and Romme knowingly took huge risks (400). Their greatest error, 
Bank maintained, was misreading the anti-colonial attitude of the US 
(403). Their miscalculations delayed Indonesian independence and 
contributed to needless warfare. Bank mourned the fact that Catholic 
emancipation in the Netherlands formed an obstacle to the national 
emancipation of Indonesia (493).
23 Bijkerk, De Laatste Landvoogd, 61.
24 Bank, Katholieken, 11.
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Bank’s work marked a milestone in the critical historiography of Dutch 
decolonization, for he dared to raise the issue of violent excesses by Dutch 
military personnel, be it in a modest 7 out of nearly 500 pages. He argued 
that while socialists and communists, and even the leadership of Protes-
tant churches, demonstrated their horror at the reports of Westerling’s 
tactics, responses from the Catholic authorities were mixed (425-427). He 
furthermore argued that Catholic army chaplains remained deliberately 
silent when it came to reports of military brutality (427). Additionally, while 
communists and socialists in the metropole, as well as leaders of various 
Protestant churches, demonstrated concern when reports of atrocities 
appeared in the Dutch press in 1948 and 1949, KVP leader Romme did little 
to intervene when he personally received evidence that these atrocities 
were taking place, believing these were simply the accidental effects of 
warfare (429).
Katholieken en de Indonesische Revolutie was a massive volume. P.F. Maas’s 
Indie Verloren, Rampspoed Geboren (East Indies lost, disaster born) was 
a slim collection of three essays examining the crucial period of Dutch 
decision-making between November 1948 and February 1949. The professor’s 
main argument was that the Catholic leaders Romme, Sassen and Beel had 
fallen victim to their own moral certainty and by February 1949 the Drees 
cabinet had formulated a policy best described as “muddling through.”25
Ronald Gase’s Beel in Batavia appeared in 1986. Based on recently opened 
archives, the book covered the political dealings among the Dutch par-
ties in The Hague following the election of July 1948.26 Gase conducted 
a close analysis of the negotiations among Dutch leaders that led to Van 
Mook’s removal and a reorientation in policy (125-175). He was in no doubt 
that Van Mook was sacked “because the domestic political constellation 
in the Netherlands had made his going necessary” (173). The result was 
disastrous and, like Bank and Maas, Gase attributed the responsibility to 
the KVP and its triumvirate of leaders, Romme, Sassen and Beel (175; 219). 
Van Mook’s replacement in Batavia, former Prime Minister Louis Beel, was 
convinced that he was working according to God’s plan (291). Lacking any 
experience of Indonesia, he fell increasingly under the influence of the 
Dutch military leadership and opted for a military solution that was futile 
(237-286). Ultimately, Gase argued, all political parties “and the Dutch as a 
people” failed in Indonesia (291).
25 Maas, Indië Verloren, 68-69 and 89.
26 Gase, Beel in Batavia, 81-127.
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These works shared a number of shortcomings. Firstly, there is the intense 
Eurocentric (Hollandcentric) point of view. Indonesia is almost a sideshow. 
The works are written by Dutch men and are concerned exclusively with 
Dutch men. As Raben writes, they mainly focus “on discussions in Dutch 
politics or the military and diplomatic entanglements in the archipelago.”27
It is signif icant that, with the exception of seven pages in Bank, war is 
absent in these accounts. No battles are mentioned, no casualty f igures 
given, none of the blood and shattered bones that make up warfare. They 
offer insights and Baudet, Bank, Maas and Gase produced academically 
excellent work. However, their representations of the biggest war in Dutch 
history lack representation of warfare. They hide the unpleasant act of killing.
From Van Mook and De Kadt, through Gerbrandy and Smit, to Bank and 
Maas, the war, according to Dutch chroniclers and historians, had been 
fought in the corridors of power in Batavia and The Hague. We encounter 
negotiations in Batavia, the Hoge Veluwe, Linggadjati, Malino, Renville 
and The Hague, are made privy to insider deals and backstabbing in the 
Netherlands and we continually encounter the personal rivalries of the 
leading Dutch diplomatic players. Indonesian nationalist leaders earn 
cameo appearances. However, we are rarely informed of the soldier’s or 
civilian’s experience.
With historians’ reluctance to confront the “blood and guts” of a war, it 
is not surprising that others from outside academia leapt into the breach. 
Ewald Vanvugt published an article in De Volkskrant, in which he wrote of 
the massacre by Dutch soldiers of 96 Indonesian rebels, including resistance 
hero Ngrurah Rai.28 Ad van Liempt wrote in Vrij Nederland about the mass 
murder in Galoeng Galoeng. Liempt correctly argued that the massacre had 
“never become history.”29
Perhaps the practitioners of the Dutch historical profession, especially 
the colonial experts, could not account for the madness of colonial war 
within their professional symbolic framework. They simply fell back on 
what they knew – the analysis of power exercised by politicians through 
rational means. They withdrew into an arena where horizons were bound 
by the walls of conference rooms. They consequently constructed safe 
representations of the conflict and unremembered the ultimate condition 
of warfare – the act of killing.
27 Raben, “Hoe wordt men vrij?,” 15.
28 Ewald Vanvugt, “Maar jij, een Nederlander, wat doe jij hier op ons veld van eer,” De Volkskrant, 
23 November 1985.
29 Ad van Liempt, “De Massamoord van Galoeng Galoeng,” Vrij Nederland, 31 January 1987.
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Silence of the Guild
We f ind the act of killing articulated graphically in the works of Beb Vuyk, 
Vincent Mahieu, Albert van de Hoogte, Job Sytzen, Jan Schilt, Jan Varenne 
and Jacob Zwaan, remembered and represented by documentarists like 
Wigbold, Kiers and Vermeer. Trouillot suggests that the silencing of his-
torical memory is rarely the result of political conspiracy, but is nearly 
always structural.30 Therefore, the historiographical silence must have been 
structurally rooted within the small world of Dutch colonial historians. In 
2002, Stef Scagliola summarized the factors that she considered account 
for the lack of interest in decolonization among Dutch historians. The most 
telling is her assertion that historians were considered scholars of integrity 
who avoided “sweeping statements.” Consequently, even the royal family 
consulted prestigious historians like Fasseur, Bank and Wesseling when 
it came to Indonesian affairs. Such positions of influence would not have 
been achieved had they demonstrated “contrarian views.” She adds, “I don’t 
condemn this; I simply suggest that that is how it works.”31
People often do not see what is blatantly obvious. Margaret Heffernan 
offers dozens of cases of organizations that suffer from “wilful blindness.” The 
need to belong to the in-group, she argues, leads to conformity. In a closed 
group, conformity is appreciated and organizational silence becomes the 
norm, with disconfirming views seldom heard.32 Robert Cribb coined the 
term “circles of esteem” to describe the phenomenon in which scholars of 
Indonesia create a sense of common purpose, supporting each other’s work, 
thereby making the work of individuals from outside the circle “vulnerable 
to charges of charlatanry, to the suspicions of being a maverick or loose 
cannon.”33 Such a process makes disconfirming points of view diff icult.
Sociologists Pierre Bourdieu and Jean-Claude Passeron have written of 
how the power to bestow educational credentials serves a social function, 
“quite analogous to that which befell nobility titles in feudal society.”34 
This academic system forms an almost closed environment, self-policing 
and self-perpetuating.35 Numerous scholars have likened the organization 
of historical scholarship to that of a guild.36 No less a historian than Marc 
30 Trouillot, Silencing the Past, 106.
31 Scagliola, Last van de oorlog, 191-193.
32 Heffernan, Wilful Blindness, 165-173, 300.
33 Cribb, “Circles of Esteem,” 292.
34 Bourdieu and Passeron, Reproduction in Education, x.
35 Ibid., 198.
36 Brante, “Sociological Approaches,” 137-138; Fish, “One More Time,” 278-279.
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Bloch warned against the temptation of writing “for the private use of 
guild.” Furthermore, he warned of historians acting like “the rules com-
mittee of an ancient guild, who codify the tasks permitted to the members 
of the trade.”37 Louis Mink argues that academic historians act like a 
guild that exercises the power to differentiate between their own serious 
work and that of popular or amateur histories.38 Edward Said argued that 
scholars create “a guild solidarity.”39 References to a guild mentality are 
widespread among Said’s works.40 He argued that the discourse among 
professors “becomes a jargon, speaking only to the informed, keeping 
them essentially in a state of acquiescence.”41 Said argued that the guild is 
ultimately responsible for deciding, “Who writes? For whom is the writing 
done?”42
We have seen Scagliola’s assertion that Dutch historians had an aversion 
to sensationalist topics and sweeping statements. This is supported when 
we consider the point of view of essayist Rudy Kousbroek. He accused Dutch 
historians of timidity, arguing that they “only express themselves when 
something is, not just historically, but politically no longer disputed.”43 Said 
argued that a characteristic of the scholarly guild mentality is to believe 
that the real scholar is “preoccupied only with ideas, eternal values, and 
high principals.”44 This allows guild members to use “scholarly honour and 
integrity” to deny “political partisanship” and reject “critical outsiders.”45 
According to Anne-Lot Hoek, these “strategies of avoidance” were used by 
the Dutch academic elite to avoid the controversial topic of Dutch excessive 
violence in Indonesia.46 In a radio conversation with Rudy Kousbroek, 
Remco Raben highlighted a problematic aspect of Dutch colonial histori-
cal culture – the avoidance of the moral side of history and a “philatelic” 
obsession with registering and summarizing a narrow range of European 
sources.47
37 Bloch, The Historian’s Craft, 18, 21.
38 Mink, “The Theory,” 3-8.
39 Said, “Opponents,” 6-17.
40 For instance: Said, Orientalism, 207, 326, 342, 343; Said, Covering Islam, 150, 152, 170. He also 
uses the term “barony” (Orientalism, 346) and “corporate institution” (Orientalism, 3).
41 Said, “Europe,” 39-40.
42 Said, “Opponents,” 1.
43 Kousbroek, Oostindisch Kampsyndroom, 290.
44 Said, Covering Islam, 140.
45 Ibid., 150.
46 Anne-Lot Hoek, “Rengat, 1949 (Part 2),” Inside Indonesia 125, 12 September 2016, https://
www.insideindonesia.org/rengat-1949-part-2, accessed 27 February 2021.
47 Geschiedenisgasten: Remco Raben en Rudy Kousbroek OVT, VPRO Radio, 14 July 2002.
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Trouillot agrees that a characteristic of the guild of historians is that it 
prides itself in the purity of its academic work free from political opinions.48 
It creates parameters within which research takes place, archives the sources 
and limits what can be debated. The tendency is towards producing “a closed 
corpus.”49 Young historians are initiated into what constitutes signif icant 
issues and what should be passed over in silence. Those who pass through 
the gates of the masters and doctorate degrees internalize the values of 
the guild and it becomes the ambition of every new member “to conform 
to guild practice.”50 In the case of the Dutch, this was successful. Hoek 
argues that the younger generation of historians “appeared to lack the 
radical attitude necessary to make the story [of Dutch violence] part of the 
national discourse.”51
Frances Gouda, American trained herself, was quoted by Lizzy van Leeu-
wen, as arguing that Dutch historians “form a guild” and this closed group 
perpetuated the uncritical myth of the superior form of Dutch colonialism, 
ignoring important studies of the Indonesian revolution that were published 
abroad.52 Australian historian Joost Cote agrees that Dutch historians 
cannot tolerate interference from outsiders when it comes to their colonial 
history, referring to the “self-referential academic environment” of which 
the heartland is Leiden University and the Royal Netherlands Institute of 
Southeast Asian and Caribbean Studies (KITLV).53 Similarly, trying to 
describe the rough treatment foreign scholars of Dutch history receive in 
the Netherlands, American historian Benjamin Schmidt playfully remarked, 
“the dikes and dunes of the Low Countries […] are designed to keep outsiders 
at bay.”54 At a presentation in Leiden in 2016, American historian Jennifer 
Foray argued that Dutch colonial historians engaged in an “endless rhetorical 
loop” by claiming that Dutch imperialism is exceptional and therefore 
“only those aware of this exceptional status” (i.e. certain Dutch historians) 
are qualif ied to study it.55 Indeed, historian Louis Zweers referred to my 
48 Part of this passage f irst appeared in Paul Doolan, “Decolonising Dutch History,” Impe-
rial and Global Forum (blog), Centre for Imperial and Global History, University of Exeter, 
16 November 2016, https://imperialglobalexeter.com/2016/11/16/decolonizing-dutch-history/, 
accessed 10 December 2016.
49 Trouillot, Silencing the Past, 19.
50 Ibid., 56.
51 Hoek, “Rengat.”
52 Lizzy van Leeuwen, “Gordelroos van Smaragd,” De Groene Amsterdammer, 19 October 2016.
53 Cote, “Strangers,” 86.
54 Schmidt, “Dikes and Dunes,” 85.
55 Foray, “Comparatively Exceptional,” 90.
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work as “inmenging” or “interference.”56 The Belgian historian David van 
Reybrouck remarks that, when writing his recent history of the Indonesian 
War of Independence he, as an outsider, had to justify himself before his 
Dutch colleagues “hundreds of times.”57
Henk Schulte Nordholt admits that, despite isolated efforts, the KITLV 
in Leiden “remained well into the 1970s an old-fashioned bastion of Dutch 
orientalism.”58 Martin Kuitenbrouwer argued that various disciplines in 
Leiden underwent decolonization soon after Indonesian independence.59 
But when it came to historiography as practised at the KITLV, he admit-
ted, “decolonization and internationalization of historiography was more 
limited.”60 Some of the institute’s leading historical practitioners were 
“strongly focused on the pre-war, traditional historiography,” exhibiting 
little appreciation for “new socio-historical publications.”61
The world of historians in Leiden was a pleasant, informal circle. Scholarly 
careers could be built with a tap on the shoulder. Eminent Leiden historian 
Henk Wesseling confessed that, in the beginning of the 1960s, because 
he had the right contacts, he received a grant to complete a dissertation 
without writing a proposal and eventually received an appointment to a 
lectureship without applying for a job.62 He, in turn, helped the career of 
Cees Fasseur, who in 1977 was appointed (without applying) Special Professor 
in the History of West European Overseas Expansion within one year of 
his achieving a PhD.63 Fassuer’s ignorance of Indonesian languages did not 
prevent him from becoming Professor of Indonesian History in Leiden in 
1986.64 Looking back at his career, Fassuer admitted, “I never really had to 
formally apply for any position.”65
Decolonization had been greatly ignored by historians. By the mid-1970s, 
Smit had published three histories of the conflict, as well as editing Scher-
merhorn’s journal in 1970.66 But, having worked in the Dutch East Indies 
56 Louis Zweers, 6 February 2017 (13:04) comment on Caroline Drieenhuizen, “Veranderde 
Perspectieven: Een Discussie over Dekolonisatie in een Indonesische Context,” Koloniaal verleden, 
voortdurende erfenis: Indonesië en Nederland (blog), 29 December 2016.
57 Van Reybrouck, Revolusi, 17.
58 Schulte Nordholt, “Locating,” 41.
59 Kuitenbrouwer, Dutch Scholarship, 183-190.
60 Ibid., 204.
61 Ibid., 204-205.
62 Wesseling, Van Toen en Nu, 207-208.
63 Fasseur, Dubbelspoor, 158.
64 Ibid., 186.
65 Ibid., 304.
66 Schermerhorn, Het dagboek.
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as a lawyer, Indonesia was more a personal interest for Smit, his main work 
concerning the documentary history of Dutch diplomacy in the nineteenth 
and twentieth centuries. Lijphart published The Trauma of Decolonization in 
1966. Born and raised in the Netherlands, Lijphart was awarded a scholarship 
to study in the United States when he was nineteen. He began research 
for a PhD in political science at Yale University, never returning to live or 
work in the Netherlands. The Trauma of Decolonization was based on his 
PhD dissertation, written while teaching at a small American college. In 
other words, he was working outside the guild, in isolation, which is why he 
stumbled across his topic almost accidentally.67 Neither Smit nor Lijphart 
had been Leiden educated. The works of Paul van ’t Veer and Van Doorn and 
Hendrix were signif icant, but Van ’t Veer was a journalist and Van Doorn 
and Hendrix were sociologists. With the likes of Bank and Baudet we see 
the beginnings of the historical study of decolonization in the 1980s. But 
even here, the military aspects of the conflict are mostly avoided; only Bank 
mentions the issue of war crimes.
Let us look at how guild mentality operated. In the Hueting interview 
of 1969, the Dutch were confronted with descriptions of widespread 
atrocities carried out by their soldiers. The government commissioned a 
report under Fasseur. Fasseur had been born and partially raised in the 
colony. He attended grammar school in Leiden before entering Leiden 
University and joining the Leidsch Studenten Corps, the traditional Leiden 
student association. In 1969, he dutifully published the Excessennota. 
He studiously avoided using the term “war crimes.” He concluded that 
“excesses” had been incidental. Fasseur did feel more research was 
needed, but cautiously published this opinion under a pseudonym.68 
This ensured his career would not be spoilt by the expression of a critical 
attitude.
In the coming years, he published works on the Dutch East Indies, keeping 
clear of the subject of war crimes. He was appointed to professorships in 
Leiden, where students undertook research under his supervision, none of 
which touched on war crimes. Eventually he became the biographer of the 
royal family, rewarded by Queen Beatrix with exclusive access to the archive 
of the royal household, the only historian ever to have been given such 
an honour. When he died in 2016, the KITLV referred to him as a colonial 
historian who “carried out ground-breaking research on the cultivation 
67 Lijphart, “Political Institutions,” 237-244.
68 Fasseur, Dubbelspoor, 149.
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system in nineteenth-century Java.”69 His f inal, posthumously published 
book was a biography of the imperialist Gerbrandy. Although he made 
some mildly critical remarks of Gerbrandy’s role during decolonization, his 
conclusion heroizes Gerbrandy and fails to mention Indonesia.70
Hoek writes that when Scagolia criticized Fasseur for his role in ignoring 
Dutch war crimes, he reacted so badly that she deleted the reference to him 
in her PhD dissertation because it might have damaged her position in the 
network of historians. Hoek quotes Scagolia describing Fasseur’s attitude as 
being “the discretion of the ruling class: look away from things that make you 
uneasy.”71 Hoek claims that “the entire political and social establishment 
carries the responsibility” for lacking the willpower to investigate and 
remember the period of decolonization.72 Fasseur wrote that after 1969, 
he never considered undertaking any further investigation into Dutch 
war crimes because it “wasn’t challenging enough,” adding the rhetorical 
question, “Why drag all of the outrages that were perpetrated back and forth 
and all the concerned victims into the light?”73 This is an extraordinary 
question for a historian to ask.
In 1969, thanks to Fasseur’s work, the Dutch public could look away from 
the issue of war crimes. It is an example of Said’s “cult of expertise and 
professionalism” used to “make invisible” the collaboration “between the 
ideas and scholarship, on the one hand, and the world of politics, corporate 
and state power, and military force on the other.”74
The guild was fairly isolated from external pressures. Its leaders imposed 
the norms that led to its continuity, meaning that any change would be slow. 
The equilibrium could be broken only when disturbed by a strong outside 
force. The Hueting interview was a rupture coming from outside. However, 
because other institutions – the government, political parties, the Indisch 
community, the military – when it came to remembering decolonization, 
were conservative, the guild of historians could perpetuate unremembering. 
None within the guild had the strength, courage or imagination to break 
out of the circle of esteem and represent the war as an arena of mass killing. 
Soldier-novelists offered an insight into the bloody gore of war. But the 
69 “Cees Fasseur (1938-2016),” KITLV, http://www.kitlv.nl/cees-fasseur-1938-2016/, accessed 
20 January 2020.
70 Fasseur, Eigen meester, 493-536, 555-561.
71 Anne-Lot Hoek, “Iedereen wist het. Niemand kon het zeggen,” NRC Handelsblad, 
16 September 2016.
72 Anne-Lot Hoek, “Historici, stel de juiste vragen over NL-Indie,” NRC Handelsblad, 20 June 2015.
73 Fasseur, Dubbelspoor, 146-147.
74 Said, “Opponents,” 3.
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attention of academic historians and memorialists remained f ixated on 
the, perhaps no less gory, corridors of power in The Hague and Jakarta.
Willem IJzereef
In 1982, a book was published, Westerling: De eenling (Westerling: The loner), 
that, similar to Westerling’s earlier memoir, reads like a boy’s adventure 
story. The purpose was to clear Raymond Westerling’s name. The book 
included photographs and documents, including a telegram from General 
Buurman van Vreeden to Westerling’s superior, Colonel de Vries, permitting 
De Vries to order other groups to use Westerling’s methods.75 This showed 
that orders had come from high command and any atrocities that had oc-
curred had been committed, not by Westerling himself, but by other groups 
misusing his methods. The author argued that Westerling did everything 
possible to protect the innocent with his quick justice.76 Historian Jaap de 
Moor dismisses the book as a mixture of fact and fantasy, written to justify 
Westerling’s actions.77 Decades after the war, Westerling felt he needed to 
clear his name because the history of the conflict had yet to be written by 
any academic historian.
Between 1982 and 1984, the insistence that the war had been an arena of 
mass killing found a representation in the work of a young historian. Willem 
IJzereef had just graduated in contemporary history when Groniek, the 
student-edited historical journal of the University of Groningen, published 
his overview of the role of the press in the so-called South Celebes affair. 
As he described it, information regarding atrocities by special Dutch forces 
on the island of South Celebes was well known and available. It could be 
expected that someone would investigate the historical circumstances of 
the atrocities. Yet, despite the occasional discussion, historians had mainly 
remained silent on the issue.78
Two years later, IJzereef ’s more substantial De Zuid-Celebes affaire: 
Kapitein Westerling en de standrechtelijke executies (The South Celebes 
affair: Captain Westerling and extrajudicial executions) appeared. In the 
acknowledgements, he thanked the Ministers of General Affairs, Foreign 
Affairs and Defence for having given him permission to access “all secret 
75 Venner, Westerling, 236.
76 Ibid., 202-206.
77 De Moor, “Van vrije jongen,” 176-177.
78 IJzereef, “De Zuid-Celebes affaire,” 49.
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civil and military archives of the former Dutch East Indies authorities.”79 
Despite the title, less than half of the book directly concerned Westerling. 
IJzereef spent more than half of the book setting the scene, demonstrating 
how the Australian occupation after the Japanese surrender deteriorated 
into a situation of violent lawlessness. This was partially due to Dutch 
policy of arresting and interning moderate Indonesian nationalists, leading 
to an increase in the influence of the more violent supporters of Sukarno 
(68-73). Tensions led to the Dutch resorting to excessive violence, shooting 
suspects without due process, using electric shock torture and mutilating 
prisoners during interrogation (79-80). By December 1946, with the situation 
almost out of control, it was decided to send in the special forces under 
Westerling. Involved in this decision were civil leader Van Mook; military 
leader General Spoor; leader of the judiciary Procurator-General Felderhof; 
the resident of South Celebes, Lion Cachet; and local army boss Colonel 
De Vries (93). The implication was that these men were responsible for the 
bloody consequences of this decision.
IJzereef gave a graphic account of the “Westerling method.” As Westerling 
himself had claimed in his early memoir, this consisted of gathering intel-
ligence, then breaking the power of the terrorists by applying summary 
justice in the form of on-the-spot executions, followed by winning the 
support of the people by restoring law and order (96-98). IJzereef gave a 
summary of Westerling’s f irst three operations, resulting in 35, 61 and 58 
summary executions, respectively. There was no evidence that the summary 
killings were based on intelligence gathering (99-103). Victims seemed to 
have been picked on the spot (103).
Reports of Westerling’s fourth operation reached the Dutch public when 
Vrij Nederland published an account by an eyewitness. IJzereef demonstrated 
that this report suggested that the Westerling method was arbitrary and 
chaotic and included a description of Westerling shooting off f ive toes of a 
victim before killing him (102-103). This proved to be a propaganda coup for 
the enemies of the Dutch, reaching the halls of the United Nations where 
the f igure of 40,000 fatal victims was spread (108).
IJzereef argued that officials in Batavia were aware of what was happening 
and justif ied these illegal methods (109-112). Eventually, as the policy of 
summary executions was extended and subordinates of Westerling began 
to apply it in an almost indiscriminate manner, leaders in Batavia became 
uncomfortable. Under the command of Jan Vermeulen, about 700 Indonesian 
villagers were executed, including scores who had been taken from prisons 
79 IJzereef, De Zuid-Celebes affaire, 4.
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(123-127). Van Mook compared such methods with those used by the Germans 
and Japanese during World War Two (130). Nevertheless, he did not stop 
the campaign. Instead, under Vermeulen, 364 villagers were massacred in 
Galoeng-Galoeng (133-134). It was the summary execution of a local rebel 
leader who was an aristocrat that f inally led the authorities in Batavia to end 
the campaign (133-137). IJzereef estimated that the campaign had resulted 
in 3,130 Indonesians being executed (141). He concluded that this method 
of f ighting was “completely illegal” (138).
IJzereef devoted the final 20 pages of his work to examining the aftermath 
of the South Celebes affair, a process in which we see unremembering at 
work. Vrij Nederland had brought the affair to the public’s attention (148). 
Minister Jonkman when asked for clarification, gave answers that were vague 
and the public’s attention quickly diverted towards the f irst “police action” 
(149). IJzereef noted that Romme, the Catholic leader, had been in South 
Celebes at the time and must have known what was going on, and IJzereef 
provided documentary evidence showing that other Catholic politicians 
had been well informed, including Prime Minister Beel. They hoped that 
this would never become known to world opinion (148).
Van Mook initiated an investigation into Westerling’s methods in 1947, 
with the creation of a commission under K.L.J. Enthoven. IJzereef suggested 
that its organization left a lot to be desired (146). Family members of the 
victims of Dutch military violence were not interviewed (150). The Enthoven 
Report was completed in 1948 and concluded that incidental excesses had 
taken place on South Celebes. Further investigation began in 1949, but it 
ceased with the handover of sovereignty in December 1949. Meanwhile, the 
Enthoven Report was simply f iled by the Dutch parliament. During the next 
20 years, no parliamentarian ever requested to see it (151).
In early 1949, members of the Dutch Labour Party called for further 
investigation. This resulted in the Van Rij and Stam Report in 1954. Van Rij 
and Stam concluded that there had been no evidence that those summarily 
executed by Westerling and his followers had been guilty of any crime and 
that the Dutch actions “had had nothing to do with jurisprudence” (153). 
The Minister for Justice decided that the report contained nothing that 
would justify prosecutions; the report was shelved without parliamentary 
discussion and without the nation’s media or public being informed (153). 
Consequently, those in Batavia and The Hague who bore political responsibil-
ity for the atrocities were never investigated (160). IJzereef judged:
The South Celebes affair was a political and military excess. The military 
illegally maintained the method of summary executions introduced by 
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Westerling, politicians and soldiers made decisions, including decisions 
over the fate of prisoners, that could not be defended within any legal 
framework. (159)
Here was a book about a war that actually offered representations of 
a war. It was the bravest attempt yet by a historian to undo decades of 
unremembering. Still, it should be noted that IJzereef avoided the term 
“war crimes,” instead using the more acceptable “excesses.” Joop Morriën 
of the communist De Waarheid emphasized IJzereef ’s verdict, that the 
South Celebes affair was a political and military excess.80 B. Lulofs, editor 
of the conservative De Telegraaf, compared IJzereef to a spoilt child for 
his insistence that Westerling killed between 20,000 and 40,000 victims, 
a claim that IJzereef never made.81 A reviewer in the Nieuwsblad van het 
Noorden praised IJzereef for managing to reclaim some “remarkable facts” 
about Dutch brutality.82 Some months later, Ger Vaders admitted IJzereef’s 
work produced in him outrage and anger against Catholic leaders Romme 
and Beel.83 A reviewer in the Leeuwarder Courant warned that the book 
contained “shocking passages,” noting that the killings in Pare-Pare and the 
massacre in Galoeng-Galoeng formed the “dramatic deep point” in Dutch 
military brutality.84 Morriën returned to IJzereef’s book, this time focusing 
on how the political leaders were implicated in the policy of “systematic 
cruelty.” His review carried a photograph of Romme alongside a photograph 
of Westerling, a montage that implied they were both equally guilty.85 
Within a couple of years, IJzereef’s book was referred to as “the standard 
work” by the liberal NRC Handelsblad.86 A decade later, Graa Boomsma, 
writing in the same newspaper, referred to it as a “ground-breaking study.”87 
80 Joop Morriën, “Zuid-Celebes affaire was een militair en politiek exces,” De Waarheid, 
10 July 1984.
81 B. Lulofs, “Den Haag Brief,” De Telegraaf, 14 July 1984.
82 Harry Wubs, “Groninger historicus belicht rol Westerling,” Nieuwsblad van het Noorden, 
7 July 1984.
83 Ger Vaders, “Geweld en de zindelijke burgerheren,” Nieuwsblad van het Noorden, 
21 September 1984.
84 “Standrecht kostte 5,182 Indonesiërs het leven,” Leeuwarder Courant, 3 September 1984.
85 Joop Morriën, “De wreedheden van Westerling waren de authoriteiten bekend,” De Waarheid, 
10 December 1984.
86 Herman Vuijsje, “Wat heeft gebeurd geweest, moet vergeet,” NRC Handelsblad, 
13 December 1986.
87 Graa Boomsma, “Het verleden blijft actief, het woekert door, barst naar buiten,” NRC 
Handelsblad, 26 May 1994.
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Yet no reviewer seemed aware that Westerling himself had openly boasted 
of his deeds in his published memoir of 1952.
Loe de Jong, Volume 11a
The editors of the newspaper Trouw could hardly hide their excitement: “The 
book that a whole lot of Dutch people have been impatiently looking forward 
to is available today in the bookstores.” They added that the author, Loe de 
Jong, had made use of 59 advisers or co-readers, including two Indonesian 
professors, and they had read his text and given him feedback.88 The 
f irst reviews of Volume 11a of Het Koninkrijk der Nederlanden in de Tweede 
Wereldoorlog (The Kingdom of the Netherlands during World War Two) 
appeared the same day. Joop Morriën summarized De Jong’s main argument 
and expressed agreement regarding his thesis of “the double tragedy” – that 
the Dutch had miscalculated the pre-war power of Indonesian nationalism 
and that they were woefully unprepared for war with Japan.89 The review 
in Trouw was positive, praising the dramatic structure, suggesting that 
De Jong had opened up his work to another new audience.90 Van Wijnen 
expressed his wholehearted agreement with De Jong, that in the historical 
drama of the collapse of the Dutch empire in Asia, only the left-wing parties 
in parliament “do not have to be ashamed of their behaviour.”91 De Kok, 
in the Haagsche Courant, a newspaper with a large Indische readership, 
mentioned that the book provided a rehabilitation of the Indisch-Dutch 
population.92 Ben Maandag embraced the main lesson that the Dutch 
should be ashamed of how they behaved in colonial times.93
However, some reviewers paid close attention to the foreword, in which 
De Jong gave space to two of his co-readers, who expressed disagreement 
with his approach. None of De Jong’s team had ever before gone public with 
their disagreement. The Leeuwaarder Courant headlined with, “Dr. L. de 
88 “Nieuw deel De Jongs geschiedschrijving uit,” Trouw, 30 October 1984. Throughout the 
publication, De Jong made use of a group of advisors. In total, 227 co-readers made 100,000 
critical suggestions pre-publication (Smits, Loe de Jong, 513).
89 Joop Morriën, “Government doof en blind voor nationale beweging,” De Waarheid, 
30 October 1984.
90 J. Kuijk, “De Jong verlegt zijn blik naar Indie,” Trouw, 30 October 1984.
91 H.A. van Wijnen, “Links hoeft zich niet te schamen voor de koloniën,” Het Parool, 
31 October 1984.
92 G. de Kok, “De Jong en Multatuli,” Haagsche Courant, 30 October 1984.
93 Ben Maandag, “Een dubbele tragedie,” Het Vrije Volk, 30 October 1984.
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Jong Wrote a Different Book Than Two Advisers Called For.”94 De Volkskrant 
published a positive review from Jan Bank, which included a discussion of 
the disagreement,95 but also published a separate article headlining with 
news of the “conflict.”96 Some reviewers found themselves siding with the 
criticisms of the two advisors. The NRC Handelsblad carried two reviews. 
One praised De Jong’s achievement, but accused him of simplifications when 
it came to the rise of Indonesian nationalism and the Dutch response.97 
The other was extensive in its criticism, claiming that De Jong kept the 
achievements of the Dutch colonial governments hidden and ignored the 
progressive missionary work of the churches during the twentieth century.98 
A day later, the Algemeen Dagblad ran an interview with one of the dissenting 
advisers, R. Kwantes, quoting him as saying “Brugmans and I believe that 
De Jong should have mentioned more of the positive aspects that the Dutch 
have carried out in Dutch East Indies.”99 The emphasis had shifted from 
the actual contents of De Jong’s book (over 1,200 pages), to the dissenting 
opinion expressed in seven paragraphs of the foreword.
In the coming weeks, resistance to De Jong’s views of colonial society 
hardened, and sympathy for the “Indisch” point of view grew. Lulofs of the 
conservative De Telegraaf offers a case in point. His review, published on the 
day of the book’s appearance, was positive. Some days later, in his editor’s 
column, he returned to the subject, this time mentioning the dissenting 
advisors Brugmans and Kwantes, who had both worked in the colonial 
service in the former Dutch East Indies. Lulofs now argued that De Jong 
did not have adequate knowledge of colonial society, because he had no 
f irst-hand experience of it.100 A week later, his criticism was more pointed: 
“[T]here is too much Indonesian disturbance and too little Indische organiza-
tion; there is too much Indonesian revolution and too little Dutch-Indische 
national unity.”101
94 P. Boltendal, “Dr. L. de Jong schreef een ander boek dan twee adviseurs bepleitten,” Leeuwarder 
Courant, 30 October 1984.
95 J. Bank, “L. de Jong scheidt illusie en werkelijkheid in Indie,” De Volkskrant, 30 October 1984.
96 “De Jong in conflict over elfde deel oorlogsgeschiedenis,” De Volkskrant, 30 October 1984.
97 R. Soetenhorst, “De Jong verzamelde schat van gegevens in goedlopend verhaal,” NRC 
Handelsblad, 30 October 1984.
98 F. Groeneveld, “Nederlands tijdperk in Indië door een anti-koloniale bril beschouwd,” NRC 
Handelsblad, 30 October 1984.
99 Karel Bagijn, “Twee medewerkers van De Jong hebben bezwaren tegen boek,” Algemeen 
Dagblad, 30 October 1984.
100 B. Lulofs, “Indie,” De Telegraaf, 3 November 1984.
101 B. Lulofs, “Deel 11a,” De Telegraaf, 10 November 1984.
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In De Volkskrant, Peter Hoefnagels begged readers to remember that 
Indische people were just ordinary people and “should not be judged in one 
breath together with the colonial structure and the behaviour of the govern-
ments under which they lived.” He added that these people were “displaced 
persons” and only after decolonization had they become “wrong” colonials.102 
De Jong had used the simple framework of “good” Dutch and “bad” Germans 
and “bad” Dutch collaborators in De Bezetting and the earlier volumes of Het 
Koninkrijk der Nederlanden in de Tweede Wereloorlog. Hoefnagels suggested 
that this ran aground when it came to the Dutch East Indies. Volume 11a 
seemed to mark all colonials, by the fact of their birth, as “wrong.” Even 
Peter Schumacher of the left-wing De Groene Amsterdammer claimed that 
De Jong had created a twisted picture of colonial society.103
Historian H. Abels was mainly very positive, pointing out criticisms only 
in De Jong’s history of the pre-European period, while pronouncing this 
volume as showing De Jong at his best. Regarding the Brugmans and Kwantes 
disagreement, Abels concluded that they were ideologically motivated and 
had not yet dealt with the loss of the colony.104 However, other academics 
were critical. Elsbeth Locher-Scholten attacked De Jong for his careless 
methodology. She pointed out factual errors, but worse, she argued that De 
Jong misused quotations to make the narrative livelier.105 Worst of all, the 
book was f illed with judgements.106 The motivations for this was simply to 
increase the readability.107 Another specialist, P. Drooglever, co-editor of 
the sourcebook Officiële Bescheiden, was critical. He referred to 11a as being 
less reliable than it should be, because of its tone and emphasis.108 He gave 
examples of what he considered to have been isolated incidents, but which 
De Jong used as the basis for generalizations.109 He considered the work to 
be “sour and one-sided,”110 as well as “too highly dramatic.”111
102 Peter Hoefnagels, “Kolonialen waren gewone mensen,” De Volkskrant, 13 November 1984.
103 Peter Schumacher, “Een onevenwichtig en slordig Indisch deel,” De Groene Amsterdammer, 
9 January 1985.
104 H. Abels, “Prof. L. de Jong en Indonesië,” Skript: historisch tijdschrijt 7, no. 1 (1985): 59.
105 E.B. Locher-Scholten, review of Het Koninkrijk der Nederlanden in de tweede wereldoorlog, 
vol. 11a, by L. de Jong, Bijdragen en Mededelingen betreffende de Geschiedenis der Nederlanden 
101, no. 2 (1986): 266.
106 Ibid., 267.
107 Ibid., 266.
108 P. Drooglever, review of Het Koninkrijk der Nederlanden in de tweede wereldoorlog, vol. 11a, 
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The most signif icant criticism emerged from the self-designated mouth-
piece of the Indisch community. Originally founded by Tjalie Robinson as 
Tong-Tong, the magazine was now named Moesson and under the editorship 
of Ralph Boekholt. De Jong’s biographer Boudewijn Smits is incorrect when 
he claims that this group had been “born and raised in the former Dutch 
East Indies.”112 Many, including Boekholt himself, had been raised in the 
Netherlands. Nevertheless, they strongly identif ied with the former colony. 
Their negative review (published with the initials AvL), appearing in three 
monthly sections, accused De Jong of being blinded by socialism113 and being 
far too subjective.114 They reported that the older among them considered 
De Jong’s judgements to be “hurtful.”115 Months later, Moesson published a 
short article, signed by Boekholt and Tjalie Robinson’s widow, Lilian Ducelle, 
announcing that Moesson was joining with other plaintiffs in order to sue 
the Dutch state. Their aim was to force the state, as De Jong’s employer, to 
withdraw and destroy all copies of Volume 11a and to persuade De Jong to 
rewrite his account. In order to achieve this they had founded the Comité 
Geschiedkundig Eerherstel (Committee for Historical Rehabilitation).116
Already in the mid-1950s, Tjalie Robinson had written, in a number of 
private letters, that the Indo needed a Dutchman to write his history, in order 
for the colonial population to have its honour restored.117 For decades, the 
Indisch community had felt that their narrative and specif ic identity was 
unremembered by historians. However, when at last their memory was due 
to be rehabilitated and assumed into the national narrative, by no less a 
f igure than the admired national historian, their high expectations were 
dashed. Boekholt summarized their complaint: it was “painful that they are 
depicted as the colonial evil in historical writing that is published by the 
state.”118 After the court rejected the claim of the Committee for Historical 
Rehabilitation, Boekholt added that it was “unhealthy when Indisch people 
112 Smits, Loe de Jong, 747.
113 AvL, “Het Koninkrijk der Nederlanden in De Tweede Weredoorlog 11a: Nederlands-Indië,” 
Moesson, 15 November 1984.
114 AvL, “Het Koninkrijk der Nederlanden in De Tweede Weredoorlog 11a: Nederlands-Indië 
(vervolg),” Moesson, 1 December 1984.
115 AvL, “Het Koninkrijk der Nederlanden in De Tweede Weredoorlog 11a: Nederlands-Indië (2e 
vervolg),” Moesson, 1 February 1985.
116 Lilian Ducelle and Ralph Boekholt, “Process tegen de staat der Nederlanden Inzake deel 11a,” 
Moesson, 1 March 1985.
117 Robinson to J.W. Meyer Ranneft, 18 July 1955 and 21 July 1955, in Robinson, Schrijven met je 
vuisten, 77-80 and 81-84.
118 Ralph Boekholt, “Indische Nederlanders hebben recht op een eerlijk geschiedschrijving,” 
Trouw, 27 December 1989.
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are considered exclusively in terms of war and social welfare” and what 
their legal case had demanded was “the correction of a conscious one-sided, 
negative and sometimes grievous off icial description.”119
A sequel to the case occurred when Moesson attempted to publish Boek-
holt’s account of the legal process. Government publisher the Staatsdrukkerij 
(Sdu), attempted to legally prevent Moesson from selling the book, because it 
looked almost exactly like the volumes of De Jong’s work. Trouw inaccurately 
reported that the state wished to forbid the book.120 The state objected only 
to its cover.121 A compromise was reached: Boekholt’s book would receive 
an obligatory sticker declaring that this was not a work of De Jong and not 
a publication of the Sdu.122
However, the organized dissent of Indisch people against how they saw 
themselves represented in 11a was only the beginning of problems for De 
Jong. The next couple of additions to Volume 11, also dealing with the Dutch 
East Indies, were published without much criticism. They dealt with the 
Dutch at war with Japan and the Dutch imprisoned by the Japanese. Here, 
the old framework of the good Dutch and the bad enemy worked easily. In 
1988, De Jong was due to publish the f inal volume of his great work, with 
the subtitle Epilogue. It would provide an account of the post-war period in 
the Netherlands and include the post-war period in the Dutch East Indies. 
Unlike his earlier television programme De Bezetting, this time he decided 
to include the war of decolonization.
The trouble started in late 1987. De Jong had shared with his co-readers 
a “concept text,” as it became known, detailing atrocities by Dutch soldiers 
and using the term “war crimes.” It had been shared in conf idence, but 
co-reader Colonel Heshusius leaked De Jong’s concept text. De Jong was 
furious.123 He soon found himself embroiled in a polemic about how to (un)
remember decolonization.
In the Haarlems Dagblad, Colonel Heshusius admitted that he had leaked 
the text to a group of radical right-wing ex-military personnel, but countered 
that he wasn’t at all ashamed, because if he could mobilize a broad mass of 
people, they might force De Jong to change his mind. He could not tolerate 
De Jong “kicking the military.”124 On the other hand, De Volkskrant supported 
De Jong. Fred Vermeulen gave a positive review of the disputed unpublished 
119 Ralph Boekholt, “Blinde vlek voor Indisch verleden,” Trouw, 17 August 1991.
120 “Staatsdrukkerij wil boek ‘De Jong en Indië’ verboden zien,” Trouw, 7 March 1992.
121 “Boek over De Jong lijkt te veel op boeken van De Jong,” Algemeen Dagblad, 7 March 1992.
122 “Uitgeverijen sluiten compromis over boek over dr. L. de Jong,” De Volkskrant, 7 January 1992.
123 “Prof. de Jong woedend over uitlekken tekst,” Algemeen Dagblad, 20 November 1987.
124 Jos Heymans, “Loe de Jong geeft militairen een trap na,” Haarlems Dagblad, 20 November 1987.
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Chapter 7 of Volume 12. He was convinced that the excesses committed by 
Dutch soldiers were many.125 Nieuwsblad van het Noorden compared the 
situation with the Hueting controversy and blamed the veterans for causing 
it, concluding that war crimes remained “a sort of taboo” that, if some had 
their way, would remain “beyond discussion.”126
In the NRC Handelsblad, Van Doorn, co-author of Ontsporing van geweld, 
was critical of De Jong. He accepted that war crimes had taken place, but 
asked for understanding for the veterans, describing them as a misunder-
stood group who simply wanted “a dignif ied place in the history books.” He 
blamed De Jong for maintaining the good-bad framework that he had used 
when discussing the German occupation of the Netherlands. This did not 
work when it came to Indonesia because the Dutch-Indonesian conflict had 
been “infinitely more complicated than what had taken place during World 
War Two in the Netherlands.” De Jong had fallen into the trap of simply 
replacing the Germans with the Dutch in Indonesia.127 In an interview in 
De Geldlander, Van Doorn added that the French in Algeria and Portuguese 
in Africa had acted much worse than the Dutch had.128
An exchange in the NRC Handelsblad shows how bitter the polemic 
quickly became. H.L. Zwitzer, of the Institute of Military History and a former 
member of De Jong’s team of advisers, attacked De Jong for not caring about 
balanced and responsible history, accusing him of making loose accusations. 
De Jong’s analysis of Dutch war crimes, according to Zwitzer, was an attempt 
to stain all military personnel who served in Indonesia between 1945 and 
1950.129 Columnist and veteran Henk Hofland replied to Zwitzer, defending 
the work of De Jong. He reminded his readers of the letter from an off icer 
in De Groene Amsterdammer in 1949, as well as the interview with Hueting 
in 1969. Accusing Zwitzer and others of using their sense of outrage as a 
means of intimidation, he asked: “How can it be that we in 1987, with the 
aborted chapter by Dr. L. de Jong, have come no further than we were in 
1949?”130 Zwitzer replied that “my problems with the historical demi-god 
of the Netherlands date from years ago, from long before the time that his 
125 Fred Vermeulen, “Excessen bij de politionele acties waren veelvoudig,” De Volkskrant, 
25 November 1987.
126 H. Wuibs, “Onbespreekbaar: de rol van ‘onze jongen’ in Indie,” Nieuwsblad van het Noorden, 
22 January 1988.
127 J.A.A. van Doorn, “Dr. L. de Jong en Nederlands-Indie,” NRC Handelsblad, 3 December 1987.
128 R. Brandsma, “De Jong oordeelt te snel,” De Gelderlander, 12 December 1987.
129 H.L. Zwitzer, “De Jong parafraseert er op los,” NRC Handelsblad, 5 December 1997.
130 H.J.A. Hofland, “Een per abortus afgeslacht hoodstukje,” NRC Handelsblad, 9 December 1987.
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Indische volumes were published.”131 He did not explain why he only now 
made them public.
Veteran and writer Ben Laurens, in a thoughtful piece in the NRC Han-
delsblad, reminded readers that most soldiers had been young conscripts, 
“adolescents in war.” He compared their situation to those Dutchmen and 
women who had been forced labourers in Nazi Germany. He described the 
lives of these conscripts – two to three years of living in small, autonomous 
groups in rural areas, in an alien tropical environment while suffering from 
loneliness, tiredness and bad nutrition, with shoddy old uniforms, scared of 
an invisible enemy that practised castration, gouging out eyes and cutting 
out tongues. He wrote: “Many parents would never sleep again if they only 
knew how their child was butchered.” He concluded: “When judging the 
cruelties committed there by the Dutch, take this into account.”132
Two days later, Hofland replied, praising Laurens for not attacking De 
Jong, but instead painting a sympathetic portrait of the Dutch soldier. 
However, it was the politicians who sent these young conscripts to war 
that carry a heavy responsibility. Yet “the discourse around their guilt has 
not even started.”133
In a period of just over a month, Wilma Nanninga penned four attacks on 
De Jong. She claimed that De Jong had agreed to meet in December with his 
critical advisers and she asked Colonel Heshusius for his reaction: “I hope that 
we can convince Mister De Jong that he needs to bring affairs into balance.”134 
She related that a number of historians had written to the Minister for Educa-
tion, calling on the minister to prevent the publication of De Jong’s work 
in its present form.135 Keeping up the pressure, she interviewed a veteran, 
Captain Düster, a former intelligence chief in Batavia, who maintained 
that no act of cruelty from Dutch soldiers had gone unpunished.136 Düster 
f iled a case against De Jong for defamation.137 In late December, Nanninga 
published her fourth piece, a short interview with Ad Ploeg, member of 
parliament for the Liberal Party and chairman of the Parliamentary Defence 
131 H.L. Zwitzer, letter to the editor, NRC Handelsblad, 15 December 1987.
132 Ben Laurens, “Wat zijn wreedheden en excessen als het gaat om lijfsbehoud,” NRC Handels-
blad, 4 January 1988.
133 H.J.A. Hofland, “Het Verleden als tegenstander,” NRC Handelsblad, 6 January 1988.
134 Wilma Nanninga, “‘Excessen niet te vergelijken met Duitse en Japanse,’” De Telegraaf, 
20 November 1987.
135 Wilma Nanninga, “Historici kraken werk Loe de Jong,” De Telegraaf, 2 December 1987.
136 Wilma Nanninga and Menzo Willems, “Kapitein Duster nodigt historicus De Jong uit bewijzen 
te komen inzien: ‘Niet een wrede militair ongestraft gebleven,’” De Telegraaf, 12 December 1987.
137 “Aanklacht tegen De Jong,” Nieuwsblad van het Noorden, 11 December 1987.
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Committee, and the only member of parliament who was an Indies veteran. 
Ploeg revealed he had had a “solid discussion” with Minister of Education 
Deetman and that he was doing everything possible “to prevent historical 
injustice from occurring,” concluding: “I cannot permit this to happen in 
an off icial history, paid for by the state.” Ploeg argued that De Jong was 
“blinded by his socialism and his anti-colonial lens.”138
In early December, Jos Hagers published a piece about the funeral of 
recently deceased Captain Westerling in Amsterdam. In his concept text, 
De Jong had written that Westerling had committed serious war crimes. 
Hagers reported that the funeral had gathered over 800 veterans and had 
developed into “a mass demonstration against the history writing of Dr. Lou 
[sic] de Jong.”139 The following day Hagers wrote that the vice chairman of 
an organization representing Dutch World War Two resistance groups was 
also calling on the Minister for Education to intervene in order to prevent 
veterans and victims of war from suffering needless pain through inaccurate 
history writing.140
The following month, the court rejected Düster’s case against De Jong.141 
A few months later, De Jong’s f inal volume was published. He revealed that 
he now distanced himself from the leaked concept text. The new version, he 
assured the public, was rewritten because of his discussions with experts.142 
Remarkably, he include a lengthy criticism of Chapter 7 in an appendix, 
penned by one of his dissenting co-readers.
On pages 1,011-1,012, which in the concept text had been labelled “War 
Crimes” but was now labelled “Excesses,” he included a long footnote:
In October 1987 I confidentially shared, as usual, a concept for Chapter 7 
among about 40 persons, who included a number of experts on the Dutch-
Indonesian conflict, with the request that they supply me with their 
critical feedback. This section of the chapter was consequently passed 
on by one of the experts to various organizations, including the press, 
thereby infringing upon confidentiality. Soon it was circulating across 
the country in dozens, if not hundreds, of copies.143
138 Wilma Nanninga and Menzo Willems, “‘Ik doe er alles aan een historisch onrecht te 
voorkomen,’” De Telegraaf, 30 December 1987.
139 Jos Hagers, “Begrafenis van Westerling,” De Telegraaf, 2 December 1987.
140 Jos Hagers, “Verzet: Deetman moet De Jong corrigeren,” De Telegraaf, 3 December 1987.
141 “Geen vervolging van Prof. L. de Jong,” De Telegraaf, 24 January 1988.
142 “De Jong paste laatste deel na kritiek aan,” Nieuwsblad van het Noorden, 28 April 1988.
143 De Jong, Het Koninkrijk, vol. 12b, 1011-1012.
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He explained that criticism of the concept text from within his group of 
readers had brought him to the decision to make corrections. These correc-
tions included providing more contextual background to the committing 
of excesses by Dutch troops; providing arguments against the use of the 
term “war crimes”; refraining from making a comparison between, on the 
one hand, German behaviour in the Netherlands and Japanese behaviour 
in the East Indies and, on the other hand, Dutch behaviour in Indonesia. He 
expressed his deep sorrow that his work had caused a feeling of hurt among 
old soldiers. He added that the responsibility for causing this unnecessary 
hurt was the person who had leaked the document. Finally, he alerted the 
reader to the fact that he had included a criticism of the volume, written by 
retired Lieutenant-General F. van der Veen, in an appendix (1,012).
In what followed, he provided the context in which the Dutch had commit-
ted atrocities, describing how Indonesian nationalist rebels had slaughtered 
tens of thousands of their fellow Indonesians in the most horrible ways 
(1,013-1,015). He described how the Dutch faced the diff icult task of deciding 
how to respond to such awful violence, and that the decision made was 
to reply with counter-terror (1,015). He then gave numerous examples of 
counter-terror in action, especially under Westering. Thousands of men, 
women and children were killed in extrajudicial executions and massacres 
under Westerling’s command (1,017-1,021). De Jong described how military, 
as well as government, authorities were well informed about Westerling’s 
activities; the Dutch press had published reports on the massacres; the 
parliament in The Hague had been forced to set up an off icial inquiry 
which had resulted in a report and that all of this led to the decision to do 
nothing more (1,022-1,026). De Jong concluded that government ministers 
knew exactly what was going on in South Celebes and that “Westerling […] 
was nothing more than a tool” (1,026).
De Jong gave an account of other atrocities committed by Dutch troops 
(1,026-1,034). He quoted General Spoor using the term “war crimes” (1,029). 
This was followed by an account of the methods used by the Dutch Intel-
ligence and Security Service, which frequently included torturing and killing 
prisoners (1,034-1,037). Again, he quoted Spoor, who, alarmed by evidence of 
the widespread use of torture, in a report to the authorities in The Hague, 
compared the Dutch to the Kenpeitai, the Japanese political police (1,035). 
Similarly, he quoted a report to the prime minister that compared Dutch 
methods to those of the Gestapo (1,035).
De Jong’s analysis of Dutch military courts martial leaves no doubt that 
they were inadequate. While soldiers were found guilty of murder, not one 
senior off icer had been prosecuted (1,045). He argued that excesses were 
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never a secret, but had been publicized during the conflict in Vrij Nederland, 
Het Parool and De Groene Amsterdammer and that Frans Goedhart had 
often raised the issue in parliament (1,052). He added, “no one in politics 
in the Netherlands was unaware that excesses had been committed in the 
Indies” (1,053). However, this was “forgotten” until the Hueting interview 
(1,055). De Jong’s account of the publication of the Excessennota leaves no 
doubt that he found it to be insuff icient (1,055-1,058).
De Jong then discussed the use of the term “war crimes.” Admitting that 
the term does not exist under Dutch law, he argued that this form of legalism 
was a weak argument. He suggested that we should free ourselves from the 
fear that causes us to avoid the use of the term altogether. He recommended 
historians should focus on where the primary responsibility lay, namely, at 
the highest level of political authority (1,060).
Although De Jong maintained that the changes he had made were the re-
sult of discussions with experts, historian Jan Bank disagreed. Bank claimed 
that De Jong had compromised due to pressure from the “Colonial-military 
lobby.” Bank could not hide his disappointment: “In the good tradition of the 
Indische administration, a group of Indische military managed to shut De 
Jong’s mouth by means of appeals to the judge and minister, through personal 
threats and through the breaking of confidentiality.” He concluded that De 
Jong was a victim “of a verbal police action.”144 The Utrechts Nieuwsblad 
included two articles, both focusing on the controversy. The f irst reported 
on the press conference preceding the book launch, quoting De Jong, that 
Chapter 7 was “only a provisional attempt to draw up an outline of the 
conflict.”145 The second article gave the reaction of Colonel Heshusius. He 
still maintained that Chapter 7 was “insuff icient because you feel De Jong’s 
personal resentment.”146
Many regional and national newspapers celebrated the appearance of 
De Jong’s f inal volume as a major national event and hardly mentioned the 
controversy. There were exceptions. The Nieuwsblad van het Noorden focused 
on Chapter 7 and gave a positive summary of De Jong’s views regarding the 
decolonization.147 The newspaper also carried a sympathetic interview 
144 Jan Bank, “Koloniaal-militaire lobby brengt De Jong enigzins uit zijn evenwicht,” De 
Volkskrant, 28 April 1988.
145 “Stuk over Indië in boek De Jong heeft ‘voorlopig karakter,’” Utrechts Nieuwsblad, 28 April 1988.
146 “Oud-Knil-off icier Hoofdstuk over oorlogsmisdrijven nog onvoldoende,” Utrechts Nieuwsblad, 
28 April 1988.
147 “Nationaal besef tegen Duitsers en Indië,” Nieuwsblad van het Noorden, 28 April 1988. Peter 
van der Vusse, “Dr. L. de Jong is klaar: ‘Ik ben blij dat het werk er op zit,’” Nieuwsblad van het 
Noorden, 28 April 1988.
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with De Jong, as he looked back at the work that he had started in 1955, but 
without mentioning the recent controversy. Het Vrije Volk was outspoken 
in its support for De Jong. Maandag’s full-page review focused exclusively 
on Chapter 7 and reprinted De Jong’s footnote about the changes he had 
made. Maandag concluded that “war crimes” accurately described some of 
the actions of the Dutch during decolonization.148
By admitting that he felt the term “war crimes” to be inappropriate and 
the comparison of Dutch behaviour with German and Japanese beyond the 
pale, De Jong paradoxically forefronted the issue of war crimes. He refrained 
from referring to Dutch actions as being “war crimes” and he never compared 
the Dutch with the Germans or Japanese, but he did allow others to do so, 
quoting no less a historical actor than the commander-in-chief, General 
Spoor. Perhaps De Jong’s greatest stroke of genius was allowing one of his 
critics the space to present his case in the appendix. This seemed a humble 
gesture. However, Frans van der Veen’s argument already seemed weak in 
1988. From the vantage point of the twenty-f irst century, it is embarrassing. 
Van der Veen’s main point was that De Jong could not use the term “war 
crime” because the legal concept of Dutch war crimes was non-existent.149 
This spurious, legalistic argument holds no water; historiography does not 
depend on legal definitions. It would mean that historians must refrain from 
terms such as “Armenian genocide,” because the term “genocide” was not 
recognized under Ottoman law. Even historian Herman Bussemaker, no fan 
of De Jong, was forced to admit that Van der Veen’s argument “misses the 
moral aspect of the excesses, or war crimes.”150 Likewise, Oostindie argues 
that the Fourth Geneva Convention on war crimes may not be applicable 
to Dutch actions from a judicial point of view, yet for the historian today it 
offers a “sharp analytical framework.”151
Van der Veen argued that it was only in South Celebes that the Netherlands 
used systematic counter-terror tactics.152 Admitting that Westerling’s troops 
carried out 1,500 extrajudicial executions, he concluded that this was the 
only manner to protect the civilian population.153 This is an example of 
trying to diminish the importance of Dutch killing, but it is now also out of 
148 Ben Maandag, “De Waarheid over Indonesië: Term ‘oorlogsmisdaden’ is niet te vermijden,” 
Het Vrije Volk, 28 April 1988.
149 Frans van der Veen, “Het optreden van de Nederlandse en de Republikeinse strijdkrachten,” 
Appendix 2, in De Jong, Het Koninkrijk, vol. 12b, 1,135-1,137.
150 Bussemaker, Indisch verdriet, 171-172.
151 Oostindie, Soldaat, 28.
152 Van der Veen, “Het optreden,” 1,140.
153 Ibid., 1,146.
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date. In September 2011, a Dutch court found the Dutch state guilty of killing 
hundreds of civilians in Rawagede, Java, in 1947.154 This makes the attitude 
of De Jong’s biographer Bodewijn Smits all the more remarkable. He agreed 
with De Jong’s critics, claiming that the “weak spot” in De Jong’s argument 
was that the situation in the former colony was “much too complicated” 
when compared with the German occupation.155 Perhaps, but the courts 
have judged that war crimes were committed, vindicating De Jong’s concept 
text. Gouda commented on the De Jong controversy, “the proverbial cat had 
escaped from the bag.”156
By the late 1980s, a number of forces contested the collective memory 
of decolonization. The Indisch community awaited a vindication of their 
identity, which could come through a historical narrative constructed by 
the historical guild. A generation of postmemory authors had constructed 
postcolonial representations that problematized the phenomena of unre-
membering. A second generation of Moluccan activists had problematized 
their unremembered role in decolonization. A significant number of citizens, 
nudged out of unremembering, felt the history of decolonization to be 
something shameful, suspecting that the Dutch had failed to investigate the 
unsavoury part of their history. Due to inertia within the historical guild, 
they turned to television, radio and newspapers to express their views. 
Military veterans felt their experience had not been recognized. The Loe 
de Jong controversy stirred them out of their silence.
Bibliography
Bank, Jan. Katholieken en de Indonesische Revolutie. Barn: Ambo, 1983.
Baudet, Henri and Cees Fasseur. “Koloniale bedrijvigheid.” In De economische 
geschiedenis van Nederland, edited by J.H. van Stuijvenberg, 309-350. Groningen: 
Wolters-Noordhoff, 1979.
Baudet, H. and Meindert Fennema. Het Nederlands belang bij Indië. Utrecht/
Antwerp: Het Spectrum, 1983.
Bijkerk, J.C. De Laatste Landvoogd: Van Mook en het einde van Nederlandse invloed 
in Indië. Alphen aan den Rijn: A.W. Sijthoff, 1982.
154 The verdict of the judge 14-09-1011, ECLI:NL:RBSGR:2011:BS8793, Civil Court, The Haag, 
http://uitspraken.rechtspraak.nl/inziendocument?id=ECLI:NL:RBSGR:2011:BS8793, accessed 
17 July 2019.
155 Smits, Loe de Jong, 753-754.
156 Gouda, Dutch Culture Overseas, 30-32.
LOE DE JONg CONTROVERSY 229
Bloch, Marc. The Historian’s Craft. Translated by Peter Putnam. New York: Vintage 
Books, 1953.
Bogaerts, Els and Remco Raben. “Beyond Empire and Nation.” In Beyond Empire 
and Nation: Decolonizing Societies in Africa and Asia, 1930s-1970s, edited by Els 
Bogaerts and Remco Raben, 7-21. Leiden: KITLV Press, 2012.
Bourdieu, Pierre and Jean-Claude Passeron. Reproduction in Education, Society and 
Culture. Translated by Richard Nice. London: Sage publications, 1990.
Brante, Thomas. “Sociological Approaches to the Professions.” Acta Sociologica 31, 
no. 2 (1988): 119-142.
Bussemaker, Herman. Indisch verdriet: Strijd om erkenning. Amsterdam: Boom, 2014.
Cooper, Frederick. Colonialism in Question: Theory, Knowledge, History. Berkeley, 
Los Angeles and London: University of California Press, 2005.
Cote, Joost. “Strangers in the House: Dutch Historiography and Anglophone 
Trespassers.” Review of Indonesian and Malaysian Affairs 3, no. 1 (2009): 75-94.
Cribb, Robert. “Circles of Esteem, Standard Works, and Euphoric Couplets.” Critical 
Asian Studies 37, no. 2 (2005): 289-304.
Fasseur, Cees. Dubbelspoor: Herinneringen. Amsterdam: Balans, 2016.
Fasseur, Cees. Eigen meester, niemands knecht: Het leven van Pieter Sjoerds Gerbrandy, 
Minister-president van Nederland in de Tweede Wereldoorlog. Amsterdam: Balans, 
2014.
Fish, Stanley. “One More Time.” In Postmodern Sophistry: Stanley Fish and the Critical 
Enterprise, edited by Gary A. Olson and Lynn Worsham, 265-298. Albany: State 
University of New York Press, 2004.
Foray, Jennifer L. “Comparatively Exceptional: The Paradoxes of Twentieth-Century 
Dutch Imperialism and Decolonization.” The Dutch Empire between Ideas and 
Practise, 1600-2000, edited by René Koekkoek, Anne-Isabella Richard and Arthur 
Weststeijn, 89- 108. London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2019.
Gase, Ronald. Beel in Batavia: Van contact tot conflict – Verwikkelingen rond de 
Indonesische kwestie in 1948. Baarn: Anthos/In den Toren, 1986.
Gouda, Frances. Dutch Culture Overseas: Colonial Practice in the Netherlands Indies 
1900-1942. Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press, 1995.
Heffernan, Margaret. Wilful Blindness: Why We Ignore the Obvious at Our Peril. 
London: Simon and Schuster, 2012.
IJzereef, Willem. “De Zuid-Celebes affaire en de Nederlandse Pers 1946-1982.” 
Groniek 80 (1982): 49-54.
IJzereef, Willem. De Zuid-Celebes affaire: Kapitein Westerling en de standrechtelijke 
executies. Dieren: De Bataafse Leeuw, 1984.
Jaquet, Louis G.M. Aflossing van de Wacht: Bestuurlijke en politieke ervaringen in 
de nadagen van Nederlandsch-Indië. Rotterdam: A.D. Donker, 1978.
230 COLLEC TIVE MEMORY AND THE DUTCH EAST INDIES
Jong, Loe de. Het Koninkrijk der Nederlanden in de Tweede Wereldoorlog. Vol. 11a. 
Leiden: Martinus Nijhoff, 1985.
Jong, Loe de. Het Koninkrijk der Nederlanden in de Tweede Wereldoorlog. Vol. 12b. 
Leiden: Martinus Nijhoff, 1988.
Jonkman, Jan A. Nederland en Indonesië, beide vrij; Gezien vanuit het Nederlands 
Parlement. Assen/Amsterdam: Van Gorcum, 1977.
Kousbroek, Rudy. Het Oostindisch Kampsyndroom. Amsterdam: Olympus, 2005.
Kuitenbrouwer, Maarten. Dutch Scholarship in the Age of Empire and Beyond: 
KITLV – The Royal Netherlands Institute of Southeast Asian and Caribbean Studies, 
1851-2011. Leiden and Boston: Brill, 2014.
Lijphart, Arend. “Political Institutions, Divided Societies, and Constitutional 
Democracy.” In Passion, Craft, and Method in Comparative Politics, edited by 
Gerardo L. Munck and Richard Snyder, 237-244. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins 
University Press, 2007.
Maas, Peter F. Indië Verloren, Rampspoed Geboren. Amsterdam: De Bataafsche 
Leeuw, 1983.
Mink, Louis O. “The Theory of Practise: Hexter’s Historiography.” In After the 
Reformation: Essays in Honor of J.H. Hexter, edited by Barbara C. Malament, 
3-24. Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1980.
Moor, Jaap A. de. “Van vrije jongen tot ratu adil: De memoires van kapitein Raymond 
Westerling.” Indische Letteren 8, no. 1 (1993): 171-179.
Oostindie, Gert. Soldaat in Indonesiё 1945-1950: Getuigenissen van een oorlog aan 
de verkeerde kant van de geschiedenis. Amsterdam: Prometheus, 2015.
Oostindie, Gert, Irene Hoogenboom and Jonathan Verwey. “The Decolonization 
War in Indonesia, 1945-1949: War Crimes in Dutch Veteran’s Egodocuments.” 
War in History 25, no. 2 (2018): 254-276.
Poeze, Harry A. Tan Malaka: Strijder voor Indonesië’s vrijheid – levensloop van 1897 
tot 1945. The Hague: H.L. Smits, 1976.
Poeze, Harry A. Verguisd en Vergeten: Tan Malaka, de linkse beweging en de Indo-
nesische Revolutie, 1945-1949. 3 vols. Leiden: KITLV Uigeverij, 2007.
Raben, Remco. “Hoe wordt men vrij? De lange dekolonisatie van Indonesië.” In: Van 
Indië tot Indonesië, edited by Els Bogaerts and Remco Raben, 13-29. Amsterdam: 
Boom, 2007.
Reybrouck, David van. Revolusi: Indonesië en het onstaan van de modern wereld. 
Amsterdam: De Bezige Bij, 2020.
Robinson, Tjalie. Schrijven met je vuisten: Brieven van Tjalie Robinson, edited by 
Wim Willems, 81-84. Amsterdam: Prometheus, 2009.
Said, Edward W. Covering Islam: How the Media and the Experts Determine How 
We See the Rest of the World. London: Vintage, 1997 [1981].
LOE DE JONg CONTROVERSY 231
Said, Edward W. “Europe and its Others: An Arab perspective.” In States of Mind: 
Dialogues with Contemporary Thinkers, edited by Richard Kearney, 39-47. New 
York: New York University Press, 1995.
Said, Edward W. “Opponents, Audiences, Constituencies, and Community.” Critical 
Inquiry 9, no. 1 (1982): 1-26.
Said, Edward W. Orientalism. London: Penguin Books, 2003 [1978].
Schermerhorn, Wim. Het dagboek van Schermerhorn, 2 vols, edited by Cornelis 
Smit. Utrecht: Nederlands Historisch Genootschap, 1970.
Schmidt, Benjamin. “Dikes and Dunes: On Dutch History and Dutchness.” BMGN 
– Low Countries Historical Review 133, no. 1 (2018): 82-99.
Schulte Nordholt, Henk. “Locating Southeast Asia: Postcolonial Paradigms and 
Predicaments.” In Asia in Europe: Europeans in Asia, edited by Srilata Ravi, 
Beng-Lam Goh and Marrio Rutten, 36-56. Singapore: ISEAS Publications, 2004.
Smit, Cornelis. De Dekolonisatie van Indonesië. Groningen: H.D. Tjeenk Willink, 1976.
Smits, Boudewijn. Loe de Jong, 1914-2005: Historicus met een missie. Amsterdam: 
Boom, 2014.
Trouillot, Michel-Rolph. Silencing the Past: Power and the Production of History. 
Boston: Beacon Press, 1995.
Venner, Dominique. Westerling: De eenling. Amsterdam: Teleboek, 1982.
Wesseling, Henk L. Van Toen en Nu: Opinies en observaties over politiek, geschedenis 
en cultuur. Amsterdam: Prometheus-Bart Bakker, 2014.

7 Remembering the War
Abstract
Works by veterans during the late 1980s and 1990s illustrated the liminality 
of veterans’ experiences. Their unremembered narratives, ignored by 
historians, had failed to be integrated into the national collective memory. 
Oeroeg (1983), the anti-colonial f ilm directed by Hans Hylkema, loosely 
based on Hella Haasse’s novel, provided a restaging on screen similar to 
Hollywood’s Vietnam f ilms. A number of controversies, including the 
Boomsma affair, the Poncke Princen affair and the queen’s 1995 visit to 
Indonesia, kept the contested nature of collective memory prominently in 
the news throughout the mid-1990s. Television documentaries highlighted 
Dutch war crimes, including the massacre of Rawagede, while historians 
provided solidly researched accounts of the diplomatic side of the conflict 
as well as the business of running a war.
Keywords: liminality, decolonization, Dutch war crimes, Boomsma affair, 
Poncke Princen affair, collective memory
At a commemoration in 2016, marking 70 years since sending conscripts 
to f ight a colonial war against Indonesian nationalists, Dutch Minister for 
Defence Jeanine Hennis-Plasschaert said, “there is absolutely no point in 
walking away from the past. […] [T]he past will always occupy us.” She then 
said to the elderly veterans: “[Y]our commitment towards gaining recognition 
and appreciation laid the foundations for the present-day veteran policy.” 
She added: “We commemorate so that we do not forget.”1
We notice three things from this excerpt. Firstly, there is continuity – three 
decades after the Loe de Jong controversy, decolonization is still current. 
Secondly, there is change – it would seem that the age of unremembering 
1 “Toespraak van minister Hennis-Plasschaert bij de herdenking bij het National Indie-
monument 1945-1962 op 3 september 2016 te Roermond,” https://www.nim-roermond.nl/
toespraken/hennis2016.html, accessed 25 February 2021.
Doolan, P.M.M., Collective Memory and the Dutch East Indies. Unremembering Decolonization. 
Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press 2021
doi: 10.5117/9789463728744_CH07
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is over. Thirdly, the veterans are seemingly appreciated and remembered. 
The foundations for these changes did not emerge from work within the 
historical guild, but from the veterans. Provoked by the Loe de Jong con-
troversy, veterans organized, became more vocal and began to write their 
own histories, outside the hallowed halls of academia.
Ben Laurens: A Soldier Novelist
According to Indo author Joop van den Berg, the publication in 1986 of the 
novel Het Peleton (The platoon) by Ben Laurens and the memoir De heren 
worden bedankt (The gentlemen will be thanked) by Anton P. de Graaff 
constituted a new genre that, for the f irst time, confronted the core issue, 
“a merciless war between two equal parties […] with cruelties inflicted 
back and forth.”2
We have seen Ben Laurens involved in a polemic with Henk Hofland 
in the pages of the NRC Handelsblad in 1988. In June 1985, Laurens had 
taken early retirement from his teaching career. He announced that, now 
that he had the time, his intention was to write about his experiences as a 
conscript stationed on Java during 1948-1950. “That period has been long 
buried in silence,” he commented.3 Two works of f iction duly appeared – a 
novel, Het Peloton in 1986, and a collection of stories De Vreet Patrouille (The 
dispatched patrol) in 1987.
Het Peloton, begins with a preface that lays out the intention of the author. 
Firstly, Laurens wishes to provoke all those outf itted with a “corrective 
memory,” pointing out that at the time of the conflict, with the sole excep-
tion of the Dutch Communist Party, all Dutch political parties and the 
overwhelming majority of the population fully supported the war against 
Indonesian independence.4 In other words, he intended to undo decades of 
unremembering. Secondly, his purpose is to eradicate the myth that the war 
consisted of two “police actions,” with nothing much happening in between 
or after. Laurens informs the reader that the total number of fatal causalities 
among the Dutch during the f irst and second police actions were 127 and 
71, respectively. The total number of dead, however, was 2,589 (Peloton, 7-8).
There is a great amount of brutality in both books, sometimes perpetrated 
by the Indonesian nationalists, but especially by Dutch soldiers. We learn 
2 Joop van den Berg, “Boeken over Indie raken eindelijk de kern,” Trouw, 20 August 1988.
3 “Mijn boek ontstond door tijdnood in de klas,” Het Vrije Volk, 16 June 1985.
4 Laurens, Het Peloton, 7.
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that the average Dutch soldier felt a close connection with the Indonesian 
population, but this did not prevent him from carrying out merciless actions 
(Peloton, 184). After a soldier is abducted and tortured to death, the Dutch 
in their anger, destroy everything they come across, including livestock 
(Peloton, 193). After brutal interrogation of two prisoners, they decapitate 
both, having forced them to dig their own graves (Peloton, 196-199). They 
torture prisoners by means of electric shocks, then kill them.5 Newly arrived 
soldiers receive the advice that if they ever injure a civilian, it was better to 
f inish them off, because “the dead can’t complain” (Vreet, 79).
Soldiers routinely have sex with women, including prostitutes (Vreet, 68; 
98-99). Children are born after dalliances with local women (Vreet, 46). The 
commander of the platoon complains about numerous diseases that his 
soldiers suffer from: “About VD he wouldn’t even start, or he would still be 
sitting here tomorrow morning” (Vreet, 30). Soldiers swap tall stories about 
the cruel treatments for venereal disease (Vreet, 159-160).
One might ask, how can Laurens get away with these sort of accusations 
while Loe De Jong could not? However, Laurens’ work places Dutch brutality 
against a background in which the soldiers are lonely, terrif ied and betrayed 
by their government. As his publisher argued, Laurens described incidents 
that were unacceptable, but placed them “in the right context.”6 The 
soldiers’ barracks lacks proper electrical lighting (Vreet, 12-13). They lack 
radios, walkie-talkies and even carrier pigeons (Peloton, 36; Vreet, 14-17). 
Their guns are shoddy and easily jam (Peloton, 141-142). Transportation 
vehicles are few (Vreet, 52). Soldiers suffer from a lack of basic medical 
equipment (Peloton, 173-175).
The Dutch public betrayed the soldiers at a time of war and continued 
to do so: “[C]ivilians of their beloved Fatherland promptly forgot the sons 
that they had sent here and who had been broken” (Peloton, 178). Laurens 
comments on the Dutch public of the 1980s when he has the narrator predict 
that sometime in the future there will be a generation that, when hearing 
of the victims among the military, will dismiss this with the judgement 
that they had been f ighting for the wrong side (Peloton, 178-179). While 
for Zwaan, Schilt and Varenne the war had been brutal, for Laurens what 
made the war unbearable was the betrayal. His books form a double j’accuse 
against, not simply the military authorities or the government leadership, 
but the Dutch public and historians, who from the 1940s until the 1980s 
continue to unremember.
5 Laurens, De Vreet Patrouille, 65-67.
6 Willem Donker, “Boomsma,” NRC Handelsblad, 6 June 1994.
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Laurens offered representations of the conditions that the soldiers 
worked in. Unable to differentiate between friend and foe, living among 
rats and vermin, always at risk of falling prey to disease or to the enemy, 
undersupplied and betrayed by their government and seemingly forgotten 
by their country, they gambled their lives for nothing. We are reminded of 
his words: “When judging the cruelties committed there by the Dutch, take 
this into account.”7 Remembering is constructed in the social environ-
ment of the present. These books were written with an act of remembering 
turned towards Laurens’ experiences during the 1940s but are rooted in the 
decolonization discourse of the late 1980s.
The f irst review of Het Peloton contained a double error. The reviewer 
claimed that Laurens’ novel was the f irst to describe the “police actions.” 
Firstly, the novel is set during the period of guerrilla warfare that followed 
the last so-called “police action.” Secondly, the reviewer was unaware of the 
previous novels that had been penned by Indonesia veterans.8 Laurens was 
quoted as complaining that Dutch people have more sympathy for American 
Vietnam veterans than the Dutch Indonesia veterans. No television maker 
has ever found it worthwhile to make a documentary about the Indonesia 
veterans or to cover their annual reunions, he argued. The entire period was 
“repressed.”9 Joop van den Berg compared Het Peloton to Norman Mailer’s 
The Naked and the Dead, claiming that it successfully evoked how “a small 
handful of men, with extremely bad supplies, had to f ight against an all 
present enemy […] in a war of nerves.”10 He praised De Vreet Patrouille for 
its sharp evocation of the bloodiness and cruelty of war.11 Historian Joop 
de Jong argued that Het Peloton provided an important corrective to the 
accepted image of the war, reminding readers that the Netherlands, “with 
massive support from parliament and public opinion,” had sent young 
conscripts to f ight in a war that they did not understand.12 I have been 
unable to f ind any reviews attacking Laurens for exposing the cruelties 
that Dutch soldiers inflicted upon the enemy. Clearly, it made a difference 
that he was a veteran himself. That Laurens’ work was received positively by 
7 Ben Laurens, “Wat zijn wreedheden en excessen als het gaat om lijfsbehoud,” NRC Handels-
blad, 4 January 1988.
8 Tjitte de Vries, “Eerste Nederlandse roman over politionele acties,” Het Vrije Volk, 
15 November 1986.
9 Ibid.
10 Joop van den Berg, “Te zwaar aangezet oorlogsverslag,” Trouw, 29 January 1987.
11 Joop van den Berg, “Boeken,” Trouw, 15 February 1988.
12 Joop de Jong, “Hollandse soldaten in Indië kenden een doel – overleven,” De Volkskrant, 
25 April 1987.
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his former comrades can be concluded by the fact that, during the biggest 
ever reunion of Indonesia veterans, he was kept busy signing copies of both 
books for his former comrades.13
Yet, the Dutch public seemed uninterested. In 1990, Het Peloton received 
a second printing. However, both books sank into oblivion. In 2015, Laurens 
was overlooked when a research team in Leiden spent three years gathering 
and analysing a “complete” collection of veteran’s published egodocuments 
– diaries, memoirs, stories and novels.14 The team published a “complete” 
online bibliography of known works. It still lacks the name Laurens.15
Anton P. de Graaff and The Way Back
In 1986, Anton P. de Graaff was middle-aged, with a career in international 
business. Four decades earlier, he had spent eight weeks f ighting as a con-
scripted soldier in the Dutch East Indies. Between 1986 and his death in 
2008, he published eighteen books about the colonial war, was knighted 
and acclaimed as the most inf luential spokesperson of the East Indies 
veterans.16 Unknown in 1986, f ive years later he met members of the royal 
family.17 Generals in the Indonesian army and ministers in the Indonesian 
government became readers of his early books. Most significantly, De Graaff’s 
goal of gaining some recognition for the plight of the East Indies veterans 
was achieved.18
In 1988, the Dutch authorities unveiled the monument to the veterans of 
the decolonization conflict, the National East Indies Monument, 1945-1962, 
in Roermond. De Graaff complained about how few members of the royal 
family or ministers of government paid their respects at the new monu-
ment.19 Shortly after, Prime Minister Wim Kok began regularly attending 
the annual commemoration.20 In 2020, Prime Minister Mark Rutte gave 
13 Huib Goudriaan, “‘Fantastisch’ weerzien voor vergeten leger,” Trouw, 19 October 1987.
14 Oostindie, Soldaat, 319-320.
15 Gepubliceerde egodocumenten van Nederlandse militairen in/veteranen uit de oorlog 
in Indonesië, 1945-1950 (26 April 2017), https://www.kitlv.nl/wp-content/uploads/2017/04/
Lijst-met-gepubliceerde-egodocumenten-Indi%C3%AB-veteranen-26-april-2017.pdf, accessed 
4 January 2018.
16 Charles Sanders, “Indiëveteraan/auteur De Graaff overladen,” De Telegraaf, 7 January 2008.
17 “Prins Bernhard krijgt boek verbroederingsreis,” Nederlands Dagblad, 20 June 1991.
18 Noel van Bermmel, “Pleitzorger voor de gewone Indië-veteraan,” De Volkskrant, 8 January 2008.
19 De Graaff, Zeg, 15.
20 Huib Goudriaan, “Veteranen bevochten erkenning: Vijftig jaar na Indië-oorlog is Nederland 
nu zuinig op oude en jonge ex-militairen,” Trouw, 26 July 1997.
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the commemoration speech, drawing attention to his personal postmemory 
experience of the conflict.21 Perhaps the best illustration of De Graaff ’s 
influence is found in the 2016 speech of Hennis-Plaschaert, with which I 
started this chapter, where she quoted directly from De Graaff’s work.22
In 1988, De Graaff did not make his intentions a secret. In an attack on 
the historical guild, he wrote, “We, old East Indies soldiers, want to gain 
recognition, that we went to present-day Indonesia by order of the Dutch 
government and left a part of our youth there. We, old East Indies soldiers, 
want this to be mentioned in the school textbooks and that history will no 
longer be silenced.”23 The subtitle of his f irst volume is Het Vergeten Leger 
(The forgotten army) and he repeatedly hammered home the injustice of 
being unremembered.
Unremembering had begun as the war approached its end. De Graaff 
describes the situation in 1949: “three lads of 21 years old lie in freshly dug 
graves and another four are missing in action while in the Bijenkorf [a 
department store in Amsterdam] a new window display is being readied.”24 
In Amsterdam, “police direct the traff ic, a cyclist gets a f ine because he 
didn’t stick his hand out, and a housewife complains because milk is 
one cent dearer. […] [N]o one pays attention to the list of casualties way 
down at the bottom right of the front page.”25 Though hostilities ended in 
1949, thousands of young Dutch soldiers remained stationed in the newly 
independent Indonesia, while the home front in Holland “starts to become 
silent. […] [W]e became the ‘defeated’ army, now we are THE FORGOTTEN 
ARMY.”26
Unremembering continued when soldiers came home:
The ex-soldiers returned to a society in which there were those who were 
ashamed of this war and who wanted it to be forgotten. […] [T]heir own 
children approach it like this – in ignorance – [and] their father and lots 
21 “Toespraak minister-president Mark Rutte bij de Nationale Herdenking 15 augustus 2020 
bij het Indisch monument in Den Haag,” https://www.rijksoverheid.nl/documenten/toe-
spraken/2020/08/15/toespraak-van-minister-president-mark-rutte-bij-de-nationale-herdenking-
15-augustus-1945, accessed 27 February 2021.
22 “Toespraak van minister Hennis-Plasschaert bij de herdenking bij het Nationaal Indië Monu-
ment 1945-1962 op 3 september 2016 te Roermond,” https://www.nim-roermond.nl/toespraken/
hennis2016.html, accessed 25 February 2021.
23 De Graaff, De weg, 7-8.
24 De Graaff, De heren, 4.
25 Ibid., 43.
26 Ibid., 156.
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of other veterans didn’t speak, and still don’t speak about it with their 
wives.”27
A soldier who wanted to talk felt like, “a stranger in his own family.”28 Decades 
later De Graaff visited a Dutch war cemetery in Indonesia: “Graves of lads 
that no one in Holland ever thinks about anymore.”29 He calls for historians 
to do their job: “It is not acceptable that lads of 20-21 years of age lie there, 
that in total more than 5,000 lads remain buried there and that this is not 
mentioned in the school textbooks.”30 Recent events, not least the Loe de 
Jong controversy, had provoked discussion about Dutch military actions 
in the former colony, but, according to De Graaff, “we are still a ‘forgotten 
army,’ because as long as our history is kept away from children in schools, 
our history will die together with us.”31
De Graaff presented a picture of a futile war without redeemable qualities, 
a war in which the lives of the ordinary soldier, in the eyes of the Dutch 
authorities, were held to be cheap.32 He admitted that they had arrived 
with the notion that they would restore order and peace, but were reduced 
to f ighting for their lives, while “what the gentlemen in The Hague decide 
leaves us cold.”33 He told of four of his comrades taken prisoner by the 
enemy and held for three and a half months. The Dutch military authorities 
deducted their pay for their time spent in captivity.34
De Graaff’s battalion spent 75 weeks in Indonesia, though only the f irst 
eight were spent f ighting. After eight weeks, the ceasef ire kicked in. In 
other words, his brigade of badly trained conscripts were shipped to the 
front, at a time when the military and political authorities in The Hague 
were fully aware that it was a lost cause. Van Doorn, co-author of Ontsporing 
van geweld, asked in the foreword to De Graaff’s f irst book, “Why did they 
sacrif ice human lives for a cause that was being politically resolved?”35 
After visiting the graves of eight of his former comrades in Bandung, all 
killed at the age of 21, De Graaff reflected: “They shouldn’t have been lying 
27 De Graaff, Brieven, 10-11.
28 De Graaff, Merdeka, 167.
29 De Graaff, De weg, 24.
30 De Graaff, Brieven, 13.
31 De Graaff, Met de TNI, 166.
32 De Graaff, De heren, 55.
33 Ibid., 74.
34 Ibid., 88.
35 J.A.A. van Doorn, foreword to De Graaff, De heren, 12.
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there” because by the time they arrived in Indonesia, the war “that must 
not be called a war, was in fact, already over.”36
The weeks that they spent f ighting were intense and unforgettable. He 
described a patrol being ambushed. When they recovered the body of their 
corporal, they found a bullet hole in his groin, his throat slashed open, his 
left ear and nose cut off.37 He described the fear among the inexperienced 
young men, as hundreds of Indonesian soldiers under Japanese off icers 
surrounded them in the jungle: “I still see the terrif ied faces around me 
and hear the despairing voices asking what we should do. Living creatures 
in mortal fear. Lads like me, who just like me had had no experience of 
anything and now ran around praying or cursing.”38 This did not necessarily 
diminish the significance of Dutch military violence; rather, by providing the 
historical context, it emphasized the gravity of decisions taken in Batavia 
and The Hague.
Although De Graaff’s battalion saw only eight weeks of f ighting, what 
followed the end of hostilities was in some ways even worse. Repatriation 
took over a year: “Some men […] lose it. They cannot stand the loneliness, 
the longing for home, cannot bear the longing for wife or f iancé anymore. 
[…] Driven crazy, they go into the kampong [village] and come out with 
a venereal disease.”39 The city of Semarang became a “Wild West” city 
with the disarmed Dutch becoming victims of “muggings, car theft, and 
burglaries.”40
De Graaff gave numerous examples of how veterans still carried the 
memory of their experience, in the form of physical and mental scars. 
One returns from the conflict with a major loss of hearing.41 One spends 
20 years taking drugs in order to f ight nightmares, dizziness, depression 
and fear of the dark (Brieven, 30). Another suffers from stomach infections 
and gastric haemorrhages (Brieven, 47). Depression forces one into early 
retirement (Brieven, 45). Another admits that he became a torment to his 
family (Brieven, 48).
De Graaff is angry that these men received inadequate state support. 
Indeed, the government cannot even supply the exact number of Dutch 
fatalities in the war (Brieven, 115). Having undertaken a return journey to 
Indonesia, De Graaff feels that this is what many veterans need. However, 
36 De Graaff, De weg, 96-97.




41 De Graaff, Brieven, 29.
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most cannot afford to undertake such a journey and the government refuses 
to pay (Brieven, 8, 13, 30-31, 62). De Graaff argues that psychological scars 
have passed to the second generation, giving the example of a woman who 
cannot mourn properly for the father she never met, because he lies in a 
cemetery in Indonesia. Neither she nor her mother can afford the journey 
(Brieven, 47).
De Graaff undertook the journey back to Indonesia, together with a small 
group of comrades, and found it to be healing. They had gone on patrol 
again to “liberate themselves from the memory that has haunted them for 
38 years” (De weg, 10). They returned to the place of their nightmares to 
discover that returning “was their best form of therapy, […] a way of coming 
to terms with their unprocessed memories” (De weg, 107).
Having completed three books that had sold well, De Graaff might have 
been forgiven for concluding that his work was done. In December 1990, how-
ever, De Graaff accepted an invitation from Lt. General Dading Kalbuardi, 
Inspector General of the Department of Defence in Indonesia, to organize an 
off icial visit of veterans to Indonesia.42 The visit took place in March 1991. 
The following month, De Graaff declared the trip to have been “1,000 per 
cent successful,” having been treated like heads of state, and his traumas 
had disappeared. Thinking of the war crimes discourse dominating Dutch 
media, he remarked that Indonesian former freedom fighters regarded the 
entire decolonization as a “misunderstanding.”43 A few months later, De 
Graaff’s account of the visit was published.
De Graaff informed the reader: “Returning to Indonesia is the best 
therapy.”44 He returned with other veterans to the scene of a Tentara 
Nasional Indonesia (TNI, Indonesian National Military) ambush in which 
three Dutch soldiers had been killed. The veterans include Bartels, who 
had been captured by the TNI. They met a local villager called Salimin, 
who turned out to be one of the f ighters who had captured Bartels. Salimin 
asks Bartels to forgive him: “Bartels begins to cry,” but soon, “Salimin, his 
former enemy, and Bartels, walk hand in hand along the railway” (Met de 
TNI, 28). The photograph on the cover of the book shows the two former 
enemies walking hand in hand.
The veterans walk the path that in 1949 had been the scene of a fatal ambush. 
They walk with one of their former enemies who admits how easy it had been to 
shoot them and then disappear in the jungle. The experience brings healing, De 
42 Jos Hegers, “Historische ontmoeting op Midden-Java,” De Telegraaf, 6 December 1990.
43 “Indiëgangers terug in Indonesië,” Nederlands Dagblad, 6 April 1991.
44 De Graaff, Met de TNI, 29.
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Graaff remarking: “This cannot be described! This means the definite end of the 
trauma” (Met de TNI, 128). Journalist Rinze Brandsma, who had accompanied 
the group and whose article is included in De Graaff’s book, described it as 
“the final coming to terms with unprocessed memories” (Met de TNI, 168).
Mixed groups of Dutch and TNI veterans travelled together to villages 
where they once had fought each other. As they eat together and enjoy each 
other’s company, they exchanged name tags in an act of fraternization (Met 
de TNI, 118-124). In Semarang, the Dutch visited the Dutch war cemetery, 
together with members of a militant student group that had been their enemy 
and had killed their comrades who now lay in these graves (Met de TNI, 153). 
That evening the Indonesian Minister of Defence, and seven generals and 
three admirals, joined them for an off icial dinner. De Graaff described the 
scene: “There is no difference anymore; we all sit there as soldiers and old 
soldiers” (Met de TNI, 163). More receptions followed at the homes of generals 
and admirals and the Dutch embassy (Met de TNI, 180-183).
From a historical perspective, the book included three chapters of interest. 
Brigadier-General Hardijono chronicled the Indonesian military side of the 
story regarding the conflict in the area of Wonosobo (Met de TNI, 45-83). 
R. Wahjudi Brotodiredjo wrote a short history of his student resistance 
organization (Met de TNI, 96-110). One chapter, assembled especially for 
the Dutch visitors, offered an Indonesian perspective on the f irst “police 
action” (Met de TNI, 135-150). No one within the Dutch historical guild had 
produced an account with such diverse perspectives.
This point was not lost on reviewers. Though Jan Hoffenaar was clearly ir-
ritated by De Graaff’s name-dropping, he admitted that the three Indonesian 
chapters “give insight into the organization and tactics of these groups,” 
adding that there had been very little of Indonesian memory literature 
published in Dutch.45 Joop van den Berg noted that it had taken 40 years 
to gain the f irst image of the Indonesian soldier.46 J.A. van Hooglander 
judged that the three chapters made De Graaff ’s work “unique” as they 
demonstrated the vision and motivations of the Indonesian freedom fighters 
and convincingly showed that Dutch war making had been futile.47
In his further work, De Graaff continued to complicate the one-dimen-
sional Dutch perspective on the conflict. His book Notities van een soldaat 
(Notes from a soldier) focused on the Dutch volunteer soldier, Adrian van der 
Heiden, while Zeg, Hollands soldaat… (Hey, Dutch soldier…) from 1995, was 
45 Jan Hoffenaar, “Veteranen,” NRC Handelsblad, 31 August 1991.
46 Joop van den Berg, “Omzien met steeds minder wrok,” Trouw, 3 August 1991.
47 J.A. van Hollander, “met de TNI op stap,” Nederlands Dagblad, 26 June 1991.
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based on letters written by a young conscripted Dutch soldier. This volume 
opened with a full-page photograph of the Indonesian, Trisunu, who had 
accompanied the group during their reconciliation trip of 1991. The caption 
under the photograph read “freedom f ighter Trisunu.”48
His next volume, Merdeka, from 1995, offered a postcolonial perspective 
on the conflict, using multiple perspectives.49 The title alone gives us 
pause. “Merdeka” (“Freedom”) was the slogan that Indonesian nationalists 
shouted and painted on walls in 1945. De Graaff explained: “Freedom, 
which was hard fought, but eventually led to a great Indonesia, which this 
year remembers that independence was proclaimed 50 years ago.”50 The 
cover of the book showed a photograph of Indonesian soldiers and the f irst 
page a photograph of a small group of “freedom f ighters,” two of whom 
are named (Merdeka, 4). The book contained eight photographs showing 
people – two photographs of Dutch soldiers, one of Indonesian women and 
f ive of Indonesian freedom f ighters. The book ended with an explanation 
of the symbol for the Republic of Indonesia, the Garuda (Merdeka, 172-173). 
All of this reflected a sympathetic interest in the former enemy.
Merdeka is De Graaff ’s f irst venture into what seems to be historical 
f iction, based on a manuscript by the “white Indonesian,” Pim Coulson 
(Merdeka, 7). The book has a number of main characters, Indonesian, Indisch 
and Dutch. One of the Indonesians, Hamdani, is a thug who terrorizes his 
own people (Merdeka, 66-70, 76-77, 135-137). Some Dutch soldiers spend 
their free time with prostitutes (Merdeka, 39-50). Two soldiers of the KNIL 
(Royal Netherlands East Indies Army) sell weapons to the enemy (Merdeka, 
51-55). Their behaviour contrasts sharply with the Indonesian freedom 
f ighter Lieutenant Marsoedi, a hero of the book. Marsoedi leads an attack 
on a Dutch position. The attack is described from an Indonesian point of 
view. Marsoedi is portrayed as a leader who holds the respect of soldiers 
and who has a strong sense of justice (Merdeka, 13-21). He is captured by the 
Dutch and earns the admiration of his jailers and lawyer. The latter reflects: 
“a freedom f ighter, but how obscene it was that a state of war didn’t exist. 
There were only police actions of a lawful authority” (Merdeka, 113). Facing 
execution, Marsoedi meets his end with dignity (Merdeka, 149-156). This 
contrasts with the behaviour of a member of the KNIL, jailed for illegally 
selling weapons. Terrif ied, he hangs himself in his cell (Merdeka, 126).
48 De Graaff, Zeg, 6.
49 De Graaff’s Merdeka, like the works of Ben Laurens, is not included in Oostindie’s bibliography 
of veterans’ published egodocuments.
50 De Graaff, Merdeka, 7.
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A leading character is an Indonesian tani or peasant. We learn his name, 
Serin. We discover his thoughts, as well as those of his wife. He is abused 
by thugs and is then badly beaten by the Dutch (Merdeka, 65-88). Serin is 
a victim twice over, but we would be mistaken to conclude that De Graaff 
allows the subaltern no agency. Serin weighs up his options and carries 
out an action that pleases the Dutch authorities, but avoids reprisal when 
Merdeka is achieved (Merdeka, 135-140, 144-145). His cautious wisdom ensures 
his survival. The book ends with him feeling “good and content,” back on 
his patch of land in the village where the flag of the Republic of Indonesia 
now waves freely (Merdeka, 167).
De Graaff’s sympathy for the cause of Indonesian independence deepens his 
conviction that it was a futile war. This means that he and other young men who 
were fulfilling their military service were the first victims of the Dutch “historic 
miscalculations.”51 Dutch soldiers were victims, and so it is irritating that Dutch 
media and Loe de Jong have branded them war criminals. In Merdeka, a Dutch 
soldier called De Rooie is portrayed as being well intentioned and honest. 
Like the Indonesian freedom fighter Marsoedi, he is an honest man fulfilling 
his duty. Like Marsoedi, he is killed, a victim of a futile war brought about by 
politicians in The Hague.52 De Graaff could not resist lecturing the reader. He 
argued that such a soldier “was the opposite of what some people – let’s call 
them the ‘mad bloodsuckers’ – now, 50 years later, try to scream about the old 
East Indies soldiers.”53 He dismissed what had been said on television about 
war crimes: “every old East Indies soldier knows himself if he is guilty or not.”54
This is not to say that De Graaff ignored Dutch soldiers behaving badly. He 
showed that drunkenness was common.55 The off icer class was particularly 
given to drunken debauchery.56 Dutch soldiers traded tinned good and 
cigarettes for sex.57 With the newly independent Indonesia suffering from 
shortages and rising prices, Dutch soldiers made a quick prof it selling 
military goods on the black market.58 Soldiers gave in to loneliness and 
turned to prostitutes for relief.59 Many contacted venereal diseases.60
51 F.L. Meijer, foreword to De Graaff, Zeg, 8.
52 De Graaff, Merdeka, 148.
53 Ibid., 147.
54 De Graaff, De weg, 110.
55 De Graaff, De heren, 32-37.
56 De Graaff, Zeg, 106-107.
57 De Graaff, Merdeka, 37.
58 De Graaff, De heren, 148.
59 De Graaff, De heren, 102; 153; Brieven, 101; Zeg, 106, 113.
60 De Graaff, De heren, 123-124.
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De Graaff supplied notable examples of Dutch violent excesses. Prison-
ers were beaten.61 Intelligence was gained through hard interrogations.62 
Kampongs were burned.63 Wounded enemies were shot dead.64 In one 
passage, soldiers from the KNIL hunt down a TNI group and their Japanese 
instructor, subject them to hard interrogation, force them to dig their own 
graves, then shoot them dead.65 However, many of these incidents are silently 
justif ied through the context. Excesses were committed in response to the 
killing of Dutch soldiers. The worst excesses were perpetrated by KNIL 
soldiers, the survivors of brutal Japanese imprisonment.
De Graaff argued that conscripted young Dutch soldiers were victims. 
It is hard to see a victim as a perpetrator. This is underscored in Zeg, 
Hollands soldaat…, which closed with pages copied from a manual that 
had been supplied to soldiers. The manual explained how Dutch soldiers 
should search a kampong. When searching a house, it is recommended to 
never shoot in the air, but to shoot directly through the bamboo walls of 
the house, from above to below. The soldier should then use his bayonet 
to cut the supporting ropes, causing the walls to collapse. The soldier 
should then search the house by stabbing with his bayonet anything that 
might hide a human. General Spoor, the commander-in-chief, issued these 
instructions to the soldiers.66 De Graaff adds the rhetorical question: “Is 
it crazy, that not hundreds but thousands of old East Indies soldiers are 
walking around with traumas?”67 De Graaff records one veteran: “I was 
not a war criminal, I was not a user of whores, I was not an alcoholic, I was 
not a moral degenerate,” adding, “Where was Loe de Jong in the period 
from 1945 to 1950?”68
De Graaff reports a conversation between him and other veterans:69
De Graaff: The war was completely futile; entirely wrong. […] Things were 
done there that are not acceptable. But not by our battalion.
Van Erp: I don’t like to hear that we were war criminals.
61 De Graaff, De weg, 104; Merdeka, 47, 140-141.
62 De Graaff, Zeg, 22-23.
63 De Graaff, De weg, 106.
64 De Graaff, Brieven, 32.
65 De Graaff, Merdeka, 99-108.
66 De Graaff, Zeg, 134-139.
67 Ibid., 140.
68 De Graaff, Brieven, 104-105.
69 De Graaff, De weg, 116.
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Marius: Still, it begins to eat at you. Like rust. If you don’t scrape it off, it 
eats through and destroys you.
De Graaff: No, the best medicine is to return to Indonesia.
This passage reveals interesting points. Firstly, Van Erp’s remark indicates 
how sensitive the veterans had become to the dominant mode of discourse 
during the late 1980s. Secondly, Marius’ remark is ambiguous. It is not clear 
if what “begins to eat you” is a sense of guilt, or if it is the accusations, 
that begins to eat you. I suspect it is the latter. Thirdly, De Graaff ’s “not 
by our battalion” is ambiguous. He seems to be saying that war crimes 
did take place – “but not in our battalion.” Finally, there is De Graaff’s last 
remark. The best medicine is to return. The power of the return is twofold. 
It provides therapy that relieves trauma. It brings one to the realization that 
the Indonesians themselves are not obsessed by the issue of war crimes. The 
entire conflict was a “misunderstanding.” In a radio interview, De Graaff 
claimed that he and his former enemies had become brothers – “We don’t 
accuse each other of anything, so would the people in Holland please stop 
their whining about war crimes.”70
The popularity of De Graaff’s books among veterans, and the popularity 
of embarking on a journey back to Indonesia, can be understood if we frame 
the plight of the veterans within a concept from cultural anthropology, 
namely, liminality. Arnold van Gennep argued that, implicit in the lives of 
human beings, are a succession of stages, with beginnings and ends, events 
like birth, puberty, marriage, parenthood, death, and so on. Each event is 
accompanied by a rite of passage, the purpose being “to enable the individual 
to pass from one defined position to another.”71 Van Gennep’s insight was 
to propose that rites of passage can be subdivided into rites of separation, 
transition and incorporation.72 He called these stages preliminal, liminal 
and postliminal. Preliminal rites involve “separation from a previous world.” 
Liminal rites are “executed during the transitional stage.” Postliminal rites 
are “ceremonies of incorporation into the new world.”73
This can be applied to conscripted soldiers. They pass through a preliminal 
stage – leaving home for residence in a barracks, getting a military-style 
haircut, donning a uniform. This marks them as separated from their 
70 This interview was broadcast after his return from Indonesia in 1991 and rebroadcast upon 
his death in 2008: Omroep Brabant, In memoriam Anton de Graaff, 7 January 2008.
71 Van Gennep, The Rites, 3.
72 Ibid., 11.
73 Ibid., 21.
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previous world. The liminal stage involves life in the army. Here, one lives 
within a horizon radically different from the norms and values of the regular 
world, most clearly def ined by the fact that soldiers are trained to kill. 
For the Dutch soldiers in Indonesia, this liminal stage involved becoming 
violent actors operating out of sight from the home front. An important 
rite is the postliminal stage, in which the soldier is reincorporated into the 
civilian world. For the Dutch soldier in Indonesia, reincorporation would 
have to wait years, until their return to the Netherlands, and would only 
be partially successful.
The work of British cultural anthropologist Victor Turner focused on 
the “betwixt and between” stage of liminality, in which liminal entities 
are “neither here nor there,” but living beyond what is customary.74 Turner 
realized that the liminal stage can become permanent. Instead of a threshold, 
the liminal becomes a way of life.75 For instance, certain monastic orders 
withdraw from the world and transition becomes “a permanent condition.”76
Turner argued that those who live in a liminal state “tend to develop an 
intense comradeship and equalitarianism,” what he calls “communitas.”77 
Communitas is spontaneous and equalitarian. He characterized the 
relational quality of communitas as “unmediated communication, even 
communion,”78much like what was described in Varenne’s work of 1969. 
Communitas is regarded as dangerous by non-liminal society.79
Recent studies indicate that recovery from battlefield experiences depend 
on the society that the soldier re-enters.80 The failure of reincorporation 
leaves former combatants in a liminal state, susceptible to trauma. Laurens, 
De Graaff and thousands more, feeling themselves to be members of a forgot-
ten army, had lived for decades, partially, in a liminal state. This is suggested 
in the title of one of De Graaff’s later books, Levenslang op patrouille (Lifelong 
on patrol).81 The failure was one of postliminal reincorporation. Young 
men, separated from the world they had grown up in, were trained and sent 
to kill and returned to a society intent on post-war reconstruction. They 
were reinserted, but not reincorporated, into a society that considered their 
exploits shameful. This made it impossible to share their experiences with 
74 Turner, The Ritual, 95.
75 Turner, Blazing, 49.
76 Turner, The Ritual, 107.
77 Ibid., 95-96.
78 Turner, Blazing, 58-59.
79 Turner, The Ritual, 109.
80 Junger, Tribe, 90.
81 De Graaff, Levenslang.
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their children or their wives.82 Veterans found work, built careers, raised 
families. However, with the historical guild unremembering the conflict, 
their experiences were never acknowledged, and therefore reincorporation 
remained incomplete.
As represented in the books of Varenne, Laurens and De Graaff, one 
of the few certainties in the nightmare of war, was the comradeship or 
communitas, shared by the soldiers. This feeling was intensif ied by the 
antagonism that they felt towards the military and the political leadership. 
The shared sense of grievance stemmed from being unremembered, and 
this increased their self-perception of being outsiders, being liminal. Even 
decades after the war, communitas could be renewed at annual reunions.
Turner and his wife, the anthropologist Edith Turner, saw pilgrimage as 
an intensif ication of communitas.83 Religious pilgrims seek some sort of 
initiation, but also desire to f ind a cure.84 Pilgrimages, according to Victor 
Turner, “are full of symbols and metaphors of death.”85 Pilgrims are “self-torn 
from their familiar environment” and may come to see the metaphoric 
death of the pilgrimage as “a death to the negative alienating aspects of 
system and structure,” which leads to a regaining of “an innocence felt by 
them to have been lost.”86
Turner could have been describing the phenomena of De Graaff’s two 
pilgrimages to Indonesia. Indeed, De weg terug (The way back) has a double 
meaning. At a superf icial level, it refers to the way back to Indonesia. A 
deeper reading reveals that it is also a way back to “an innocence felt by 
them to be lost.” After all, De Graaff tells us that the pilgrims to Indonesia 
had left “a part of our youth there.”87 One soldier even f inds his former 
girlfriend, and the pilgrims are relieved to discover she “she hasn’t changed 
in the slightest and still speaks fluent Dutch.”88 The pilgrimage character 
of the journey was not lost on reviewers.89
Turner tells us that pilgrimages are saturated with metaphors of death. 
De Graaff’s books describe visits to places where killings took place and 
82 De Graaff, Brieven, 10-11.
83 Turner and Turner, Image, 34.
84 Ibid., 13-14.
85 Turner, Blazing, 29.
86 Ibid., 30-32.
87 De Graaff, De weg, 8.
88 Ibid., 91.
89 Joop Morriën, “De heren worden bedankt,” De Waarheid, 1 August 1986; Joop Morriën, 
“Nederlands legerleiding onderschatte de kracht van het Indonesische verzet,” De Waarheid, 
21 May 1988; Joop de Jong, “Een indringende collage van verbittering en wrok,” De Volkskrant, 
9 September 1989.
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to cemeteries where dead comrades rest. He closes his account of the f irst 
pilgrimage with a chapter entitled “Terug over de dodenweg” (“Return along 
the Road of Death”).90 De Graaff converses with three other pilgrims. They 
have just returned from re-enacting the fatal patrol along the Road of Death:
De Graaff: I walked in a trance. Like how a fakir lies on a bed of nails. […]
Marius: It was as if we had passed through a peeling machine. Yah, 
something changed. We were not the same.
De Graaff: […] What was the most important thing for you, Joep?
Joep: That I have been back to the place where Jo Bedaux died. That is the 
most important part of the entire journey. Then, it brought something out 
of me. […] I had lived towards this for 38 years; all those years the East 
Indies had haunted me. But now that I’ve been here, I can think about it 
much more calmly. It has indeed been liberating.91
The language reads like an anthropologist’s f ield diary. De Graaff’s walked “in 
a trance” like a fakir, Marius’ passed “through a peeling machine,” Joep sensed 
that “it brought something out of me.” It sounds initiatory. The remarks, 
“something changed. We were not the same” and the description that it was 
“liberating,” imply passing through or beyond a threshold, the liminal. The 
postliminal pilgrimage had succeeded in reincorporating them back into the 
world. As De Graaffput it: “They began to see everything with new eyes.”92
According to De Graaff, this journey to the place associated with death, 
healed trauma. This was confirmed by the second pilgrimage, undertaken 
by a larger group of Dutch veterans, accompanied by dozens of Indonesian 
freedom f ighters. Again, they walk the Road of Death. Again, De Graaff 
conf irms that this means the end of traumas.93 We learn of the curative 
qualities of pilgrimage.94
The group of veterans possess a sense of comradeship or communitas. 
This is deepened during the pilgrimages, but it is broadened to include 
Indonesians, the former enemy. De Graaff repeatedly emphasized that 
Indonesian leaders joined them. His prose at these times seemed to suffer 
from exaggeration: “There is no difference anymore. […] [G]enerals had been 
freedom fighters then, without rank. We had been military conscripts.” But 
90 De Graaff, De weg, 113-119.
91 Ibid., 118-119.
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now they realized “that we had a connection […] without rank or class.”95 
This irritated some reviewers. Jan de Graaf complained that De Graaff ’s 
account suffered from an overuse of drama.96 Hoffenaar felt that De Graaff’s 
tone should have been more tempered.97 However, De Graaff’s emotional 
prose was his attempt to convey the sense of communitas.
Oostindie makes clear that the number of East Indies veterans who 
published memoirs before the 1980s, in f ictional or non-f ictional format, 
had been slight. The 1960s saw a meagre ten publications, while during 1970s 
the total was only fourteen. However, the 1980s and 1990s saw an explosive 
tenfold increase.98 What accounted for so many suddenly putting pen to 
paper?
De Graaff offered the simplest explanation. He claimed that memories had 
been suppressed while the veterans had been building careers and raising 
families. However, entering their 50s, memories came creeping back into 
consciousness, “above all the unpleasant memories.”99 By the mid-1980s, 
many, like Ben Laurens, would have been approaching retirement, allowing 
for deeper dwelling on the unincorporated memories of their experiences. 
As Oostindie puts it, there may not have been just a “Hueting effect,” but 
also a “pension effect.”100
In Dutch military and psychiatric circles, it was long accepted that old 
traumas could reappear after many decades. In 1980, post-traumatic stress 
disorder was recognized as an off icial psychiatric diagnosis.101 The same 
period saw an “explosion of new organizations of and for war victims,” and 
these were dominated by those who considered themselves victims from 
the East Indies.102 The national Vereeniging Oud Militairen Indiëgangers 
(Association of East Indies Veterans) was founded in 1985, in order to lobby for 
the veterans who considered themselves “victims of a lack of recognition.”103 
In 1989, the association participated in the creation of a national “Veterans’ 
Platform,” under the chairmanship of Ted Meines, an East Indies veteran 
himself.104 Thus, the works of Laurens and De Graaff appeared against a 
95 De Graaff, Met de TNI, 163-165.
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background in which victimhood was increasingly a political football game, 
the prize being recognition but also better pensions and social welfare.105 
The increasingly well-organized veterans were becoming a force in the new 
memory discourse, leading anthropologist Nico Schulte Nordholt to quip 
that the veterans’ lobby was rewriting or erasing history while, what was 
needed, was “for history itself to be written.”106
True, some books by veterans at this time gave a sanitized view of the 
conflict. Take, for example, the account by General Spoor’s aide-de-camp, 
R.M. Smulders. What he offered was a nostalgic ode to the late General 
Spoor. The book includes photos of dead Dutch soldiers, graveyards, and 
destroyed tea plantations, but no Indonesian f ighters are shown. We are 
told that the Indonesian folk were pleased with the “police actions.”107 His 
account included no references to any actual combat.108 Spoor is portrayed 
as a sober, workaholic intellectual, quoting freely from Shakespeare, Goethe 
and the French philosophes.109 Smulders concluded that war never happens 
without crimes, torture, rape, horrible wounding and killing, but that the 
Dutch army “liberated people, fed children, cared for the wounded who, 
because of us, survived to experience other, happy years.”110
However, the works of Laurens and De Graaff gave a fuller picture of 
life among Dutch conscripts during the conflict. De Graaff ’s work, and 
Merdeka, in particular, provided postcolonial, polyglossia accounts of the 
war. Nevertheless, historian Joop de Jong condemned De Graaff’s works, 
seeing in them a connecting thread “of bitterness, revenge and a feeling of 
being victimized on all fronts.”111 This caricature ignored two things. Firstly, 
for over four decades Dutch society, including historians, had unremembered 
that their government forced tens of thousands of youths to f ight a colonial 
war. Secondly, with some exceptions, the little that was known about the 
dirty war, was known, thanks to the words of veterans like Sytzen, Hueting, 
Schilt, Zwaan, Varenne, Hendrix and Van Doorn, Laurens and De Graaff, and 
not thanks to the works of historians. In 1995, a report about the services 
offered to veterans concluded that veterans placed the greatest value on the 
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“immaterial advantages of recognition and legitimacy.”112 They hankered 
after “symbolic value.”113 Veterans wanted an acknowledgement that they 
had served their country. The most likely place to receive this would be in 
the works of historians, but few in the historical guild showed an inclination 
to provide it.
Oeroeg: The Film
Steven Lipkin has written that two of the most important functions of histori-
cal f ilms are “Provoking public memory and shaping national identity.”114 
In 1993, the f ilm Oeroeg, directed by Hans Hylkema, premiered. Its popular 
representation played a signif icant role in provoking public memory. To 
some extent, it normalized discussion of Dutch military actions during 
the decolonization conflict.
In 1992, the Dutch press reported that De Stichting Veteranen Platform 
(Veterans’ Platform Foundation) had written to the Minister of Defence 
expressing concern that the f ilm would offer a negative image of the Dutch 
army in Indonesia.115 However, a few days before the f ilm’s release, De 
Telegraaf published an interview with Hella Haasse. She gave the f ilm 
her blessing, emphasizing that it was the work of director Hans Hylkema, 
that her book had simply provided him with the inspiration. She gener-
ously added, “I f ind that he has done this with integrity.”116 On 9 June 1993, 
the f ilm premiere was graced by the presence of the director, cast, Hella 
Haasse, the ambassador of Indonesia, the Dutch prime minister and even 
the queen.117
From the opening scenes onward, it is immediately clear that this is a 
f ilm only loosely based on Haasse’s novella. Of course, the content of a book 
cannot easily be detached and reproduced in f ilm. Changes are inevitable. 
Nevertheless, the differences between the book Oeroeg and the f ilm Oeroeg 
are extreme. It is not simply in content that the f ilm differs from the original 
work. The tone and purpose are different. Pamela Pattynama argues that 
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the contrast between the book and the f ilm “best exemplif ies how cultural 
artefacts embody shifts in memories of the colonial past.”118
There are similarities. Both are about a Dutch boy and his childhood 
Indonesian friend, Oeroeg, and how they became estranged and end up on 
opposite sides during the armed conflict. However, the f ilm is primarily a 
war f ilm. The purpose seems to have been not only the exploration of the 
relationship between the boys, but also the rectif ication of the Dutch view 
of history. As Haasse said in an earlier interview, her story had been about 
an emotional conflict, not a political one.119 Hylkema’s work was more 
forthrightly political and postcolonial. It included scenes showing Dutch 
soldiers involved in “excesses,” torturing a prisoner, shooting civilians and 
torching villages. However, it is also a f ilm that demonstrated how diff icult 
life was for the young Dutch volunteers and conscripts. They are in alien 
surroundings, so it is hard to tell who is friend and who is foe. The enemy 
uses irregular tactics and the soldiers are housed in conditions that are basic.
Hylkema’s f ilm is an attack on colonialism with little ambiguity. Pat-
tynama notes Hueting’s interview in 1969 initiated widespread “anti-colonial, 
guilt-ridden discourses about exploitation and racism” and this accounts 
for “the difference in memories embodied in book and f ilm.”120 However, it 
was the De Jong controversy that formed a context for the f ilm. Pattynama 
argues that some scenes in the f ilm, but not in the book, seemed to refer-
ence Jewish experience under the Nazis and apartheid in South Africa.121 
Hylkema admitted that his f ilm had a political message and that he was 
anti-colonial. Asked if he was worried about receiving extreme reactions, 
like those that targeted Hueting and De Jong, he answered that he did not 
fear this, seeing as the queen’s presence at the premiere would be an off icial 
statement of approval. He added, “I f ind it scandalous how [the De Jong 
affair] developed and incomprehensible that De Jong changed his opinion 
as a historian.”122
Rob de Kam warned that nearly 50 years after the violent convulsions 
of Dutch colonialism, the subject was still taboo and anyone who dared to 
venture a critical view of Dutch actions in Indonesia could be certain of 
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receiving a large dose of verbal violence from the Indies veterans.123 However, 
for the most part, critics praised the f ilm for its constructive approach 
to the national narrative. Henk ten Berge admired its passion and saw it 
as representative of the thinking of the post-war generation, adding that 
the screenplay had brought Haasse’s book to completion.124 Stan Huygens 
claimed to have overheard Prime Minister Ruud Lubbers saying, “Luckily the 
f ilm isn’t too moralising. Both sides [Dutch and Indonesian] will appreciate 
it.”125 Another reviewer wrote that few books in Dutch literature had been 
so successfully translated to the screen. Regarding the scenes of Dutch 
atrocities, he added that sometimes “the conflict got dirty” just like in all 
wars.126 Tjerke S. de Vries admitted that the original book must have been 
a shock to all those who believed that the Dutch cause was right, including 
the readers of his own Nederlands Dagblad. He recommended that both 
book and f ilm could show a new generation how the Indonesian cause was 
justif ied, concluding that it “can be sobering to see history from the other 
side.”127 A reviewer in De Groene Amsterdammer noted that the f ilm found 
him rereading Haasse’s novella and commented that Tjalie Robinson’s 
vicious critique of the book now seemed “painful.”128
Hans Beerekamp expressed his admiration for Hylkema’s courage to 
f inally break through the collective denial and the taboo of the national 
trauma.129 The following day the same newspaper published a piece with 
the title “The Demons in the Fatherland’s Memory” written by Joop Hueting 
himself.130 Hueting claimed that the old soldiers now had their Vietnam 
film. He declared that it had been brave of Haasse to publish her novel during 
the armed conflict, demonstrating understanding “for the call for independ-
ence from a repressed and humiliated people.” Hueting likewise expressed 
admiration for Hylkema’s demonstration of support for the Indonesian 
quest for independence. However, Hueting claimed one torture scene in 
123 Rob de Kam, “Hans Hylkema verf ilmde klassiek boek van Hella Haasse: ‘Oeroeg’ – woorden 
in plaats van beelden,” Nieuwsblad van het Noorden, 11 June 1993.
124 Henk ten Berge, “‘Oeroeg’ pakt stevig uit,” De Telegraaf, 10 June 1993.
125 Stan Huygens, “‘Oeroeg’: Koninklijk premiere,” De Telegraaf, 10 June 1993.
126 Pieter van Lierop, “‘Oeroeg’: Nederlands f ilm van zeldzame allure,” Limburgsch Dagblad, 
11 June 1993.
127 Tjerk S. de Vries, “De verschillende herinneringen van Oeroeg en Johan ten Berghe,” Ned-
erlands Dagblad, 19 June 1993.
128 August Hans den Boef, “‘Oeroeg’: De dubbelzinnigheid van een koloniale overgangsnovelle,” 
De Groene Amsterdammer, 9 June 1993.
129 Hans Beerekamp, “Vervlogen illusive van polderjongen in de tropen,” NRC Handelsblad, 
9 June 1993.
130 J.E. Hueting, “De demonen in het vaderlandse geheugen,” NRC Handelsblad, 10 June 1993.
REMEMbERINg THE WAR 255
the f ilm was based on his own interview of 1969 and he criticized Hylkema 
for softening the scene, sparing the viewer the full impact of the cruelty. 
Nevertheless, Hueting expressed relief that a younger generation continues 
the struggle to confront the demons that his generation tried to ignore.
Rudy Kousbroek was far more outspokenly critical of the f ilm. For him, 
the reason the f ilm was so different than the book had nothing to do with 
the inherent differences in the media but was a question of money, misun-
derstanding and “especially a lack of talent.” He concluded that a f ilm-maker 
who used the same name as a book, but changed the story entirely and 
deviated radically from the original intention, “is quite simply guilty of the 
theft of the name and the reputation of the other.”131 In a second review in 
De Groene Amsterdammer, the judgement was also negative. Zuilhof felt 
the relationship in the f ilm between the Dutch and Indonesians was a 
one-dimensional caricature of exploiters versus exploited that failed to say 
anything worthwhile about the essential trauma – “that there were Dutch 
people who had the feeling that they were welcome [in Indonesia] and that 
they understood the native population.”132
The f ilm caused a short outburst of letters to newspaper editors. A former 
off icer wrote that good intelligence was of utmost importance and that 
“you don’t get this from a prisoner by asking him in a friendly manner.”133 
A veteran in the Haagse Post/De Tijd stated that he heard the movie showed 
a burning village, its inhabitants massacred by Dutch soldiers, as well as a 
torture scene, indicating that the Dutch were no better than the German 
Nazis. He complained that the “good side of the coin is never revealed 
and that is a pity. […] [T]he massacre which can be seen in the f ilm is an 
exaggeration of the director who puts us old soldiers in a bad light.”134 In 
the weekly Elsevier, a veteran accused Hylkema of attempting to brand all 
veterans as criminals, and pleaded, “[S]pare them from these repetitive, 
derogatory accusations.”135A week after the f ilm’s release, Henk ten Berge 
wrote, “Not in living memory has a Dutch f ilm caused so many emotions 
and reactions to break free.”136
However, perhaps it was the reputation of Hella Haasse, or the stamp 
of royal approval, but Hylkema faced nothing like the onslaught that had 
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struck Loe de Jong. A f ilm reviewer at the Leeuwarder Courant remarked 
that within ten years of the ending of the war in Vietnam, the Americans 
were making one f ilm after another about the conflict, but it had taken 
45 years for a Dutch f ilm-maker to broach the subject. He reminded his 
readers of the protests that ignited when De Jong had dared to write about 
atrocities, concluding that it “is miraculous but pleasing that this f ilm has 
not summoned the same feelings.”137 Four months after the f ilm’s release, 
the judges at the Dutch Film Festival gave the lead actor the award for best 
male actor.138
Most criticism was directed towards aesthetic or cinematographic aspects 
of the film. Political elements were referred to, but rarely forefronted. Instead, 
the subject matter seemed normal. Zuilhof’s criticism is poignant, that the 
f ilm missed the chance to deal with the tragedy of the Dutch and especially 
the Indisch community during decolonization – that they became strangers 
in what they considered their homeland. However, this, too, was primarily 
an aesthetic shortcoming of the f ilm, not a political one. To an extent, 
Hylkema’s work, but also the press coverage surrounding it, helped normalize 
what had been a taboo.
Hueting’s remark that the veterans now had their Vietnam film was astute. 
Most of the f ilm takes place against the backdrop of a tropical jungle setting. 
The jungle is an example of what Lipkin calls “arenas of the performance 
of memory.” He argues that the “arenas that frame performance become 
the means to make the past present.”139 The tropical setting frames the 
public memory, not because the viewer remembers an experience in the 
tropics, but because the viewer remembers other such f ilms in such a set-
ting – remembers, that is, Hollywood f ilms of the Vietnam War. The frame 
of remembrance by which meaning was extracted from Oeroeg was found 
in f ilms like Michael Cimino’s The Deer Hunter (1978) and Francis Ford 
Coppola’s Apocalypse Now (1979). That is what made the texture of the setting 
tangible, not because audiences had been there before, but because they 
had seen this type of f ilm before. The setting was alien, yet comfortable at 
the same time and this framing anticipates remembering (the audience is 
expecting to experience the atrocities against Asian people that Western 
boys f ighting in the jungle invariably brings). In this intertextual manner, 
Oeroeg reminds the viewers of (Hollywood’s) Vietnam more than it reminds 
them of Indonesia. The American f ilm industry had appropriated war in the 
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jungle and colonized the public memory of decolonization’s excesses. One 
could question whether it was the past that was made present by Oeroeg or 
if it was other, Hollywood, f ilms that were made present.
The f ilm had a soundtrack, unlike the book and unlike real life. The 
noise of rotating blades blended with electronic music reference f ilms like 
Apocalypse Now. The sounds of the tropical night blending with the sounds of 
bamboo percussion reference the arena of the jungle. The f ilm is entangled 
with well-used Orientalist tropes, like when it mixes Western orchestral 
music with Indonesian music, but it is the latter’s gongs, f lutes, gamelan 
and bamboo percussion that provide the signpost that a threat is about to 
emanate from the alienating world of the tropical jungle.
Baudrillard suggested that artif icial memory ef faces forgetting 
through a “restaging,” arguing that f ilms spill into a form of “aestheticized 
forgetting.”140 Rather than the screen bringing us a memory of the event, 
it brings us, with its inflated hyperrealism, an aesthetic experience that 
replaces the event. For Baudrillard, history becomes myth and finds its place 
in the cinema.141 Cinema’s attempt at “an absolute correspondence with 
the real” leads to the “disappearance of history.”142 Substituting the reality 
of f ilm for the historical event results in unremembering. The historical 
event is replaced by the cinematic experience.
In Hyklema’s Oeroeg, it is not only the Indonesian-Dutch conflict that is 
represented. Something more glamorous is taking place, namely, Holland’s 
Hollywood-style war. Hylkema’s work comments on the conflict of 1945-1949, 
but it is chiefly a restaging rooted in Hollywood. References are partially to 
historic events, remediating the likes of the Hueting interview, but owe a 
great deal to other f ilms, television news reportage and photographic images, 
like the photograph of the baby in the massacred village in Aceh in 1904. 
The image of the crying baby appeared in Nieuwenhuys’ photo collection, 
and it reappeared for a moment in De Jong’s De Bezetting. It was recycled 
again in Fons Rademaker’s anti-colonial f ilm adaption of Multatuli’s classic 
novel Max Havelaar. The Dutch colonial army has massacred the inhabitants 
of a village and a baby sits crying, surrounded by a pile of corpses, similar 
to the original photograph. Hylkema’s scene of the crying baby is far less 
radical, though according to Pattynama, it “must be a visual echo of the 
infamous Aceh photo” as well as a reminder of Hollywood’s The Deer Hunter 
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and Apocalypse Now.143 In Hylkema’s f ilm we see the protagonist running 
into the already burning village (we never actually see the Dutch soldiers 
setting f ire to it), stumbling past the corpses of villagers, and when he 
encounters the crying baby inside the hut, he picks it up. Indeed, he is the 
heroic rescuer of the baby. The effect is different from the radical impact of 
Rademaker’s scene. Hylkema’s repurposing of this image is an example of 
the sign breaking free from its documentary origin in 1904, becoming a sign 
that triggers a repulsive response in the late twentieth century. However, it 
has no direct referential value when it comes to decolonization.
The impact of the De Jong debate had been to prepare the Dutch public 
for more news of atrocities. When it came to Oeroeg, the approval of Hella 
Haasse, and most of all the queen, had further prepared the audience to 
keep an open mind. Finally, the arena of the jungle, well known from 
American movies, provided the framework for what could be expected. This 
contributed to the sense that what was being enjoyed on the big screen was 
normal. When one reflected upon the fact that these were Dutch soldiers 
carrying out atrocities, it was easy to agree with the reviewer who had 
commented that that is what happened in war. Indeed, in a documentary 
broadcast on Dutch television the week after the f ilm’s release, one of the 
f ilm’s actors, Peter Faber, said: “As soon as there is war, there is no good and 
evil.”144 Hans Hylkema, by providing entertainment that referenced recent 
Hollywood movies, had translated the existence of Dutch atrocities from 
the taboo to entertainment.
Within four years, a grand epic covering the entire period from 1940 to 
1949 was released. Examining the press reactions to this second f ilm will 
reveal just how deep normalization had gone. Two hugely successful French 
f ilms released around the same time as Oeroeg may have inspired director 
Orlow Seunke: L’Amant (1992) and Indochine (1992).145 Gordel van Smaragd 
(The emerald belt) premiered at the seventeenth Dutch Film Festival and 
during an interview, Seunke commented that Dutch colonial history during 
the 1940s provided “a treasure of fascinating incidents.”146 The violence of 
World War Two, Japanese internment camps, the Bersiap period and the 
War of Independence did not constitute traumatic memories, but simply 
formed “a treasure of fascinating incidents.”
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In the conservative De Telegraaf, a reviewer was impressed by the f ilm’s 
wonderful images, outstanding action scenes and lack of sentimentality.147 
The Protestant Trouw praised the magnif icent shots of the Indonesian 
landscape, found the love story to be believable and considered the mixing 
of archival f ilm footage and f ictional scenes to be ingenious.148 The left-
of-centre De Volkskrant judged it a “quality f ilm” with a beautiful romantic 
story, supported by a mix of fact and f iction and a lack of sentimentality.149 
The liberal NRC Handelsblad found Seunke’s work to be a real chronicle of 
decolonization and “an impressive attempt to do justice to the viewpoints 
of all those involved in Indonesian decolonization.”150
On the other hand, the NRC Handelsblad also pointed out a weakness 
of the f ilm – the balanced treatment of the historical structure meant that 
the dramatic demands of the story suffered.151 In the weekly Elsevier, Rob 
van Scheers argued that the f ilm lacked drive and was simply a collage of 
incidents.152 The Algemeen Dagblad was the newspaper most opposed to 
the f ilm. The black-and-white original f ilm footage irritated Ruud Kuyper, 
because it felt like sitting in a history lesson.153 Ab Zagt agreed, claiming the 
f ilm was a half-soft documentary with a romance that lacked any passion, 
but worse was Seunke’s attempt to send his audience back to school.154 He 
declared the f ilm was clichéd and a bad history lesson.155 But reviewers 
never ventured beyond the norm of what is acceptable in the world of criti-
cism. Some in the conservative press, while possibly politically motivated, 
verbalized criticism in a way that made it seem like it was the aesthetic 
elements of the f ilm that are being critiqued. The contestation of memory 
was never made explicit.
In Het Parool, Seunke was asked if he was worried that he might become 
involved in some terrible polemic. He answered that he need not worry 
because everything that he shows in the f ilm “is based on memoirs, photo 
albums and f ilm archives.”156 In a second interview he admitted, “I am not 
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somebody who wants to make political statements with a film.” Furthermore, 
he claimed that everything “is historically correct.”157
Seunke choose to include archival black-and-white f ilm footage with 
voice-over in his full-colour f ilm epic – the so-called history lesson that 
annoyed some reviewers. He explained that he faced the problem of hav-
ing to place the love story against a complicated and shifting historical 
background. He looked at how other f ilms had done this.158 The f ilm footage 
contextualized the love story. It was a technical solution to a narrative 
problem. The history lesson was necessary because the Dutch were igno-
rant of their colonial history. Decolonization supplied a treasure trove of 
“fascinating incidents,” but the audience needed to be educated in order 
to enjoy them.
Gordel of Smaragd provides an example of the normalization of de-
colonization in the world of the cinema, a process triggered by Oeroeg but 
enabled by the popularity of French as well as Hollywood movies set in a 
similar arena. The familiarity of the arena made these f ilms easy to relate 
to. They restaged scenes of horror, but were simultaneously familiar and 
comfortable to watch. These forms of entertainment enacted remembering 
and unremembering.
The Boomsma Affair
Months after the release of Oeroeg, De Groene Amsterdammer republished 
the letter from an off icer, originally published in February 1949, reminding 
the Dutch public how their military forces burned Indonesian villages, shot 
civilians and practised military terror.159 A short introduction informed 
readers that the original article had the impact of a bomb, but that all of the 
outrages were eventually hushed up.160 The following week the magazine’s 
editor, Martin van Amerongen, drew attention to the work of Chris van 
Esterik, in which the latter claimed that former Dutch members of the SS 
had been sent to f ight in the Dutch “police adventures.”161 It was a deliberate 
157 Quoted in Joost Niemoller, “Indo-vrouwen Zijn Prachtig,” De Groene Amsterdammer, 
24 September 1997.
158 Quoted in Ab van Ieperen, “De puzzels van Orlow Seunke,” Vrij Nederland, 4 October 1997.
159 “Djokja, Februari 1949: Een off icier schrijft aan zijn vrienden,” De Groene Amsterdammer, 
8 September 1993.
160 Ibid.
161 Martine van Amerongen, “Reclassering anno 1949,” De Groene Amsterdammer, 
15 September 1993.
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provocation, coinciding, as it did, with the “Boomsma affair,” in which a 
Dutch novelist was brought to court for comparing the deeds of Dutch 
soldiers to the deeds of the Nazi SS.
In 1992, Graa Boomsma published his novel De laatste tyfoon (The 
last typhoon), a reworking of his earlier De idioot van de geschiedenis 
(The idiot of history). The novel explored the relationship between a 
son and a father who fought in the War of Independence. Boomsma 
based the novel on his own postmemory experiences, his father having 
participated in the war. Boomsma’s father had remained silent about 
his experiences until the Hueting interview of 1969. His father had died 
at the early age of 52. To honour him, Boomsma felt compelled to tell 
his story. There are parallels with the postmemory works of Jill Stolk, 
Marion Bloem and Adrian van Dis. Once again, the scars of the father 
have passed to the second generation. However, Boomsma also meant 
his book to be a critical attack on the authorities who had sent young 
men to f ight in a dirty war. Boomsma’s novel took a knife to the roots 
of Dutch unremembering, dragged it before the bar of judgement, and 
f inding it wanting, condemned it.162
In an attack on the historical guild, the novel’s narrator writes that he 
had learned everything about the American Civil War in school, “but the 
f inal years of our East Indies colonialism remained a black hole.”163 The 
narrator burns with curiosity about what his father, Kerst, must have 
experienced as a conscript. The history of the conflict is a dark hole that 
“I descend into, like a half-baked archaeologist who studies the earth, 
layer after layer, and I come back up with mud and blood on my hands 
and scratches on my face” (119). He aims “to wriggle a hole with my pen in 
the wall of the past” (27). He offers a picture of young men, drafted into 
an army and forced to f ight in an alien environment, because politicians 
back in The Hague made mistakes. Young men like Kerst are brutalized 
by the conditions of warfare.
Kerst f inds himself working as an assistant prison warden where 
Indonesian prisoners are being interrogated. He cleans up prisoners 
after Dutch jailers have tortured them (151). When going on patrol it 
becomes routine to burn down entire villages (108, 168). The postmemory 
narrator imagines a life consisting of heavy drinking and sleeping with 
young women (135).
162 Ibid., 21.
163 Boomsma, De laatste tyfoon, 45.
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The narrator does not deny that the attempt to reconstruct an image 
of the past is based mainly on imagination, “foolish and unreliable writer 
of history that I am” (125). On the other hand, “Every reconstruction is a 
matter of imagining” (89). Boomsma was staking a truth claim here. The 
brutality of the Dutch forces was not f iction. Boomsma was not claiming 
that he made it up – it was not simple fantasy. The representation that he 
(re)constructed was of the Dutch pursuing a murderous war for self ish ends, 
later covered up and forgotten (or unremembered). Unremembered until, 
as Kerst’s wife, the narrator’s mother, puts it: “About ten years ago I saw on 
the television an episode of Achter het Nieuws about how bad the Dutch 
troops had behaved on Java. I had never known that” (25).
The narrator asks: “Is it true that historical phenomena are like boulders 
that, when dropped in the deep sea of memory, cause waves that grow bigger 
and bigger?” (45). As it turned out, Boomsma had dropped a boulder and 
the waves quickly grew bigger. The novel, like the works of Schilt, Zwaan, 
Varenne and Laurens, might have remained little noticed by the public, 
but Boomsma was interviewed in the Groningen newspaper, Nieuwsblad 
van het Noorden.164 Journalist Eddy Schaafsma described how Boomsma’s 
novel f illed in a “black page from the Fatherland’s history” and showed “why 
the processing of the Dutch ‘Vietnam trauma’ has taken so long.” Boomsma 
told Schaafsma: “America processed her Vietnam past, made f ilms, wrote a 
whole pile of books; in the Netherlands you can count them on the f ingers 
of one hand.” He claimed that the task of the author was “to be the memory 
of humanity.” However, Boomsma also uttered words that would cause a 
great deal of trouble: “Shortly after the war the communists wrote: ‘Don’t 
turn our lads into the SS.’ I think that reflected what was happening.” The 
title of the interview was Boomsma’s statement: “‘They Weren’t SS, No, Even 
Though, Because of the Things That They Did, the Comparison Could Be 
Made.’” Comparing former Dutch soldiers to the hated SS was an eye-catching 
headline, but it landed them in court, initiating the so-called Boomsma 
affair – a public debate that would lead to hundreds of publications in 
newspapers during the following few years.
Veteran Lodewijk Buma, having read Boomsma’s comparison with the 
SS, decided to take Boomsma and Schaafsma to court for defamation. The 
court in Groningen in 1993 decided that there was no case to be made. In 
September 1993, Buma lodged a complaint in the court in Leeuwarden, in 
164 Eddy Schaafsma, “‘Geen SS-ers, nee, ook al konden ze door de dingen die ze deden, daar wel 
mee worden vergeleken,’” Nieuwsblad van het Noorden, 6 March 1992.
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the province of Friesland.165 In November 1993, the Prosecutor General in 
Leeuwarden proclaimed that Boomsma and Schaafsma should be prosecuted 
for defamation, and sent the case back to the court in Groningen.166 The 
international writer’s organization PEN expressed its concern by sending 
a letter of protest to the Dutch Minister for Justice.167 The case opened on 
26 May 1994 and the public prosecutor called for Boomsma and Schaafsma 
to be f ined 500 guilders.168 On 9 June the defendants were pronounced not 
guilty.169 Buma and the Prosecutor General appealed to the High Court in 
Leeuwarden. Over a hundred veterans demonstrated against Boomsma 
outside the courtroom on 12 January 1995.170 However, on 26 January the 
court decided that there had been no instance of defamation.171
Throughout these years, Boomsma’s name was seldom out of the news, 
and like during the De Jong affair, newspapers became the vehicle for 
discussing decolonization. If veterans like Buma had hoped to smother 
discussion of the military behaviour during the decolonization conflict, 
then their plan backfired. On 29 September 1993, De Volkskrant published 
not one, but two articles on the case. In the f irst, Boomsma was quoted as 
saying, “the Netherlands has not yet processed the war in the former Dutch 
East Indies.”172 Boomsma himself wrote the second article.173 He wrote, 
“I feel this has attacked my freedom as a writer.” Referring to the article 
by Van Amerongen in De Groene Amsterdammer, he asked: Why is it still 
not generally known that “under the patronage of the Dutch army 15,000 
to 30,000 ex-SS were sent into the kampongs?” He asked: “How come the 
165 “‘Uitspaak Boomsma is smadelijk,’” NRC Handelsblad, 29 September 1993.
166 “Boomsma vervolgd,” NRC Handelsblad, 19 November 1993; “Hof: OM moet schrijver en 
journalist wegens smaadschrijft vervolgen,” Nieuwsblad van het Noorden, 19 November 1993; 
“Auteur toch vervolgd na vergelijking met SS,” De Volkskrant, 19 November 1993.
167 “PEN verontrust over process tegen Graa Boomsma,” NRC Handelsblad, 24 May 1994; “PEN 
neemt het op voor Boomsma,” De Volkskrant, 25 May 1994.
168 “Geldboete geeist tegen auteur Graa Boomsma,” NRC Handelsblad, 27 May 1994.
169 “Vrijspaak voor Graa Boomsma,” NRC Handelsblad, 9 June 1994; “Vrijspaak in zaak van 
Indië veteranen,” De Telegraaf, 10 June 1994; Gerad de Kleine, “Journalist NvhN niet schuldig 
van smaad,” Nieuwsblad van Friesland, 10 June 1994; “SS vergelijking niet strafbaar,” Het Parool, 
10 June 1994.
170 “Indië veteranen demonstreren voor respect,” De Volkskrant, 13 January 1995; “Protest bij 
process,” Trouw, 13 January 1995.
171 “Vrijspraak voor schrijver Boomsma,” Leeuwarder Courant, 26 January 1995; “Hof in Leeu-
warden speekt schrijver Graa Boomsma vrij,” Trouw, 27 January 1995.
172 “Schrijver wacht wellicht process na vergelijking Indië-gangers met SS,” De Volkskrant, 
29 September 1993.
173 Graa Boomsma, “Politionele acties blijven een zwart gat in ons geheugen,” De Volkskrant, 
29 September 1993.
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Netherlands deals so badly with her past, particularly when it comes to 
her war crimes in Indonesia? Why is the colonial war that we ignited still 
referred to euphemistically as the ‘police actions’?” He referred to this period 
as a “black hole in our memory.”
Historian Thomas van der Dunk penned a letter to the editor in De Volk-
skrant in which he challenged the conservative minister Fritz Bolkestein 
to support Boomsma in order for there to be freedom to openly speak 
about the “nature and volume of war crimes committed by Dutch soldiers 
in Indonesia.”174 The renowned anti-establishment critic Theo van Gogh 
wrote, “denial that the tortures and bloodbaths described in Boomsma’s 
book are similar to those of the SS is a perf idious stupidity.”175 The affair 
took a surprising twist in a radio programme when the chairman of the 
Old Soldiers Legion expressed his disagreement with Buma: “There will 
certainly have been a number of lads who misbehaved themselves like 
that.”176 Manuel Kneepens of Erasmus University wrote that the behaviour 
of Westerling on South Celebes was comparable to the SS’s worst atrocity 
on Dutch soil, the destruction of the village of Putten. However, while 
the off icer responsible for Putten was sentenced to death, “Westerling 
wasn’t even charged.”177 Kneepens went on: “But it is Boomsma, and no 
one else, who is now being legally prosecuted. That means that the events 
on South Celebes, via his case, will indirectly be legally evaluated.” It 
was the army of the Indies, as much as Boomsma and Schaafsma, that 
was on trial.
In February 1994 Trouw ran an interview with Boomsma entitled: “Graa 
Boomsma and the Gaps in the History: The Netherlands Has Not Yet Pro-
cessed Her Past.” Boomsma was quoted as saying: “Why do the Indonesian 
people feel no vindictiveness against the Netherlands? Because the people 
there have processed their past. The Netherlands has not done that. There has 
never been a discussion in the Netherlands about the colonial war. There has 
only been talk of incidents.”178 The following day the NRC Handelsblad came 
out in favour of Boomsma, with an article entitled “Boomsma: Indies Veterans 
Defamation Process Absurd.” Reinjan Mulder referred to the absurdity, 
that while Boomsma is being prosecuted “those guilty of the police actions 
174 Thomas van der Dunk, letter to the editor, De Volkskrant, 14 November 1993.
175 Theo van Gogh, “Indië verloren, rampspoed geboren,” HP/De Tijd, 26 November 1993.
176 Rene Zwaap, [untitled], De Groene Amsterdammer, 12 January 1993.
177 Manuel Kneepens, “De schrik komt er geweldig in,” Trouw, 23 December 1993.
178 Jet Kunkeler, “Gra Boomsma en de gaten in de geschiedenis: Nederland heeft zijn verleden 
nooit verwerkt,” Trouw, 22 February 1994.
REMEMbERINg THE WAR 265
were always allowed off. People like Raymond Westerling.”179 The following 
day, the day of the court hearing in Groningen, the NRC Handelsblad gave 
the f loor to Boomsma. His article was entitled: “The Past Stays Active, 
It Festers, Bursts Out.”180 The article was identical to the statement that 
Boomsma read out in court later that day. He warned that a ghost hangs 
over the Netherlands, “the ghost of an unprocessed history.” He compared 
the past with nuclear power, asking, What do we do with the unprocessed 
radioactive waste?
Historian Elsbeth Locher-Scholten’s reasoned article, which used the 
term “war crimes” in its title, tried to put the entire matter into historical 
perspective. She argued that in some ways Boomsma should be grateful to 
Buma, because thanks to the latter’s accusation, the “repressed colonial 
past” had been dragged into the open.181 However, while this might have 
been necessary for the public, Locher-Scholten claimed there had already 
been consensus among historians that “the Netherlands, just like other 
countries in war, has been guilty of unnecessary violence, military excesses 
or war crimes.” She mentioned the works of Van Doorn and Hendrix from 
1970 (neither a historian), Willem IJzereef from 1984 and Loe de Jong’s 
twelfth volume from 1988. She correctly pointed out that already in 1949 
accusations of excessive violence had led to questions in parliament, but 
after Indonesian independence, this had disappeared into “the deepest 
regions of the collective unconsciousness.” Hueting had broken this silence 
in 1969. She concluded: “It seems to cost the Netherlands quite some trouble 
to recognize that human good and evil don’t keep to national frontiers; that 
the Netherlands doesn’t have a patent on sanctity; that a justif ied war does 
not exist and so the Netherlands is responsible for war crimes, too.”
It would be mistaken to conclude that the entirety of Dutch academia was 
happy with Boomsma. J.A.A. van Doorn published an article with the cynical 
title, “Graa Dreyfus.”182 Van Doorn offered two reasons for why the affair 
had reached such heights of publicity. Firstly, it had been the next link in a 
chain of incidents “that accompanied the processing of the post-war Indies 
trauma.” Secondly, because of “the pronounced vindictiveness by which 
these […] issues are exaggerated.” Van Doorn was irritated by Boomsma’s 
179 Reinjan Mulder, “Boomsma: Process wegens belediging Indie-strijders absurd,” NRC 
Handelsblad, 25 May 1994.
180 Graa Boomsma, “Het verleden blijft actief, het woekert door, barst naar buiten,” NRC 
Handelsblad, 26 May 1994.
181 Elsbeth Locher-Scholten, “Nederland leert niet van oorlogsmisdaden,” NRC Handelsblad, 
20 May 1994.
182 J.A.A. van Doorn, “Graa Dreyfus,” HP/De Tijd, 17 June 1994.
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attitude of “the hero before the f iring squad.” He claimed that Boomsma 
saw himself as a modern Multatuli, and that his novel reflected “pretentious 
claptrap.” This attack seems diff icult to comprehend. He accused Boomsma 
of libelling old soldiers by including highly improbable scenes, but as Esther 
ten Dolle has pointed out, “Van Doorn does not explain why Boomsma’s 
inventions are improbable.”183 Van Doorn had also attacked De Jong in the 
mid-1980s. Unlike his colleague Wim Hendrix, he had not cooperated with 
Roelof Kiers during the making of Indonesia Merdeka.184 He may have felt 
that Boomsma was pretentious and enjoying the role of the persecuted hero, 
but the principal of setting the historical record straight surely was what 
was at stake. Yet, Van Doorn accused Boomsma of having written a bad 
book, because it mixed fact and f iction. What’s more, Van Doorn gave an 
example of a passage in Boomsma’s book, which was based on research by 
Van Doorn. Van Doorn and Hendrix had written, “Violence justif ies itself,” 
while Boomsma had changed this to “Violence defends itself.”
While the Boomsma affair brought unsought publicity for the author, 
Adriaan van Dis reached a wide public in 1994 with his postmemory novel 
Indische Duinen (Indische dunes). Nathan Sid had been a slim volume. Now 
Van Dis returned to the same family, telling a substantial tale of the long 
afterlife of decolonization. Van Dis offered the reader encounters with many 
of the aspects of decolonization that we have already come across. Those 
who lost their homes under the Japanese, and again because of Indonesian 
nationalists, learn the art of adapting and living life in a manner as if the need 
to escape might again erupt.185 We read of the intense silence and attempts 
at forgetting of those who suffered, and how this is passed down to the next 
generation (40-41, 66-67). We read of episodes of abuse in Japanese camps 
and of arguments regarding comparisons with German concentrations 
camps (40). Characters deal with trauma, years after the events, by joining 
therapy groups, though the main character, Nathan, has his serious doubts 
about dwelling on victimhood (63-64). Ex-camp prisoners struggle with the 
Dutch government to get their salaries and pensions paid (65-66). An Indo 
father who died f ighting for the Dutch is considered a hero by his daughter, 
but Nathan adds, “A sucker, I thought, he fought for the wrong party, choose 
the side that had stolen his land and resisted the nationalists” (68-69). Van 
Dis described the feelings of fear during the Bersiap violence (75-76), the 
183 Ten Dolle, “Morality,” 177.
184 Peter Schumacher, “TV vanavond: zeer unieke ‘Indonesia Merdeka,’” NRC Handelsblad, 
1 December 1976.
185 Van Dis, De Indië Boeken, 14, 49.
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feeling of shame for having survived (124), the homesickness and the cold 
reception that the repatriates met upon arrival in the Netherlands (97, 113, 
122-123).
Despite some lukewarm reviews,186 within two years of publication, 
Indische Duinen had sold more copies than any other literary novel in Dutch 
history.187 It received two book prizes in 1995 and was shortlisted for the 
country’s two most prestigious book prizes.188 It ignited no controversy and 
resulted in no protests, focused, as it was, not on combat or war crimes, but 
on the postmemory scars of a narrator who could not properly mourn or 
understand loss for which he lacked direct experience. The narrator of the 
novel suffered from the brutality that his father endured, but this brutality 
was never foregrounded, always remained hidden.
The Poncke Princen Affair
Poncke Princen was the most famous Dutch deserter of the war. Drafted into 
the army in 1945, not only had he deserted, he had fought for the Indonesians. 
He became an Indonesian citizen and remained there for the rest of his life, 
active in politics and human rights. Princen had family in the country of 
his birth, with whom he corresponded. In 1993, Princen applied for a visa 
to visit the Netherlands, igniting a new controversy.
In the October 1993 edition of the magazine of the former Communist 
Party, Joop Morriën used the Poncke Princen controversy to call for a rethink 
of the colonial war. He claimed that the refusal of a visa for Princen was 
another indication of “the inability of successive Dutch governments to 
come clean regarding the post-war colonial past.”189 More widely read were 
two articles by ex-conscripts to the Indies army, published in De Volkskrant 
the same month. Jan van der Horst argued that the soldiers had been lied 
to, had served their country well, had suffered and had never received an 
apology. On the other hand, A. Huijvenaar claimed that stories about the 
Dutch army in Indonesia were “saturated by a nasty mendacity that one 
186 Alle Lansu, “Een Indische doos van Pandora,” Het Parool, 23 September 1994; Gertjan van 
Schoonhoven, “Door de jungle van zelfbedrog,” NRC Handelsblad, 30 September 1994; Marc 
Reugebrink, “Schrijven in een glazen kamer,” Nieuwsblad van het Noorden, 30 September 1994; 
Arnold Heumakers, “Rijsttafelen met de overladen vader,” De Volkskrant, 30 September 1994.
187 Sars, Adriaan van Dis, 100.
188 Ibid., 136.
189 Joop Morriën, “Waar blijft erkenning dat de politionele actie fout was?,” Politiek en Cultuur 
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should be ashamed of.” He was disgusted with the acceptance of the story 
of former members of the SS being conscripted into the army.190
A television programme unexpectedly confronted veterans with a 
face-to-face confrontation with Princen.191 Veteran Dirk Hartman was 
in the studio before a live audience. Hartman allowed that the war had 
been wrong, but he could not tolerate comparisons with the Germans, 
and would refuse to talk with the traitor Poncke Princen. Nevertheless, the 
programme makers had a live connection with Princen at the German-Dutch 
border. Hartman trembled when confronted with Princen on the monitor. 
The ensuing discussion between veterans in the audience and Princen 
was heated. However, there seemed to be consensus regarding the nature 
of the war, with veterans using words like “Repressed past,” “suppressed 
memories of a dirty war,” “colonial war,” “the Netherlands stood on the 
wrong side” and “unjust war.” One participant, the author Jan Schilt, argued 
that it had been “a dirty war – not police actions” and that prisoners and 
wounded had often been killed by the Dutch. The programme included an 
interview with the Dutch Minister of Agriculture at the time of the war. 
He admitted that “we made the wrong decision on military intervention.” 
The fact that most veterans in the show refused to speak to Princen made 
the news. As one journalist pointed out, this made for good television, but 
in an already polarized public debate, it convinced the veterans that they 
were misunderstood.192
The question if Princen should be permitted to return continued into 
1994. Historian Paul Ophey argued that as long as the Dutch government 
did not issue an off icial statement regarding guilt for the conflict, than it 
would remain diff icult for members of the public to realize that, historically 
speaking, Princen had had more justice on his side than the soldiers who 
had remained loyal.193 A reader of the NRC Handelsblad complained: “I 
knew everything about the atrocities of the Nazism, the Holocaust and 
the Vietnam War, but nothing about the decolonization of ‘Our Indies.’ […] 
[I]t was barely mentioned in the history textbooks.”194
In late 1994, Hans van Mierlo, Dutch Foreign Minister, personally au-
thorized the issuing of a visa to Princen. It was agreed that Princen would 
190 A. Huijvenaar, “Indonesia bestaat bij de gratie van Nederlands-Indië,” De Volkskrant, 
21 October 1993.
191 De Tijd Staat even stil, NCRV, 22 June 1993.
192 Peter Sierksma, “Het praat niet mak kelijk met Ponkce Pr incen erbij,” Trouw, 
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193 Paul Ophey, “Schooljongenspolitiek tegenover Indonesia,” De Gelderlander, 14 June 1994.
194 Letter to the editor, NRC Handelsblad, 9 April 1994.
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not make any political statements during his visit. This was scheduled 
for December 1994. Anthropologist Nico Schulte Nordholt accused the 
veteran lobby of having swept history under the carpet.195 Princen, as agreed, 
refrained from making political statements, but soon after he left the country, 
De Volkskrant published an interview with him, asking detailed questions 
about his personal role f ighting for the Indonesians. He accepted that there 
was brutality on both sides – “It was war” – but he believed that the Dutch 
government should offer apologies to Indonesia because it had started a 
colonial war.196
The debate now focused around the role of the army during the period 
from 1945 to 1949 and put the veterans, whether they wanted this or not, 
again in the limelight. De Groene Amsterdammer ran a couple of articles 
on the veterans that captured the two extremes. The f irst was a prof ile of 
the veteran Ted Meines.197 As chairperson of the Veteran Platform Meines 
had managed to unite 32 different veteran groups under one umbrella 
representing the 150,000 veterans in the country. He had not only fought 
in the “police actions,” but had also been active in the Dutch resistance 
against the Nazis. In fact, he had saved the lives of dozens of Jewish children 
during the war. What made the article so poignant was that the author of 
the article, Max Arian, was one of those children. In the opening paragraph, 
Arian introduced Meines as the man who had appeared on television to 
simply answer “no” to the question if Poncke Princen should get a visa. 
However, Arian told of another side of Meines: “I know him mainly as the 
old resistance man from the NV group, the group that during the war, as a 
Jewish child, saved my life.” Meines admitted that he was not the sort who 
would join the anti-Boomsma demonstrators outside the courthouse, but 
he expressed his frustration: “The Indies veteran has always felt picked on, 
that we played a bad role in the decolonization process. I have to reject that. 
We never did anything except what the government of the time ordered. […] 
[G]ratitude is what we have never gotten.” He condemned “historians and 
pseudo-historians and the media who want so much to point a f inger at those 
who were wrong.” Meines also rejected the too easy comparison between 
Vietnam and Indonesia, which Hueting had made. He asked the media to, 
195 Maurits Schmidt, “Sterke veteranenlobby poetst geschiedenis weg,” Het Parool, 
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“try to give the veterans, who are now near the end of their lives, a little 
more time where they have the feeling that what they did was responsible.”
Some months later, De Groene Amsterdammer offered a different aspect 
of the veterans with portraits of two veterans, J.H.C. Ulrici, who went to the 
war as a volunteer, and T.E. Spier, a professional soldier who had risen to the 
position of lieutenant colonel.198 On the one hand, Ulrici seemed to deny that 
excesses had taken place, emphasizing that his men were always on their 
best behaviour. However, he belittled some well-known atrocities: “They 
talk about Westerling on Celebes. Now, well, that was not really that bad.” 
Some of what he said contradicted the image he had painted of disciplined 
soldiers who kept to the rules:
We were hard, rock-hard. That is logical. If you f ind your lads with their 
penis cut off and in their mouth, their legs sawn off with the saw thrown 
by their side, and you catch the guy who has done it, then you don’t offer 
him a cup of espresso. Then you give him absolutely no consideration, 
no mercy. And that’s what they call excesses.
Ulrici and Spier had been tasked in August 1949 with hunting down and 
killing Poncke Princen. They killed Princen’s wife and between f ifteen 
(according to Speir) and nineteen (according to Ulrici) of his soldiers. They 
found Princen’s diary, which, Ulrici claimed, was f illed with pornographic 
drawings, communist slogans, descriptions of his ambushes on Dutch 
soldiers and expressions of his frustration at not being made an off icer in 
the Dutch army. Ulrici referred to Princen as “a prick,” using the same term 
to describe Hueting. He opposed any attempt to assassinate Princen during 
his visit to Holland, but admitted that he would love to have kidnapped him 
“and given him a good smack and kicked him out of this country.”
Television
In a criticism of the indifference demonstrated by the guild of historians, Stef 
Scagliola has written that journalists, especially f ilm-makers, “had become 
interested in the war experiences of veterans and made up for the lack of 
interest of historians.”199 In 1989, 20 years after he had presented the famous 
Hueting interview, Herman Wigbold was involved in making De Kampong 
198 Joeri Boom and Paul Rubsaam, “De Princenjagers,” De Groene Amsterdammer, 16 August 1995.
199 Scagliola, “The Silences,” 20.
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staat in brand (The kampong is on f ire). He claimed his objective was not 
only to show what went wrong in Indonesia, but also what the average 
soldier had had to endure. He added that soldiers were not responsible for 
the terrible violence, but the politicians who had sent them to f ight.200 The 
Leeuwarder Courant mentioned some veterans of the conflict had expressed 
their concerns, but that Wigbold did not expect the documentary to cause 
a great deal of controversy.201
The 90-minute f ilm showed brief images of actual f ighting, including 
dead and wounded. Soldiers told of killing and being injured, taking part 
in executions, witnessing hard interrogations.202 Interviewees admitted 
to carrying out excesses that they later regretted. One confessed he saw 
hundreds of summary executions under Westerling, but had no problem as 
it was the only way to restore peace and order. All agreed that the soldiers 
became demoralized, felt betrayed by their political leaders and complained 
that they never received the needed support after demobilization. One 
remarked: “The Netherlands suppresses its defeat in a great silence.” Peter 
Schumacher of the NRC Handelsblad expressed his disappointment as, 
he felt, bearing in mind other documentaries such as Indonesia Merdeka 
(which had just been broadcast for the third time) and “Ons Indië” voor de 
Indonesiërs, and despite the contributions of historian Petra Groen, De 
Kampong staat in brand had little new to offer.203
On the day marking 50 years since the end of World War Two in Asia, 
the commercial television station RTL 5 broadcast a documentary about 
the Dutch massacre in the village of Rawagede. Fassuer’s Excessennota 
of 1969 had claimed that in 1947 the Dutch had killed about 150 f ighters 
in this action and had executed 20 civilians. No prosecutions had taken 
place. As we have already seen, soldiers had spoken of the massacre during 
the making of a 1983 radio programme, but this had not been broadcast. 
Now, De Excessen van Rawagedeh maintained that the researchers of 1969 
had vastly underestimated the number of dead, mentioning a total of 431 
civilians massacred by Dutch soldiers. Journalists spoke of a Dutch My Lai 
massacre.204
200 Hans Visser, “De Kampong staat in brand,” Het Vrije Volk, 8 September 1989.
201 “Documentaire Indonesië pakt kritiekloze pers aan,” Leeuwarder Courant, 8 September 1989.
202 De Kampong staat in brand, RVU, 9 September 1989.
203 Peter Schumacher, “Het wachten is nog steed op de eerste echte f ilm over ‘het Nederlands 
Vietnam,’” NRC Handelsblad, 9 September 1989.
204 Frans van der Waals, “Rawagedeh krijgt contouren van een Nederlands My Lai,” Het Parool, 
10 August 1995.
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The film crew had gone to Rawagede and interviewed five survivors of the 
massacre. It was a piece of sober oral history. However, at only 30 minutes 
in length, and based entirely on eye-witness testimony, Addie Schult of Het 
Parool was not completely convinced.205 Some objected that broadcasting 
a documentary about Dutch military atrocities on the anniversary of the 
Japanese surrender and the liberation of Dutch prisoners was disrespect-
ful.206 However, many found the new findings convincing and disturbing.207 
Some correctly pointed out that this might have legal consequences, leaving 
the Dutch government liable to paying compensation.208
Tom Verheul’s Tabee Toean: Op patrouille in Nederlands-Indie (Tabee 
Toean: On patrol in the Dutch East Indies) was released in cinemas on 
17 August 1995, to coincide with the anniversary of the Declaration of 
Independence of 50 years earlier. The following year it was televised twice 
and again in 2000. Verheul built his f ilm around interviews with f ive Dutch 
veterans. Using De Graaff’s format of the pilgrimage, in which the old warrior 
returns to the scene of trauma, he brought four of them back to Indonesia, 
where they narrated their stories. Like Kiers’ Indonesia Merdeka, Verheul 
included interviews with Indonesians, describing their attacks on Dutch 
soldiers and on fellow Indonesians.
The encounters between the Dutch and Indonesian veterans provided the 
f ilm with poignant scenes. A Dutch soldier returned to the village where he 
killed an innocent man, met the man’s family and learned his name. Another 
met a woman who survived an attack on a village that he had been a part 
of. Accompanied by her, he laid f lowers at a monument commemorating 
hundreds of villagers killed when the Dutch unleashed over 3,000 grenades 
into the village. We hear of prisoners being killed routinely and villages 
burnt. The SS are mentioned more than once. One veteran, stumbling over 
his words, says that all excesses should be brought into the open, but admits 
that he still f inds it diff icult: “In guerrilla warfare there are no rights,” he 
says. He admitted that he has wrestled his entire life with his memories.
In an interview in Vrij Nederland, Verheul claimed that he had wanted 
to make a f ilm about ordinary men who had gone to f ight for noble reasons 
but were caught in a spiral of violence. He wanted to f ind out “how our lads, 
our fathers, brothers, uncles and neighbours, behave once they become a 
205 Addie Schult, “De excessen van Rawagedeh,” Het Parool, 15 August 1995.
206 S. Paul, letter to the editor, Het Parool, 22 August 1995.
207 “Massamoord op Java in 1947 onthuld,” Trouw, 9 August 1995; “Commentaar: Rawagedeh,” 
Trouw, 11 August 1995; Marc van den Eerenbeemt, “Een sobere getuigenis van militair ingrijpen 
in 1947,” De Volkskrant, 15 August 1995.
208 Kees Schuyt, “Vergeven en vergeten,” De Volkskrant, 21 August 1995.
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part of an army of occupation.”209 Pierre Heijboer wrote that it was clear 
that “small excesses” like the shooting of a few prisoners had been the 
most normal thing in the world.210 Pieter Kottman compared what he saw 
in Verheul’s f ilm with the atrocities taking place in Yugoslavia during the 
1990s.211 Tabee Toean, which had received f inancial assistance from the 
Foundation for Veteran’s Services, was widely and positively reviewed and 
has had a long afterlife. It formed an important element in an exhibition at 
the Museum of the Dutch Resistance in Amsterdam in 2016.212
When considering the Hueting interview and the many television 
documentaries, we must agree with f ilm historian Chris Vos: “If, in the 
Netherlands, a collective repression exists regarding the crimes that were 
committed in Indonesia, then one cannot blame the television for this.”213 
We can hardly give responsibility to novelists, including some veteran 
novelists, or print journalists. That leaves historians.
The Guild Stirs
In the early 1990s, Rudy Kousbroek argued that a social discussion on the 
f inal years of the colony had been going on for 25 years, but the group who 
remained silent were historians, hidden behind “scrupulous neutrality.”214 
This was not quite accurate. As we have seen, historians like Jan Bank 
had produced carefully researched monographs, focused on politics and 
diplomacy. In 1988, another outstanding monograph was published, marking 
a new, international approach.
J.J.P. de Jong
Joop de Jong was the head of the Indonesia division at the Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs in The Hague. For years, he spent his free time working on 
209 Ingrid Harms, “Veteranen oog in oog met hun Indië verleden,” Vrij Nederland, 5 August 1995.
210 Pierre Heijboer, “Neerknallen van gevangen peloppers was normaal: Indië-veteranen 
vertellen in f ilm over moorden,” De Volkskrant, 5 August 1995.
211 Pieter Kottman, “Het kleine verschil tussen pijnlijk en hartverscheurend,” NRC Handelsblad, 
16 August 1995.
212 “Koloniale oorlog 1945-1949. Gewenst en ongewenst beeld,” Museum of the Resistance, 
Amsterdam, 26 November 2015-3 April 2016.
213 Chris Vos, “Televisie is niet debet aan verdringen van oorlogsmisdaden,” NRC Handelsblad, 
30 May 1994.
214 Rudy Kousbroek, “De diachronie van de doofpot,” NRC Handelsblad, 29 April 1994; see also 
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a PhD dissertation, analysing the web of negotiations between the various 
stakeholders in the run up to the f irst “police action.” Its publication met 
with a positive reception. As the reviewer in the NRC Handelsblad put it, 
De Jong had studied the 7,500 pages of the mammoth Officiële Bescheiden 
betreffende de Nederlands-Indonesische Betrekkingen 1945-1950, explored 
archives in four countries, interviewed 34 Indonesian nationalists and 
produced a “historical tour de force” of 300,000 words that, despite being 
“brilliant,” also tended to put one to sleep.215
De Jong attacked foreign historians for tending to see the Dutch as 
intent on a war of colonial reconquest. He claimed the Dutch objective 
was never to reinstitute colonial authority.216 De Jong argued that many 
shared responsibility for the outbreak of violence. For instance, Japanese 
inaction and a number of British errors by September 1945 (71-85). During 
the years from 1945 to 1947, the Dutch made mistakes, but also showed a 
willingness to compromise (211-214). However, the arrival of large numbers 
of Dutch troops from 1946 onward aggravated a dualism in Dutch policy, 
with the militant wing of the Catholic People’s Party (KVP), together with 
the military leadership opposed to the leadership of Van Mook in Batavia 
(250-253). Party politics within the coalition government led to “cloak and 
dagger” scenes in The Hague (289).
De Jong argued that the Dutch went to great lengths to avoid the outbreak 
of warfare in the summer of 1947 (383-400). He concluded that British policy 
in India was no better than Dutch policy in Indonesia, as British policy 
amounted to the abandonment of India while the Dutch refused to abandon 
their colony, due to a sense of duty (410-411). In his concluding remarks, he 
maintained that the discussion between the Netherlands and the Republic of 
Indonesia of 1945-1949 was “purely about the manner in which decolonization 
would take place” (423-424).
De Jong referred to the years from 1945 to 1949 as “a discussion,” 
unremembering that it was a war (423). His representation of the years 
from 1945 to 1947 offered a tapestry of intricate negotiations between a 
variety of actors – diplomats, politicians, military leaders, revolution-
ists. His greatest innovation was to complicate the representation by 
revealing how the British, Indonesians, Japanese, Americans and Dutch 
were entangled in a web of mutual responses. Furthermore, despite the 
best intentions of Dutch diplomats in Batavia and nationalist leaders 
215 Michiel Hegener, “Nakaarten over de boedelscheiding in de Oost,” NRC Handelsblad, 
14 January 1989.
216 De Jong, Diplomatie, 10, 116.
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of Yogyakarta, peace was sabotaged by politicians in The Hague and 
revolutionary cadres. All would have been well, according to the diplomat 
De Jong, had politicians, soldiers and revolutionaries not interfered with 
the work of the diplomats.
As a histoir événementielle, De Jong’s minute examination of two 
years of negotiations never reveals what motivated the Indonesian 
revolutionaries. The reviewer in Trouw summarized De Jong’s thesis: 
negotiators failed to achieve a settlement because of the “force f ields” 
behind both sides.217 The reviewer never questioned what motivated 
these force f ields. Het Parool summarized de Jong’s thesis as being that 
the outbreak of war was the result of a series of unfortunate blunders 
by the Dutch, English (sic) and Americans.218 The Marxist Joop Morriën 
argued that one can never narrate the true course of events by giving 
an almost day-to-day account, for something is always missing.219 P.J. 
Drooglever praised De Jong’s “outstanding book” while criticizing De 
Jong for “exaggerating the impact of policy deeds and underestimating ‘la 
forces des choses.’”220 De Volkskrant claimed that the red thread running 
though the book was the powerlessness of the well-intentioned Dutch 
and Indonesian negotiators who tried to reach a diplomatic solution.221 
However, Jan Bank wrote of how he missed any account of the political 
behaviour of collectives and organizations in De Jong’s account, adding 
that De Jong’s constant criticism of politicians in The Hague betrayed a 
lack of compassion.222 Somehow, all of these commentators miss another 
shortcoming of De Jong’s work. As Anne-Lot Hoek has argued, rather 
than analyse the f ighting that constitutes a war, “academics preferred 
to focus on safer issues like the politics of decolonisation.”223 De Jong’s 
representation of a war of decolonization lacked the essential aspect of 
a war – the act of killing.
217 “‘Achterbannen’ in Nederland en Indonesië wilden geweld,” Trouw, 2 June 1988.
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P.M.H. Groen
In 1987, Petra Groen co-edited a volume of essays on the Dutch “police 
actions.” With one exception, none of the essays dealt with actual f ighting.224 
Groen, together with J. Zwaan, published a photographic book on the war of 
decolonization in 1989. The collection included images of Dutch soldiers in 
action as well as photographs of Dutch soldiers with Indonesian prisoners.225 
Of the 166 photographs in the collection, only one showed a dead body (50). 
Four showed Dutch soldiers shooting, but the targets are invisible (30, 35, 
36, 39). The only photograph showing physical contact between a Dutch 
and Indonesian soldier, showed the former giving f irst aid to the latter (37). 
The collection continued the tradition of representing war without warfare.
In 1992 Groen co-wrote Inzet in Nederlands-Indië 1945-1950. It gave an 
account of the measures taken by the Dutch to suppress Indonesian national-
ism, arguing that the Japanese used the nationalist leaders for their own 
ends.226 Groen and Staat admitted that the Dutch used contra-guerrilla 
warfare, which meant using hard methods against those unwilling to co-
operate. Then they repeat, almost word for word, a sentence from Groen’s 
1991 PhD dissertation, that members of the special forces and intelligence 
services did not shrink from using excessive violence (45). A photograph of 
the “notorious” Captain Westerling is included (48). This suggests that the 
only victims of Dutch hard methods were those who refused to cooperate 
and that the violence had not been indiscriminate. It also suggested that the 
use of excessive violence was the monopoly of Westerling’s special forces 
and the intelligence services.
The authors mentioned that Dutch soldiers visited “native prostitutes,” 
but pregnancies, children and sexually transmitted diseases were passed 
over in silence (53). They pointed out that veterans were not supported 
suff iciently when they returned to civilian life and that the population paid 
little attention to their stories (62). They did not point out that historians 
ignored the veterans, too. They added that veterans today are disturbed by 
talk of violent excesses (64).
Groen’s most signif icant work, the result of years of archival research, 
was her 1991 PhD dissertation. In her introduction, she argued that the 
historiography of the conflict had created a paradox – on the one hand, 
many veterans of the forgotten army had written memoirs based on their 
224 The exception was De Moor, “Het Korps,” 121-143.
225 Zwaan and Groen, Oorlog, In action: 30, 35, 36, 38, 39, 40. With prisoners: 35, 47, 48.
226 Groen and Staat, Inzet, 12-16.
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experience in the f ield, while, on the other hand, professional scholars (i.e. 
the historical guild) had all but ignored the military aspect of the conflict. For 
decades historians had focused exclusively on the political and diplomatic 
aspects of the conflict.227 She hoped to rectify this.
It was a brilliant piece of work, providing in-depth analysis of Dutch 
military strategic policy during the war. Thoroughly researched and closely 
argued, it offered a compelling thesis, that the military leadership under 
Spoor, blind to the strength of the nationalist movement, produced a strategic 
policy that was no more than “a castle in the sky” (289). What had permitted 
Spoor to follow this catastrophic policy had been the increased influence 
of the Catholic party in the Dutch coalition cabinet (272, 276). She provided 
evidence that the military leadership as well as the right-wing politicians 
had vastly underestimated the depth of support among ordinary Indonesians 
for the nationalist cause.228 This was combined with a vast overestimation 
of their own military offensive capacity (233-136).
Groen’s focus was Dutch military strategy, but she also used Indonesian 
sources and occasionally focused attention on nationalist planning, motiva-
tions and actions (189-199). She made a partial attempt to measure the 
numbers killed during the f inal year of the conflict, including Indonesian 
victims (259-260). Her work was the f irst of its kind, and punctured a 
number of myths. Her outstanding achievement had been to make it no 
longer possible to believe that the Dutch had lost their colony to a small 
pro-Japanese clique simply because their allies and the United Nations had 
betrayed them. Furthermore, she showed that the Dutch aim in 1945 was to 
reconquer their colony totally and liquidate the Indonesian republic. Only 
gradually, during 1946, did The Hague compromise somewhat, but the aim 
remained a partial decolonization only (267-275).
We must remember that it had already been suggested in a radio pro-
gramme in 1979, Daar werd iets grootsch verricht, that Spoor had influenced 
the decision to wage war. Furthermore, Groen’s focus was limited to analys-
ing the creation, implementation and effect of military strategic planning. 
Logistics, statistics, maps, reports, discussions, and timelines – this book 
offered an outstanding representation of the business of warfare, but with 
little representation of the reality of war in the f ield. When Groen described 
war, it was in leaden prose: “During the Dutch breakthrough and advance, 
heavy f ighting broke out in a number of places. The Indonesians always 
came out worst” (103) and “two Dutch combat groups in south-east Tapanoeli 
227 Groen, Marsroutes, 11-12.
228 Ibid., 56, 74, 177, 184-185, 196-198, 200, 215, 233-236, 282-289.
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encountered […] roadblocks and resistance. The last was overcome with air 
support” (188). Her account of the British assault on Surabaya in 1945, which 
cost the lives of thousands, consisted of a single sentence: “In Surabaya the 
5th Division and the remainder of the 49th Brigade, supported by air forces, 
managed to take the city from the republicans, step by step” (41).
Trouillot has argued that the naming of a fact or the choosing of a 
term by historians is often disguised as an innocent act, but it is always 
a “narrative of power” that sets up a “f ield of power.”229 By 1992, the term 
“war crimes” was commonly used by journalists. Groen studiously avoided 
it. Indeed, she avoided the term “war,” preferring the neutral “conflict” 
and even “police action.” Her discussion of the use of excessive violence is 
minimal. Groen upheld the rule, described by Scagliola as “avoid sweeping 
statements” and by Kousbroek as “scrupulous neutrality.” Regarding the 
hypothesis that the Dutch engaged in a military contra-terror policy, 
Groen concluded: “Based on the available source material it cannot with 
certainty be proven if this hypothesis is correct,” adding that research 
shows that “the KST [Korps Speciale Troepen (Special Troops Corps), special 
forces under Westerling] and the intelligence services did not shrink from 
using excessive violence, even against the civil population” (213). This is 
the sole, indirect, reference to Westerling. She admitted that commanders 
received orders to use “hard” methods, but added that “summary executions 
remained forbidden” (117). She exhibited no curiosity as to whether this rule 
was followed, ref lecting an attitude that Kousbroek described – “typical 
Dutch formalism. […] It was not what was asked. Why should we look 
further for injustice?”230
Groen argued that there “had never been a declaration of war.” Although 
we use the term “colonial war” in the 1990s, at the time, the majority con-
sidered “police actions” to be appropriate.231 Groen seemed to be saying 
that “police actions” is a suitable term (it is the title of her book from 1987) 
but on the other hand, she (reluctantly) admitted that we can now use 
the term “colonial war.” If we are allowed to apply the term “colonial war” 
retroactively, then why cannot we use the term “war crime” retroactively?
On television in 2015, Groen argued that the historian has to maintain a 
middle position between veterans and those who claim that war crimes were 
widespread. However, there is no logical reason why truth should be in the 
middle. Groen contradicted her own position, admitting that she realized 
229 Trouillot, Silencing the Past, 114-115.
230 Interviewed in Meijer, Oostindisch, 201.
231 Petra Groen interviewed in ibid., 114-115.
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that “in a scale larger than we actually thought, there had been, shall we 
say, violations of the laws of war, so, excessive violence or war crimes.”232 In 
an article in 2013, Groen proposed that there was now a consensus among 
historians regarding “the violent character of the colonial state.”233
This was a work clearly created from inside the guild. Groen was employed 
by the Historical Section of the Royal Netherlands Army (who owned the 
copyright of the book) and it was defended as a PhD thesis at the University 
of Leiden. Her doctoral advisor was Cess Fasseur. In her foreword, she 
thanked military historian H.L. Zwitzer and a variety of former military 
off icers from the Dutch East Indies, including F. van der Veen and C.A. 
Heshusius.234 Zwitzer had attacked Loe de Jong in print. Heshusius had 
leaked the infamous Loe de Jong concept text. Van der Veen had written 
the contra-De Jong appendix. Groen herself had advised Loe de Jong to 
forgo using the term “war crimes” for reasons that could best be termed 
legalistic.235 She recommended that De Jong refrain from claiming that 
the Dutch widely used excessive violence, suggesting that more research 
was needed.236
Groen claimed that she is the type of historian “who wants to stay close 
to the facts” and rejects “psychological speculating,” adding: “The fact that 
I did my doctorate with Cees Fasseur maybe plays a role in that.”237 In the 
2015 television interview, Groen admitted that she changed her opinion. Her 
study of thousands of egodocuments from the time and her realization that 
oral history has value, led to a reassessment. She now concludes that off icial 
documents do not reveal the whole truth. Yet Marsroutes en Dwaalsporen 
was based on off icial documents.
This devotion to documents and deliberate avoidance of entanglement 
with political controversies meant that the best work being produced had 
little to contribute to collective remembering. It is an example of what 
Said termed “the powerful cult of professional expertise,” the attitude that 
“you are responsible not so much to an audience in your community or 
society, as to and for your corporate guild of fellow experts.”238 It supports 
Trouillot’s argument: “The traditions of the guild, reinforced by a positivist 
232 Ander Tijden: Onverwerkte oorlog in Indonesië, VPRO, 27 October 2015.
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philosophy of history, forbid academic historians to position themselves 
regarding the present.”239
Experts within the guild’s circle of esteem were pleased with Groen’s work. 
P. Kamphuis had supported Groen during her research.240 He now claimed 
that the top management of the Dutch army “cheered on” her work.241 Joop 
de Jong praised the work as a “powerful, balanced study.”242 Jaap de Moor 
referred to it as “an excellent study.”243 De Moor, like Groen, was working on 
a PhD on the Indonesian War of Independence at the University of Leiden. 
Indeed, he had contributed an essay to the 1987 collection that had been 
co-edited by Petra Groen. The circle of esteem was tight.
Veterans who were disturbed by talk of violent excesses had little to fear 
from the works of Groen.244 She had done an excellent job of demythologizing 
aspects of the war. It would be more difficult to argue that the army had been 
restoring peace and order, but as we already saw in the works of Laurens and 
De Graaff, many veterans had already concluded that they had fought in a 
dirty war, on the wrong side of history. Marsroutes en Dwaalsporen appealed 
to the guild of historians because of its vast research in the archives and 
ocean of facts supported by thousands of footnotes. But it left the experience 
of warfare unremembered and the thorny issue of war crimes excluded 
from scholarly consideration.
A. Alberts
A. Alberts’ 1952 collection De eilanden (The islands) is a masterpiece of 
twentieth-century Dutch literature, each story saturated with a pyscho-
geography in which European restlessness and the hunger to conquer prove 
fatal. The stories indirectly touch upon decolonization. “De jacht” (“The 
hunt”), for instance, has the civil servant narrator claim that Indonesian 
revolts are always led by lunatics, “little messiahs.”245 In this fable, Alberts 
represented colonialism as a matter of measuring, organizing and surveying. 
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240 Groen, Marsroutes, 9.
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The rebel is doomed because the government uses maps, timepieces and 
reason to pin him down and kill him. However, as Alberts’ biographer, Graa 
Boomsma, pointed out, “De jacht” is set during the first weeks of the Japanese 
invasion of 1942.246 This casts a new light on the story. Alberts was saying 
that the Dutch system of control and exploitation, based on surveillance, 
measurement, repression and punishment, was about to be swept away.
Alberts remained obsessed with the memory of his life in the East Indies 
and his time in Japanese internment camps.247 Boomsma’s research revealed 
that Alberts’ contributions to De Groene Amsterdammer during the 1950s 
and 1960s form a consistent critique of Dutch historical indifference and 
ignorance and the common misunderstanding that Sukarno had been a 
Japanese fascist collaborator.248 In 1962, Alberts published a modest memoir 
of his years in the East Indies, expressing his affection for the landscape 
and people of Madura, “the most beautiful island in the world.”249A polemic 
concerning conditions for Europeans in the Japanese internment camps 
broke out between Rudy Kousbroek and novelist Jeroen Brouwers in the early 
1980s, followed immediately by the Loe de Jong controversy. This formed 
the background to Alberts returning, at an elderly age, to the meaning of 
decolonization.250
Een kolonie is ook maar een mens (A colony is only a human) appeared 
in 1989. Alberts argued that any comparison between Japanese intern-
ment camps and German concentration camps was absurd.251 Rejecting 
the view that the Dutch achieved something great in their colony, he also 
denied any need for an apology, because “a colony is also human” (7). He 
argued that the Dutch believed they were following an ethical policy in their 
colony. Nevertheless, the problem was rule by a foreigner, something that 
Indonesians rightfully resisted (33-35). When the Japanese invaded, Alberts 
viewed them as if they came from another planet, but he now recognized 
that the Dutch were the real aliens in Indonesia (71-72). Alberts claimed 
that Sukarno liberated his country (122-124).
In 1992 the organization Collective Promotion for the Dutch Book, which 
had published Hella Haasse’s Oeroeg in 1948, commissioned Alberts to 
write a volume to celebrate Book Week. In Twee jaargetijden minder (Two 
seasons less), he suggested that, 50 years after the Japanese invasion and the 
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effectual end of the colony, there are still those who believe that the average 
Indonesian peasant was lazy and needed the supervision of the Dutch in 
order to work harder.252 Alberts argued that the Dutch aimed at turning a 
profit for Dutch industry, which led to forced labour and punishment for the 
Indonesian peasant.253 He argued against reducing the history of colonial-
ism to stereotypes, like the Orientalist image of the native servant, or the 
“impenetrable Eastern soul,” so popular among colonial representations.254 
Instead, he admitted that the time of colonialism is over, that all that is left 
is memories.255
Alberts’ late works, written during a time of f iercely polemical discourse, 
provided a working through of the loss of the Dutch East Indies, going beyond 
the nostalgia of Dermoût and Nieuwenhuys. Alberts held a mirror to what 
the relationship between the ruler and the ruled had been, and found much 
wanting. The end – decolonization – approaches with the certainty of a 
Greek tragedy. Kousbroek saw this tragic element in Alberts’ representation 
of decolonization. To be born into the colonial elite is fate. Consequently, to 
experience loss and exile is also fate. The Indisch community, the Indonesians 
and the Dutch are participants in a blind process. Those who experienced 
the old days retain memories, but it makes no sense to play the role of the 
victim.256
J.A.A. van Doorn
J.A.A. van Doorn had co-authored the f irst important study of Dutch violent 
excesses. In the coming decades, the sociologist continued to produce works 
on Dutch colonialism in the East Indies. In 1994, his study of decolonization, 
De laatste eeuw van Indië (The last century of the Dutch East Indies), was 
published.
In the introduction, Van Doorn offered remarks on Eurocentric and 
Indocentric approaches to colonial history. He criticized foreign histori-
ans because they refused to see the “problematic sides of an Indocentric 
perspective,” namely, that “native society was […] characterized by stagna-
tion and passivity, unless colonial impulses were active.”257 Furthermore, 
taking an Indocentric approach was impossible because the sources were 




256 Kousbroek, Oostindisch Kampsyndroom, 362-363, 420.
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overwhelmingly Dutch. This was convenient for Van Doorn; he admitted 
his knowledge of Indonesian languages was close to nil, allowing him to 
“choose in this book for a conscious and consistent Eurocentric perspective” 
(15). What De Kadt had described in 1949 as “Dutch smugness” was alive 
and well in Dutch academia.
Van Doorn argued that the Dutch had “sailed a reasonable course” during 
decolonization (262). They ruled over a “model colony” and were set on 
organizing a gradual decolonization process. Alas, it ended in a debacle. 
The reasons, Van Doorn asserted, were the inflexibility of the Indonesian 
republic and the lack of support among the Indonesian intelligentsia for 
Dutch proposals, the inadequacy of the Dutch military, the pressure from 
the international community and the pressure of decolonization elsewhere 
in Asia. Finally, he blamed the increasing interference (bemoeienis) by the 
United Nations (262-263). Foreigners got it wrong twice – interfering during 
the war and later supporting an Indocentric historiography.
The great contribution of Van Doorn’s sociological approach was that 
is counterpoised the approach taken by De Jong and Groen, who focused 
on events and the actions of individual actors. Van Doorn showed that 
personalities counted for little. Instead, he argued that individuals operated 
within a pre-World War Two colonial framework, which exposed their 
inadequacies after the Japanese occupation (264-284). Finally, he argued 
that the afterlife of decolonization had led to the Indisch repatriates and 
veterans being beleaguered by a new, anti-colonial generation, but during 
the 1980s, they had won respect and gained self-confidence (326-327).
The shortcomings of his approach are self-evident – a lack of Indonesian 
sources, a superf icial account of the rise of Indonesian nationalism and a 
top-down approach to analysing colonial organization that ignored “a long 
tradition of hidden and open resistance by the native population.”258
Locher-Scholten was motivated by Van Doorn’s book to pen a reflective 
article entitled “Dutch East Indies and the Collective Memory.”259 She 
recognized that having once felt pain for losing the East Indies, a large part 
of the Dutch public now felt shame. This polarization of emotions repressed 
the historical reality. She noted that in the past quarter of a century, ex-
detainees of Japanese camps as well veterans of the decolonization war and 
Moluccan activists all contributed to bringing the memory of decolonization 
to public attention. She argued that historians can help with the working 
258 Jan Breman interviewed in Meijer, Oostindisch, 149.
259 Elsbeth Locher-Scholten, “Indië en het collectieve geheugen,” NRC Handelsblad, 9 April 1994.
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through of the trauma, adding that Van Doorn’s study should be seen as a 
contribution to that process.
Ad van Liempt
In 1994, Ad van Liempt offered a blow-by-blow account of Dutch negotiating 
in the f inal seven weeks before the f irst “police action” in 1947, covering 
much the same material that De Jong and Groen had provided in their 
works. Een mooi woord voor oorlog (A nice word for war), however, differed 
in style. Van Liempt did not use reference notes, because they lead to a 
“cumbersome interruption of the story.”260 He was not afraid to inject ironic 
asides, anecdotes and personal commentary. Most of all, what differentiated 
his work from the monographs of professional historians is the pace. Van 
Liempt leads the reader through every day of the seven weeks building up 
to war, with generous quotations from diaries, letters, minutes of meetings 
and interviews with some of the major players. The result is dramatic, 
reading like the screenplay of a f ilm. Indeed, it would eventually form the 
basis for a television drama.
Despite lacking references, Van Liempt was at pains to impress upon the 
reader that he had done his homework. He claims to have consulted the 
private archives of nearly all of the prominent leaders.261 But “all” referred 
exclusively to Dutch leaders – no Indonesian archives were consulted. He 
frequently referred to the ninth volume of the Officiële Bescheiden, which 
De Jong had already thoroughly analysed. The anecdotal asides give the 
impression that one is encountering new revelations. We read a lot about 
secret documents and dossiers in archives, though these usually turn out 
to have been published in the Officiële Bescheiden. One such revelation is 
that in July 1947 General Spoor, discovering that the Dutch government had 
postponed his planned military assault, sent to his superiors his letter of 
resignation, which they refused to accept. Van Liempt believed this was a 
crucial move by Spoor in his attempt to ignite a war. Van Liempt described 
the telegram of resignation: “Telegram GB 303. Top Secret.” This gives the 
impression that Van Liempt had seen a top-secret document, but the lack 
of reference notes makes this diff icult to verify. He added, “all the parties 
succeeded in managing to keep Spoor’s threat out of public view, right up 
until today.”262 This is only half-true, for one can find the telegram in volume 
260 Van Liempt, Een mooi, 271.
261 Ibid., 12.
262 Ibid., 235.
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nine of the Officiële Bescheiden.263 Moreover, Joop de Jong had mentioned 
Spoor’s threat of resignation back in 1988.264 Therefore, Van Liempt’s quip, 
“right up until today” seems an exaggeration, especially when we f ind De 
Jong’s book in Van Liempt’s short bibliography and he references De Jong 
once directly.265
Furthermore, in 2012 Van Liempt published Nederland Valt Aan (The 
Netherlands attacks). It was meant to be a revision of Een mooi word voor 
oorlog. In fact, the new work differed little from the 1994 book, except for 
the title. The title corresponds with a television drama that Van Liempt 
directed, based on his 1994 work. The change of title seems to have been a 
commercial decision, repackaging an old book between new covers. However, 
if we go to the section in the “new” book describing Spoor’s resignation, we 
find two changes. Firstly, there is a reference note to the Officiële Bescheiden. 
Secondly, Van Liempt’s questionable claim that this remained hidden until 
his revelation has been deleted.266
Upon its publication in 1994, De Volkskrant ran a front-page article, 
wrongly claiming that the work, based on original archival research, revealed 
secrets never known before about Spoor’s role bringing about the war.267 
Max Palm called it “an intriguing book” that showed the Dutch leaders 
to be an unheroic bunch.268 However, H.L. Zwitzer attacked Van Liempt’s 
simplif ications and use of the “‘good guys’ and ‘bad guys’ procedure.” Zwitzer 
criticized Van Liempt’s cavalier use of sources.269 Months later, the NRC 
Handelsblad published another review, in which Paul Ophey praised how 
the book revealed the complicity of the press, especially De Volkskrant 
and Trouw, in bringing about the war.270 Van den Berg called the work an 
“outstanding, well-written account” based on sources that had been kept 
secret. He added, that of course historians would attack Van Liempt for 
263 “Legercommandant (Spoor) aan chef generale staf Koninklijke Landmacht (Kruls) en 
verbindingsoff icier bij het cabinet van her minister-president (Moolenburgh) 15 juli, 1947.” 
(“Army Commander (Spoor) to Chief of General Staff of Royal Land Forces (Kruls) and Cabinet 
Liaison Off icer of Prime Minister (Moolenburg), 15 July 1947,”) in Wal et al., Officiële Bescheiden, 
vol. 9, 683.
264 De Jong, Diplomatie, 396.
265 Van Liempt, Een mooi, 18.
266 Van Liempt, Nederland Valt Aan, 247-248.
267 Jan Tromp, “Generaal Spoor wilde wat het kost oorlog in Indië,” De Volkskrant, 18 May 1995.
268 Max Palm, “Indië verloren, rampsspoed geboren,” NRC Handelsblad, 10 June 1994.
269 H.L. Zwitzer, “Indië conflict versimpeld,” NRC Handelsblad, 18 June 1994.
270 Paul Ophey, “Pers en politionele acties,” NRC Handelsblad, 1 January 1995.
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his arbitrary quoting from sources.271 In the same newspaper, Jan Greven 
called it “a conceited book” in which the author reduced the events to a 
good versus evil drama.272
1995
The release of the f ilm Oeroeg, and the Boomsma and Princen affairs, had 
extended a public debate that had commenced with the Loe de Jong affair. 
With the 50th anniversary of Sukarno and Hatta’s Declaration of Independ-
ence approaching, 1995 seemed destined to be a year of further memory wars. 
Furthermore, it was planned for Queen Beatrix to visit Indonesia in August.
As already discussed, 1995 marked the end of the Boomsma trial, the 
publication of two of De Graaff’s books, the broadcasting of De Excessen 
van Rawagedeh on television and the release of Tabee Toean in cinemas. The 
year began with the contested memory war showing no signs of abating. Let 
us look at a small sample of newspaper coverage over a period of two weeks 
in January. On 9 January, newspapers reported that Poncke Princen had 
returned to Indonesia.273 The following day De Volkskrant published articles 
on decolonization, including an interview with Princen, an article informing 
readers that parliamentary chairman Deetman had called for a political 
debate on decolonization, and an article from Herman Wigbold, complaining 
that politicians, not the media, were the ones who stif led debate.274 The 
next day the Algemeen Dagblad published an interview with Loe de Jong, 
who claimed it was pointless for the Netherlands now to offer an apology 
for what the country had done to Indonesia then.275 Trouw announced it 
was in favour of a national debate.276 The next day De Volkskrant reported 
that a majority of the population opposed having a national debate.277 The 
Leeuwarder Courant ran an interview with Minister Pronk, in which he stated 
271 Joop van den Berg, “De zeven weken die aan de Politionele Actie voorafgingen,” Trouw, 
12 August 1994.
272 Jan Greven, “De Indische kwestie,” Trouw, 1 October 1994.
273 “‘Ik ben een shock-therapie’: Poncke Princen gaat tevreden terug naar Indonesië,” Trouw, 
9 January 1995; “Poncke Princen bereid tot debat met veteranen,” De Volkskrant, 9 January 1994; 
Edith van Zalinge, “Zuurkool eten en uren praten,” Het Parool, 9 January 1995.
274 “Poncke Princen beschouwt visum als rehabilitatie,” De Volkskrant, 10 January 1995; “Deetman 
bepleit politiek debat over Nederlands-Indië,” De Volkskrant, 10 January 1995; Herman Wigbold, 
“Uitkomst van Indonesië debat staat nu al vast,” De Volkskrant, 10 January 1995.
275 “Prof. de Jong: Excuses zijn overbodig,” Algemeen Dagblad, 11 January 1995.
276 “Commentaar: oproep tot debat,” Trouw, 11 January 1993.
277 “Meeste Nederlanders hoeven geen Indië debat,” De Volkskrant, 12 January 1995.
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that the Dutch “police actions” had been “futile and wrong.”278 On 13 January, 
NRC Handelsblad published an article opposing any national debate while 
Trouw warned that Minister Pronk wished for the government to issue a 
declaration that the Netherlands had fought a crude (“ordinaire”) colonial 
war.279 The following day De Volkskrant ran nine letters to the editor on the 
issue of veterans and war crimes.280 The Leeuwarder Courant published an 
interview with the only still living member of the Dutch cabinet of 1947. 
In a separate article, Bob Kroon wrote that people in Indonesia regarded 
the Dutch as fools for considering an apology.281 Two days later, Elsbeth 
Locher-Scholten called for an end to the simplistic black versus white tone of 
the moral debate.282 Cees Fasseur wrote that the Netherlands made serious 
errors during decolonization, but pleaded for nuanced judgements.283A 
businessman argued that a national debate on decolonization might have 
a negative impact on business with Indonesia.284 A couple of days later, 
newspapers announced that members of parliament had decided not to 
have a debate on decolonization.285 Joop de Jong shared his verdict, that 
the Netherlands “didn’t do such a bad job.”286 Het Parool dedicated a page 
to the work of Louis Zweers, who had uncovered photos of Dutch soldiers 
in action against Indonesian nationalists.287 Het Parool reported that the 
leader of the Green-Left party demanded a declaration that Dutch policy 
had been wrong.288 Throughout these weeks, every newspaper covered the 
Graa Boomsma affair in detail. With this memory war dividing society, it is 
no surprise to f ind historian Vincent Houben referring to the “torn soul” of 
278 Paul Koopman, “Politionele acties fout en zinloos,” Leeuwarder Courant, 12 January 1995.
279 J.L. Heldering, “Een exercitie in zelfkwelling,” NRC Handelsblad, 13 January 1995; “Com-
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280 “Laat ons schoon schip maken met koloniale verleden,” De Volkskrant, 14 January 1995.
281 Paul Koopman, “Mansholt in Indisch boetekleed,” Leeuwarder Courant, 14 January 1995; 
Bob Kroon, “Batikhemd staat veel beter dan boetekleed,” Leeuwarder Courant, 14 January 1995.
282 Elsbeth Locher-Scholten, “Moralisme helpt ons Indië niet verwerken,” De Volkskrant, 
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288 Willem van Toorn, “Onze gemartelde bruid Indonesia,” Het Parool, 23 January 1995.
288 COLLEC TIVE MEMORY AND THE DUTCH EAST INDIES
the Dutch.289 By mid-year, Jan Blokker concluded that decolonization had 
become a channel for national narcissism.290
Ted Schouten’s book Dwaalsporen: Oorlogsmisdaden in Nederlands-Indië 
(Stray tracks: War crimes in the Dutch East Indies) offered little new, being 
based on published cases. His work was indebted to the Excessennota of 1969 
and to Groen’s work. He wrote of “terrorists” being killed in South Celebes.291 
He argued that the Dutch contra-guerrilla war was due to widespread use 
of terror by the Indonesians (121-123). Dutch atrocities were listed without 
comment (123-132, 150-161). The number of victims of the Rawagede massacre 
was wrongly listed as 150 (150). Schouten claimed that the Indonesians 
manufactured incidents as propaganda for the international community 
(131-132). With no references, thin on analysis and lacking any conclusion, 
the book had been put together in haste. Interestingly, the title refers to 
war crimes, but not Dutch war crimes as such. The implication was that the 
Dutch did behave badly, but the Indonesians behaved even worse. That such 
a book could reach publication highlighted that a serious study of Dutch 
war crimes was needed, but none was forthcoming.
In March, De Volkskrant gave a short overview of historical titles published, 
or to be published, in this anniversary year (as in, end of World War Two). 
The list included 46 books on World War Two in the Netherlands, but only 
ten titles with a connection to the “liberation” of Indonesia.292 Of these ten, 
none provided direct analysis of the war of decolonization. For instance, 
Harry Poeze and Henk Schulte Nordholt’s De roep om Merdeka (The call 
for freedom) had a promising title, but was in fact an anthology of 37 short 
Indonesian essays, poems, stories, speeches and pamphlets calling for 
freedom.293 A useful collection, but not a deep analysis of decolonization.
Another was the nineteenth volume of Officiële Bescheiden betreffende 
de Nederlands-Indonesische Betrekkingen. Since the death of S.L. van der 
Wal, the work had been under the editorship of P.J. Drooglever and M.J. 
Schouten and the f inal, 20th volume appeared in 1996. Its origin was inex-
tricably linked with the Hueting interview of 1969 and the publication of 
the Excessennota (republished in 1995, with an introduction by historian Jan 
Bank). In its f inished form, it was a monumental work: 7,000 off icial Dutch 
government documents and 15,000 pages. The f inal volume, according to 
289 Houben, “A Torn Soul,” 47-66.
290 Jan Blokker, “Kanaliseering van een nationaal narcisme,” De Volkskrant, 12 August 1995.
291 Schouten, Dwaalsporen, 99-101.
292 “Etalage,” De Volkskrant, 18 March 1995.
293 Poeze and Schulte Nordholt, De roep.
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one reviewer “reads like an exciting novel.”294 Rereading the entire work, 
Drooglever concluded that the documents revealed that the Dutch of 1945 
were “rock solid convinced” that Indonesia, would remain dependant on 
the Netherlands. Dutch nationalism, concern for their own status and 
business interests, and a strong sense of mission, were forces that shaped 
Dutch policy.295
During his life, Raymond Westerling dreamed of becoming an opera star. 
In 1995, he became the main character in a chamber opera. The author of the 
libretto of Westerling was Graa Boomsma. His purpose was to complicate the 
simplistic narrative by focusing on the perpetrator rather than the victim 
and to leave the audience disturbed.296 The chamber opera premiered 
in Amsterdam in June and ran for four evenings. Reviews were positive, 
agreeing that, by revealing the human rather than the hero, the work offered 
a sympathetic portrayal of a man who, far from being simply a brute, had 
been the tragic plaything of political and military powers.297
The most interesting historical publication of 1995 came from journalist 
Remco Meijer, a collection of eighteen interviews with leading participants 
in the debate on decolonization. It did have blind spots. Of the eighteen, just 
two were women. Seven interviewees were totoks, but none were Indos. Three 
interviewees are veterans, but none could be considered a spokesperson for 
the veteran platform.298 None were from the KNIL. None were Moluccan. 
None were Indonesian.
One concern that emerges from the historians is their annoyance with 
non-academics. Jan Bank expressed frustration that Van Liempt’s work 
made the front page in De Volkskrant.299 (He doesn’t mention that Groen’s 
work had made the front page in Trouw.300) Groen attacked Van Liempt’s 
work for as being simplistic.301 Boomsma, on the other hand, praised Van 
294 Meijer, review of Officiële Bescheiden, 454.
295 Drooglever, “Dekolonisatie,” 466.
296 Cornald Maas, “Al is het maar stil in ieders hoofd,” De Volkskrant, 2 June 1995.
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7 June 1995; Johan Jansen van Galen, “Requiem voor een desperado,” Het Parool, 6 June 1995; Peter 
van der Lint, “Indië zingesprekken,” Trouw, 10 June 1995; Frits van der Waa, “Opera Westerling 
mist conflict,” De Volkskrant, 10 June 1995.
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Liempt’s work.302 Ewald Vanvugt earned the ire of two historians – Fasseur 
called him “a failed writer” and Van Goor exclaimed, “Vanvugt looks for the 
scandal and presents it as a discovery.”303 However, Jos de Beus accurately 
pointed out that amateur historians had “pushed the professional guild 
into the defensive.”304
Despite differences, the interviewees agreed that the nation was gripped 
by widespread moral indignation. Public debate had become polarized 
between contesting collective memories. On the one hand, veterans f ighting 
for recognition, on the other, zealots crying “war crimes.” The historians 
inhabit the uncomfortable middle ground – the sensible person who delves 
into the archives, producing balanced, evidence-based analysis. Bank 
admitted that great work had been accomplished by historians, but, “the 
results seem to not get through.”305 Schulte Nordholt praised the work of 
Van Doorn, but wondered if it would be read.306 Henk Hofland conceded 
that historians produced outstanding studies, but what was lacking was 
“the really great generalist” – someone of the calibre of the great historian, 
Johan Huizinga.307
Outstanding monographs had appeared in the last few years, from Jan 
Bank, Joop de Jong and Petra Groen – but all were written for the circle 
of esteem within the guild. Such works seldom appeared in paperback. 
They had an afterlife; they were collected in academic libraries and 
footnoted in monographs, but they hardly impacted the wider com-
munity, remaining on the periphery of collective memory. It remained 
the works of Van Liempt and Van Dis that sold by the thousands. The 
1960s had commenced with the innovation of television. By the 1980s, 
radio and television journalists had become the drivers narrating the 
history of decolonization. Newspapers paid them widespread attention, 
too. Despite this, historians, through discipline and careful methodology, 
had gained a deeper understanding of the complexities of decolonization. 
But historians found themselves in a dilemma. The contesting of memory 
taking place on radio, television and in newspapers had collapsed into 
a moral contest. Historians like Bank, Locher-Scholten, Joop de Jong 
and Fassuer attempted to insert reasoned argument and complexity 
302 Interviewed in ibid., 177.
303 Fasseur interviewed in ibid., 105; Van Goor interviewed in ibid., 128.
304 De Beus, “God dekoloniseert niet,” 320.
305 Interviewed in Meijer, Oostindisch, 86.
306 Interviewed in ibid., 139.
307 Interviewed in ibid., 171.
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into public discourse, but they lacked the privileged position that Loe 
de Jong had had in the early 1960s. To be heard, they would have to f ind 
a new Huizinga.
Many Dutch newspapers marked the 50th anniversary of the Declara-
tion of Independence in August 1995. The Haagsche Courant published a 
supplement on the topic, including an interview with a former member of 
the KNIL entitled “My War Is Not Finished.”308 He told the journalist how 
he had seen terrible things: “[P]eople shouldn’t accuse us of war crimes. 
What we did was simply a reaction to the actions of the Indonesians.” He 
concluded: “just like the Dutch who fought against the Germans, we fought 
for the same queen, the same flag and the same ideals.” The supplement 
included a profile of one of the 25,000 volunteers in the Dutch army. He told 
his interviewer: “I never talk about the Indies, mainly because no one ever 
listens.”309 The title of the article, “The People Must Know Why,” emphasized 
how veterans believed the government had betrayed them, but also the 
people and historians, who seemed disinterested.
A few days after the anniversary, Queen Beatrix arrived in Indonesia 
for an off icial state visit. The Dutch government, giving in to pressure 
from veteran groups, had timed her arrival so that she would not have 
to acknowledge 17 August as the day of Indonesian independence. At an 
off icial state dinner, the queen gave a speech that for months had been 
the source of controversy. Would she acknowledge that the Dutch had 
been on the wrong side of history? The queen had penned her own speech 
but had listened to the advice of three historians – Jan Bank, Henk Wes-
seling and Cees Fasseur.310 The speech, delivered in perfect English before 
General Suharto and Indonesian dignitaries, was broadcast live on Dutch 
television.311 The crucial sentence was: “When we look back at that time 
which now lies almost 50 years behind us, it deeply saddens us that so 
many died in that struggle or had to bear its scars for the rest of their 
lives.” She had avoided recognizing that Indonesia had become a sovereign 
state on 17 August 1945. Likewise, she had avoided apologizing for Dutch 
wrongdoing. However, the Dutch head of state had expressed sadness for 
the lives lost and destroyed by the war of decolonization. The following 
day, Dutch newspapers reported that parliamentarians had been satisf ied 
308 Frank Hitzert, “Mijn Oorlog Is Niet Afgelopen,” De Haagsche Courant, 12 August 1995.
309 John Stael, “De Mensen Moeten Weten Waarom,” De Haagsche Courant, 12 August 1995.
310 Jan Tromp, “Beatrix ‘droevig’ over littekens dekolonisatie,” De Volkskrant, 22 August 1995; 
Fasseur, Dubbelspoor, 223.
311 It can be viewed on YouTube: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=PQJ-qsTVSEs, accessed 
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because her speech had been “balanced,” a virtue held in high esteem by 
parliamentarians.312 And, as we have seen, a virtue held in high esteem 
by Dutch historians.
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The press initially collaborated with the authorities by representing a 
sanitized war. Until the late 1960s, the press exhibited indifference when it 
came to decolonization. With the Hueting interview of 1969, television, as 
well as radio, provided veterans a platform to represent their experiences. 
Literary works for the most part provided nostalgic memories of loss. How-
ever, Moluccan activists as well as postmemory novelists problematized 
unremembering during the 1970s and 1980s. De Jong’s work of the late 1980s 
broke the silence of the historical guild. By the mid-1990s the collective 
memory of decolonization had become highly contested. Today, with the 
legal courts writing history, historians seek to reclaim the initiative of 
undoing the decades of unremembering of previous generations.
Keywords: collective memory, Hueting interview, unremembering, 
decolonization, Dutch East Indies
The years from 1945 to 1995 saw various tendencies in Dutch culture in (un)
remembering decolonization. Off icial media initially collaborated with 
military and governmental authorities by reporting a war that was not a 
war. The military authorities generated a f iction that represented the war as 
a massive humanitarian project. The f iction was distributed by a complicit 
press and consumed by a compliant public. This was further supported by 
the self-image of a benevolent Dutch power attacked by Japanese collabora-
tors and betrayed by ignorant, interfering foreigners. Counter-memories 
were sidelined as extreme and unpatriotic. This non-critical approach was 
maintained for some time.
Nostalgic remembering served a pragmatic function, helping an Indisch 
identity to thrive in exile. This remembering was not entirely reaction-
ary. It was not directed towards restoring colonial power, except by an 
archconservative fringe. Instead, nostalgia provoked a reflection upon what 
it meant to be Indisch, in an attempt to salvage a collective memory from 
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pre-war times. Nevertheless, this nostalgia was a form of unremembering 
as it eclipsed rather than confronted the pain of decolonization and failed 
to account for the historical rupture that was decolonization.
Throughout the 1960s, the press, for the most part, exhibited passiveness 
and disinterest when it came to the war of decolonization. Reviewers of 
the f ilm The Battle of Algiers demonstrated an unwillingness or a lack of 
imagination when it came to drawing parallels between the French in Algeria 
and the Dutch in Indonesia. Reviewers of Paul van ’t Veer’s De Atjeh-oorlog 
demonstrated a similar lack of imagination when it came to drawing parallels 
between the brutality of a Dutch war of colonial conquest and that of the 
war of decolonization.
However, the new medium of television provided a platform in which 
former conscripts, rather than political leaders or professional historians, 
stimulated a new discourse. Loe de Jong’s early work on television helped to 
create the collective memory of the Dutch as plucky heroes in the face of Ger-
man barbarism. The Hueting interview of 1969 clearly was a breakthrough. 
However, the official inquiry that followed and the massive project to publish 
off icial documents, furthered the process of unremembering. From the 
early 1970s onward television, radio and newspapers allowed a minority of 
veterans to articulate memories of excessive violence.
Veterans also authored a variety of f ictionalized memoirs that revealed 
the “dirty war” in all of its brutality. There was no cover-up. Ironically, the 
motivation for many veterans of “the forgotten army” was for their efforts 
to be remembered and acknowledged. They hoped to end their liminal 
existence by seeing their experience integrated into the collective memory 
of the nation. Instead, they were increasingly dismissed as war criminals.
Novelists provided f ictional memoirs focusing on loss and nostalgic 
rememberings, but during the 1980s, a second generation of postmemory 
novelists and political activists problematized the act of unremember-
ing, sometimes highlighting the dilemmas of postcolonial hybridity. The 
postmemory violence of young Moluccans during the 1970s can best be 
understood as actions against unremembering.
Academic historians mainly avoided the topic. The virtues promoted by 
the guild included cultivating a balanced judgement, maintaining off icial, 
legalistic terminology, avoiding sweeping statements of any sort and refrain-
ing from speculation and the making of controversial claims. Hence, we f ind 
Dutch military historians at the centre of the guild in the 1990s maintaining 
the f iction that the war was a series of short “police actions.” Postcolonial 
insights and methods had made few inroads among practitioners of Dutch 
colonial history by the mid-1990s.
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New media in the form of television had democratized the debate from 
the late 1960s onward. By the mid-1990s, this had meant that decolonization 
had become a site for publically contested memories. Legal cases involving 
Loe de Jong, Graa Boomsma and Poncke Princen were widely covered in 
the media, leading to an increasingly polarized debate. Democratization 
confronted historians with a dilemma. Jan Bank, Joop de Jong and Petra 
Groen all participated at public events – exhibitions, readings, discussions 
and documentaries. Nevertheless, the new stridency of tone in the public 
debate was not something that scholars had been trained to deal with. If 
they did not emerge wholeheartedly from their circles of esteem, they ran 
the risk that they would be drowned out by the increasing cacophony of 
voices. Yet, the virtues of balance and avoiding sweeping statements would 
be in danger of being lost if they fully entered the fray.
In my view, the most important catalysts for undoing the work of un-
remembering came from documentary makers, like Joris Ivens, Herman 
Wigbold and Roelof Kiers, from veterans like Job Sytzen, Joop Hueting 
and Ben Laurens, from novelists like Beb Vuyk, Marion Bloem and Graa 
Boomsma. Despite some notable exceptions, historians lagged behind. The 
drivers for remembering decolonization were most often working outside 
the historical guild. Dutch historians contributed to unremembering the 
national past.
Imagine a man who, as a child, had been blinded by a disease. Decades 
pass, the man grows old, but a technological development allows a medical 
intervention that restores his sight. Throughout the passing years, the man’s 
remembering nurtured the image of his youthful visage. Now he calls for a 
mirror. What he sees staring back at him is an alien scarred and wrinkled 
face. Perhaps he wishes himself blind again.
By 1995, the Dutch began to emerge from blindness and peer tentatively 
into the mirror. They had constructed a memory of themselves as an innocent 
and even righteous nation, one that had survived the mutilation of German 
occupation. For decades, a collective memory of themselves as the victims 
of German and Japanese occupations was sustained. It was diff icult to see 
that the victim was simultaneously a perpetrator of injustice. Furthermore, 
Dutch “overseas history” had always been viewed as benevolent.
For many, what was reflected in the mirror was something alien. It was 
diff icult to recognize the nation that had collaborated with military and 
political authorities in a brutal war of colonial reconquest. Perhaps some 
would have preferred to remain blind. Perhaps this explains my friends’ 
reticence to peer in detail into the mirror during our student days in the early 
1980s. Stoking controversy was not the way of the historical guild. Strolling 
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through the hallowed halls of a Dutch university in the early to mid-1980s, 
one was unlikely to encounter any hint of a dirty war fought in the recent 
past. My university days in Groningen (1982-1987) were marked by conversa-
tions more likely to revolve around the rising AIDS crisis rather than the 
rise of postcolonial theory. As the AIDs pandemic grew, colonial historians 
practised safe history. Decolonization remained off the curriculum.
Returning to my mirror metaphor, I imagine that the old man would 
have turned the mirror to the wall. If he were a king, like in a fairy story, he 
would have ordered all mirrors in the kingdom to be destroyed, all mirror 
makers put to death. But life is no fairy story. By 1995, there were too many 
mirrors in the Kingdom of the Netherlands. Destroying them was not an 
option. Silencing the historians, novelists, f ilm-makers and documentarists 
was not an option. And of course, the internet was just making itself felt 
in people’s lives. Soon, the historical guild would have to deal with a new, 
medium and an explosion of blogs and websites dealing with colonialism 
and its (un)rememberings.
We might expect that some sort of synthesis would emerge, creating 
a more complex collective memory. One that would accept the rights of 
the peoples of Indonesia to determine their own future without Dutch 
interference, but would also recognize the Indisch Dutch as being fully 
Dutch, with a colourful and interesting history to be fully embraced by the 
nation. One that would include facing up to the brutality of the war, while 
also acknowledging the suffering of the Dutch soldiers and the wrongs 
done to them. One that would integrate the Moluccan experience into the 
entangled narrative of Dutch colonialism and decolonization. There might 
have been the expectation that debates of the mid-1990s would produce 
some sort of working through. However, history is a perpetual argument 
and the collective memory of decolonization remains contested.
Henk van den Doel’s history of the war from 2000 was the f irst general 
study of the conflict since Loe de Jong. Based on Dutch sources, it did at-
tempt to expand beyond the narrow Dutch perspective.1 Henk Schulte 
Nordholt set a new agenda by laying a signif icant connection between the 
violence of the war of decolonization and the violence of colonialism.2 In 
2002, Stef Scagliola broke new ground with a courageous f irst attempt at 
mapping out Dutch ways of working through the atrocities perpetuated by 
Dutch soldiers.3 Bart Luttikhuis and Dirk Moses introduced a theme issue 
1 Van den Doel, Afscheid.
2 Schulte Nordholt, “A Genealology.”
3 Scagliola, Last van de oorlog.
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of the Journal of Genocide Research in 2012 that focused on Dutch extreme 
violence during the decolonization war.4 It included contributions from 
scholars such as Scagliola, Bijl, Raben and Piet Romeijn.
However, a quarter of century after 1995, the memory of the war remains 
contested. Indonesian activist Jeffry Pondaag, journalist and historian 
Anne-Lot Hoek, lawyer Liesbeth Zegveld, Swiss-Dutch historian Remy 
Limpach and Indo prize-winning novelist Alfred Birney have each played 
important roles in provoking further debate in recent years.5 Limpach’s 
study of Dutch military violence became front-page news.6 However, his 
research took place outside the guild, at the University of Berne, Switzerland. 
Activist historians, many working outside academia, pushed the history of 
unpleasant aspects of Dutch overseas history to the fore. Ewald Vanvugt 
published a long indictment of Dutch overseas crimes. Gloria Wekker ac-
cused Dutch academia of perpetuating white innocence and turning away 
from the sordid episodes of Dutch history. Anousha Nzume argued that 
the majority white population long for an unproblematic history that is 
“gezellig” (“cosy”), but when confronted with the fact of race they fall back 
on a defensive position of white fragility.7
In 2011, nearly 30 years after soldiers, in preparation for the radio series 
De kleine oorlog, had f irst publically admitted to carrying out a massacre,8 
a court in The Hague found the Dutch state guilty of massacring 431 people 
in Rawagede, ordering compensation to be paid to ten widows of victims. 
In 2012, De Volkskrant published front-page photographs of Dutch soldiers 
shooting Indonesians at the edge of a mass grave.9 In 2013, the Dutch 
state was found guilty of war crimes in Sulawesi (South Celebes).10 In 2017, 
the Dutch state was accused of unlawfully killing six Moluccans and two 
4 Luttikhuis and Moses, “Mass Violence.”
5 Paul Doolan, “Response: Rewriting Dutch Colonial Histories,” Imperial and Global Forum 
(blog), Centre for Imperial and Global History, University of Exeter, 12 December 2016, https://
imperialglobalexeter.com/2016/12/12/response-rewriting-dutch-colonial-histories/, accessed 
12 July 2020.
6 Anne-Lot Hoek, “‘Geweld Indië was structureel’: 1945-1949 Nieuw historisch onderzoek 
maakt standpunt over ‘excessen’ Nederlandse militairen onhoudbaar,” NRC Handelsblad, 
14 August 2015.
7 Vanvugt, Roofstaat; Wekker, White Innocence; Nzume, Hallo, 44-48, 109-111.
8 “Ex-trailleurs bekennen: ‘Wij moorden kampong uit,’” Het Vrije Volk, 20 July 1983.
9 Lidy Nicolasen, “Eerste beeld van executies in Indonesië,” De Volkskrant, 12 July 2012.
10 Paul Doolan, “Dutch Imperial Past Returns to Haunt the Netherlands,” Imperial and Global 
Forum (blog), Centre for Imperial and Global History, University of Exeter, 6 April 2014, https://
imperialglobalexeter.com/2014/04/06/dutch-imperial-past-returns-to-haunt-the-netherlands/, 
accessed 20 July 2020.
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hostages during the military assault that ended the train hijacking in 1977.11 
Such developments contributed to King Willem-Alexander apologizing in 
2020 to Indonesia for the Dutch use of excessive violence.12
As Martijn Eickhoff argues, while atrocity photographs as well as the legal 
judgements in The Hague brought the war of decolonization to public atten-
tion, historians played a negligible role in all of this. During the Rawagede 
debate, it was “lawyers, politicians, activists, journalists, documentary 
makers, survivors and their relatives,” who set the tone, and not historians.13 
Nicole Immler and Stef Scagliola recently concluded that while the numbers 
of scholars who published on the issue was “limited,” the court ruling of 
2011 meant that the situation “changed entirely,” with the ruling producing 
not only a new legal reality but also a new sense of “historical reality.”14
A problem emerges when a legal court begins to write history and creates 
a dichotomy dividing the accuser and the accused, the victim and the 
perpetrator, the innocent and the guilty. Manichaeism makes for bad 
history. A promising way out of this simplif ication is to follow the suggestion 
of Raben, to engage in “a transcolonial” approach that would emphasize 
the entanglement of the various historical forces and actors and avoid the 
“binary opposition between the dominator and the dominated.”15 Similarly, 
Susan Legêne, when considering the “colonial aphasia” of the Netherlands, 
argues that “we need to critically reflect on how historians have contributed 
to this.” She goes on to call for an approach to the history of imperialism 
“that does not necessarily take the nation, or even Europe, as its frame of 
reference.”16 The call for an entangled history that is transcolonial and 
transnational seems promising. Indeed, in November 2020 an example of 
such an entangled history was published. Rescaling the narrative by using 
oral histories as well as traditional research, Revolusi: Indonesië en het 
onstaan van de modern wereld (Revolusi: Indonesia and the creation of the 
modern world) is a work that combines multiple perspectives and embeds 
the Indonesian War of Independence in a global context. It is written for 
11 Paul Doolan, “A Moluccan Victory in a Dutch Court,” Imperial and Global Forum (blog), Centre 
for Imperial and Global History, University of Exeter, 13 March 2017, https://imperialglobalexeter.
com/2017/03/13/a-moluccan-victory-in-a-dutch-court/, accessed 20 July 2020.
12 “Statement by King Willem-Alexander at the Beginning of State Visit to Indonesia,” 
10 March 2020, https://www.royal-house.nl/documents/speeches/2020/03/10/statement-by-
king-willem-alexander-at-the-beginning-of-the-state-visit-to-indonesia, accessed 20 July 2020.
13 Eickhoff, “Weggestreept,” 57.
14 Immler and Scagliola, “Seeking Justice,” 2.
15 Raben, Wie spreekt, 17.
16 Legêne, “The European,” 112, 119.
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a wide audience, has quickly become a best seller and will undoubtedly 
contribute to shaping collective memory. However, this work did not emerge 
from inside the guild. The author is an independent scholar and a Belgian.17
In 2012, Piet Kampenhuis, director of the National Institute of Military 
History, declared that the debate around decolonization had become too 
emotional, describing discussions of massacres as a “commotion” and the 
publication of the photos in De Volkskrant as “hype.”18 He warned that 
bringing the state to court could happen again “if we don’t get the facts 
organized.”19 This suggests that the contamination needed to be quarantined. 
In 2014, the government granted state funding to research the war. A team 
of historians, including Kampenhuis, is presently examining the period in 
order to produce a “def initive” publication. Gert Oostindie is scheduled to 
complete a synthesis of the research in 2022, providing the public with a 
readable history of decolonization. Asked on television why it took nearly 
70 years to start this research, Oostindie commented: “historians have 
great trouble with the role of the activist judge. […] [T]hat is, in fact, not so 
crazy or wrong.” He explained: “It needed time to pass; it needed […] the 
disappearance of a generation of military personnel and politicians.”20 He 
and two other historians argue that repatriates, military veterans, Dutch 
politicians and Indonesian authorities had obstructed investigation of the 
war.21 In other words, they list a variety of constituents, but they omit to 
mention the members of their own profession. Historians are absolved of 
responsibility in a contemporary example of unremembering. The conclusion 
of the present study disagrees.
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